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2ABSTRACT
The Sudan is afflicted by continuous and increasing 
problems of nation-building arising from the significant 
cultural, linguistic, religious and historical diversity 
of its citizens. Decentralisation of government has, of 
late, been identified as a possible solution.
The thesis examines the legal aspects of the policies 
of decentralisation of government in the Sudan from the 
colonial period to the present time. After an historical 
survey of the earlier period, the thesis concentrates upon 
decentralisation policies and programmes implemented after 
the May revolution of 1969. The constitutional provisions 
for decentralisation of government in the constitutions of 
1968 and 1973 are examined, with reference to the earlier 
constitutional arrangements, including those made for 
independence in 1956, which contained no such provisions.
The concept, objectives and history of 
decentralisation of government in the Sudan are also 
examined. At the theoretical level, the types and forms 
of decentralisation generally, are considered. The 
distinction between "delegation" and "devolution" as forms 
of decentralisation are examined. An attempt is made to 
identify the principal motives for policies of 
decentralisation. These include the achievement of 
national unity and the promotion of popular participation 
in government. Some comparative references are made in
!
i
3order to illuminate the important aspects of 
decentralisation. Particular attention is given to the 
problems of implementing decentralisation policies between 
1971 and 1985. The discussion focusses upon: the 
organization of decentralised governments; the scheme of 
power-sharing•between central, regional and local 
governments; the relationship between central and regional 
governments and between regional and local governments.
The financial arrangements for the decentralised 
governments especially their ability to budget and raise 
revenue, and their capacity for effective financial 
management are among the problems discussed. Other topics 
considered include the staffing of decentralised 
governments, problems of physical infrastructure and the 
constant questions of the extent of the central government 
intervention and the role of traditional rulers. The 
character and quality of political support for 
decentralised policies is analysed. The prospects of 
decentralisation in the Sudan are considered in the light 
of these problems and in the context of the latest 
developments. In conclusion, it is submitted that an 
appropriate form of decentralisation of government which 
must involve substantial devolution of powers to the 
regional governments is an essential condition for the 
stability and security in the Sudan. However, recognition 
of this fact accompanied by political compromises are the 
vital conditions without which decentralisation will 
remain incomplete.
PREFACE
This study was inspired by the writer’s experience as a 
Regional State Attorney to the Southern Regional Government 
of the Sudan from 1977 to 1983.
Being the first of its kind, the operation of the 
Southern Regional Government proved most difficult in the 
circumstances of the Sudan where everything was practically 
lacking, ranging from commitment, funds, skilled manpower, 
books and documentary materials. There were even no decided 
cases to be used as precedents.
In view of these shortcomings and the absence of any 
internationally adopted model for decentralisation of 
government, the writer thought it appropriate to undertake 
the research under difficult conditions of little funds and 
political instability.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the lessons drawn from
decentralisation of government in the Sudan will be of
assistance to the future politicians, administrators,
lawyers and academicians within or outside the country
preoccupied with the implementation, or intending to embark 
s
on, decentralisation along similar lines.
Many people have contributed to the completion of this 
work but their names cannot all be mentioned here. I 
cannot, however, help to express my deeply felt gratitude to 
Professor James Read for his undoubtedly able supervision
5and fatherly attitude. I am also thankful to Dr. Peter Slin*o 
who has been been very friendly and ready to assist at any 
time.
It will be noted that the study has heavily relied on 
the works of the Administrative Group at the University of 
Birmingham who undertook field studies and organized 
seminars and colloquiums and published many materials on 
these activities. I am much indebted to them, especially 
Dr. Malcom Norries who kindly gave me a lot of documents 
free of charge.
Finally, I thank my father, Elisapana K. Mulla for his 
untiring moral support and driving force to see this work 
through.
I, however, assume responsibility for all mistakes, 
omissions and critical views expressed.
Richard M. Mulla
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
"Deep seated political problems cannot be 
cured or transformed by constitutions, 
although they can be accommodated or at 
least contained."^
Decentralisation has, since the 1970s, become of 
increasing importance in third world countries wishing to 
accommodate or contain secessionist tendencies and/or 
promote participatory democracy. Among these countries 
are the Sudan, Papua New Guinea, Iraq, Tanzania and 
Zambia, to mention a few. The tremendous resurgence of 
decentralisation in the last decade or so raises concern 
for a wider investigation into the concept, objectives, 
conditions and problems of implementation of the policies 
and programmes thereof. This study, however, confines 
itself to those aspects of the subject which are of direct 
legal concern.
I. DEFINITION, OBJECTIVES AND CONDITIONS FOR 
DECENTRALISATION
The questions addressed here are: what is the 
definition of decentralisation of government? How can it
ii
21
be distinguished from other similar forms of arrangements? 
What are the objectives for decentralising governments and 
how do they relate to the Sudan? What are the conditions 
necessary for the successful implementation of the same 
and how do they affect the Sudan? What are the problems 
faced by developing countries in the process of 
implementing decentralisation policies and programmes in 
the light of Sudan experience.
A. Definitions
So far, no statutory definition has been assigned to 
decentralisation of government by any country. One is 
therefore obliged to consider other definitions offered by 
academicians, politicians and administrators. Not 
surprisingly these definitions have differed in several 
ways, possibly intended to suit their purposes.
1. David K. Hart, in "Theories of Government Related to 
Decentralization and Citizen Participation (1972) wrote:
". .. decentralization entails the delegation of authority 
to subnational entities".
This definition is too limited in scope because it 
omits the other essential aspect of decentralisation 
that is "devolution". Moreover, it fails to explain the 
nature of the delegation, its relationship with
22
deconcentration and how they can be distinguished from 
other forms of decentralisation.
2. Lord Kilbrandon's Royal Commission on the 
Constitution (1973) defined devolution after considering 
the various forms thereof. It concluded that devolution 
was the transfer of power to the regions to determine 
policy on a selected range of subjects, to enact 
legislation to give effect to that and to provide the 
administrative machinery for its execution, while 
reserving to Parliament the ultimate power to legislate 
for the regions on all matters.3 However, this definition 
omits decentralisation by "delegation" where the inferior 
governments execute policies only. Nevertheless the 
definition is far-reaching.
3. In his book, Democracy, Decentralisation and 
Development (1963), Professor Henry Maddick views 
decentralisation as embracing "both the process of 
deconcentration and devolution".^ For him, the 
distinction between the two is that devolution is a 
non-hierarchical concept and is essentially an autonomous 
or separate system involving "the legal conferring of 
powers to discharge specified or residual functions upon 
formally constituted local authority".3 Apart from this 
foregoing general description, Maddick did not elaborate 
on delegation. However, in his report compiled for the UN 
on Decentralisation for National and Local Development 
(1962) Maddick defined decentralisation as, "the transfer 
of authority away from the national capital whether by
23
deconcentration (i.e. delegation) to field officers or by
c
devolution to local authorities or local bodies".
Maddick has therefore drawn an interesting 
distinction between "devolution" and "delegation".
Whereas the former involves the exercise of residual 
powers by locally constituted bodies, the latter confers 
powers on field officers of the same government. However, 
the implications of this distinction are not clear.
4. Mukhtar Allassam also defined decentralisation along 
Maddick's lines when he said it is "the legal transfer of 
powers irrevocable by any other law, to persons elected or
, *7
selected as representatives of the local authority". 
However, it was wrong to say that legally decentralised 
powers are irrevocable by any other law. Parliament can 
make laws revoking the same.
5. As for Phillip Mawhood, the introduction of the term
'devolution' by Maddick and others was totally irrelevant
and confusing. His definition is related to that of
Talcott Parson's levels of social control as given here:
"... The sharing of part of governmental 
power by a central ruling group with
other groups, each having authority
within a specific area of the State. At
the level of 'norms' it indicates the 
existence of formal political structures, 
each covering a defined area, 
representing local interests as well as 
the interests of the central rulers? the 
local share of allocating power is 
protected by the formal as well as by the 
normative rules which are accepted by the 
centre. At the level of 'collectivities 
and roles' it means unit of local 
government in which formal 
decision-making is primarily exercised by
24
locally representative councillors or 
officials."g
However, this definition appears very philosophical and 
too complex. It is thus clear from the examination of the 
above definitions that there is no generally accepte 3 
definition of decentralisation. A definition depends on 
the purpose which it is meant to serve. We must therefore 
offer a simple operational definition in the case of our 
study.
6. Generally, decentralisation is regarded as the 
process by which functions and decision-making authority 
are transferred from the national government to 
sub-national governments or from one sub-national 
government to yet lower one, depending on the tiers of 
government established in a particular country.
Thus decentralisation of government is quite distinct 
from other forms of decentralisation which are:
(i) The establishment of relatively autonomous local
organizations in specific functional areas such as 
parastatal bodies like Development Corporations or 
Service Boards.
(ii) The transfer of Public Service enterprises to
privately-owned and controlled companies - a
process often called "de-bureaucratization" or 
"privatisation".
(iii) The establishment of public organizations for rural 
development such as farmers associations, youth 
clubs, women's organisations, cooperative
25
societies, etc.
The main distinction with these other forms of 
decentralisation is that they are established for specific 
purposes while decentralised governments perform a wide 
variety of functions which are discussed in various parts 
of the thesis.
7. Theoretical Classifications of Decentralisation
"Deconcentration" and "devolution" are more 
theoretical sub-divisions of decentralisation. In 
practice they often co-exist. We shall consider each one 
in turn.
(i) Deconcentration (or delegation)
Deconcentration (or delegation) is the transfer of 
power or functions to local representatives of the central 
government. The concept is hierarchical in that the 
central government delegates authority for the discharge 
of specific functions to its staff who are located in the 
Departments situated outside the Headquarters.
These powers do not involve decision-making but only 
the execution of policies already laid down. They can be 
withdrawn at any time at the will of the central 
government. The field officers must implement decisions
26
taken from the above as they are without altering or
amending them; they being mere agents of those above.
This is the category of decentralisation found in
Tanzania, Zambia and other countries. As Mawhood
concluded on the Tanzanian experiment:
"... although decentralisation this was, 
of course, the well-known formula of 
deconcentration plus advisory committees; 
a reform with little political content."g
Invariably this form of decentralisation strengthens the
grip of central government control over the inferior
governments which is contrary to the objectives of
decentralisation as we shall see.
(ii) Devolution
From the definitions quoted above, devolution accords 
to the inferior government a semi-autonomous existence and 
status independent of the central government. According 
to Phillip Mawhood, a government exercising devolved 
powers can be distinguished by the following features:
(a) It is autonomous or has a corporate status at law, 
with all the legal incidents flowing therefrom.
(b) It has a budgetary capacity, often accompanied by 
its own sources of revenue.
(c) It has a wide range of functions to perform.
(d) It can appoint, recruit, train and discipline its 
own staff, or obtain them on secondment.
(e) It has a decision-making body (appointed or elected 
representatives)
The obvious examples of such governments are the 
Regional Governments in the Sudan, the Provincial 
Governments in Papua New Guinea, the Kurdish Region in 
Iraq and so forth. Yet these characteristics are not 
watertight because the Tanzanian deconcentrated system had 
for example a budgetary capacity, wide variety of 
functions to perform and could make decisions.
8. Classifications of Decentralised Governments
Decentralisation by devolution, however, can be 
broadened to include confederations, federations and 
unitary governments with decentralised system of 
administration.
(i) A Confederation;
A confederation is the union of states whereby the 
legislative and administrative authority of the central 
government is subordinate to that of the confederal 
states. For example in Switzerland, the Central 
Government is subordinate to the "Cantons" (states) . ^
(ii) A Federation;
In a federation, on the other hand, the legislative 
and administrative authority of the central government and
28
state governments are both subordinate to the constitution 
but coordinate to one another. For according to Professor 
Wheare, the federal principle is "the method of dividing 
powers so that the general government and the regional 
government are each within a sphere coordinate and
1 o
independent". In such a situation, the government of 
the region and that of the whole country are "mutually 
exclusive and reciprocally limiting" in the fields of 
power.
However, this study is not concerned with confederal 
or federal governments. It is primarily aimed at unitary 
governments with decentralised systems of administration 
as found in the Sudan, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, etc.
(iii) A Unitary Government with Decentralised System of 
Administration
A unitary government with decentralised 
administration exists where the central government is 
legislatively supreme while the regional governments are 
subordinate to them as already stated. However, two 
patterns of decentralised governments are identifiable 
under this category. Those with mere decentralised 
systems of administration as found in Tanzania, Zambia, 
Ghana and Others; and those with quasi-federal systems of 
government, as the present Regional and Provincial 
Governments in the Sudan, Iraq and Papua New Guinea. As 
already stated, whereas the former exercise deconcentrated
29
powers, the latter enjoy devolved powers which are 
comparably less than those of fully-fledged federal 
governments as we shall see.
(iv) Local Government
Local governments could also be classified as 
decentralised governments. According to Harold F. 
Alderfer, Local Government consists of "all units of 
government under the national level in unitary states and 
under national and state levels in federal systems".^
With the development of quasi-federal systems this 
definition could be modified to read, "and under national 
... regional and provincial levels, in quasi-federal 
systems". However, the general understanding is that 
ordinarily, local governments include provinces, 
districts, sub-districts, municipalities and villages.
But for the definition of decentralisation to be 
comprehensive, it should cover the exercise of authority 
by the traditional rulers as established by their 
respective local systems of administration. Such a 
definition would not therefore be confined to the exercise 
of powers transferred from above only but would also 
include those existing at the lower level too. It would 
eliminate the limitation so far imposed on the definition 
of the concept.
3Q
B. The Objectives of Decentralisation
Decentralisation has several objectives which may not 
all be applicable to a country. So the objectives for 
decentralisation vary from one country to the other 
although some are similar. Furthermore the importance of 
these objectives has varied from the colonial past to the 
post-independence period.
During the colonial era, decentralisation had two 
objectives, maintaining the status quo and providing 
limited essential services to the rural community.
The status quo was to be maintained through the 
"indirect rule" system or "Native Administration" as was 
the case in the Sudan. 'Indirect rule1 was clearly 
intended by the colonial authorities not only to save 
costs and achieve administrative convenience but also to 
maintain the status quos in the colonial societies. Hence 
the general limitation of the powers of the traditional 
rulers to the adjudication of customary law cases.
In response to nationalist movements and widespread 
dissatisfaction with the indirect rule policy, 
particularly among the growing intelligensia, native 
administration was replaced by local administration. This 
limited change in the late 1930s and 1940s established 
local councils intended to provide more services
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than the former authorities did, as well as to accommodate 
the educated class in government - so that "the sons of 
sheikhs and the sons of effendia (educated Sudanese civil 
servants) [could] lie down happily together".^
However, with the issue of the celebrated Colonial
Office Despatch of 1947 directing the establishment of
"efficient and democratic system of local government"^ in
each dependency, decentralisation was reconceived to
achieve several additional objectives, which included the
promotion of democracy and efficiency, as stated by the
Secretary of State Creech Jones:
"I use these words because they seem to 
me to contain the kernel of the whole 
matter. Local because the system of 
local government must be close to the 
common people and their problems; 
efficient because they must be capable of
managing the local services in a way
which will help raise the standard of 
living; and democratic because it must 
not only find a place for the growing 
class of educated men, but at the same 
time command the respect and support of 
the masses of the people.
By the 1960s, the objectives had been widened further to
include the achievement or preservation of national unity.
This was obvious from the statement of the Cambridge
Summer Conference on African Local Government in 1961.
"... Most African countries are not 
homogeneous and contain within them 
potentiallly disruptive minorities. This 
threat to unity is greatly diminished, if 
not entirely removed, by the institution 
of local government in that it provides 
lawful outlet for local interests."^®
Though an accurate observation, the prescription of local 
government proved to be totally inadequate in certain 
cases. As time passed, local governments could no longer
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sustain unity in diversity in sharply divided societies 
like the Sudan, Papua New Guinea, Iraq and others. Hence, 
the introduction of Regional or Provincial Governments in 
these countries. Whether such arrangements are successful 
is the subject of this study.
However, we must examine in detail the current and 
most important objectives of decentralisation. Since the 
1970s, as already stated, decentralisation has aimed at 
defusing the secessionist tendencies and promoting popular 
participation in government. What do these objectives 
mean?
1. The Accommodation of Secessionist Pressures
For some time countries like the Sudan, Papua New 
Guinea and Iraq have been threatened by secessionist 
movements. Whereas the Southern Sudanese attempted to 
secede between 1955 and 1972, the islands of Bougainville 
and New East Brittan declared themselves separate from 
Papua New Guinea at the time of independence in 1975.
Iraq still continues to face a secessionist struggle from 
the Kurds. In view of these secessionist struggles, the 
granting of autonomy to the relevant regions was intended 
to permit diversity in the interests of maintaining the 
unity of the country. However, decentralisation in such 
situations could also be risky if its effect were to 
increase the capacity and will of the secessionist groups 
to achieve their ultimate goal. It is therefore crucial
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to make a careful choice of the powers to be 
decentralised: the allocation of powers between the 
general and regional governments must be well-balanced.
Sometimes it might be more appropriate to 
decentralise powers to smaller regional groupings, so as 
to weaken their combined pressure - a policy of "divide
and rule" which seeks to preserve national unity by
cultivating competitive interests arising from the 
divisions. This was the justification for the break-up of 
the Nigerian States from 4 into 12 in 1967, and further to 
19 in 1976. It was also the main reason for the division
of the Southern Region of the Sudan in 1983. The rescuing
of Regional minorities from majority domination through 
this device accounted only as a secondary objective in the 
case of the Sudan.
Other issues to consider are whether powers should be 
decentralised only to those regions which demand autonomy, 
or to all parts of the country, and, if the latter, 
whether the same form of decentralisation should be 
applied to all the regions.
The Sudan had started with the Southern Region only 
in 1972 but this imbalanced situation was remedied in 1980 
following the establishment of 5 more regions in the 
North. Iraq continues to have only the Kurdish Region and 
the secessionist war is still being fought. Papua New 
Guinea had uniform decentralisation all over the country 
from the start and stability is being maintained. This is
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perhaps an indication of what governments ought to do when 
considering decentralisation.
2. The Promotion of Popular Participation
The promotion of popular participation is derived
from the notion of participatory democracy. Every country
tries, or pretends, to be as democratic as possible, 
including third world countries. It was not therefore 
surprising that the promotion of popular participation was 
equally an important objective for decentralisation.
As stated by Prime Minister Michael Somare of Papua 
New Guinea (1970s):
"My government's policy is generally in 
favour of decentralising power and 
stimulating initiative and a sense of 
participation in the decision-making 
process at all levels in the country.
Thus the promotion of popular participation was an
important objective of decentralisation to the containment
of secessionist pressures in Papua New Guinea.
When launching the most extensive programme of
decentralisation in Tanzanian history in 1972, President
Julius Nyerere declared:
"... in order to make reality of our 
policies of socialism and self-reliance, 
the planning and control of development 
in this country must be controlled at 
local level to a much greater extent than 
at present . . . ".
Similar statements were made by President Kenneth Kaunda
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of Zambia with regard to decentralisation in his country.
"Having attained political independence, 
the people through their party, have 
proclaimed participatory democracy as the 
only political system that could 
safeguard it."2^
He defined participatory democracy as:
"... the type of democracy in which the 
citizens participate not only through 
their freely-elected representatives but 
by their own direct involvement in the 
decision-making process."22
The above quotations show how widely participatory
democracy is regarded as an objective for
decentralisation? in fact it is one of universal
application. However, for participation to be popular, it
must include the urban and rural dwellers, the rich and
the poor, the majority and the minority groups without any
discrimination. It must also amount to actual control and
decision-making by all and not the mere consultation of
some of the people. Whether this is really possible in
the general social, political and economic circumstances
of the third world countries is highly doubtful, as this
study shows.
3. The underlying factor behind the above objectives for 
decentralisation is the promotion of rapid and equitable 
economic development. In this regard, development 
theorists and the International Aid Agencies like the 
World Bank and the USAID have become increasingly 
interested in decentralisation and in particular the 
decentralisation of planning. In 1975 Robert S. McNamara, 
President of the World Bank, said:
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"if governments are serious about 
distributing the benefits of development 
more equitably then experience shows that 
there is a greater chance of success if 
institutions provide for popular 
participation, local leadership and 
decentralization of authority."^^
Furthermore, some policy analysis contend that
"decentralization is necessary to accelerate economic growth
and to spread its benefits to those groups traditionally
24bypassed by economic progress". This is so because it is 
thought that proper and coordinated planning for national 
and sectoral development is the basis upon which the sound 
development of a country depends. In order to do this 
accurately and rally support for the successful 
implementation, the people who best know their needs must be 
involved in the planning process. For, central planning 
has, over the years, proved to be quite ineffective in 
developing the rural areas of the country. It leads to 
over-concentration of powers, authority and resources in the 
centre, and to the neglect of diverse regions. Moreover, it 
is neither flexible nor responsive to the changing needs of 
the community.
In theory, however, decentralised planning cuts through 
bureaucratic red tape, reduces delays in decision-making, is 
innovative, creative and capable of improving coordination 
between various levels of governments. But in order for 
decentralisation to be successful, certain conditions must 
exist or be made to prevail.
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C . Conditions Necessary for the Successful Implementation 
of Decentralisation of Government
What are the conditions which are likely to support the 
successful implementation of decentralisation of government? 
From the following points it will be seen that the most 
important factors involve the striking of an appropriate 
balance between relevant extremes.
1. Political Accord to Decentralisation
The successful implementation of decentralisation 
requires the political concensus of the community to be 
affected by it. So political factors favouring 
decentralisation are vitally important without which the 
operation of a well-designed decentralised system can remain 
stagnant. There has to be widespread political commitment 
to support the policy and programmes of decentralisation 
among both the politicans and the masses.
(i) Political Commitment Among the National Leaders
However, the cases of Sudan and Tanzania indicated that 
there was very limited political support to decentralisation 
among the national leaders in both countries.
Local political support for decentralisation in the 
Sudan was only obvious in the South. The Western and
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Eastern parts of the country were less committed while the
entire central region was hostile to it. Generally,
political support for decentralisation was lacking among the
high level leadership as observed by Rondinelli:
"Despite strong pressure exerted by 
President Numeiri for more than 10 years, 
support for decentralisation remains very 
weak among some military leaders and 
politicians outside his faction of the 
Sudan Socialist Union. Central 
bureaucrats and local elites have either 
resisted the new regulations, or 
attempted to reassert control over the 
decentralised structures."25
Resistance to decentralisation came from the traditional
political parties (the Umma and the National Unionist
Party), which try to maintain as much control as possible
over power. It is the loss of power to the rural areas
that they feared because they would ultimately lose
control over the entire country.
Those of extreme views even suspected that
decentralisation was a secessionist device intended to
divide the country. For example, when President Numeiri
proposed the regionalisation of Northern Sudan in March
1979, the critics contended that it would "jeopardize
national unity". A puzzled participant strongly
commented:
"Decentralisation [that is, the 1971 
decentralisation arrangement] has not yet 
been consolidated and still you talk 
about Regional GovernmentP'^g
As already stated, Tanzania faced similar problems to that
of the Sudan. According to Rondinelli, throughout the
period of decentralisation, intense political pressure had
to be applied by President Nyerere who "pushed, prodded,
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cajoled, persuaded and led the people" towards socialism
and decentralisation. In conclusion on both countries
(Sudan and Tanzania), Rondinelli said:
"Both leaders [Numeiri and Nyerere] had 
to resort to coercion - Numeiri by 
constantly manipulating his Cabinet and 
abolishing those Ministries that opposed 
decentralisation and Nyerere by imposing 
the control of a single political party,
TANU over both the bureaucracy and local 
units of administration."2 Q
Papua New Guinea, however, managed to overcome the 
problem of lack of political support for decentralisation 
soon after the start of its implementation Hence
the relative success of decentralisation in that country.
(ii) Finding a Suitable Role for the Traditional Rulers
Another important aspect of cultivating support for 
decentralisation is to find a suitable role for the 
traditional rulers. In some countries of Africa, 
traditional rulers still play an important role in the 
administrative system. Tanzania was a rare example of the 
countries which successfully abolished Native 
Administration at the period of Independence - 1963.
Nigeria has accommodated the traditional rulers in
the local government system but as separate sub-units.
The 1976 guidelines on Local Government in Nigeria read:
"Nothing in these reforms could be 
construed to mean an attempt at reducing 
or abolishing the traditional functions 
of our Emirs, Obas and Chiefs. On the
contrary, the reforms recognise the 
crucial nature of the position of 
traditional authorities and care has been 
taken to preserve the organic unity of 
our traditional institutions and 
societies."29
However, the establishment of separate councils for
traditional rulers at parallel levels with local
government councils has created competition and clashes
between the two not to mention the excessive expenditure
involved. Nevertheless, the Nigerian government maintains
the same policy.
In Zambia, traditional rulers theoretically appear to
play an important role in State matters. The Zambian
constitution, 1975, provided for the establishment of "A
House of Chiefs" for the Republic composed of eleven
3 0elected chiefs. Their function is to discuss any bills
referred to them or any other matter referred to them by
the President or with his approval. Their resolutions are
submitted to the President who causes them to be laid
31before the National Assembly. Since 1983, the paramount 
chiefs of Bemba and Lozi tribes have been appointed to the 
Central Committee of the Party [UNIP].
Traditional rulers have also been ex officio members 
of the Zambian National Council, the second important 
organ of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), 
which meet every year to debate major government policies. 
In the field of local politics, chiefs are required to 
mobilize the masses by organizing meetings, participating 
during the census periods and campaigning on public
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issues, for example by persuading the farmers to use 
fertilizers. Traditional rulers in Zambia are therefore 
involved in most organs of the government.
Inspite of its importance due to its deeprooted role
in the affairs of the local government councils, the
Revolutionary Government in the Sudan tried to abolish the
role of the traditional rulers in 1971. However, the
attempt was never successful. Assessing the changes in
the local administration shortly after the establishment
of the new councils in 1971, John Howell wrote:
"The picture that emerges is of an 
informed leadership group at the village 
level based on respected familiar 
loyalties ... this group is likely to 
fill any institutional roles that are 
required by visiting government or party 
officials."22
The administrative survey team on Southern Darfur Province
reached a similar conclusion in 1976:
"The Ugada or elders who help maintain 
peace by informal consensus among smaller 
groups within the tribe ... selected for 
their diplomacy and detailed historical 
knowledge of the causes of disputes ... 
should be given formal authority ... to 
continue performing their traditional 
functions."23
Impliedly, they operated informally.
The position of traditional rulers in the south was
similar to those in the North. Malcom Norris of
Birmingham University wrote as late as 1983 that:
"In the South there is a widespread 
acceptance among administrators that the 
influence of traditional authorities and 
chiefs continues to be an indispensable 
element in orderly government."34
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However, despite the failure of the Sudan Government to 
isolate traditional rulers from the local councils, their 
partial exclusion seriously affected the collection of 
revenues as discussed in Chapter 9. Furthermore, the 
general standard of performance of the councils 
deteriorated as people lost confidence in the new rulers.
2. Resource Capacity
The availability of financial and skilled manpower 
resources are crucial prerequisities to the success of 
decentralisation. The decentralisation governments must 
not only receive grants from the central government but 
must also have their own productive sources of revenue.
In addition, they must be free to budget, spend and manage 
their own financial affairs according to the normal 
financial practices and controls. An available supply of 
skilled manpower for the management of the decentralised 
systems is just as important as the financial resources, 
yet so far no third world country has got adequate 
supplies of both. The situation of the Sudan in these 
respects is examined in Chapters 9 and 10.
3. The Structure of Decentralised Governments
The decentralised governments must be suitably 
structured to achieve stability, effectiveness and
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efficiency. Whereas the units of state or regional 
governments must not be too limited to avoid constant 
competition between each or amongst them, multiplicity of 
regions and uniformity of powers are most appropriate.
The regions should have democratically elected assemblies 
with executives responsible to the legislatures.
Local government councils on their part must neither 
be too small nor too large to be viable units. Whereas 
large councils guarantee sufficient population (and local 
resources) and more representation, they may exclude the 
minority from effective participation and may themselves 
be less efficient.
Too small a council on the other hand, is less 
effective for want of adequate population although they 
may more readily provide adequate representation.
The establishment of appropriate machineries for 
coordination, consultation and dispute settlements would 
promote the smooth operation of decentralisation. 
Moreover, decentralisation should not be antiquated in 
structure. It was, however, not until 1980 that Sudan 
began to evolve suitable structures (see Chapters 5 and 
6) .
Furthermore, in defining the powers decentralised to 
regional or local governments, efforts should be made to 
match the needs of the areas concerned with the abilities 
of the respective governments to exercise powers
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effectively. While inadequacy of powers can lead to 
frustration, over-loading can incapacitate. The capacity 
of the governments can be measured through the 
geographical size, population density and resource 
availability of the area concerned.
The definition of the powers of the various 
governments and the relationship between them must be 
detailed and precise to avoid confusion, overlappings, 
conflicts and loopholes. Whereas the central government 
must maintain some degree of control over the lower 
governments, excessive control, giving a dominant position 
to the central government, may frustrate the purposes of 
decentralisation. There must be some constitutionally 
guaranteed machinery for the resolutionof 
inter-governmental conflicts. As will be seen in Chapters 
7 and 8 the Sudan has not yet adopted an appropriate 
design of decentralisation of government due to lack of 
well-balanced and precisely defined powers and absence of 
certain institutions.
4. Administrative Factors
Initial, administrative assistance from the central 
government to the inferior government is important, 
particularly in terms of directives, advice, training and 
so forth.
In his studies on Kenya in 1977, David Leonard found
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that:
"In a decentralised administrative 
structure the centre needs to be every 
bit as strong as a centralized one, but 
the orientation required is one of 
technical services rather than a 
hierarchical control."^
In the Sudan, however, administrative assistance from the
central government to the lower governments existed in
theory but not in practice. This can be confirmed by the
ILO report on Growth, Employment and Equity in the South
in 1976.
"The South will not get far if central, 
regional and local governments are weak 
and ineffective and do little more than 
provide employment for unimaginative 
officials who cannot give the South the 
service it needs and deserves. 36
On the contrary the Central Government was an obstacle to 
the lower governments. For example the Central Government 
was most unwilling to implement Decree 39 which assigned 
revenues to the Southern Region. Consequently, the region 
mobilized negligible amounts under the Decree as examined in 
Chapter 9.
In 1979 the President abolished seven Central 
Government Ministries - Education, Interior, Religious 
Affairs, Youth and Sports Cooperation, Social Affairs,
Health and Construction in order to enable the People*s 
Province Executive Councils to operate properly because 
those Ministries stood in the way of the councils. For 
example, dealings between the councils and the Central 
Government had to go through the said "parent" ministries 
regarding various affairs of the councils. The Provincial 
Commissioners had to be promoted to the status of the
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Central Government Ministers to enable them to discuss 
matters affecting the provinces as equals with the 
Ministers.
Taking the central Ministry of Health as a typical 
example, it maintained only one central store for all drugs 
in the country. It had absolute rights over the 
distribution of the drugs to the extent that some medicines 
remained undistributed for several years, with their period 
of validity often expiring. Conditions in the hospitals 
deteriorated so badly that citizens had to resort to private
07
pharmacies and clinics for treatment.
Furthermore, the attitude of the Central Government
officials were too centrist. Since they were employees of
the Central Government, their loyalty and expectations for
better prospects in terms of promotions and training
remained with the central government. They under-rated and
undermined the role of the local government councils. For
example, following the dissolution of the Social Affairs
Ministry in 1979, as mentioned earlier, a technical officer
was quoted to have said:
"I don't know how I'm going to work in 
the Provinces away from home. The 
Province Commissioners do not understand 
the work of social workers, our efforts 
will be undermined."^q
The capacity for administrative assistance by the central
ministries and agencies to the regions was weak in
Tanzania too. Although most central ministries were
over-staffed, technical and managerial skills were not
well-developed in the lower levels of administration. The
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bureaucracy was unwilling or unable to provide the 
technical personnel and other assistance needed by the 
lower levels. However, the weakness in public 
administration was not as pronounced in Tanzania as in the 
Sudan.
Owing to the effective system of secondment of 
personnel from the Central Government to the Provincial 
Governments in Papua New Guinea, the problem of 
administrative assistance was not so conspicuous.
5. Environmental Factors
Finally, certain geographical and physical 
conditions, like the adequate communication networks and 
organized patterns of settlement, may be valuable factors 
to promote the success of decentralisation. However, of 
all the countries examined, Sudan, Papua New Guinea and 
Tanzania had poor systems of communications. (For details 
see Chapter 10.)
II. THE APPLICATION OF DECENTRALISATION IN THE SUDAN
A. The Size of the Country
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Map I.
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The Sudan is the largest country in Africa; it is 
about one million square miles which is roughly the size 
of Western Europe. Its internal administrative 
boundaries, physical infrastructure and neighbouring 
countries are shown in Map I.
Administratively, the Sudan is divided into nine 
regions including Khartoum, the national capital. Details 
of the regions are as follows:
Req ion Area 
(1,000 
sq. miles)
Popula 
( 000
Northern 477 1,083
Eastern 341 2,208
Khartoum 21 1,082
Central 142 4,013
Kordofan 381 3,093
Darfur 496 3,094
Upper Nile 236 1,600
Baher El Ghazal 214 2,266
Equatoria 198 1,406
Source: B. Yongo-Bure, Background to the Current Economic
Conditions in the Southern Sudan (Halifax: Dalhousie 
University, 1983), pp. 4 and 31 and Bank of Sudan Annual 
Report - 1983, p. 19.
Inspite of its large size, Sudan's population is 
relatively low with a total of 21 million people. That is 
about 4 people to the square mile; of these, two-thirds live 
in the North and the other third in the South. The sharp 
differences between the North and the South are adequately 
presented by Fadlal Ali Fadlal, and Dunstan Wai Mogga. 
Fadlal, a Northern Sudanese, wrote:
"The Sudan is a country of wide
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diversity. There are about 115 
languages, 26 major ones, 56 ethnic 
groups subdivided into 597 sub-groups, 43 
non-Arabic tribes, more than 10 Islamic 
religious sects, numerous non-Islamic 
religious sects and 2 major regions (an 
Arab-dominated, largely Muslim North and 
the Non-Arabic, non-Muslim, physically, 
linguistically and culturally different 
South).
Although Fadlal has accurately described the diversities,
he has not vividly portrayed the sharp contrast between
the South and the North which has led to the world wide
case of the regionalisation of the country. The position
is better explained by Mogga:
"The Sudan is a wide country in its 
physical and environmental setting, and 
ethnic groups, variety of life and 
competitive religious and ideological 
relationship ... The Northern Sudanese 
consider themselves Arabs? the Southern 
Sudanese consider themselves as Africans 
... The sharp Afro-Arab schism negates 
the notion of one Sudan and one 
people."4Q
Considering the natural divisions - both in the terrain as 
well as among the people - and also its sheer size, it has 
often been suggested that the Sudan should have been two 
countries. However, the colonial authorities 
precipitately annexed the South to the North on the 
unconvincing argument that the South would not be viable 
on its own. To ignore the tremendous difference between 
the North and the South or treat it as imaginary was a 
serious misjudgement of the situation. Since independence 
in 1956, the Sudan has never enjoyed real unity due to 
constant clashes and wars between the two parts. The 
problems are not only based on the racial, ethnical, 
religious and linguistic differences. They are also 
deeply rooted in the history, geography and economy of the
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country.
Historically, the relationship between the North and 
the South has been one of extreme hostility since the 
North used to plunder the South for slaves and ivory 
before the arrival of the colonialists. Though both 
practices have long stopped, the North has consistently 
exhibited feelings and practices of religious and cultural 
superiority under the banner of Islam. The imposition of 
an Islamic constitution over the whole country has failed 
four times since independence in 1956. On the other hand, 
the South has continued to view some Northern Sudanese as 
Arabs, or their descendants, who migrated from the Middle 
East or Saudi Arabia in particular during the 14th 
century. The exhibition of superiority complex and lack 
of moral and political understanding on the part of the 
North make them less acceptable in the South.
One indirect solution to this North-South antagonism 
seems to be emerging following the sharpening of tribal 
differences within the South itself. The South is not 
homogeneous but has struggled as one people due to the 
Northern threat until 1980. However, later years have 
shown that the regional majorities could even be very 
dangerous to the interests of the minorities. Hence the 
call for the division of the South in the 1980s. Indeed 
problems of regional minorities are not unique to the 
Southern Sudan, they have been experienced in other 
countries like Nigeria where the Hq,usa and the other 
majority tribes dominated the minority communities
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surrounding them. It would appear that the restoration of 
the South would only depend on adequate guarantees of 
protection of the interests of regional minorities by the 
majorities which seems to be difficult in the case of the 
South.
B. The Economy
The economic profile of the Sudan is not very 
encouraging. It is classic of an under-developed country. 
In 1982, its GNP ' v*as 440 million US d o l l a r s . ^
The position has deteriorated rather than improved. 
Inflation has continued to rise reaching 45% in 1 9 8 5 . ^  
Official sources indicate a steep debt rise too, from 
272.5 million US dollars in 1970 to 3 ,7 7 2 .8^  in 1982 and 
about 9 billion in 1 9 8 5 . ^
The country is generally composed of flat featureless 
plains with the Imatong mountains in the far South and 
Nuba mountains in the middle. The Red Sea Hills are in 
the extreme East. The North is a complete desert, the 
central part consists of grasslands while the South is 
mainly a tropical jungle with swamp. Vegetation closely 
follows the rainfall pattern.
The river Nile and its tributaries are the main 
physical features of the country and so far they provide 
economic activity through irrigated agriculture. On the
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whole, the economy is still imbalanced - it is 
predominantly agrarian, dependent on 80% of the population 
living in the rural areas. Agriculture provides 95% of 
the total export earnings. The main cash crops are cotton 
(48.8%), Gum Arabic (9.1%), oil seeds (8.6%) and 
groundnuts ( 2 . 0 % ) Since 1981/82, however, dura (a 
variety of sorgum) has moved swiftly from the main staple 
food of the people to being an important export crop, 
second only to cotton.
Cotton production on the other hand has declined. It
is chiefly grown in irrigated lands like Gezira, which is
the largest irrigation scheme in the world, covering 
almost 900,000 hectres between the Blue and While Nile 
rivers. There are several causes for the downturn in the 
cotton field, including poor incentive system for the 
small holder producers, substantial delays in payments, 
poor maintenance of the irrigation system and frequent 
shortages of supplies of, agricultural inputs.
Other crops like Gum arabic, sesame and groundnuts
are produced in the irrigated as well as the rain-fed
sectors, but they have been exposed to the vagaries of 
climate. Their production has been seriously curtailed by 
the current drought.
Sudan's mineral sector is relatively unimportant. 
However, numerous mineral deposits are known to exist in 
quantities insufficiently determined to warrant commercial 
extraction. So far chromite is the most important
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mineral, found in the Ingressna Hills area, in the South 
East of the country. The Red Sea Hills are also known to 
contain a wide range of minerals which include zinc, 
chromite, lead and gold. A pilot tangsten is being built 
in the area. More exploration for gold continues with 
encouraging results. The greatest hope for the future, 
however, lies in the oil discoveries in the South (Bentiu) 
and the South-West (Muglad). Oil exploitation had been 
commenced by the White Nile Petroleum corporation but the 
first production, scheduled to begin in 1985/86, has 
stopped due to war in the Southern Sudan.
Modern industry is still young and limited to the 
processing of agricultural products like cotton, sugar 
manufacture, oil and seed processing (such as floor 
milling) together with the productionof light consumer 
goods such as soap and textiles.
Sudan's economic development is also hampered by the 
inadequacy and unevenness of the transportation system and 
facilities as well as other types of infrastructure like 
power, water supply and technical education which are all 
examined in Chapter 10. Despite these constraints the 
agricultural potential in the Sudan remains high. So far 
only 10% of the estimated cultivable land is being used. 
The rainfall in the South is quite sufficient from April 
to November every year, measuring between 8,000 and 1,600 
MM. Additional water can be harnessed from the Nile, the 
Sobat and Baher El Ghazal rivers. The huge Jonglei Canal 
Project (in the South) was intended to supply additional
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water to the Northern Sudan and Egypt for irrigation. In 
this connection Sudan was to become the breakbasket of the 
Middle East but unfortunately work on the project has also 
been stopped due to war. The semi-arid areas support 
abundant livestock, much of which is still used for 
subsistence purposes. The country's fishing resources are 
equally encouraging. The potential output for the Nile 
alone is about 60,000 tons a year, although so far only a 
third of this quantity is being utilized. This amount 
could also be supplemented by the great marine fishing 
potential that exists about 700 km of coastline bordering 
the Red Sea. The huge forest reserves at Imatong, the 
Baher El Ghazal Region and other places have not yet been 
exploited. Given peace and stability, Sudan's economy 
could support any decentralised system of government.
However, as already stated, the present problems are 
partly due to imbalanced economic development in the 
country. In particular, the gap between the North and the 
South, in terms of economic development, has been far too 
wide. The South has, on the whole, been neglected for too 
long. The first development plan for the South was made 
in 1938 by Dr. J.D. Todhill, the Director of Agriculture. 
It was a 10-year plan but its implementation was prevented 
by the Second World War. The Zande Scheme, approved in 
1945, was intended to encourage peasant farmers to grow 
cotton for conversion into cloth at Nzara to meet the 
local needs.
The Equatorial Agricultural Project Board was also
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established in the same period to plant coffee, cotton and 
palm oil while some private entrepreneurs planted coffee, 
tea and tobacco. Some sawmills were also launched, 
together with the construction of road links to the 
principal towns but due to severe financial constraints, 
the economic achievements were "too little and too late" 
for Southerners to catch up with their Northern brothers 
when independence came.
The post-independence period was also followed by 
another period of total neglect. Although some schemes 
like the Mongalla Sugar Factory, the Malakal Paper Factory 
and fish-canning, the Kapoeta Cement Factory and a few 
others were considered suitable for the South, they never 
got off the ground.
So the real problem for any Sudanese government is to
accommodate the interests of the various communal groups
in a united Sudan without discriminating against any of
them and at the same time bridge the gaps in the levels of
economic development. This is only feasible under an 
appropriately decentralised system of government, the 
establishment of which is long overdue.
C . History of Decentralisation in the Sudan
Unfortunately, the colonial period paid very little 
attention to decentralisation of government. All powers
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were centralised in the Governor-General (see Chapter 2). 
When decentralisation was first considered in 1920, the 
Milner Commission reported that "a centralised bureaucracy 
[was] wholly unsuitable for the Sudan". However, the 
remedy recommended and adopted was applied only on the 
most basic level of Native Administration. Native 
administration or indirect rule was established and 
gradually developed into local government over a period of 
30 years. However, up to 1969, decentralisation had been 
limited to local government which, in the circumstances of 
the Sudan, was quite inadequate.
Successive Sudanese governments in the Sudan were 
preoccupied with inter-Party rivalry and formation of weak 
coalition short-lived governments. Besides they never 
looked beyond their bigotic religious programmes of 
Islamisation. The 1968 Islamic constitution, the only 
constitution forcefully adopted by the civilian government 
was the historical example. Expectedly, it was rapidly 
overtaken by political events before implementation.
President Numeiri, who came to power in a military
coup on May 25th 1969, was the first Sudanese leader to
implement a far-reaching decentralisation of government in
the Sudan. This was initially intended to accommodate the
secessionist pressure in the southern part of the country.
"The revolutionary government ... 
recognises the historical and cultural 
differences between the North and the 
South ... [and so it] resolved to 
recognize the right of the Southern 
people to a Regional autonomy.
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However, this objective has not been achieved up to the 
moment, although for well over 11 years there was peace 
and stability in the Sudan during the period of regional 
government in the Southern Sudan (1972-1982).
The objectives for decentralisation were, however,
extended in 1980 following the government's decision to 
L
estabjish more regions in the Northern part of the country.
They have been summed up by M. Alassam then controller of
the National Assembly, as follows:-
" (a) The sheer size of the country, its 
heterogeneous nature and its varied 
population and means of earning a 
living necessitated decentralisation 
of decision.
(b) Decentralisation provides for 
democracy and participation of the 
people in the government of their 
areas.
(c) Regional government can provide for 
closer supervision of local 
authorities.
(d) The grouping of provinces into 
regions makes better use of economic 
and manpower resources.
(e) By devolving powers to the Regional 
Governments, national authorities 
and ministries will have more time 
for planning and follow up.
(f) The establishment of Regional 
governments will give the Central 
government opportunity for shedding 
more power to the people and thus 
bringing the government closer to 
them.
(g) Successful experience of Regional 
government in the South encourages 
the application of a similar 
provision in the Northern Sudan.
(h) Regional government can help in the 
advancement of national unity by 
recognizing regional differences and 
thus acting as a safety-valve for 
regional pressures.
(i) Rural development and the expected 
modernization in the regional 
capitals and the other big towns may 
help in reducing immigration from 
the countryside to Khartoum.
(j) Regional Government can encourage
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the provisions and development of 
socio-economic regions of the 
country."^
The objectives listed above were quite comprehensive 
because they took into account the large size of the 
country, the ethnic and other differences of the people 
and the need to promote unity among them including their 
participation in government, the need to introduce 
equitable development as well as enhance administrative 
efficiency in the government by bringing it nearer to the 
people, making the best use of its manpower resources and 
leaving more time for the top administrators to plan.
Thus, they encourage all the objectives that exist for 
decentralisation generally. However, as the study shows, 
these objectives were never realised due to the weakness 
in the design of the decentralisation, resource 
availability and political commitment to the policy.
The permanent constitution and the Southern Provinces 
Self-Government Act were different in nature. Whereas the 
former was Presidential, the latter was Parliamentary. 
Moreover, the Self-Government Act did not envisage 
dissolution of the region and the participation of the SSU 
in the election of the Members of Parliament like the 
speaker and his deputy. So there were constant clashes 
between the central and the regional government in the 
South. Issues like Islamisation of laws kept recurring, 
not to mention the inadequate solutions for language 
policy and sources of legislation.
The question which, however, remains unanswered is
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why the Sudan has not become a Federal Republic in the 
light of its characteristics?
So far no Sudanese government has made an official
statement on the question of federation since
independence. The only reference made to it was in 1957
when Prime Minister Abdulla Khalil announced to Parliament
that federation was "unworkable", without further
substantiation. Later, the National Commission on
Decentralisation in the Sudan (1980) reported that the
Nigerian federal system would be too expensive for the
Sudan. It would also seem that the North considers
federation in the Sudan with much suspicion, that once
federated, national unity would be jeopardised because the
South would ultimately break away and form a separate
independent state. Such a view is supported by writings
like that of Rafia Hassan Ahmed:
"Granting federal constitutional powers 
which are not easily revocable, and in 
most cases cannot be controlled except by 
military force, may lead to serious 
political problems between the federal 
government and the unit government and 
this may worsen the situation in the 
South rather than solve the problem."^g
However, this view is totally unjustified considering the
joint statement of the Southern Members of Parliament to
the House in 1957:
"... the South has no ill-intention what 
soever towards the North; the South 
simply claims to run its local affairs in 
a united Sudan.
The financial argument against federation is also 
weak because the Sudan is potentially rich as already
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discussed. As early as 1954 the Jonglei investigation
team had already reported that the South was economically
viable in terms of agricultural and animal and fish
resources. Prospects for mineral extraction also 
50existed. Objectively considered, the Sudan could 
qualify for a federal form of government which would 
constitutionally guarantee the autonomy of the regions and 
thereby bring peace and stability. The short-lived peace 
between 1972 and 1982 during the period of the regional 
government in the Southern Sudan suggests so.
III. THE PRESENT STUDY
The purposes of the study are to examine from the 
legal aspects the design and application of 
decentralisation in the Sudan and to evaluate its success.
The study starts by examining the history and 
practice of decentralisation of government in the Sudan 
from the time of the establishment of colonial 
administration in 1899 to the overthrow of the May 
Revolutionary Government in April, 1985. Special 
emphasis, however, is laid on the period from 1969 to 1985 
when the "May regime" was in power and undertook to 
decentralise considerable powers. The study falls into 
four broad parts.
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1. Part One examines the colonial and post-colonial 
period prior to the assumption of power by the May 
Revolutionary Government in 1969.
2. Part Two analyses the process of the implementation 
of decentralisation of government by the May regime 
from 1969 to 1985.
3. Part Three makes a detailed examination of the 
problems raised by the implementation of 
decentralisation within the said period (1969-1985) .
4. Part Four evaluates Sudan's experience in 
decentralisation within the internal context of 
decentralisation of governments, draws conclusions 
and makes recommendations for the future.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN THE SUDAN 
TO INDEPENDENCE: 1899-1956
The Sudan was conquered by combined Egyptian and British
Forces led by Lord Kitchener in January 1899, about i ih years
after the death of General Gordon at Khartoum. The Nile waters
and the valley have always been of economic and strategic
importance to Egypt. At first Britain had no interest because
it did not seem feasible. However, the conquest of this vast
territory was followed surprisingly by the immediate signing of
a joint Agreement between Britain and Egypt for the future
administration of the country. It then became clear that
Britain was actually interested in the Sudan. This point was
confirmed by the despatch from the Marques of Salisbury to Lord
Cromer in August 1899:
"In view of the substantial military and 
financial cooperation which has recently been 
afforded by Her Majesty to the Government of 
the Khedive, Her Majesty's Government has 
decided that at Khartoum and all places South 
of the spot the British and Egyptian flags 
should be hoisted side by side. It is not at 
present necessary to lay down with any great 
precision the political status of the occupied 
countries, and the manner in which they will 
in future be administered. These matters will 
be considered at a later period. You will, 
however, explain to the Khedive and his 
Ministers that the use of the British 
co-jointly with the Egyptian flag is intended 
to emphasise the fact that Her Majesty's 
Government consider that they have a 
predominant voice in all matters connected 
with the Sudan, and that they will expect that 
any advice which they may think fit to tender 
to the Egyptian Government in respect of 
Soudan affairs will be followed."^
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This British interest was based on the right of conquest and was 
imposed on Egypt. As we shall see it was the route to India 
through the Suez Canal that Britain wanted to protect.
Although the Agreement lacked most essential components of 
a modern constitution, it did provide a Charter for the 
administration of the country from 1899 to independence in 1956. 
Its validity was reaffirmed by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
concluded in July 1936. Article 11 of the same reasserted the 
rights which the 1899 Agreement gave to the contracting parties, 
as well as the powers of the Governor-General. It also defined 
in categoric terms the aims of the parties in administering the
3
Sudan as being for "the welfare of the Sudanese". Subsequent
attempts were made to abrogate the Agreement but all were very
unsuccessful. The first was done by Egypt in 1946 but Britain
decided to ignore it. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary at
the time, made a statement in the House of Commons declaring
that the sole aim of the British Government in the Sudan was to
t
administer it for the welfare of the Sudanese people. Attlee, 
the Prime Minister, also made it clear that no change in the 
status of the Sudan was to be made. The Sudanese had to be 
consulted through constitutional channels. However, Egypt tried 
to argue against the Sudanese right to self-determination by 
stating her demand for union with Sudan in the Security Council 
in 1947 but the question was set aside without resolution. By 
1950 the impasse in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had already 
encouraged the United States to bring pressure on the British 
Government to reach an agreement with Egypt which would 
safeguard Western interests in the Suez Canal, the outcome of 
which resulted in the reversal of the Southern policy in 1946.
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This chapter sets out to trace and analyse the constitutional 
developments in the Sudan during the condominium period. It 
examines the highly centralized system of administration 
established by the Condomini powers and the subsequent limited 
decentralisation introduced. In particular it focuses on the 
following: The Governor-General1s Council; The Sudan Executive 
Council, and Legislative Assembly, Self-Government and the 
achievement of independence. It also considers the recognition 
of Native Administrative in 1922 together with the 1937 changes. 
Despite efforts to deconcentrate, powers remained concentrated 
in the Governor-General. Finally, the controversial Southern 
Policy which effectively separated the administration of the 
South from that of the North for about four decades is examined. 
Considered objectively the Southern policy was neither the sole 
nor the initial cause of disunity in the Sudan. As has been 
shown in the introduction, there are other important factors 
like ethnicity, language, religion etc.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRALISED GOVERNMENT, 1899
The over-centralisation of administration by the Mahadists 
(1885-1888) had already caused disruption to the system of 
decentralisation developed in the period of the Fung Kingdom 
(1505-1820). The colonial rulers perpetuated the Mahadists 
policy by setting up a highly centralised form of government 
too. The foundations of the modern Sudan Government were
4
estabished by agreement for "The Administration of the Sudan"
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generally referred to as the Condominium Agreement. It was 
jointly signed by Britain and Egypt in Cairo on January 19th, 
1899. The structure of government establihed under this 
agreement is shown in diagram 1 .
1. The Governor-General
The Governor-General was the Supreme Constitutional 
Authority in the country but not as was the case for the 
equivalent of a Head of State. He was responsible to both the 
Foreign Office and the Egyptian Government through the British
Representative, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul General
5 . . .m  Cairo. This was so because Britain was at first unwilling
to have any colonial interest there. So unlike other colonies, 
the Sudan did not come under the Colonial Office.
The Agreement stipulated that the Governor-General was to
be jointly appointed and removed by Britain and Egypt according
to the following procedure:
"He shall be appointed by Decree on the 
recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's 
Government, and shall be removed only by 
Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her 
Britannic Majesty's Government.
Expectedly, the mandatory requirement for the recommendation of
the British Government concerning the appointment and removal of
the Governor-General ensured British predominance in the
administration of the Sudan. It is thus not surprising that all
Governor-General's who served in the Sudan (as shown in the
Appendix) during the colonial period were British. Professor
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Holt also confirmed this point by writing:
"Although the Agreement was silent on the 
point of Nationality, all Governor-Generals 
from 1899 to 1955 were British subjects from 
the United Kingdom."^
Furthermore, all legislative and Executive powers were vested in
the Govenor-General by the Agreement.
"The Supreme Military and Civil Command in the 
Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed 
the Governor-General of the Sudan ... Laws as 
well as orders and Regulations with the full 
force of law, for the good government of the 
Sudan ... may from time to time be made, 
altered or abrogated by the Proclamation of 
the Governor-General."g
In theory, his proclamations were to be "forthwith notified to
Her Britannic Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the
President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the
g
Khedive" but in practice there were no restrictions on his 
authority, his legislations being considered binding as long as 
the condomium governments did not disagree.
The Governor-General was assisted by three Secretaries
(Civil, Financial and Legal) plus Khaid (Commandant of the 
Army). The duties of these personalities speak for themselves. 
The Civil Secretary was in charge of general administration and 
since all correspondence ’ went to the Governor-General through 
his office, he effectively provided the liaison between the 
central and provincial governmental units.
2. The Provincial Governors (the Mudirs)
Governors (Mudirs) were appointed by the Govenor-General to
be in charge of each Province (Muduriya). The Sudan had been
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divided into 15 provinces since 1871 under the directives of 
Khedive Ismail of Egypt but the number and boundaries have been 
altered throughout the years.
The Governors represented the Governor-General in the 
Provinces and were responsible to him through the Civil 
Secretary. They had supreme authority in the provinces. The 
Provincial Governors were exclusively British and up to 1908, 
they were all Military Officers in order to contain threats to 
political stability. Thereafter Civilian Governors were 
gradually appointed.
The Governor's functions included the supervision and 
control of the finances of the Province as defined by the 
financial regulations; taking charge of all public animals, 
arms, equipment and stores; being responsible for the observance 
of all ordinance orders and regulations and administer justice 
by hearing appeals against the decisions of District 
Commissioners. The Gov^nors could also issue local orders with 
force of law.
3. The District Commissioners (The Mufatish)
The District Commissioners (Mufatish) or Senior Inspectors 
were appointed by the Governor-General from among the British to 
be in charge of districts (Merkaz). They acted as Governors 
whenever the Supreme authorities were absent. Their main 
responsibility was to ensure the uniformity of administration. 
The District Commissioners also ranked as first-class
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magistrates and administered both civil and criminal justice and 
were assisted by Assistant District Commissioners.
4. The Executive Officers (The Mamurs)
The Governor-General appointed Executive Officers (Mam urs) 
to assist with administration in the Sub-districts. The Mam urs 
were responsible for carrying out all orders and regulations 
emanating from the office of the District Commissioner. They 
also assisted in the collection of revenue; acted as magistrates 
and were responsible for the efficiency and discipline of the 
police force. They were assisted by Sub-Mam urs. Mam urs were 
usually Egyptians or Syrians although sometimes Northern 
Sudanese were appointed.
The above hierarchy demonstrates the high degree of 
centralisation of government in the Sudan during the colonial 
period. Whereas other colonies had Governors, Governor-Generals 
ruled in the Sudan, Nigeria and India. The difference was 
mainly due to the vastness of these countries and the consequent 
strain placed on the administration.
We shall now proceed to examine subsequent changes that 
were made to the colonial administration.
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B. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S COUNCIL, 1910
In 1910, the Governor-General1s Council was created "to
assist the Governor-General ... in the discharge of his
executive and legislative powers" under the Governor-General's
ordinance, 1 9 1 0 . ^  However, the Promulgation of this law was a
mere formality as according to Sir Harold MacMichael:
"Technical questions assumed an ever 
increasing importance, and the machinery of 
civil government evolved along professional 
lines, it became the practice of the 
Govenor-General with greater frequency to 
assemble those upon whose advice he placed 
reliance for informal consultation."^
The Council was composed entirely of ex officio and appointed
members. The ex officio included the civil, financial and legal
secretaries together with the Khaid. The Governor-General was
empowered to appoint "not less than two or more than five
12additional Members ... for a period of three years". These 
members were eligible for re-appointment. Undoubtedly, the 
Council was wholly composed of British officers.
The Governor-General presided over the meetings of the 
Council or a senior Member acted in his absence. The Council 
considered various matters including loans, ordinances, 
regulations to be proclaimed, the annual budgets and all matters 
of administrative importance or those referred to it by the 
Governor-General. All appointments and military questions were, 
however, excluded from the jurisdiction of the Council.
Moreover, the Governor-General could veto decisions of the 
Council "for reasons to be recorded in the records of the 
proceedings of the Council or suspend the same pending reference
1 o
to the condominium authorities".
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According to Eldon Gorst, the decision to establish the
Governor-General' s Council meant:
"To go a step further and create a duly 
constituted Council to associate with the 
Governor-General in the discharge of his 
executive and legislative powers [because] 
such body would conduct its deliberations with 
a greater sense of responsibility than would 
be expected under the informal condition which 
had hitherto prevailed, and prove a valuable 
safeguard against precipitate action on the 
part of the executive or the adoption of 
insufficiently considered measures."^
The placing of legislative powers in the the Governor-General's
Council though amounted to statutory practice of consultation
among senior British officials only; it made no contribution in
terms of decentralisation of powers.
II. THE 'ESTABLISHMENT1 AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE SUDAN, 1922-1936
'Native Administration' or 'indirect rule' as it was also
known was restated by Mergary Perham in 1934 as:
"A system by which the tutelary power 
recognises existing African societies, and 
assists them to adapt themselves to functions 
of local government. This recognition is a 
legal one ... the system gives the native 
institutions the fixity and status that only 
detailed statutory recognition can give •••"15
Proceeding from the above definition it can be seen that Native
Administration was officially introduced into the Sudan with the
16Promulgation of Nomad Sheiks Ordinance, 1922. The reasons for 
doing so will be explained in due process. One was that as
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early as 1871, Sir Charles Brook, Rajah of Serawak, had already 
sounded a warning beneficial to the British authorities by 
wri ting:
"The common mistake Europeans make in the East 
to exalt Western civilization almost to the 
exclusion of the Native System, instead of 
using them as mutually corrective.".^
This warning, however, was not heeded until the 19th century
when indirect rule was applied in Northern Nigeria by Lord
Lugard. After being established there, it was extended to the
Cameroons, Uganda and Tanganyika.
The colonial government in the Sudan at first pretended to
ignore indirect rule paying it little attention until 1919 when
the Milner Commission recommended that
"Having regard to its [Sudan's] vast extent 
and varied character of its inhabitants, the 
administration of its varied parts should be 
left, as far as possible, in the hands of 
native authorities, wherever they exist, under 
British supervision ... decentralization and 
employment wherever possible of native 
agencies for the simple administrative needs 
of the country, in its present stage of 
development, would make both for economy and 
efficiency."^g
This was then the first time decentralisation of government was 
ever officially conceived of in the Sudan. It was purely to 
save on the costs of the administration since efficiency could 
hardly be attained by the involvement of traditional rulers in 
the government.
From 1922 to 1932, the colonial government embarked on the 
formalisation of the powers of traditional rulers by 
promulgating a series of legislation to that effect. The pace 
followed was gradual and sometimes the process depended on the
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personal commitment of the Governor-General in power. The 
series of legislations promulgated were started in the Northern 
Sudan. The Southern Sudan had not been brought completely under 
control in 1931.
A. The 'Establishment1 and Development of Native Administration 
in the Northern Sudan, 1922-1932
Native Administration in the Northern Sudan was established 
and developed through the promulgation of four important 
ordinances as listed below.
1. The Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, 1922
The Nomad Sheikhs ordinance, 1922 was the first law to
establish Native Administration over the Nomadic tribes in the
19Northern Sudan. "Nomadic tribes" included semi-nomadic ones 
as well. Surprisingly, nomadic tribes in the Sudan, unlike 
those elsewhere, had an estabished system of traditional
government under the Nazirs, omdas and Sheikhs (details of which
are fully examined in Chapter 4]. It was then for this reason
that they were chosen first.
The ordinance empowered the Governor-General to apply its
provisions "to such provinces and such nomadic tribes or
2 0sections thereof" as he would direct from time to time. In 
areas where the ordinance applied, the Sheikhs had powers to
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administer limited justice in accordance with the customary laws 
of the people [for more details see Chapter 4]. A shortcoming 
of the ordinance was that it purported to "regularize" and 
"delegate" powers which the Sheikhs already possessed under 
their traditional system. According to the Governor-General1s 
report of 1923, the experiment in establishing statutory Native 
Administration was successful in that a total of 300 Sheikhs 
then exercised powers under the ordinance with the full support 
of the government.
2. The Village Courts Ordinance, 1925.
22The village courts ordinance, 1925 extended Native
Administration to those sedentary tribes which had no organized
tribal machinery of government. In those areas, powers similar
to those under the 1922 Sheikhs ordinance were delegated to
councils of elders "with considerable traditional reverence and
2 3esteem m  the village".
3. The Sheikh's Ordinance, 1927
24
The Sheikh's Ordinance of 1927 had two important 
consequences in both extending and consolidating the powers of 
the Sheikhs. The powers of the Sheikhs were enhanced by 
allowing them to try any offence except that of homicide and a 
few others which are examined in Chapter 4. Their position was 
consolidated by making them appointees of the Governor-General 
with salaries for their services paid out of Public funds
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thereby boosting their status and dignity in the community.
The Promulgation of the 1927 ordinance followed the
appointment of John Maffey as Governor-General of the Sudan in
1926. Maffey was personally interested in Native
Administration, having been influenced by his experience of it
in India. This was clear from his writing only six months after
completing his stay in the Sudan:
"I have become convinced that of the large 
issues facing the government of this country, 
few, if any, are comparable in importance with 
that of placing upon a more clearly defined 
basis our policy with regard to Native 
Administration."25
4. The Sheikh's Ordinance, 1928.
2 6
The Sheikh's Ordinance, 1928, was the re-enactment of the
1927 ordinance intended to include smaller tribes which had been
hitherto omitted from the previous legislations. Those were the
tribes living in the neighbourhood of the nomadic and sedentary
tribes. The preamble to the ordinance was self-explanatory.
"And WHEREAS it has been customary to use 
inter-tribal and inter-regional councils for 
settlement of inter-tribal disputes ...".
By 1929, seventy-two Native Courts were working under the
reenacted law, having heard over 10,000 cases in the course of
27that year alone. When the Native Courts ordinance was
2 8promulgated in 1931, it replaced all the various laws on
Native Administration and unified the Native Courts system in
the Northern Sudan. This ordinance was, however, soon itself
29replaced by the Native Courts ordinance, 1932 , which widened
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the powers of the courts to suit the needs of a growing society. 
The 1932 ordinance provided for the establishment of five 
classes of courts [details of these are given below in 
Chapter 4). Thus by 1932 the Native Court system in the 
Northern Sudan had been totally integrated.
B. Native Administration in the Southern Sudan
Until the 1930s Native Administration had hardly any impact 
in the Southern Sudan. The Shilluk Kingdom, the only known 
tribe that had an established system of native government under 
the 11 Reth" (King) , only had a half-hearted application of the 
Nomad Shilluk ordinance, 1922. Courts were established for 
Shilluk chiefs "to deal with cases of minor importance".
Experimental chiefs courts were established in Baher El
Ghazal in 1923 under the name of "Lukiikos" (a name probably
borrowed from the Baganda in Uganda) but those courts had
functioned without statutory authority. They were only
30legitimated by the Chief s Courts ordinance, 1931, which 
provided for the establishment of three classes of courts (for 
details see Chapter 4).
III. THE SOUTHERN POLICY, 1930-1946
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The introduction of Native Administration in the South 
coincided with the implementation of the Southern policy between 
1930 and 1946 which seriously affected the development of a 
uniform system of administration in the country. The part which 
this policy played in the later constitutional evolution of the 
Sudan was enormous. We shall examine at this stage, the nature 
of the Southern policy and its impact.
The Southern policy was formally stated by MacMichael, the
civil secretary, in 1930 as follows:
"The Policy of the Government in the Southern 
Sudan is to build up a series of 
self-contained racial and tribal units with 
the structure and organization based, to 
whatever extent the requirements of equity and 
good government permit, upon indigeneous 
customs, traditional usage and beliefs.
It was thus a protectionist policy against Northern
infiltration, domination, Islamisation and Arabisation of the
South as the way in which it was implemented will demonstrate.
The Protection of the South was deemed necessary due to its 
distinct cultural character and other unique features outlined 
in Chapter 1. Not only were a "series of self-contained racial 
and tribal units with structure and organization based on 
traditional structure and beliefs" to be built, in practice all 
Northern administrated and technicians were to be gradually 
eliminated and replaced with Southerners. English was to be the 
medium of communication when use of the vernacular proved 
impossible. This obviously implied that Arabic was to be 
discouraged.
The impact of the policy with regard to immigration, trade
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and education was considerable and deserves a detailed 
examination.
In 1922, the Passports and Permits ordinance^ was 
promulgated. It, inter alia, stipulated:
"The Governor-General may by order published 
in the Sudan Government Gazette declare any 
part of the Sudan to be a closed district."33
A person entering "a closed district" had to obtain a permit on
conditions and for purposes specified. The order could apply to
any person or class of persons as the Governor-General deemed
fit. Section 23 thereof also empowered the Governor-General to
close any part of the Sudan to external trade "or declare that
in any part of the Sudan trading other than by the natives of
such parts shall be permitted only under permit". Persons
already trading there and to whom the order applied had to cease
from doing so within a month. In exercise of these powers, the
Governor-General declared the provinces of Darfur, Equatoria,
upper Nile and parts of Kordofan, Gezira and Kassala to be
"closed districts".
In 1925, the Governor-General also issued "the Permit to
Trade order" which required Northern Sudanese among others to
obtain a permit to conduct business in the South. The
cumulative effect of these orders was to seal the South off from
the North for reasons which were stated by MacMichael in 1930.
"It has been the aim of the Government, to 
encourage as far as possible (Christian)
Greek, Syrian traders rather than the Gallaba 
(Muslim Arab traders from the Northern Sudan) 
type. Permits to the latter should be 
decreased unobtrusively but progressively, and 
only the best type of Gallaba, whose interests 
are commercial and pursued in a legitimate 
manner, should be admitted. The limitation of 
Gallaba trade to towns or established routes
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is essential.
It was left entirely to the Christian Missionaries to establish
a system of education in the South. The Governor-General's
report in 1921 had already clearly stated the aim of the
Government as:
"... not to substitute a government system of 
education for the missionary schools but 
rather to attempt the regulation of some of 
the missionary societies along lines likely to 
be of more immediate benefit to the 
Government.
At the Rejaf Lanugage Conference of 1928 it was resolved that 
six language groups, namely Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Lotuka, Shilluk 
and Zande, were to be the media of instruction in the lower 
stages of education. English would replace these in the higher 
stages. Arabic was rejected on the grounds that "it would open 
the door for the spread of Islam, Arabize the South, and 
introduce the Northern Sudanese outlook". Certainly the 
Southern policy had implications for the South, the question 
remains whether it could be held to be solely or largely 
responsible for the political rift between the Northern and 
Southern Sudanese. Before attempting to answer this question 
the fate of the policy itself should be looked at.
In 1946, the Southern policy was finally abandoned partly 
because of its negative effects but mainly because of the 
changing political conditions. The negative results of the 
policy were observed in the low educational standards achieved. 
The educational system produced only low grade personnel to 
serve as clerks and book keepers. Northern Sudanese politicians 
were tireless in pointing out this defect which had also been 
noted by some Southerners and British administrators. One of
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the latter, for example, the District Commissioner of Western
District wrote in 1941 to the Governor of Equatoria Province
"... the most disappointing aspect of the 
working of the Southern policy is the failure 
to produce in ten years any Southern staff 
trained in executive w o r k . " ^
Oliver Albino, a Southern politician and writer also stated with
disappointment that "not ... until 1942 was the Southerner ...
allowed to sit for the civil (now the public) examination ... it
is difficult to understand why progress towards localising the
staff was so gradual."^g As stated earlier, however, political
considerations had to take into account the interest of the
British. They were expected to live longer in the South.
Unfortunately, as Sudanese nationalism developed, pressure
was brought to bear on the British. They were continuously
accused of dividing the Sudan, coupled with the British and
American interest in the Suez Canal as stated earlier, and their
preoccupation with the world depression, the British abandoned
the Southern policy in 1946.
"The policy of the Sudan Government regarding 
the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts 
that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are 
distinctively Africans and Negroid, but that 
geography and economics combine (so far as can 
be foreseen at the present time) to render 
them inextricably bound for future development 
to the Middle Eastern and Arabicised Northern 
Sudan; and therefore ensure they shall, by 
educational and economic development, be 
equipped to stand up for themselves in the 
future as socially and economically the equals 
of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the 
Sudan of the future."gg
The statement was a distortion of facts. The geographical and
economic arguments are untenable. Geographically, the South is
tropical and too distant from Khartoum. It can never be
classified as part of the North or the Middle East which are of
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course desert areas. Economically the South could have survived 
on its agricultural potential without both the Northern Sudan 
and the Middle East. So the issue of the inextricability of the 
South from the North did not arise. If the South were to be 
developed economically and educationally to catch up with the 
North, how long would this take and how would that be guaranteed 
now that the British were preparing to leave.
The change of policy did not only surprise the Southerners 
but was taken with misgivings because the British had all along 
vouchsafed to protect them. The complexities of international 
politics surrounding the protection of British interests in the 
Suez Canal, examined earlier, could not be appreciated by them.
e
However, Arnold Tjyn bee rightly argued:
"If the South was to be re-united with the 
North eventually, the re-uni^ri would have been 
least painful for the South if the North had 
been given a free hand to assimilate the South 
while the British were still in power in both 
parts of the country. If re-union was the 
objective the British ought to have encouraged 
the spread, in the South, of Islam and Arabic 
language. However, re-union did not become 
the British regime's policy till the eleventh 
hour ...".£q
In reflecting on the question of how much the Southern 
policy contributed to the political instability of the country, 
views have differed between the North and the South. While 
Northern Sudanese regard the policy as the main source of 
disunity in the country, Southerners regard the policy as a 
redundant one. As Bandal put it "the Nilotics did alright by 
themselves to put out the alien cultures".^ Certainly the 
disregard and resistance to Islam and Arabisation in the South 
had been quite marked. Up to today the Southerners continue to
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maintain their cultural distinct ness and traditional practices 
inspite of Arab attempts to impose their values on them through 
education (such as the opening of Mahad and Koranic schools) and 
the preference accorded to Muslims in obtaining jobs, 
promotions, accommodation, etc. However, beyond dispute is the 
fact that the Southern policy widened the historical gap between 
the South and the North. That this gap could have been bridged 
is the concern of this thesis.
Having examined the controversial Southern policy, we now 
go back to trace the constitutional and administrative 
development from the mid-1930s.
IV. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION, 1937-1951
The appointment of Steward Symes as the Governor-General of 
the Sudan in 1933 was to bring more positive changes in the 
system of local administration in the country. The Native 
Administration that had been established in the 1920s was 
already under heavy criticism for being too inadequate to meet 
the needs of the changing society. The powers delegated to the 
traditional rulers were less and limited to adjudication of 
cases only. Moreover, it discriminated against the elite by 
isolating them from participating in the government. All courts 
were composed of traditional rulers alone. Thus some change was 
seen to be appropriate. In his note on the relations between 
the educated Sudanese and the tribal leaders Symes* suggestion
for solving the problem was to:
"replace as soon as possible, the name of 
native administration by Local Government.
Native Administration had become a slogan.
All slogans are perilous and ambiguous slogans 
most of all. To its more old-fashioned and 
rabid disciples "native administration" has 
acquired the vague sanctity of a Delphic 
Oracle; to its detractors, it is anathema.
Local Government is a more intelligible term 
and arouses more passions. It embraces the 
Sultanate of Masalit (one of the backward 
areas of the Sudan) and the port Sudan 
Municipal Council. It will absorb some 
nationalist ambitions and under the ample 
folds of its respectable cloak, the sons of 
Sheikhs and the sons of effendia (the educated 
Sudanese civil servants) can lie down happily
together."^2
In the meantime, however, Symes adopted the policy of confining 
native authorities to areas that were predominantly rural with 
low social and economic development potential. The replacement 
of Native Administration was finally introduced by the enactment 
of three local Councils ordinances in 1937 which are here 
briefly examined in turn.
A. Municipal Councils, 1937
43The Municipal Council ordinance, 1937 provided for the 
creation of Municipal Councils in urban areas. By urban areas 
was meant the large towns with a high proportion of European 
inhabitants, as for example Khartoum, Port Sudan, etc.
B . Town Councils, 1937
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44The Town Councils Ordinance, 1937 , provided for the
establishment of Town Councils in urban areas which had few or 
no Europeans such as Kassala, El Obeid, etc.
C . Rural Councils, 1937
The Rural Councils Ordinance, 193 7 ^ ,  provided for the 
establishment of Rural Councils in the rest of the country.
(For further details of the ordinances see Chapter 4.)
Generally, the 1937 ordinances provided the statutory basis 
for the establishment of local government councils categorized 
as Municipalities, Townships and Rural Councils which were based 
on the Model of English local councils. Three ordinances were 
passed because it was believed that no single or rigidly 
prescribed system of local government would meet the needs of 
the country.
D. Province Councils, 1943
Province Councils were established in the existing councils
of Baher El Ghazal, Blue Nile, Equatoria, Darfur, Kassala,
Khartoum, Kordofan, Northern and Upper Nile under the Province
4fi
Councils Ordinance, 1943.
90
The Province Councils were introduced as it was:
"deemed expedient to associate a Council with 
the Governor-General in the discharge of his 
executive and legislative powers, so ... with 
recent growth of local government it [was] 
deemed expedient to associate Councils ... 
with Governors of provinces in the exercise of 
their local government powers."^^
Clearly the Councils were meant to advise and assist the
Governor. They were also intended to serve as electoral
colleges from which members of the Advisory Council(s) would be
elected.
V. TOWARDS SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SUDAN, 1942-1948
The struggle for self-rule could be said to have started 
during the 1920s when in 1924 Ali Abdel Latif .a Dinka officer 
from the South) led a rebellion against the c o l o n i a l i s t  , 
through the organization of the white flag union. Lee Stack, 
the Govenor-General of the Sudan was also assassinated in Cairo 
in the same year. These incidents led to the effective 
suppression of the association.
1936, however, saw the resurfacing of Sudanese nationalism 
following the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship 
in that year. The agreement confirmed the earlier position of 
the 1899 Agreement among other things, as already mentioned. 
However, it totally excluded Sudanese participation. The 
disappointment felt by the Sudanese resulted in the formation of 
the "Graduates Congress" in 1938. "Graduates" included any
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Sudanese who had completed a post-primary school institution. 
Initially, the objectives of the Congress were philanthropic but 
it was soon extended to cover political ambitions as well. In 
April 1942, the Congress submitted a Memorandum to the 
government demanding, inter alia, the right of the Sudanese 
people to self-determination. However, the government was quick 
to reject the demand on the grounds that the issue of 
self-determination was "the duty and business of the Sudanese 
government alone". Nevertheless the government felt compelled 
to act.
The Governor-General appointed a high powered committee of 
the three ex-officio members of the Govenor-General's Council 
(the three Secretaries) plus two provincial Govenors in order 
to:
"Investigate the expediency of forming a 
Central Advisory Council for the Northern 
Sudan•"49
It was upon the recommendations of this committee (submitted in 
March 1943) that the enactment of the Advisory Council 
ordinance, 1 9 4 3 ^  was based.
A. The Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, 1943
The foregoing ordinance provided for the establishment of
Advisory Council(s) in Section 3 thereof:
"It shall be lawful for the Governor-General 
in Council by an order published in the ... 
gazette to establish one or more councils in 
the Sudan advisory to the General-Governor in 
respect of good government either of the whole 
Sudan or any specific part thereof ..."
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In conformity with the foregoing provision the Govenor-General
issued an order in the same year establishing an advisory
SIcouncil for the Northern Sudan. It comprised the Blue Nile,
Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan and the Northern Provinces.
The South was excluded on the sound grounds tha,t:
"Firstly the general conditions, social, 
cultural, economic and linguistic of the
Northern Sudan are ... sharply distinguished
from those of the Southern Sudan. Secondly, 
the ethnic diversity and comparative 
backwardness of the Southern tribes preclude 
indigeneous representatives.
The Advisory Council was composed of 30 members made up as
follows:-
1. The President (the Govenor-General)
2. The Vice-President
3. 18 ordinary members drawn equally from the 6 Provincial
Councils established under the 1943 ordinance (as stated 
earlier)
4. 2 representatives of Chamber of Commerce (at least one of
whom was required to be of Sudanese origin)
5. 8 nominees of the Govenor-General representing "the more 
important social and economic interest including 
Agriculture, Education and Health as he may think
c o
desirable".
Provision was also made for the appointment of "honorary" 
and "extraordinary" members by the Govenor-General. While the 
"honorary" members were distinguished Sudanese notables like 
Sayyid Ali al Mirghani (Patron of the Khatmiyya sect) and Abdal 
Rahim-al Mahdi (leader of the Ansar sect), the "extraordinary" 
ones were professionals and senior civil servants coopted from
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time to time. In practice, all those appointed in this latter 
category were British. Both the "honorary" and the 
"extraordinary" members could give their views on the agenda but 
they had no voting rights.
Although the formation of the Council was an attempt to 
come to terms with the growing Sudanese nationalism, it fell 
under heavy criticism, spearheaded by the Ashigga party which 
boycotted it altogether. The Ashigga (meaning blood brothers in
Arabic) were an extremist group of the Graduates Congress who
had broken away in 1943. They advocated unity with Egypt on the
basis of the unity of the Nile valley. Led by Ismail El
Mirghani, the Ashigga refused to cooperate with the government. 
Their power base was of course derived from the Khatmiyya 
religious sect. Owing to the extreme views of the Ashigga and 
their objective of unity with Egypt, the moderates of the 
Graduates Congress also regrouped themselves into the Umma party 
(meaning nationalists in Arabic). The Umma, as already stated, 
were led by Abdel Rahman El Mahdi, the grandson of El Mahdi who 
defeated the British In 1885. The Umma, on the other hand, had 
their power base in the Ansar religious sect. The 
Umma stood for an independent Sudan with the hope of 
re-establishing a monarchy - an idea much cherished by the 
British.
When the Ashigga boycotted the Advisory Council, it accused 
the British of several malpractices. For example, in an article 
in El Nil (daily newspaper) of Novembr 8th, 1943, the following 
questions were raised:
"1. Why should not the North represent the 
South?
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2. How can the government deprive the South 
of the rights and privileges now granted 
to (Northern Sudanese)?
3. Is the Advisory Council competent to 
examine matters such as budget, which 
concerns the whole country, while one 
third of the population is not 
represented."
However, the motives for depriving the South of the right of
representation were doubtful. As Professor Holtr put it:
"Just as the Egyptians suspected the British 
of intending to separate the Sudan from Egypt, 
the Northern Sudanese feared that the Sudan 
government meant to amputate the three 
Southern provinces and cede them to Uganda.
For its part, however, the government viewed the formation of
the Advisory Council as a great constitutional development in
trying to associate the Sudanese with the government. Such a
view was evident in the address of the Governor-General to the
opening session of the Council in May, 1944:
"It can be said without exaggeration that we 
see today the first concrete expression of the 
Sudanese people.
K.D.D. Henderson also noted that the advisory council was, "the 
most far-reaching step yet taken in the government's declared 
policy of associating the Sudanese with the administration of 
their own".5**
Although the Advisory Council was meant to be a more formal 
machinery for consultation, its advisory powers were seriously 
curtailed. Strict rules in the order dictated that the 
determination of the agenda was the complete monopoly of the 
President; any other subject could only be included if requested 
by five members "by notice in writing delivered to the Secretary 
to the Council at least two clear months before the opening date
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57of any session". The President at his discretion could accept 
or reject such a request. Even if it were accepted, the matter 
would not be debated by the Council, but the government’s policy 
on it would be explained.
Debates were firmly controlled by the Chairman of the 
Council. He could close debates or discussions at any time.
The manner of tendering the conclusions of the debate were 
pre-determined and stated in the agenda. Sessions of the 
Council were seriously circumscribed. The order provided for 
the holding of at least two sessions per year? in practice that 
number was never exceeded. Each session was to last for 4 to 5 
days but the president could terminate it at any stage.
Clearly, under these circumstances, the Advisory Council 
involved no decentralisation of powers.
Further important developments were to follow in 1946, 1947 
and 1948.
B. The Sudan Administrative Conference, 1946
This Administrative Conference met in Khartoum in April 
1946 under the close*supervision of the Civil Secretary, James 
Robertson. The participants were:-
1. 8 British civil servants
2. 7 Sudanese officials (plus Sayyid al Siddiq and the son of 
Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al Mahdi)
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3. 8 Representatives of the Advisory Council
4. 5 Representatives of the Independent Front
The Graduates Congress, the Ashigga and the other unionist 
parties had 6 seats but they boycotted the conference. The 
South was not represented. Presumably these developments were 
intended to affect the North only as had been the case with the 
Advisory Council.
After two days the Conference split into two sub-committees 
(A and B ) , to work separately on central and local governments 
respectively. The recommendations of sub-committee B on local 
government will be examined in the next chapter. Sub-Committee 
A was chaired by Mekki Abbas, a Sudanese from the North. It had 
6 members (4 Sudanese and 2 British).
The relevant terms of reference of this sub-committee for
our purposes were:-
" (a) To consider the next steps for 
associating the Sudanese more closely with the 
Central Government and in particular to work 
out and recommend to the main conference 
methods for developing the present Advisory 
Council so as to give them greater and more 
responsible functions"(.g
The sub-committees recommendation as adopted by the conference
w a s :
"... that the best method of developing the 
present Advisory Council so as to give it 
greater representative character and more 
responsible functions was by the constitution 
of a general assembly of elected Sudanese 
members for the whole Sudan exercising 
legislative, financial and general 
administrative functions in associating with a 
newly constituted Executive Council which 
would replace the present Govenor-General's 
Council. It was the unanimous opinion of the 
Committee that the future of the Sudan depends
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on welding together the people of the whole 
country into one. The Southern Provinces, 
though not Arab in origin .. must now look to 
the rest of the Sudan for economic and social 
development. By representing the Southern 
Provinces on a general assembly for the whole 
country the realisation of the existence of 
one Sudanese people will more quickly be 
achieved and it is on this achievement that 
the welfare of the Sudanese depends . ..".^g
The inclusion of the South was obviously crucial, particularly
when it had not been presented at the conference. For, it goes
without saying that any decision taken on its behalf was done
without its participation. Had it not been for some of the
British administrators serving there, the South would have been
joined to the North without even having been informed.
On the publication of the minutes of the conference, 15
British administrators in the South signed a protest letter to
the Civil Secretary expressing their dissatisfaction with the
recommendation. In their view the future of the South was being
6 0"discussed by the wrong men in the wrong milieu". This was
rightly so considering the composition of Sub-Committee A and
the participants at the conference as detailed above. The
letter of protest suggested that "institution of an
administrative conference for the Southern Sudan, to meet in the 
61South". On the strength of this letter, the Civil Secretary 
called a hasty conference at Juba in 1947.
C . The Juba Conference, 1947
The Juba Conference was held on the 12th and 13th of June
98
1947. It was attended by the following 27 members:-
1. The Civil Secretary - James Robertson, Chairman and 
Secretary
2. The Govenors of the Southern Provinces
3. The Director of Establishments
4. 6 Northern Sudanese, including 2 distinguished lawyers with
Mohamed Shingetti being the most dominant and powerful
5. 17 Southerners, appointed from amongst tribal chiefs, 
clergymen, and local council clerks. Clement Mboro, then a 
junior clerk, was the most educated.
Certainly the Conference was not one of equals. The notice was
too short and the Southern Participants were handpicked. As
Chief Lado Lobik rightly pointed out "he was not ready for these
discussions as he had not been able to consult his people before
6 2coming to Juba". It was not even the traditional practice 
among the decentralised tribes of the Southern Sudan that they 
were normally represented by chiefs or clergymen.
The agenda was not specified. The discussion encompassed 
in general terms the representation of the South in the 
forthcoming Legislative Assembly due to be convened in Khartoum 
in 1948. The legal and constitutional implications of the 
proposal were very obscure especially for the semi-literate 
Southerners. Moreover, attempts by some of the Southerners to 
obtain more explanation about the proposal from the Secretary 
were obstructed by the Northern Sudanese, especially Mohamed 
Shingetti. For example, when the Secretary tried to put matters 
in black and white by asking "whether anybody present had any
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objections to the unity of the Sudan", Shingetti complained that 
"this was outside the meeting's terms of reference".*^ But that 
point was in fact very crucial. In this way Shingetti 
controlled and dominated the conference. If the conference was 
intended for Southern Sudanese, one wondered why Northern 
Sudanese had to attend or participate too.
No formal resolution was adopted, the chairman simply 
assumed that the South had agreed to join the North in the 
forthcoming Legislative Assembly - which unknown to the 
Southerners implied unity of the Sudan as pre-determined in 
1946.
In his book, Transition in Africa (1974), Robertson 
confessed:
"The only decision resulting from the 
conference was taken by myself. I decided 
that I could, after what I had seen of 
Southerners who attended, endorse the 
recommendation of the Administrative 
Conference, and ask the
Governor-General-in-Council to accept its 
proposal that the new Legislative Assembly 
should be representative of the whole
Sudan" . .64
No excuse could justify Robertson's partiality since the 
abolition of the Southern policy in 1946.
The consequences of the decision taken at Juba Conference 
seriously affect the Sudan up to this day in that the unity 
between the North and the South has involved more conflict than 
cooperation. Moreover, the decision of the conference could be 
hardly said to amount to the exercise of the right of 
self-determination by the Southerners. Yet the claims of the
100
d
Northern Sudanese for unity with the South are based on that 
decision. A few quotations will illustrate these claims.
Ismail El Azhari, Sudan's first Prime Minister, told the
Committee of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan
in 1955 that:
"The Sudan should be one unit on the basis of 
the decisions arrived at during the Juba 
Conference in June, 1947."g^
In 1961, Ali Baldo, the Governor of Equatoria province, declared
to the Morning Star newspaper on his visit to Khartoum that:
"... After the Juba conference of 1947, in
which it was firmly held that for its
interests, the South should be unified with 
the North forever."gg
These views are still current among Northerners as Ali Suleiman
Fadlal, lecturer at Khartoum University, stated in his study on
"Some Issues of Freedom under the Penal and the Criminal
Procedure Codes of the Sudan" (1984 PhD thesis), that, "it was
the wish of Southerners to be united together with the
Northerners in a united S u d a n . " ^
Southerners, on the other hand, have always held a contrary
opinion. Writing on The Problem of Southern Sudan (1963),
Joseph Oduho and William Deng argued:
"Throughout the night of the twelfth, Arab 
politicians made individual approaches to the 
Southern members using all possible means and 
arguments - bribery not excluded - to explain 
to them that the unity was unity of 
administration as opposed to the hitherto 
followed separatist policy in which the South 
was left lagging behind the North. They made 
it clear that unity, in the constitutional 
sense, was to be freely decided upon by both 
North and South at the time of 
self-determination that was still out of 
sight."68
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Unfortunately, this time never came as we shall see. Dr. 
Raphael Bandal of Khartoum University, rightly dismissed the 
deliberations of the Conference as "an official arms 
twisting" .^
In fact Robertson’s view was similar to that of
Southerners:
"I looked upon the conference solely as a 
means of finding out the capabilities of the 
Southerners, and it was therefore quite 
inaccurate for some people to say later that 
at the Juba Conference the Southern 
representatives agreed to come in with the 
North. No decision could be made by the 
Conference, since members had received no 
Mandate from their peoples.”^ q
One therefore wonders on what basis the Northerners maintain
their claims for unity with the South. Again, one could hardly
conclude that the Southerners had exercised their right to
self-determination as defined by Article 1(1) of the
International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966:
"All peoples have a right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their politcal status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development."
The importance of this element of freedom must be stressed. For
the normal procedure for the exercise of the right of
self-determination is either expressed through the votes of
elected representatives or by allowing the people themselves to
choose through a referendum under some neutral auspices. The
referendum was never held although the Southern representatives
were manipulated in 1955 as we shall see.
Going back to the deliberations of the Juba conference, we 
find many shortcomings. We have already seen that the Southern
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participants had no mandate to take any decisions. In addition
to this the atmosphere surrounding the Conference was not
conducive to free choice due to bribery, undue influence and
even coercion. For example, when Chief Lapponya suggested that
the Principle of Unity could only be decided when Southerners
were grown up, by which time they would be in a position to
decide whether they would be able to join the North or go to
Belgian Congo or Uganda", the Chairman shouted at him that
"People could not get up and go where they like just like 
71that". When asked why they had changed their minds the second 
day, Chief Tembura's reply was that, "judge Shingetti had said
if they did not do so, they would have no say in the future
72government of the Sudan".
The deliberations of Juba Conference should have been 
dismissed as null and void on the legal grounds stated above.
Yet this was the conference which paved the way for the 
Legislative Assembly for the whole country.
D . The Executive Council and the Legislative Assembly, 1948
The outcome of the Administrative Conference 1946 and the
Juba Conference 1947 was the Promulgation of "The Executive
73Council Legislative Assembly ordinance, 1948".
The 1948 ordinance repealed and replaced both the 
Govenor-General's ordinance 1910 and the Advisory Council 
ordinance, 1943. As stated above, it established a new
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Executive Council and Legislative Assembly for the whole Sudan. 
We shall briefly examined the organs of government found 
thereunder.
1. The Executive Council
Section 9 of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly
ordinance stipulated:
"There shall be constituted an Executive 
Council for the Sudan, which shall be 
responsible to the Governor-General for the 
executive and administrative functions of 
government".
The composition of the Council was prescribed as follows:-
"(1) The council shall consist of not less 
than 12 and not more than 18 members.
(2) The council shall be composed of:-
(a) The leader of the Assembly and the other 
Ministers if any.
(b) Not more than four ex officio members, 
appointed by the Governor-General by office 
from amongst the Civil Secretary, the 
Financial Secretary, the Legal Secretary and 
the Khaid.
(c) Not more than three councillors without 
portfolio, appointed by the Governor-General 
at his discretion ...
(d) Such Under-Secretaries as shall be 
appointed for the purpose by the 
Governor-General after taking into 
consideration the views of the Leader of the 
Assembly.
Provided always that not less than half of the 
members of the council at any one time shall 
be Sudanese ...
Normally, there were seven Sudanese and five British on the 
Council to conform with the above provisions.
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2. The Legislative Assembly
As already stated, the ordinance also provided for the
constitution of a Legislative Assembly:
"The Assembly shall compose of ex officio, 
elected and nominated members.".^
The number of nominated members was not to exceed twenty.
The Assembly had a total of eighty-seven members
constituted as follows:-
(i) Fifty-two members elected either by direct or secret 
ballots in the urban areas or through electoral colleges 
in the rural areas.
(ii) Thirteen Southerners appointed on the recommendation of 
the provincial Governors.
(iii) Ten members nominated by the Governor-General at his own 
discretion.
(iv) Twelve ex officio members of the Executive Council.
The Assembly was "entitled to debate and pass resolutions
7 6on any subject matter", except matters reserved for the 
Governor-General.
According to Section 54 of the ordinance,
"The following shall be reserved matters in 
respect of which the Assembly shall have no 
legislative powers:-
(a) The provisions of this ordinance.
(b) The resolutions between the Sudan 
Government and His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom and the Royal Egyptian 
Government.
(c) The relations between the Sudan 
Government and the foreign governments.
(d) The nationality of the Sudanese."
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In fact the most important matters remained vested in the
Governor-General. According to Mayal, R.C., the Public
Relations consultant,
"the aim of the framers of this constitution 
was to provide for the gradual development 
within the framework of the condominium 
agreement of all the necessary political 
machinery of democratic self-government."^^
However, the ordinance was not welcomed by a large section of
the Sudanese community. The Graduates Congress and the National
Unionist parties organized demonstrations against it. Criticisms
levelled against the ordinance were based on the fact that it
had failed to give the Sudanese an effective share of
government.
The Council discussed the budget and formulated
legislations but all these fell short of the expectations of the
Sudanese. Moreover, the Council was not responsible to the
Assembly but to the Governor-General. The Governor-General had
limitless powers which included interference with the decision
7 8of the Assembly. He could veto decisions of the Assembly or
79in the extreme, dissolve it. Other undesirable aspects of the 
Assembly were the presence of ex officio members; insufficient 
representation of intelligentsia; and the insignificant role 
played by the nominated members.
Nevertheless, the creation of the Assembly indirectly paved
the way for self-determination. For, two years later, the
Assembly adopted the following important resolution:
"We, Members of the Legislative Assembly of 
the Sudan, do request your Excellency [the 
Governor-General] to appoint a commission of 
whose members at least half should be 
Sudanese, to re-examine the Legislative
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Assembly and Executive Council Ordinance of 
1948 and, in respect of any of its provisions 
... to make such representations to your 
Excellency for its amendment as they may 
consider will increase the value and enhance 
the efficiency of the Assembly and Council as 
practical instrument of democratic government 
with a full measure of Parliamentary control 
within the framework of the existing 
constitutional agreements."gg
Consequently, the Governor-General appointed the Constitution
Amendment Commission in 1951 under the chairmanship of Stanley
Baker, a British Judge of the High Court. During the same
period developments in local government had reached the stage
whereby Dr. A. H. Marshall, a city Treasurer of Coventry and an
Expert in local government, had been invited to the Sudan in
1949 to study and report on the situation there. The
examination of this development is deferred for the next
chapter.
VI. SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE: 1951-1956
The process of self-government started with the appointment 
of the said Baker Commission.
O 1
A. The Constitution Amendment Commission, 1951
The Constitution Amendment Commission consisted of thirteen 
Sudanese representing all political parties except the Ashigga.
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There were three British and one Southern Sudanese (Buth Dieu). 
The Commission was to recommend to His Excellency the 
Governor-General "the next steps to be taken in the
o ?
constitutional advance to full self-government". However, the 
Commission's work was incomplete. It was dissolved by the 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the Chairman because 
the members could not agree on where the sovereignty of the 
Sudan was to be temporarily vested during the preparations and 
negotiations for self-government. Views were divided between 
vesting it in the Governor-General or in some neutral body. 
Nevertheless, the Commission submitted an informal report that 
was substantive enough and was used by the Governor-General for 
drafting the Self-Government Statute, 1953, details of which 
will be examined later.
Decentralisation of government by "devolution" was never
discussed. It was shelved in favour of safeguards or protection
for the South.
"... such safeguards would therefore be 
necessary until such a time as the South 
itself was in a position to promote its 
interests by the normal process of democratic 
representation, whether under a unitary or a 
federal system"gg
The inclusion of safeguards for the South gave rise to balanced
and interesting opposite views. The arguments for both sides
merit consideration. Those in favour argued:
"Without protection the Southerners will not 
be able to develop along indigeneous lines, 
will be overwhelmed and swamped away by the 
North and deteriorate into a servile community 
hewing wood and drawing water. To pretend 
that there are no fundamental differences 
between them is like covering up a crack in a 
tree trunk with moss. Such process, like any 
other obscuring of the truth is unsound."g^
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On the other hand those opposed to the inclusion of a protection
provision contended that:
"To include a specific safeguard will only 
arouse old suspicion in the North and 
intensify a wound that is beginning to heal.
It will also increase the feeling of 
inferiority possessed by many Southerners. As 
long as the Governor-General can intervene, 
then perhaps it is alright. But once British 
influence wanes and becomes impotent it will 
not matter what safeguards or charters have 
been created. They will make no 
difference."gg
It is not the logic behind the inclusion or non-inclusion of a
safeguard provision that balanced the argument. What emerged
was the crucial question of who would enforce the provision.
o
What after all would be the use of inserting a provision that 
would not be enforced after the departure of the British?
Eventually those in favour of the provision including the 
Southern representative Buth Dieu succeeded at the stage of the 
Commission. The recommendation read:
Recommendation 9
The Council shall consist of the Prime 
Minister and the other Ministers and should 
include a Minister for Southern Affairs who 
should himself be a Southerner selected by the
Prime Minister in consultation with the
Governor-General and with the Southern Members 
of Parliament."gg
The Minister for Southern Affairs was to be responsible for
promoting in the council and introducing in Parliament measures
for the economic and social betterment of the people of Southern
Sudan. He was to be advised by a board appointed for that
purpose. In other words, the recommendation had proposed
decentralisation by "delegation". This would have placed the
Southern Sudan in a position comparable to that obtaining in
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. However, the
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recommendation was deleted during the final self-Government 
negotiations in Cairo in 1953 examined below.
B. The Cairo Agreement, 1953
The Cairo Agreement was signed on February the 12thr 1953
by the Northern Sudanese political parties and ratified by the
condominium powers. The South was not represented on the
grounds that it had no political party. The Southern Liberal
Party which had been formed by Buth Dieu and others in 1951 was
ignored together with the Southern protests sent by a letter to 
87the meeting. The Agreement covered self-determination in the 
Sudan, in particular it laid down the procedures to be followed 
in bringing about sef-determination. Egypt, for the first time, 
recognised the right of the Sudanese to self-determination.
This unexpected good gesture has been explained in terms of 
changes in Egypt. It was to some extent due to the coming to 
power of General Neguib through the Military Coup of 1952. 
Neguib could be expected to be sympathetic to Sudanese 
aspirations since his mother was Sudanese and he had completed 
part of his education in the Sudan.
The terms of the Agreement, inter alia, included:-
1. That a free and neutral atmosphere be provided in the Sudan 
in order for the Sudanese to exercise their right of 
self-determination. To achieve this a three-year transitional 
period was agreed on, during which sovereignty over the Sudan
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was to be kept in a reserve. The dual administration of the 
Sudan had to be liquidated and it had to be administered by the 
Governor-General and his Commission during that period.
2. Sudanese parliament was to pass a resolution expressing 
their desire that arrangements for self-determination would be 
put in motion and the Governor-General was to notify the 
Condominium of the resolution.
3. The Sudanese Parliament was also to enact a Statute for the 
election of a Constituent Assembly which would:-
(i) decide the future of the Sudan by choosing either complete 
independence or some future relationship with Egypt or Britain;
(ii) draw up a constitution for the Sudan compatible with the 
decision on self-determination and draw up an electoral law for 
a permanent Sudanese parliament.
4. Three international commissions (the Governor-General1s 
Commission; the electoral Commission; the Sudanisation 
Commission) were to be set up to prepare the detailed process of 
self-determination ensuring safeguards, impartiality of 
elections and guarantee a generally neutral atmosphere. The 
condominium powers were to accept recommendations made by any of 
the international bodies. The composition and functions of 
these commissions are summarised below:-
(i) The Governor-General1s Commission
This Commission had a Pakistani Chairman, one Egyptian and 
two Sudanese as members. It replaced the Executive Council and
Ill
assisted the Governor-General in the execution of his duties to 
general satisfaction.
(ii) The Sudanisation Commission
This Commission was also made up of mixed membership, one 
British, one Egyptian and three Sudanese. Unlike the other 
commissions it had a Sudanese chairman on the basis of rotation 
of one month each (to safeguard against personal interests), 
plus three non-voting members who included the chairman of the 
public service commission (a Sudanese) and two other members of 
the same Commission (one Sudanese and one British). They were 
to advise the Chairman of the Sudanisation Commission.
The Commission was "to complete the Sudanisation of the 
Administration, the police, the Sudan Defence Force, and any 
other post that may affect the freedom of the Sudanese at the 
time of self-determination ... within a period of not exceeding 
three years".
The Commission was appointed on April the 20th, 1954 but 
surprisingly enough it completed its work on March the 7th 
which was much earlier than expected. However, shortcomings in 
the Commission's work had serious consequences. In the first 
place, due to the lack of any better alternative, most senior 
positions were filled by Sudanese who were both inexperienced 
and insufficiently trained. Secondly, the number of posts 
alloted by the Commission to the South, was a major grievance. 
The total was only 6 junior posts (4 Assistant District 
Commissioners and 2 Mamcurs) out of 800 posts Sudanised.
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"... the results of Sudanisation have come out 
with a very disappointing results, i.e. ... 
well as it appears our fellow Northerners want 
to colonise us for another hundred years."gg
On the question of Sudanisation of posts, Mohamed Omer Beshir
"The Sudanization Committee, in the best 
traditions of the British civil service, 
allocated jobs and made promotions in 
accordance with seniority, experience and 
qualifications. As posts held by Southerners, 
at the time, were far fewer and more junior 
than those held by the Northerners, and as the 
Southerners lacked seniority, experience and 
qualifications, they were not much affected by 
the Sudanization."gg
Beshir is being too fussy since all Sudanese, Northern or
Southern were not qualified for the posts.
(iii) The Electoral Commission
This Commission was composed of seven members (three 
Sudanese, one Egyptian, one British, one American and its 
Chairman, Sukuma Sen). The Commission reviewed the electoral 
laws and supervised elections to the Sudanese parliament with 
notable success, generally attributed to the efforts of the 
Chai rman.
5. Finally the Agreement provided for full Self-Government for 
the Sudan during the transitional period and authorised the 
enforcement of the Self-Government Statute, 1953.
Thus Self-Government was worked out behind the back of 
Southerners. The provision for the appointment of the Minister 
for Southern Affairs was deleted on the grounds that the South 
was no different from the poor areas of the Eastern and Western
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Sudan.
If self-determination really means (which it does) the 
future of a group of people, hpw just was it to deny the 
Southerners' participation at the Cairo negotiations? How 
binding should decisions taken by unauthorised people on behalf 
of others be? It should be remembered that the Northern 
political parties had no mandate from the South. Certainly no 
norm of justice would support such an idea. Yet astonishing as 
it may seem the agreement was effected inspite of all its 
shortcomings.
Commenting on the agreement in his book, The Southern
Sudan, Background to Conflict", Beshir said in his
characteristic understatement:
"The absence of Southerners from this 
discussion was seen as a proof of a desire to 
belittle the South and ignore its demands."^
The problem is not that of merely "belitting" or "ignoring" the
demands of the South. It was a fundamental issue of denying the
right of self-determination, a right recognised by international
law.
C . Self-Government, 1953
As already stated, the Sudanese obtained self-government under 
the provisions of the Self-Government Statute, 1953. This 
Statute resembled the Westminister Model. It provided for the 
establishment of both the Executive and the bicameral
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legislature which are examined below.
1. The Executive
The Executive consisted of the Governor-General, a Prime
Minister and a Council of Ministers appointed by the
Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
Whereas the Governor-General continued to be the "supreme
92constitutional authority within the. Sudan", the Council of 
Ministers was "responsive to parliament for the executive and 
administrative functions of the government". Thus a 
"Responsible Government" had been established, which was an 
improvement on the provisions of the 1948 ordinance. This last 
had made the Executive responsible to the Governor-General and 
not the Assembly.
2. The Legislature
A bicameral legislature replaced the unicameral one. The
91Senate and a House of Representatives were established. 
Justification for the bicameral system was based on the grounds 
that parliament should contain a proportion of men of mature 
experience and judgment, elder statesmen, tribal leaders, 
retired public servants, persons with professional and academic 
qualifications who might not be closely associated with any 
political party or doctrine but whose wisdom and practical 
experience would be of great value to the legislature.
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(i) The Senate
The Senate consisted of fifty members, of whom twenty were 
nominated by the Governor-General at his discretion. The 
remaining thirty were elected from provincial constituencies 
acting as electoral colleges.^ Membership of the Senate was 
restricted to the Sudanese of forty years and above, except for 
the South where the minimum age of 30 years was specified.
(i i) The House of Representatives
The House of Representatives was made up of ninety-seven
members, of whom sixty-eight were directly elected by secret
95ballot while twenty-four were indirectly elected.
Elections to Parliament were held in October 1953 with the 
following results as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Table 1.1 THE SENATE
POLITICAL PARTIES 3Y ELECTION BY NOMINATION TOTAL
National Unionist
Party
Socialist Republican
22 10 32
Party 3 4 7
Southern Party - 1 1
Independent (North) 1 2 3
Independent (South) 1 2 3
Source: Ibid..
Table 1 . 2______THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The National Unionist Party 51
Umma 22
Independents (North) 4
Socialist Republican Party 3
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Independents (South)
Southern Party
Southern Political Association 
Socialist Republican Party 
Front Against Colonialism
4
10
2
3
1
97TOTAL
Source: Great Britain: Foreign Office Self-Determination in the
Sudan, Resume of Developments, p .7.
Thus the National Unionist Party won by a large majority. 
Ismail El Azhari was elected Prime Minister on June 1st 1954, by 
fifty-seven votes to thirty-seven. He appointed fifteen 
Ministers of whom three were Southerners. The Governor-General 
issued a proclamation in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Self-Government Statute certifying that "the Self-Government 
institutions intended to be created under the Statute" had been 
duly constituted in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute. Thus in theory independence had been attained.
D . The Achievement of Independence
However, in practical terms the road to independence 
remained as daunting as ever. It was preceded by the mutiny of 
the Equatorial corps in the South on August the 18th, 1955. 
Southern soldiers rebelled against being transfered to the North 
under the suspicious circumstances which are examined below. 
Unity of the Sudan had to be asserted with the help of the 
British. The outgoing Governor-General, Sir Knox Helm, made a 
deceitful appeal to the Southern mutineers to put down their 
arms, promising that they would not be tried. In spite of the
11.7
promise made, a good number of the mutineers were executed 
secretly. The majority, however, managed to flee to the forest 
of the neighbouring countries of East Africa. These were to 
form the nucleus of the Anyanya movement in 1963. The word 
Anyanya meant snake poison in Moru, Madi and Lotuk-’ languages.
It brought about the Addis Ababa Agreement which will be dealt 
with in the next chapter.
The many causes of the mutiny were enumerated as follows by 
the commission of enquiry into the disturbances in the South:-
1. There is little in common between the South and the North 
in terms of race, religion, language, geography, history 
and culture.
2. Historically, North and South have been traditional 
enemies.
3. The British administrative policy of closed districts 
treated the two parts of the country as separate entities.
4. There was lack of Sudanese nationalism in the whole 
country.
5. In terms of social and economic development, the South was 
lagging behind, and so it felt cheated.
6. Promotions in the Civil Service were unfair to the South.
7. When Southerners demonstrated for a federal status in 1954
the government threatened that "they shall use force of
iron in dealing with any Southerner who will dare attempt
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to divide the 'nation'."
8. A Southern Member of Parliament, Elia Kuze, was arrested 
and charged with criminal intimidation after addressing a 
political rally at Yambio in 1954. He was tried by chiefs 
and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The courts had no
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jurisdiction and the sentence was far too excessive under 
the laws of the country. The commission described the 
trial as "farcical".
9. When Southerners organized demonstrations against the mass 
dismissal of 300 of their colleagues from the Nzara cotton 
scheme in July 1955, (they were supposed to be replaced by 
Northerners), the Government ordered the Army and the 
police to open fire. Northern merchants also joined in the 
shooting and three Southerners were killed on the spot.
10. The most provocative matter, however, was the telegram 
which the committee found to have been forged. The 
telegram was allegedly written by the Prime Minister, 
reading:
"To all my administrators in the three 
Southern Provinces. I have just signed a 
document for self-determination. Do not 
listen to the childish complaints of 
Southerners. Persecute them, oppress them, 
ill-treat them according to my orders. Any 
administrator who fails to comply will be 
liable for prosecution. In three months time 
all of you will come round and enjoy the work 
you have d o n e . " ^
The telegram was widely circulated. The forgery could not,
however, be detected due to the low level of development
and understanding in the South.
After overcoming the major problem of the mutiny in 1955, 
independence was now close at hand. The Southern Liberal party 
moved the first independence motion demanding a federal form of 
government. The Northern politicians, fearing to commit 
themselves to the motion amended it to read that the claim of
q q
Southerners for "federation will be fully considered" by the 
constituent Assembly that would be formed to make a permanent
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constitution for the Sudan. On this basis the Southerners 
agreed to pass the independence motion - it was unanimous 
read ing:
"We, the Members of the House of 
Representatives in Parliament Assembled, 
declare in the name of the Sudanese People 
that the Sudan is to become a fully 
independent sovereign state, and request your 
excellency to ask the two condominium powers 
to recognize this declaration forthwith."^
That was on December the 19th, 1955 and the motion was approved
by both Britain and Egypt. On December the 31st, the
"Transitional Constitution 1956" was adopted by Parliament as a
temporary constitution for the Sudan. Except for minor
modifications, the Constitution was the entire Self-Government
Act, 1953. A full examination of the constitution is undertaken
in the next chapter.
January 1st 1956 was fixed as the official day for 
independence celebrations. However, one major issue remained 
unresolved.
E. The 'Southern Problem1
The 'Southern Problem' has been clearly exposed in nature 
of the above analysis. It arises from the ethical, cultural, 
linguistic, religious, historical and geographical differences 
between the North and the South. The situation is aggravated by 
unequal development between the two parts of the country, the 
South having suffered constant neglect in terms of lack of 
social and economic development. Initially British colonial 
policy gave the South the false hope that it would one day be an
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independent state but this hope was rapidly destroyed in 1946. 
Thereafter the South was prematurely rushed into unity with the 
North on the terms of the North alone. The South considers 
itself to have been denied the inalienable right of 
self-determination.Even if it had been seen by some people to 
have exercised that right, however unconsciously, on December 
19th, 1955, the anticipation had been of a federal and not a 
unitary Sudan. Under a federal system the South would have 
expected the devolution of considerable legislative and 
administrative powers. The failure of the Sudan Government to 
effectively address itself to this issue has resulted in a 
serious constitutional problem for the nation.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE TO 1969
The Sudan did not, like other former British 
possessions, inherit a constitutional package from 
Westminster at independence. She simply adopted the 
Self-Government Statute, 1953 as "The Transitional 
Constitution, 1956" with minor modifications as stated at 
the end of the last chapter. The term "transitional" was 
used because it was meant to be replaced as soon as the 
Constituent Assembly (formed thereafter) could afford to 
pass a new one. Despite this fact the Transitional 
Constitution was to remain in force until 1969 with the 
exception of the period between 1958 and 1964 when it was 
temporarily suspended by Ibrahim Abboud's military junta. 
It was clear that the impossibility of passing a new 
constitution arose from the differing political views in 
the country. Whereas the Southern Sudanese had hoped at 
the very least for a federal and secular constitution, the 
Northern Sudanese aspired to a Unitary and Islamic 
Constitution with some limited form of decentralisation of 
powers. This was obviously unacceptable to the 
Southerners.
Disagreements also featured in the relations between 
the Northern political parties running the successive 
coalition governments. Apart from the bickerings over
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power, the Umma party advocated a constitution along the 
Washington Model while the National Unionist Party (NUP) 
preferred the French model in which the President was 
elected by the Assembly. Under these circumstances it was 
not possible to formulate a generally acceptable 
constitution. Even when some measure of success had been 
achieved in 1968 with the forced passage of the Republican 
Islamic constitution backed by the Umma and the NUP; it
was seriously opposed by the other parties. It was 
immediately overthrown by the military coup in 1969. This 
chapter attempts to examine the successive failures of the 
Sudanese governments to decentralise powers to subordinate 
governments from 1956 to 1969 together with the objectives
i
behind the changes. In doing so, special consideration is 
given to the establishment of modern local government in 
1956; The Provincial Administration in 1960; and the search 
for an autonomous status for the South through the Khartoum 
Round Table Conference (1965); The Report of the Twelve Man 
Committee (1966); The Resolutions of the All Political 
Parties Conference (1966); and the Promulgation of the 1968 
Constitution.
Firstly, however, we shall examine some of the main 
provisions of the Transitional Constitution.
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I. THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION, 1956
The most important difference between the 
Self-Government Statute, 1953, and the Transitional 
Constitution, 1956, was the replacement of the 
Governor-General with the Supreme Commission which acted as 
the Head of State. The Central Government was composed of 
the Supreme Commission, the Prime Minister, the Council of 
Ministers and Parliament (the Senate and House of 
Representatives). Far below this organisation were the 
local government councils established under the Local 
Government Act 1951. The Provincial Governors were in 
between as agents of the central government. The structure 
of government is shown in diagram 2.
A. The Supreme Commission
The Transitional Constitution stipulated:
"Parliament shall elect five persons who 
shall, together constitute the Supreme 
Commission. ... The Supreme Commission 
shall be the highest constitutional 
authority in the Sudan and in it shall 
vest the Supreme Command of the Armed 
Forces of the Sudan.
However, the Supreme Commission was to discharge its
2
functions "on the advice of the Council of Ministers".
This implied that the Commission was a ceremonial Head of 
State only,similar to the President in an Export 
Westminster type of constitution; where executive power is 
exercised by the Prime Minister.
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Other responsibilities of the Commission included the 
appointment of the Prime Minister, and the Ministers "on 
the advice of the Prime Minister", "grant of a free or 
conditional pardon to any convicted person" and 
participation in legislation.
There was invariably only one Southern Sudanese 
included among the appointees of the Members of the 
Commission
B. The Executive
As already stated, the Executive consisted of the
Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers all appointed
by the Supreme Commission but from amongst Members of
3Parliament only. Thus the Cabinet was entirely 
Parliamentary as in the United Kingdom.
1. The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister presided over the meetings of the
Council. He could, however, lose office in any of the
following circumstances:-
"(a) If he ... [ceased] to be qualified 
for membership of Parliament; or
(b) on acceptance by the Supreme 
Commission of his resignation ...
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or
(c) upon the first sitting of the first 
session of a new House of 
Representative"
He was therefore unimpeachable as an individual as in the
UK.
2. The Council of Ministers
Article 27 of the constitution stated;
"The Prime Minister and other Ministers 
shall together constitute a Council of 
Ministers, which shall be responsible to 
Parliament for the executive and 
administrative functions of government."
A proviso was specifically inserted for the appointment of
"not less than two ministers in each council ...
representing Southern Constituencies". However, this right
could be withdrawn if the Commission felt that it was being
abused. Although cases of abuse never arose, the number of
Southerners appointed in the council remained at the
minimum fixed by the constitution. Whatever the objective
of the inclusion of such a proviso, it never amounted to
decentralisation of powers to the South. Unlike the
appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs, whose
specific duty would have been to cater for the interests of
the region, the presence of a Southerner as an ordinary
member of Cabinet could in no way be equated with
decentralisation of Powers to the South.
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C . Parliament
Parliament of course consisted of the Supreme 
Commission, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Houses that functioned as Parliament under the 
Self-Government Statute were allowed to continue . The 
memberships were the same as before (see Chapter 2).
We shall now proceed to consider developments at local 
government level.
D . Local Government, 1956-1969
Unlike the Central Government, there was significant 
develop-ment in local government after independence. The 
history of this development dates back to the Sudan 
Administrative Conference of 1946, which led to the 
invitation of Dr. A.H. Marshall to the Sudan in 1949 as 
mentioned in the last chapter.
Dr. Marshall was invited as an expert on local
government and was given the following assignment:
"To enquire into and report on the policy 
and practice of the Sudan Government in 
respect of Local Government and make 
recommendations upon any matter arising 
from the enquiry.
Marshall toured the Sudan, interviewing both government
officials and the ordinary people. His recommendations
were submitted six months later as follows:
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" (a) Local Government should be in the 
hands of local bodies answerable to an 
electorate. They should be clearly 
separated from the judiciary, enjoy a 
corporate existence and be responsible 
for the making of decisions and for their 
execution.
(b) Local Government must not be 
stereotyped. Though the basic structure 
must be the same throughout the country, 
there must be sufficient flexibility to 
allow for the wide divergence of 
conditions in the Sudan, and to permit of 
modifications from time to time without 
excessive formality ...
(c) New powers should be granted 
piecemeal to local authorities as they 
show themselves capable of assuming 
additional responsibility.
(d) Local authorities should be given 
the greatest possible freedom - including 
the opportunity to make mistakes - which 
is compatible with the local interest, 
and in particular they should be allowed 
to meet all the communal needs of the 
area not meet by other agencies. They 
would thus not necessarily be confined to 
the traditional duties of the local 
authorities in Europe and America, and 
certainly not hampered by the rigid 
application of the "ultra vires doctrine"
(e) Local authorities must have 
independent tax revenue sufficient to 
meet a substantial part of their 
expenditure and not overlapping the 
Central Governments' taxes ...
(f) The working of the Local Government 
should be supervised by Central 
Government departments with power to 
impose standards of performance and to 
susp-end the recalcitrant or inert 
authority.
(g) As an inevitable concomitant of 
central supervision, a system of 
grants-in-aid should be instituted for 
those services for which the State 
demands a national minimum standard of 
performance, and to cater for the needs 
of poorer authorities.
(h) The units of Local Government should 
be financially stable and able to attract 
the best personnel whether as Members or 
officials.
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(i) Until local authorities have been 
provided with proper executives, 
operating apart from the Merkaz, no 
further additions to their duties should 
be made."^
Certainly, Dr. Marshall's report was far-reaching in terms
of recommending the decentralisation of powers to
responsible local governments. In particular, the
recommendation for the decentralisation of powers to render
various services, prepare budget and raise revenue locally
for their own use, be autonomous and answerable to the
local electorate were considerable. It was more or less
similar to English local government. Suffice it to say
that in accepting these proposals, decentralisation was the
primary objective of the government. For, in addressing
the Council on the presentation of the report, the Civil
Secretary, Robertson, said:
"The main reasons for setting up Local 
Government authorities are:-
(1) The need for decentralisation,
(2 ) the necessity to adapt services to 
local conditions, (3) the wish to 
inculcate a sense of political 
responsibility, (4) the wish to train 
public representatives for the wider 
sphere of Central Government, (5) the 
desire for a local body whose duty is to 
watch over the general interests of the 
citizen."g
On this note, the recommendations were accepted, presented 
to the Legislative Assembly and finally enacted as the 
Local Government ordinance, 1951. The implementation of 
this law is given detailed consideration in Chapter 4.
Having looked at the structure of government at 
independence we should proceed to examine how the post 
independence governments tried to grapple with the demand
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of the South for a federal status.
A constitution commission was formed in December,
1956, but of the forty-six members on the Commission, only 
three were Southerners; of course, they were hopelessly 
outvoted whenever the issue of federalism cropped up. In 
December of the following year the Prime Minister, Abdullah 
Khalil, having replaced Azhari in a Censor Motion in July 
1956, announced to Parliament that the constitution 
commission "had given the Southern claim for federation 
very serious consideration, and found that it would not
Q
work m  this country."
The statement was never substantiated. Naturally the 
Southern Members of Parliament were disappointed. They 
walked out together in protest after delivering the 
following speech:
"Mr. President, Sir,
the South has no ill-intention whatsoever 
towards the North; the South simply 
claims to run its local affairs in a 
united Sudan. The South has no intention 
of separating from the North for had that 
been the case nothing on earth would have 
prevented the demand for separation. The 
South claims to federate with the North, 
the right that the South undoubtedly 
possesses as a consequence of the 
principle of free self-determination 
which reason and democracy grant to a 
free people. The South will at any 
moment separate from the North if and 
when the North so desires, directly or 
indirectly, through political, social and 
economic subjugation of the South."^Q
Clearly the South had sought for decentralisation of powers
in the form of federation.
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It could in no way be misconstrued that the South had
wanted to separate from the North. To summarily dismiss
the demand was to underestimate the seriousness of the
problem and the factors underlying it. In their book
entitled, The Problem of the Southern Sudan (1963) Oduho
and Deng said:
"Full consideration can have several 
interpretations, but what the South 
considered important was good faith, and 
this they found lacking in the North.
To rely on good faith when all along there had been none
from the beginning was an admission of their naivity on the
part of Southerners. Parliament was dissolved and
elections were held for the second Parliament in February
1958 without passing a permanent constitution for the
Sudan. The constitution commission found it difficult to
decide on the form of government to be adopted for the
country as stated earlier. The government of Khalil which
succeeded Azhari's in the censOr motion in 1956 was,
however, a coalition of the two parties.
The elections held in February 1957 were direct from 
single member geographical constituencies. The voters were 
required to be at least 21 years old. Women did not,
however, participate because "it was not considered they
<np£> t 2
[were] sufficiently conscious^politically".
The results of the 1958 elections were as shown in 
Table 3.1
Table 3.1 THE 1958 ELECTION RESULTS
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1. Umma Party 63 seats
2 . National Unionist Party 45 seats
3. Peoples Democratic Party 27 seats
4. Liberal Party 20 seats
5. Southern Independents 16 seats
6 . Others 2 seats
Source: African World, May 1958, p. 23.
Abdullah was returned as Prime Minister and a similar 
coalition was formed as before. But before the new 
government could settle down to thrash out the outstanding 
problems, the Army seized power in a military coup d'etat 
in November, 1958.
H . THE FIRST MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE SUDAN, 1958-1964
The nation was taken by surprise by the news of the
military takeover on November 17th 1958, when General
Ibrahim Abboud made the following announcement:
"You are no doubt aware of the state of 
degeneration, chaos and instability which 
threatened the individual as well as the 
community, and which extended to the 
Machinery of Government and the Public 
Utilities without exception. The 
suffering of the country is solely due to 
the bitter strife between the parties 
vying to secure personal gain by all ways 
and means, irrespective of whether these 
means are legitimate or not ... We have 
been patiently watching the successive 
governments, hoping that the state of 
affairs will change for the better ... 
Unfortunately, the situation continued to 
deterioriate ... As a natural reaction to
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the Army and the Security Forces had no 
alternative but to takeover ... to put an 
end to the c h a o s . " ^
Injspite of the explanation given by Abboud, there were good
reasons to believe that the coup was a sell out by the
civilian government to the army. This was evident from the
statement of the ousted Prime Minister, Khalil, to the
three ex-Members of Parliament from the South.
"My experience has shown me that this 
country is not yet ready for democracy; I 
have therefore decided, at the suggestion 
of my advisors, to hand the reigns of 
this country to the Army. Though 
political parties have now been banned I 
still believe that the Umma people and 
the people of the South will work in 
close cooperation."^4
Furthermore, in his writing in 1978, on "The Changing
Pattern of Civilian Military Relations in the Sudan",
Mudathir Abdel Rahim concluded that "the military takeover
was largely brought about through the agency and with the
apparent approval of the Prime Minister Sayyid Abdalla
Khahil" .15
However, the real objectives for doing so remain a 
puzzle. Southerners generally believed that the coup was 
intended to forestall the Southern demand for a federal 
constitution. The demand for federalism had already
1 6appealed to the people in the Eastern and Western Sudan.
Moreover, the election manifesto of the Southern Federal
Party formed in 1957 was very articulate. English and
Christianity were to be recognized on equal terms with
Arabic and Islam. An independent Army was to be
established for the South with a separate programme for
17economic development.
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Certainly these proposals entailed considerable
decentralisation of powers, which was contrary to the
wishes of the political leaders in the North. To some
extent, the Southern suspicion could have been correct
because of the statement which the Governor of Equatoria
Province, Ali Baldo, made on the anniversary of the
November Revolution in 1961:
"We thank God that by virtue of 
marvellous efforts of the Revolution 
Government, the country will remain 
forever united. You should turn a deaf 
ear to any evil talk which comes from 
politicians, as you well know what has 
come out of them in the past few years 
and you certainly don't want bloodshed 
again in the South. You are aware that 
anybody who interferes with public peace 
and tranquility will be dealt with 
severely and at once. During the days of 
Parliament the Southern Parliamentary 
Members advocated a federal form of 
government for the South, such ideas are 
gone with the politicians."^g
The outside world could not really understand what had
caused the coup. In the first place it was reported that
the 1958 "elections were conducted in an orderly 
19fashion". Secondly, a US mission had found a few months
before the coup, that the Sudanese civil service, inspite
of its shortcomings was the finest in the Middle East. To
claim that the deterioration in the country had "reached
2 0the verge of an abyss" is hard to believe. Finally, 
although the situation had deteriorated economically, due 
to failure to dispose of cotton (Sudan's main cash crop) in 
1957 followed by a poor harvest in 1958, there were 
prospects for recovery. The mere fact of a takeover by the
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army could not have been expected to perform any miraculous 
achievement in those circumstances.
Whatever the real objectives of the coup, three issues 
were clear. Traditionally, the Umma Party and the National 
Unionists Party were divided for both political and 
sectional differences. As seen in Chapter 2 the Umma were 
identified with the Ansar religious sect whose objective 
was to have an independent Sudan while the NUP base
was from the Khatmiyya religious sect that preferred unity 
with Egypt; and although they had come together at 
independence, this was only used as a strategy for 
expelling the colonialists. Otherwise the series of 
coalitions between the two parties remained ever unstable. 
Their foreign policies also differed in that Umma was in 
favour of US aid while NUP was not. In addition, the 
Southern problem remained large in the background. So the 
government felt a military solution would resolve the 
problem.
A. THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL
On assuming power the military junta issued a series 
of constitutional order which reorganized the government in 
the country.
Constitutional order No. 1 established a "Supreme 
Military Council" as the highest constitutional authority
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in the Sudan - in which was vested the legislative, 
executive and judicial authority. All these powers were 
delegated by Council to the President. Constitutional 
order No. 3 suspended the Sudan Transitional Constitution, 
1956, dissolved parliament and all political parties. The 
imposition of the Supreme Military Council was typical of 
any military government in the third world. The Supreme 
Council consisted of thirteen military officers headed by 
the President of the Supreme Council, General Ibrahim 
Abboud. Thus a highly centralised Governor-General's 
system of government which we saw in 1899 was repeated some 
sixty years later.
Initially the Military Government could conceive of no 
constitutional solution to the Southern problem, thinking 
the rebellion in the South could be crushed militarily. It 
was preoccupied with formulating programmes of 
"Arabisation" and "Islamisation" of the Southern Sudanese. 
This was the period when the South witnessed the opening of 
many Islamic institutions (such as ""Khalwas" and "Mahdis") 
all over the region to provide basic and advanced Islamic 
studies.
Christian missionaries were expelled at short notice
from the South in February 1964, under the Missionary
21Societies Act, 1962. The Act provided that in order for
Missionaries to underi<xfce evangelical duties in the Sudan
they needed to obtain licences for doing so from the
Minister of Interior. The licences were to be renewed 
22annually. However, the renewal of the licences were as a
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rule, refused to missionaries in the South. The government
accused the missionaries of:
"Implanting in the Southern Sudanese, 
Christianity, the use of English and the 
hatred of the North and separatism."^
The military government attempted to effect some 
constitutional changes at the local government level but 
mainly in order to promote participation in government. In 
December 1959 a reform commission (the Commission on the 
Coordination of the Central and Local Government) was 
appointed under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice, 
Mohamed Abbu Rannat.
B . The Commission on Coordination of the Central and Local 
Government, 1959
Ironically, the Commission was composed of the 
representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign 
Affairs, Education and Health and not the Ministries of the 
Interior and Local Government, who were excluded on the 
grounds that both were subject to enquiry. It was ironical 
because the Ministries most unfamiliar with matters of 
local government were expected to recommend suitable 
changes without the participation of those Ministries 
involved.
The Commission had broad terms of reference:-
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"To carry out an extensive survey of 
present administrative machinery (local 
and central) and to submit its 
recommendations as to the best system 
from all points of view for an efficient 
unified administration in the Sudan 
whether through local government as 
practised now, centralized government or 
both ."24
According to President Abboud, with the appointment of the
Commission:
"... It [was]hoped that this [would] 
ultimately pave the way for the 
constitutional framework which is suited 
to the Sudanese way of life and [would] 
avoid evils arising from the unthinking 
importation and mechanical application of 
systems from abroad."25
However, one thing was clear when the Commission was
appointed; the presence of the Ministries of Interior and
local government side by side had brought about
"duplication of work, undefined responsibility, delays in
execution, overlapping of duties and extra expenses in the
2 6
cost of administration". Moreover, the Sudanese 
Government had been preoccupied with this problem since 
1953.
The Commission made the following recommendations in 
1960:-
1. The structure of Local Government should remain 
unaltered since there was nothing wrong with it. However, 
members would not be elected but appointed to the Council 
since elections produced low grade members.
2 . Provincial Administration should be established in
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every Province on the basis of the existing provinces. The 
Provincial Administration was to consist of a Government 
Representative; a Province Council and a Province Authority 
(for details see Chapter 4).
3. The Office of the District Commissioner should be 
abolished; the District Commissioner himself should be 
incorporated as Local Government Inspector in the single 
list with the Executive officers of the Council under the 
Ministry of Local Government. Certainly the presence of 
the District Commissioner in the local councils was a 
brilliant idea because it gave the Councils opportunity for 
wise guidance and supervision from people eminently suited 
to ^ Ur* tt/N£ £<. .
4. The Ministries of Interior and Local Government should
not be amalgamated because:
"The Ministry of Interior [was] concerned 
with public security, while the Ministry 
of Local Government [was] responsible for 
the development of Local Government in 
the country and the administration and 
maintenance of services ... undoubtedly 
these two Ministries [would] increase 
every year in a way which [would make] 
the amalgamation of them in one structure 
highly impracticable."27
If that was the case, how did problems of duplication of
functions and conflicts of jurisdiction arise? It seems
the Commission did not consider the relationship between
the two Ministries adequately.
The Commission really did nothing other than recommend 
the establishment of an extra tier of local government at
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the Provincial level, contradicting Dr. Marshall’s 
recommendation that the multiplicity of tiers was 
inappropriate. How this worked out in practice will be 
fully discussed in Chapter 4.
The recommendations were promulgated by the Military
2 8Government into the Provincial Administration Act, 1960 
the implementation of which is also examined in the said 
Chapter 4.
According to the Minister of the Interior, El Maghboul 
E1 Amin:
"The aims of the new system are 
three-fold - first decentralisation, 
secondly, participation of citizens in 
the responsibility of governments and 
thirdly coordination in the working of 
the different departments at provincial 
level. The centralization which vests 
all responsibilities in the Headquarters 
of the Ministries in the capital is no 
longer a suitable pattern of government 
for this age, particularly in a wide and 
extensive country like the Sudan. The 
new system has therefore catered for the 
devolution of a wide and varied range of 
powers from the Centre, to be exercised 
at provincial level.”
Decentralisation was therefore an important objective of
the 1960 reforms in local government, the success of which
is assessed in Chapter 4. The structure of government
established is shown in Diagram 3.
The next important step taken by the Military 
Government was the appointment of "The Constitution 
Development Commission" announced in December 1961.
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C . The Constitution Development Commission, 1961
The Constitution Development Commission was also
charied by Chief Justice Abbu Rannat and was composed of
professionals, with one Southerner, Clement Mboro. The
terms of reference for the Commission were as follows:-
" (1) To examine and report on the 
introduction of elections in Local 
Government Councils and the determination 
of the proportion of elected members to 
each council thereof;
(2) To examine and recommend proposals 
to set up a Central Council at a national 
level and to draw up legislation for a 
legislative body, some of the members of 
which to be elected by the provincial 
councils and the remainder to be 
selected?
(3) To recommend the duration of the 
Central Council?
(4) To examine any matter arising out of 
the above-mentioned subjects;
(5) To have authority tOi.or seek advice 
from any competent person."^
Obviously this Commission had nothing to do with
decentralisation as can be seen from its terms of
reference. The Commission submitted its recommendations in
1962 which led to the promulgation of the Central Council
Act, 1962.
D. The Central Council Act, 1962
The Central Council Act, 1962 was used as a temporary 
constitution for the country. It provided for the
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establishment of a Central Council to act as the
legislature together with the President of the Armed
Forces. The Council was to comprise:-
"Seventy-two members of whom fifty-four 
[were] to be elected by the province 
councils and eighteen to be appointed by 
the president.
The Council was to be chaired by a speaker elected from 
amongst its members. It was to last for two years only 
from the beginning of its first session, "or for such other
period as may be necessary for the enactment of a new
• • . . 39.................................................
constitution". However, it hardly lasted for two years
because of the successful civilian coup staged in October
1964.
The Council was empowered to debate any subject matter
and pass resolutions thereon. Although the President of
the Supreme Armed Forced was not surprisingly empowered to
veto the decisions of the Council, they were not
j usticiable:
"The validity of any proceedings in 
Council shall not be called in question 
before any court or other authority on 
the ground of any alleged irregularity of 
procedure."23
According to President Abboud, the members of the Council
were the "noble sons and honest servants" whose
responsibilities were:-
"(1 ) the representation and defence of 
its rights and obligations; (2 ) 
preservation of its unity and solidarity;
(3) formulation of legislation that 
coincided with the role it is destined to 
play and its future hopes; (4) watch and 
control of its resources to develop and 
diversify them and guard them against 
waste; either through oversight or 
negligence; and (5) last but not least 
the constitutional development that will
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carry it to its goals.
The main differences between the Central Council Act and 
the Transitional Constitution or the Self-Government 
Statute for that matter were in the composition of the 
executives and the legislatures. Otherwise the rest of the 
provisions of the Act were similar to those of the previous 
constitutions. Whereas the Transitional Constitution 
provided for the Supreme Commission, the Prime Minister and 
Council of Ministers, the Central Council Act provided for 
the President of the Supreme Military Council and the 
Military Council itself. On the other hand, the 
Self-Government Statute provided for the Governor-General, 
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (as already seen) .
The composition of the Central Council was different 
in that it was not only smaller in size but had appointed 
ex officio members while there were no such members in the 
previous legislatures of 1953 and 1956. Moreover, whereas 
the Central Council legislated alone without any other 
body, the Senate was part and parcel of the previous 
legislatures.
However, inspite of these differences none of the 
three constitutions considered decentralisation of powers. 
Surprisingly, no reference was even made to the Provincial 
Administration Act, 1960 in the Central Council Act, 1962.
The last effort made by the Military Government was to 
appoint a National Commission on Southern Affairs in 
September 1964.
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E. The National Commission on Southern Affairs 1964
The National Commission on Southern Affairs was 
chaired by Ahmed Mohamed Yassin. It had a total membership 
of twenty-six, equally appointed from the North and the 
South.
The terms of reference for the Commission were:-
"Without affecting the Constitutional set 
up and the principle of our unified 
government, the Commission have to look 
into the causes which affect the state of 
harmony between the Northern and Southern 
parts of the Sudan, and to submit the 
recommendations necessary to restore 
confidence, internal stability and 
national unity."35
Apparently the terms of reference designed for the
Commission, especially the opening phrase directing the
Commission to make recommendations "without affecting the
constitutional set up and the principle of our unified
government", was devised in order to preclude consideration
of possibilities of decentralisation of government.
The Commission started its work towards the end of the 
year but before long it had provoked serious controversy 
which led to the overthrow of the Military Government by a 
civilian revolution in October 1964. Matters came to a 
head as the Commission started to gather opinion about 
government policy towards the South. Not only were the 
policies concerning the South criticised but other policies
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of the government were attacked as well, an example of
which was the Nile Waters Agreement signed with Egypt in
1960. Attempts by the government to ban political rallies
led to clashes between the police and the students in the
University of Khartoum campus during which a student was
killed. This incident was interpreted as abuse of academic
freedom which offered an opportunity for the opponents of
the government to capitalize on - within a week of the
Supreme Military Council was dissolved due to extensive
civil disobedience organized by the students, all
professional groups and trade unions. Abboud resigned
three weeks later. The Committee for Public Safety formed
by the demonstrators appointed a caretaker government to
assume power. According to Edgar O'Ballance, author of The
Secret War in the Sudan (1977),
"The Northern politicians were far more 
interested In ending the military regime 
than in solving the Southern problem.
However, indirectly and unexpectedly, the 
Southern problem caused the fall of 
Abboud1s government."
O'Ballance's accurate observation is supported by the fact
that even the successive governments were never serious in
solving the problem.
III. THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, 1965
The caretaker government was representative of the 
political parties in the Sudan under the leadership of
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Prime Minister Sir El Khatim El Khalifa, a moderate, and 
once a senior Education Officer in the South. It was hoped 
that his moderate views and old connections with the South 
would help in resolving the 'Southern Problem', for which 
his government was primarily formed. Elections were to be 
held after three months. Two veteran Southern politicians, 
Clement Mboro and Ezibon Mondiri, were appointed in his 
Cabinet to assist in the task. The step taken by the 
Caretaker Government was to convene a Round Table 
Conference in Khartoum in March, 1965.
A. The Khartoum Round Table Conference, 1965
The Khartoum Round Table conference was attended by 
the following:-
1. All political parties in the Northern Sudan, namely 
the Umma; the National Unionist Party; The Islamic Charter 
Front; The Peoples Democratic Party; The Professional 
Front; and the Sudan Communist Party.
2. Three political parties from the South which were the 
Southern Front; and the two wings of Sudan African National 
Union (the external wing led by Aggrey Jaden and the 
internal wing led by William Deng).
3. Representatives of the following African countries - 
Uganda; Kenya; Tanzania; Ghana; Nigeria; and United Arab 
Republic (as observers).
In his opening address to the conference the Prime
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Minister said its aim was:
"To discuss the Southern Sudan question 
with the view of reaching an Agreement 
which [had to] satisfy the regional 
interests of the South as well as the 
national interests of the Sudan,
According to M.O. Beshir, the Secretary-General to the
Conference, the phrase to "satisfy the regional interests
of the South as well as the national interest of the Sudan"
amounted to "a rejection at once of separatism and of the
3 8
status q u o , without this being clearly stated". Assuming 
that the status quo referred to meant the centralised system 
of government, then the only alternative to centralisation 
and separatism is some form of decentralisation. However, 
the conference did not seriously consider decentralisation 
as an alternative.
The conferen ce began in an atmosphere of hesitancy
and hostility? expectedly it was between the Northern and
Southern Sudanese who are traditional enemies. The leader
of the Peoples Democratic Party, Sheikh Abdel Rahman, was
not so enthusiastic about the conference. Discussions
almost broke down when Aggrey Jaden, leader of SANU
external delivered the following speech:
"The Sudan falls sharply into two 
distinct areas, ethnic groups, and 
cultural systems. The Northern Sudan is 
occupied by a hybrid Arab race who were 
united by their common language, common 
culture and common religion; and they 
look to the Arab world for their cultural 
and political inspiration. The people of 
the Southern Sudan on the other hand, 
belong to the African ethnic group of 
East Africa. They do not only differ 
from the hybrid Arab race in origin,
arrangement and basic system, but in all
conceivable purposes - There is nothing 
in common between the various sections of 
community, ncjbody of shared belief, and
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above all the Sudan has failed to compose 
a single community. g
Gaden left the conference room in protest soon after
delivering this biting statement and flew to Zaire within a
couple of hours.
The Southern Front, however, was more diplomatic. It
demanded that the people of the South be allowed to
exercise their right for self-determination. This demand
led the Northern Sudanese Political Parties to fear that
the South would opt for a separate state and they signed a
joint memorandum stating:
"We reject the request for Plebiscite in 
the South for the following reasons:
1. Because the principle for 
self-determination is a right for the 
nation and not any section thereof ...
2. Because the Sudanese Parliament 
elected in 1953 was truly representative 
of the Sudanese People and its election 
was supervised by a respectful 
international commission. That 
Parliament has determined the destiny of 
the Sudan and declared it a free 
independent sovereign state comprising 
all the territories of the Sudan with all 
its known boundaries. As such it was 
recognised by the international society. 
Self-determination therefore for the 
Sudanese people took place in December
Commenting on the issue of self-determination, Abel Alier,
a Southern participant at the conference wrote:
"Those who stood for self-determination 
have been misunderstood, partly because 
many people did not understand the term 
"self-determination", and partly because 
the position taken allowed very little 
room for the Northern Political leaders 
to avoid facing the Southern problem.
Many thought (wrongly, of course) that 
this stand meant separation. In a way 
those who equated separatism with 
self-determination might have also been 
right, but only because they suspected 
that the result of the free choice by the
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Southerners might be separation.
Whether the meaning of self-determination was misunderstood 
or not, the arguments of the Northern political parties 
were invalid. Nowhere is it stated in the international 
codes that the right for self-determination is limited to a 
nation. It is a right exercisable by a group of people, 
which does not necessarily have to be a nation. Had it 
been limited to a nation only, then Sudan would not have 
even qualified to exercise it in 1953 when the Sudan was 
far from being a nation.
A nation is a historically evolved, stable community 
of language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
make-up manifested in a community of culture - the 
ingredients of which are totally lacking In the Sudan. If 
it is argued that what took place on December 19th, 1955, 
was the exercise of the right for self-determination, then 
as we saw at the end of the last chapter Southerners in the 
Assembly supported the 'independence' motion on the 
condition that the South would be eventually granted a 
federal status.
Finally, the SANU internal wing led by William Deng, 
proposed a federal solution to the problem but the Northern 
political parties were unwilling to accept anything more 
than local autonomy. By the time Deng was trying to come 
down to meet their expectations, they had already run out 
of patience. In the end, it was 'agreed' that more 
Southerners should be recruited into the Civil Service, the 
Police, Army, etc. A University was to be established in
156
the South and freedom of language and religion was to be 
promoted.
The real constitutional problem would have been 
ignored had it not been for observers from the African 
states who proposed the formation of a working committee. 
After close study of the problems appropriate 
recommendations were to be made to the second Round Table 
Conference in Khartoum to be reconvened after three months.
The acceptance of this suggestion led to the
appointment of the famous Twelve-Man Committee whose
deliberations are examined further on. Monsur Khalid,
Numeiri's Foreign Minister correctly summed up the outcome
of the conference as follows:
"... the Northern political parties were 
not prepared to meet the Southerners 
half-way. Islamists and Arabists were 
against the granting of autonomy. Muslim 
brothers saw the problem in terms of 
Islam versus Christianity and so 
continued to pay lip service to national 
unity."42
Thus the outcome of the 1965 conference was disastrous for 
the South as it did not achieve any concrete solution. The 
proposals for decentralisation were re/.ected by the 
Northern political parties.
We shall now consider what the Twelve-Man Committee
d i d .
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B . The Twelve-Man Committee, 1965
The Twelve-Man Committee was equally representative of 
the North and the South. The terms of reference given to 
the Committee were inter alia, identical with the statement
A “3
the Prime Minister made at the opening of the Conference. 
Unfortunately, the Committee could not render its report 
within three months as previously agreed. It had a 
difficult task over a year but finally managed to recommend 
a system of decentralised government* There was to be a 
Central Government for the Sudan and a regional government 
for the South and possibly for other parts of the country 
as well. The powers of the Central Government as defined 
by the Committee included:-
(1) National Defence
(2) External Affairs
(3) Currency
(4) Communications and
Telecommunications
(5) Foreign Trade
(6) Nationality
(7) Customs
(8) Inter-Regional Trade
Powers which were to be concurrent to both the Central and 
regional governments were:-
"i) Security Forces:
1) The National Legislature shall by 
enactment, organize the security forces.
This will include:
a) Recruitment and use of National 
Police force which carries out functions 
assigned to such forces.
b) The recruitment and use of local 
police forces.
2) The Head of National Executive shall 
be the ultimate authority as regards 
security forces and can in certain 
circumstances place any of these forces 
under his direct command.
Subject to 1) and 2) above the region
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shall recruit and use the local police 
force.
ii) Education:
1) The policy of education shall be 
national and in the hands of the Centre. 
Police has been defined to include at 
least the following: Education, 
Definition of Standard and 
Qualifications. But as there are some 
regional peculiarities that reflect on 
education this fact must be given its due 
consideration in formulating the policy.
2) That the administration of education 
up to intermediate level (between primary 
and secondary schools) should be the 
responsibility of the region.
3) And that it should be concurrent in 
the secondary stage so that the Centre 
and the region may each establish such 
schools and administer them.
4) That higher education 
(post-secondary) should be in the hands 
of the Centre.
iii) Public Health 
The Centre should retain:
1) The general policy and planning.
2) Education and training of doctors, 
the registration and doctors and all the 
professions attached to the medical 
profession.
3) Control and supervision of assisted 
projects.
4) National policy for nutrition.
5) Control over drugs and poisons.
6) Medical research and control of 
epidemics.
7) Registration of births and deaths.
8) Hospitals: the licensing and 
supervision for maintenance of the 
standards is the province of the centre - 
but the administration is concerned, so 
that the Centre and the region may each 
administer the hospitals established by
159
it."
And the following to be transfered to the Region:
"1) Control of epidemic disease.
2) Environmental health services.
3) School health services.
4) Health education.
5) Maternity and child-welfare 
services.
6) Control of markets.
7) Training of village midwives.
8) Training of medical assistants and 
opening of dispensaries.
iv) Antiquities:
Both the Centre and the Region may carry 
out its excavations.
v) Labour:
1) The Centre shall lay down the policy.
2) The execution of the policy as laid 
down in the legislations should be by the 
region."45
The Committee recommended the transfer of the following 
powers to the region:
"1) Regional and Local Government 
administration.
2) Regional public information.
3) Promotion of tourism.
4) Museums and zoos.
5) Exhibitions.
6) Projects: Establishment of local
roads, maintenance of main roads - town 
and village planning.
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7) Protection of parents, crops and 
pastures - according to national 
legislations.
8) Protection and development of animal 
resources - according to national
legi slations.
9) Land utilization and agricultural 
development in accordance with the 
national plan for development.
10) The study and development of the 
languages and local culture.
11) Commerce and industry and local
industries - organization of markets -
trade licences, formation of cooperative
societies.".c 4 6
The Regional Government was to have a legislative assembly 
and an Executive Machinery. The Regional Assembly was to 
be directly elected on similar conditions and 
qualifications as those of the central parliament. Members 
of the Executive Council in the region were to be elected
by the regional legislature. Thus the recommendation was
at last in line with the general pattern of distribution of 
powers in decentralised governments discussed in Chapter 7.
The Committee, however, disagreed over the following 
points:-
1. The method for the appointment of the Chief Executive 
for the region. The Northern representatives proposed that 
the Central Government should nominate two candidates from 
which the regional legislature would elect one. But the 
Southern representatives wanted the Chief Executive to be 
freely elected by the Members of the regional legislature 
only.
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2. There were three options for the number of units into 
which the Sudan was to be divided.
(i) That the Sudan be divided in four regions, East, 
West, South and North.
(ii) That the Sudan be divided between North and 
South only.
(iii) That the Sudan be divided into nine regions 
based on the existing provincial boundaries (the South 
would have been divided into three, Baher El Ghazal, 
Equatoria and Upper Nile).
The issue of financial arrangements for the regional 
governments was deferred.
The relationship^between the Central and regional
authorities were defined by stating that sovereignty is
granted to parliament:
"1) to protect the vital interests of 
the country; and
2) to guarantee the coordination of 
regional legislations and to provide 
leadership and initiative . .. Before any 
such legislation is passed by parliament 
there must be free consultations with the 
regions concerned ... in case of public 
security emergency occasioned by external 
or internal threat the centre may either 
suspend any of the regional powers or 
dissolve the Regional Assembly provided 
that in the latter case, elections must 
take place within one month after the 
emergency ..."^
The Committee's report, although detailed and thorough, was
not considered by another Round Table conference. It was,
however, presented to the newly-elected Government which
for reasons best known to itself did not consider the
reconvening of a second Round Table conference necessary.
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IV. THE RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, 1966-1968
After the failure of the Round Table Conference, the 
Northern political parties, in particular the Umma and the 
National Unionists, pressed hard for elections to be held 
according to schedule on April 1965. The elections were 
thus held but they were boycotted by the Southern political 
parties and the People's Democratic Party. The Southern 
political parties were obviously disappointed with the 
outcome of the Round Table Conference. The People's 
Democratic Party argued that partial elections (with South 
excluded) would lead to the separation of the South from 
the North. The results of the elections are shown in Table 
3.2.
Table 3.2 NATIONAL ELECTIONS RESULTS, 1965
1. Umma Party
2. National Unionist Party
3. Communist Party
Muslim Brothers 
TOTAL
85 seats 
56 seats
11 seats (out of 15 seats 
alloted to 
graduates)
21 seats 
173 seats.
Note: 60 seats were reserved for the South
Source: African World, July 1965, p. 19.
Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub of the Umma Party was elected 
Prime Minister in another coalition government of Umma and
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the National Unionists. Mahgoub's government decided to 
call the all political parties conference to discuss the 
report of the Twelve-Man Committee.
The All Political Parties Conference, 1966
The All Political Parties Conference was attended by 
all political parties except the People's Democratic Party, 
the Islamic Socialist Party and the Republican Party. They 
boycotted the conference on the grounds that they did not 
agree with the recommendations of the Twelve-Man Committee. 
The communists were not invited to the Conference because 
they were the most extreme opponents of the government in 
the Northern Sudan.
The terms of reference for the Conference were:
"To consider the points of difference in
the Twelve-Man Committee report: the
regional geography and the procedure for
electing the regional governor; and - to
recommend whether the Round Table
Conference should be reconvened to
reconsider the report of the Twelve-Man
Committee, or whether the matter should
be referred to the Constitution
Commi ttee.".0 48
At the same time, the government formed a Constitution 
Committee to draft a permanent constitution for the Sudan.
The Conference was chaired by Mohamed Ali Shingetti, 
the manipulator of the Juba Conference of 1947. His 
presence cast much doubt on the real intentions of this 
conference. The differences of views between the
164
Twelve-Man Committee were reported to have been resolved as 
follows:-
1. That the Chief Executive in a region should be chosen 
by the Central Government after consultation with the 
region. In other words, three names of candidates were to 
be presented by the Central Government to the Regional 
Assembly which would elect one for appointment as Chief 
Executive. If the Assembly rejected the first three 
candidates then another list of three would also be 
presented for consideration. The candidates were to come 
from within the Assemly itself in which case he would be 
responsible to both the Assembly and the Head of Government 
in the Centre. The justifications for this procedure 
were: -
(i) That the Chief Executive was to be the representative 
of the Head of State on whom the Central Government was to 
devolve its powers in addition to his obligations to the 
Regional Assembly.
(ii) That the appointment of the Chief Executive by the 
Central Government would be governed by objectivity, 
efficiency and qualifications necessary for carrying out 
his duties.
(iii) That the election of the Chief Executive by the 
region might subject him to political and partisan 
influence. These reasons do not carry much substance 
because decentralisation by devolution necessarily means 
the involvement of the people concerned in the election of 
their representatives and leaders. To suggest or do 
otherwise is to undermine or contradict that very
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obj ective.
2. That the Sudan be divided into nine regions on the 
basis of the existing provinces because it was preferable 
to start with the existing boundaries which would 
facilitate the administrative activities within smaller and 
manageable units. The South, from the Conference's point 
of view was too large to be administered from one regional 
capital. Although the conference was right with regard to 
the size of the South, it had overlooked the meagre 
financial and skilled manpower capacity the South or even 
the Sudan for that matter had.
The Conference resolved that the time was 
"inopportune" for reconvening a Round Table Conference. No 
reasons were given to substantiate this point. Yet, 
considering the nature of the problem and the circumstance ; 
of the time, no moment could have been more opportune than 
that. To delay an early solution was to increase the 
problem. The outcome of the resolutions w a s  apparent in 
the 1968 Republican constitution.
V. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN, 1968
The 1968 constitution was unique and controversial. 
It was Unitary, republican, Islamic and purported to 
decentralise powers to nine regional governments in the
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Sudan allowing any other Regions to form some kind of "a 
regional association" at a higher level. Unfortunately, 
the 1969 Military Coup overtook the implementation of the 
Constitution. Otherwise the structure of government which 
would have been established under the constitution can be 
seen in diagram 4. The Constitution did not, however, make 
any mention of local governments. Presumably local 
government councils as established under the Local 
Government Act, 1951 would have continued to stay while the 
Provincial Administrations created by the Provincial 
Administration Act, 1960 would have been replaced by the 
regional governments.
A. The Central Government
The Central Government was to be composed of the 
President, the Council of Ministers and the National 
Assembly.
(1) The President
The President was to be the Head of State elected in a 
nation-wide referendum for a term of five years. A person 
could be elected as president for two successive terms of 
office only. The President was impeachable by two-thirds 
majority vote of the Assembly. All Executive powers were 
vested in the president - excisable "in accordance with the
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49constitution and the law". The President was to be the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and he was to 
appoint and accredit Ambassadors and diplomatic envoys; 
grant special pardons or commute punishments; legislate by 
provisional orders and declare states of emergency. This 
would have been the first time for the Sudan to have a 
presidential constitution based on the Washington model.
The President was to be assisted by a Council of Ministers 
in the exercise of his functions.
2. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers was to consist of the Prime
Minister and the Ministers appointed by the president from
amongst the Members of the Assembly. The Prime Minister
was to preside over meetings of the Council in the absence
of the President and "coordinate the work between all the
50executive organs of the state". The Council of Ministers 
was to be collectively responsible to the National 
Assembly. It was therefore meant to be a responsible 
Cabinet.
3. The National Assembly
The National Assembly (the legislative organ) was to
comprise members elected by "secret and direct universal 
51suffrage" in accordance with the constitution and the 
Election Act which was to be enacted. Presumably matters
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like the total composition of the Assembly, regulations
concerning qualifications of voters and delineation of
constituencies were left for the Election Act to state.
However, Members of the Assembly had to be Sudanese, not
less than 30 years old, of sound mind, literate (without
specifying the academic standard), and were not to be
"persons who [held] an office of profit under the
government" or had been convicted for seven years for
criminal offences relating to "honour and morality" or
corrupt practices or abatement thereof or offences relating
52to the security of the State. The period of the Assembly 
was fixed at five years the same as that of the President.
B. The Regional System
The regional system was to consist of the regional
executive and the regional assembly too. The Judiciary
53remained a central government matter . With the exception 
of the Kingdom of Buganda considered in Chapter 5, the 
existence of two systems of the judiciary is not a typical 
feature of any decentralised form of government.
Presumably the lower governments received directives from 
the Central Government.
Thus conflicts of jurisdiction were to be resolved by 
consultations, conciliations and directives but not by 
adjudication.
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1• The Regional Executive Council
The Executive Council for the region was to consist of 
the Governor and the Members of the Council.
(i) The Governor
The Governor was to be appointed by the President from
"amongst three persons nominated by the President from the 
54region' and selected by the Regional Council. Presumably
in order of priority as recommended by the All Political
Parties Conference. If the Regional Council did not
support any of the three candidates, the President would
have to nominate three others and if the Council still
failed to select one within a month, then the President
could "appoint one of them to be the Governor of the 
55region". The exercise of this power by the President
would have seriously curbed the autonomy of the regions.
The Governor was to be the Chairman of the Executive
Council. He was to be "responsible for the distribution of
the tasks of the Council and the coordination of its
5 6
executive policy". He was to be responsible to the 
President for the good administration of the region. 
However, there was no mention as to whether or not he was 
answerable to the regional legislature. There was even no 
provision for his impeachment by the legislature.
Therefore once elected, a Governor would have to stay in 
office until a new one was appointed. It would have been 
impossible to remove a dictatorial or weak Governor which
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would have been an abnormal practice.
(ii) The Members of the Executive Council
The Members of the Executive Council were to be
selected and removed by the Regional Council, presumably by
a simple majority.
"The Regional Council shall select 
Members of the Executive Council. It May 
remove any one of them by a resolution 
passed by the majority of all its 
Members." 57
The reading of this provision is very strange in that the 
appointment of Ministers which is usually the duty of the 
Head of Government, was shifted to the legislature. Where 
concessions have been made for legislatures to participate 
in the appointment of the Cabinet, its role has been 
limited to the confirmation of the nominees of the Head of 
Government but not otherwise. Such was the practice for 
example under the Nigerian constitution of 1979.
The Executive Council was empowered to exercise the
following powers:-
" (a) The execution of Regional laws 
passed by the Regional Council within its 
powers.
(b) To carry out the following matters 
in accordance with the national laws:-
(i) Protection of forests, crops and 
pastures,
(ii) The development and protection of 
animal resources.
(c) To carry out the following matters 
in accordance with the national laws and 
national policies:-
172
(i) Recruitment of the local police and 
its use in such way that it shall not be 
in contradiction with the work of the 
national police, and the national 
authorities have the right to place all 
the police force under its direct 
control.
(ii) The implementation of the 
educational policy drawn by the national 
authorities for the regional educational 
insti tutions.
(iii) The establishment and 
administration of regional hospitals with 
the permission and under the supervision 
of the National Authorities.
(iv) The development of agriculture and 
the utilization of land in accordance 
with the development plan drawn by the 
National Authorities;.
(v) The execution of the labour policy 
drawn by the national authorities.
(vi) To carry out the executive matters 
delegated to it by law passed by the 
National Assembly or by order of the 
president of the R e p u b l i c . Qb o
Clearly the foregoing provision authorized the regional 
executive to execute laws passed by both the Regional and 
national assemblies. The Central Government therefore did 
not need to have its own regional Offices for matters 
listed therein; probably the Executive would be directly 
answerable to the national assembly or the President of the 
Republic through the Governor of the region for them.
It was difficult from the reading of the law to
ascertain whether the Governor or the Regional Executive
were responsible to the Regional Council. The relevant
section read:
"The Governor shall be responsible before 
the President of the Republic or the
person acting on his behalf for the
supervision over the National Services
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and he shall be collectively responsible 
together with the other Members of the 
Executive Council for the execution of 
laws and policies drawn by the Regional 
Council within its powers"
It is clear that the Governor or a person acting on his
behalf shall be responsible to the President of the
Republic for the national services but then the provision
failed to mention to which authority or body the Governor
and the Executive Council were collectively responsible.
Was it to the President or the Regional Council?
to muIcL.
Logically, it should have been the Regional Council ^  the 
Regional Executive to be responsible, but this was not
stated. This uncertainty represents a definite loophole in 
the law.
2. The Regional Council
The Constitution stipulated:
"A Council to be called the Regional 
Council shall be set up in each Region 
and shall exercise the legislative power 
within the Region in accordance with the 
provisions of this constitution •••"go
Members of the Council were to be elected by "direct
suffrage with such qualifications as those of the Members
of the National Assembly".^ The composition, status and
qualification of the members were to be defined by separate
legislation.
The powers of the Council included:- 
" (1)
(a) Regional and local administration.
(b) The establishment and administration
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of educational institutions up to the 
secondary level, in accordance with the 
educational policy drawn by the National 
Authority covering the syllabuses, 
planning and the definition of 
qualifications and standards, and without 
prejudice to the right of the national 
authority to establish institutions for 
secondary education.
(c) The conduct of environmental health 
services, school health services, 
maturity and child-welfare services, 
public health education, the supervision 
of markets, the control of epidemic 
diseases, the training of medical 
auxilliaries and village mid-wives and 
the establishment of dispensaries.
(d) The organization of local industries, 
markets, trade licences and the formation 
of cooperative societies.
(e) Regional public information services.
(f) The promotion of tourism, the 
organization of exhibitions, museums and 
zoos.
(g) The carrying out of excavation 
without prejudice to the right of the 
National Authority in this field.
(h) Establishment of local roads, 
maintenance of roads and town and village 
planning.
(i) The development of local languages 
and local cultures.
(2) The Regional Council shall have 
legislative power on any matter delegated 
to it by the National Assembly
Thus the powers of the Regional Council were similar to
those recommended by the Twelve-Man Committee except that
the 1968 Constitution did not contain a list of concurrent
powers. Moreover, the powers were defined in greater
detail by the Committee rather than under the Constitution.
The former would have reduced the chances of conflict of
jurisdiction between the central and regional authorities.
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The Council could be dissolved by the President in cases of 
emergency. Thus the regional system was fragile subject to 
the will of the President.
3. The Relationship Between the National and Regional 
Authorities
Although the relationship between the central and
regional authorities was not precisely defined, it was
certain that the regional system would have been completely
subordinate to the central government because of the
provisions of Section 177.
"(1) The National Assembly shall have 
full legislative supremacy for the 
following reasons:
(a) To protect the national interests 
of the country.
(b) To guarantee co-ordination between 
Regional laws.
(c) To provide leadership and 
ini tiative.
(2) (Omitted)
(3) Any regional law which contravenes 
a previous or subsequent national law, 
shall be made void to the extent 
necessary to remove that contravention."
There was a provision for consultation but its wording
lacked clarity.
"The National Bills, which repeal a 
Regional Law or which falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Regional authorities 
are submitted, consultations shall be 
made with the concerned Regions.'' -
Matters deferred
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The financial and civil service arrangements for the 
regional systems were deferred for separate legislations 
which never saw the light of day.
4. Other Important Provisions
In addition to the establishment of central and 
regional systems of administration, the constitution made 
other important provisions which would have in one way or 
the other affected the smooth-running of government and 
stability of the country. These provisions were in 
connection with state religion, official language and 
"source of law".
(i) State Religion and Official Language
Article one of the Constitution stipulated:
"The Sudan is a Democratic Socialist 
Republic founded on Islamic faith."
Furthermore, Article Three stated:
"Islam is the official religion of the 
state and Arabic language is its official 
language."
Thus, Arabic was not only to be the official language for 
religious use but for the state as well.
The declaration of the Sudan as an Islamic state was
probably based on Sadiq El Mahdis1 argument in the 
Constitutent Assembly of 1967 that:
"The dominant feature of our nation is an
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Islamic one and its overwhelming 
expression is Arab, and this nation will 
not have its identity identified and its 
prestige and pride preserved except under 
an Islamic revival."
This argument chooses to ignore the fact that 40% of 
the population are non-Muslims vehemently opposed to the 
imposition of Islam. Furthermore, one wonders how the 
Sudan could ever claim to become Islamic when the Muslims 
do not consitute an overwhelming majority of the population 
as is the case in the Middle Eastern countries.
Moreover, to specify Islam as the State religion was 
to contradict Section 28 of the very constitution which 
stated:
"Citizens are equal in rights and duties, 
chances of earning and work within the 
qualification based on efficiency and 
without qualification merely for 
difference in race, sex or religion."
(Emphasis)
This discrimination in favour of Arabic was also 
contrary to the interests of the South where English is 
widely used for educational purposes and the operation of 
the governmental machinery.
(ii) Sources of Law
According to Articles 113, 114 and 115 of that
consti tution:
"Islamic Sharia shall be the main source 
of laws in the State.
... All provisions in any law passed 
after adoption of this constitution which
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contravenes the provisions of the "Kitab 
and Sura” (Meaning Koran and its 
chapters) shall be void ...
... The State shall make legislations 
which shall amend all laws that 
contravene the provisions of the ”Kitab 
and Sura" and which shall carry into 
force those provisions of "Sharitf." 
(Islamic) which were not under 
application ... " .
The implementation of the foregoing provisions would 
clearly have subjected non-Muslims to Islamic law without 
their consent. It was not therefore surprising that the 
Southern members walked out of the Constitution Commission 
in 1968. Abel Alier, spokesman for the Southerners 
explained:
"Because of the over-riding racial 
components of the constitution,
Christian, Moslem and Pagan, Afro-Negro 
Southerners appeared unanimous in their 
rejection of the document. In this 
situation the Southern representatives 
... left the constitution commission at 
the end of December 1968. We did not 
wish to be party to a document that 
emphasized the Arab race, Islamic 
religion and Arabic culture to the 
exclusion of other existing races, 
religion and culture. It would have made 
a nonsense of the regional autonomy 
anyway •••"gg
Indeed it would have done so since autonomy necessarily 
implies the preservation of the uniqueness of the 
characteristics of the people who are to enjoy the 
autonomous status. The purpose of autonomy is to enable 
the people of some particular area whose characteristics be 
it religious, linguistic, ethnic or cultural to have 
separate jurisdiction within which they can practice those 
rights without affecting the unity of the country or being 
interfered with by the central government. Declaring the
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whole Sudan an Islamic state was to directly place Islamic 
religion and culture as well as Arabic language over and 
above the other cultures, languages, religions and customs 
the authority over which the constitution had purported to 
have decentralised to the regions.
It is therefore clear from the events contained in 
this chapter that all the successive Sudanese Governments 
after independence in 1956 failed totally to find any 
solution to the Southern problem for lack of seriousness on 
their part. The attempt by Abboud's Military Government to 
promote popular participation in government in the 1960s 
was also not successful.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PRACTICE OF THE EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT DECENTRALISATION,
1922-1969
The establishment and development of Native 
Administration, local administration, local government, and 
provincial administrations between 1922 and 1969 have 
already been analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter 
examines the practical operation of these forms of 
government, placing special emphasis on their structures, 
compositions, powers and functions, and financial 
arrangements as well as their relationship with the central 
government. They will be considered in the order noted 
above.
1 NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
The structure of Native Administration was 
characterised by the establishment of classes of courts 
which differed between the North and the South. We shall 
consider Native Administration in the North before that in 
the South.
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A. Native Administration in the North
The five classes of courts established in the North 
were as follows:-
1. A Sheikh's court with a Sheikh as president sitting 
with members.
2. A court of Sheikhs sitting with elders in a Majlis
(council) .
3. A village court.
4. A court of Sheikhs sitting alone.
5. A Special Court.^
All courts were established by warrant of the
Governor-General except the Special Court which needed the
approval of the Chief Justice. The approval was readily
available if he thought it would serve the ends of justice.
It was therefore dependent on his entire discretion. A
"Sheikh" was defined to include "a Nazir, an Omdas or a 
2
Shartai". Shartais assisted the sheikhs.
A Sheikh was otherwise the lowest in the 
administrative hierarchy. He was informally selected by 
the Mutual Consent of the village elders. His most 
important function was to collect taxes, for which he was 
paid. He also maintained public security, served summonses 
and rendered reports on health services; impounded cattle; 
rallied the villages for cooperative labour and was 
responsible for cattle immunization.
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The Omdas was the next man to the Sheikh in the 
hierarchy. He came to office through elections organized 
in such a way that the less popular candidates were dropped 
in turn until he was left alone. He would then be formally 
appointed by the government. The functions of the omdas 
included the supervision of the work of the Sheikhs plus 
such minor judicial work like the settlement of disputes 
and the service of summonses.
The Nazir was the paramount leader in a district. 
Unlike the Sheikh and the Omdas, the Nazir's office was 
hereditary and limited to the sons of the preceding Nazir. 
The appointment of the Nazir was subject to confirmation by 
the government after the District Commissioner had 
ascertained the wishes of the people. Nazirs were people 
of eminence and were paid salaries by the central 
government. A Nazir's duty was mainly judicial. He sat in 
the court of first instance or on appeal or both. However, 
at the appellate stage the District Commissioner presided 
over the proceedings. The District Commissioner sat with 
Nazirs and elders at the appeal court so as to obtain some 
guidance from the members of the community concerning the 
customary laws and practices with which he might not be 
familiar. Nazirs also supervised the observance of tribal 
customs and tribal movements and settled tribal disputes 
not formally brought before the courts. Nazirs were 
directly responsible to the District Commissioner for the 
working of the tribal machinery of government.
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Offences triable by the Sheikh's courts
The offences triable by these courts increased from 
1922 to 1928 and 1930s. According to the Schedule of the 
1922 Sheikhs Ordinance the list of triable offences were to 
be divided into "major" and "minor" offences, the gravity 
of the offence and the area in question. The divisions 
were left to the entire discretion of the Governor. In 
doing so he was presumably expected to take into account 
the social and economic conditions of the areas. Whereas 
"major" offences were triable by Sheikhs in council with 
elders empowered to impose a maximum penalty of £2 5 as 
fine, "minor" offences were triable by a Sheikh alone on 
obtaining the consent of the Governor. He could only 
impose a maximum penalty of £10 as fine. As a rule the 
Sheikhs had no powers to imprison but the execution of 
their judgments could be enforced by the District 
Commissioner or Governor "as if it were the judgment of an
3
ordinary court of law".
The 1927 and 1928 Sheikh's Ordinances enhanced powers
of the Sheikh's by making them competent to try any offence 
except honucide and offences against the state or relating 
to the military forces. The excepted offences included 
kidnapping, abduction, wrongful restraint, offences
relating to compulsory unlawful labour, robbery, briganda^£;
screening thereof, offences against Government Ordinances, 
and offences involving government servants. The exemption 
of civil servants from the traditional courts introduced an
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element of positive discrimination into the machinery of 
justice. The Sheikhs could now impose a maximum fine of 
£100 and imprisonment for 2 years. Two sets of courts, 
"major" and "minor" were also established under these 
ordinances. The warrant creating a "Major Court" specified 
the President, the Vice-President (if any) and the Members, 
from whom a quorum might be formed, and defined its 
jurisdiction and powers of punishments. The "minor courts" 
were also established by warrants but they could only 
impose a maximum fine of £20. Both courts tried civil and 
criminal cases.
Appeals from judgment of a Sheikh's court lay to the
District Commissioner or the Governor, who could affirm the
• . 4decision or "council or modify the judgment". If
cancelled the judgment could be directed to the ordinary 
criminal or civil courts. The District Commissioner or 
Governor could revise or review the decision of a Sheikh's 
court on his own motion.
As stated earlier, the 1932 ordinance amalgamated all 
the courts but provided for the establishment of special 
courts in addition to the Sheikhs courts. This is examined 
below.
Composition of special courts
The members of the courts were nominated by the
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Governor from amongst Sheikhs appointed in the Sheikhs 
Courts.
A special court was convened by the Governor with the 
consent of the Chief Justice in any of the following 
circumstances:-
(a) Where the accused or defendant and the complainant or 
plaintiff are subject to the jurisdiction of different 
native courts.
(b) Where the accused himself is a Sheikh.
(c) Where the gravity of the offence exceeded the 
jurisdiction of native courts.
(d) When the offence committed was culpable homicide not
5
amounting to murder committed in a tribal fight.
This was a special case presumably due to the frequent 
practice of tribal fights in Africa.
Penalties imposable by a special court
The penalties imposable depended on the nature of the
offence:-
(i) Offences for which penalties have been defined, the 
court imposed the stated penalties.
(ii) If a Sheikh was found guilty, then a fixed penalty of 
7 years' imprisonment and a fine of £200 would be 
imposed.
(iii) For other offences fixed penalties of 10 years' 
imprisonment and a fine of £250 was imposed.
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However, the sentence of a special court in criminal 
cases was never final until it was confirmed by the Chief
T  4- • 6Justice.
The law applicable
The courts were empowered to administer:
"Native law and custom prevailing in the 
area or in the tribe over which the court 
exercises its jurisdiction provided that 
such native law and custom is not
contrary to justice, morality or order.
Decisions were arrived at by a special majority of
three-quarters of the members agreeing to it or if it was
approved by the District Commissioner.
An appeal under the 1932 Ordinance would lie as of
right from the decision of native court to another higher
native court if so specified in the regulations. However, 
where there was no such provision an appeal would only lie 
to another court with the consent of the Governor or the 
District Commissioner. On appeal the court of appeal was 
not allowed to enhance sentence in a criminal appeal unless 
the appellant had been heard. In any case the sentence was 
not to be enhanced beyond the maximum limit of the sentence 
defined. In other words powers of the courts of appeal 
were the same as those courts of the first instance.
The Chief Justice could authorise the revision of a 
case at any time on the application of either party.
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Revisions were done by a Governor or a magistrate of the 
first or second class. On revision, the finding or 
sentence could be altered, cancelled or suspended except
(i) A finding of guilty could not be substituted for one 
of not guilty.
(ii) A sentence could not be enhanced before hearing the 
accused - and only to the maximum limit defined.
The proceedings could also be cancelled and rehearing
ordered on revision before the same court or another court
provided that if provisions of the code of criminal
procedure or the Civil Justice Ordinance were to be invoked
then such powers were not to be exercised six months after 
9
the judgment.
The execution of judgment depended on the manner 
defined in the regulations or it could be sent to the civil 
courts for execution under Section 206 of the Civil Justice 
Ordinance.^
B . Native Administration in the South
In the South, three classes of courts were estabished 
as follows
1. The court of a Chief sitting alone.
2. The court of a Chief sitting with members.
3. A special court.
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Except for the special court, which required the 
consent of the Governor-General, all other courts were 
established by the Governor. The Governor-General's 
consent was readily avaiable "if the ends of justice would 
thereby be served". In any case circumstances under which 
ends of justice would be served were laid down as follows:
(i) Where the accused and the complainant were not
subject to the jurisdiction of one Chief.
(ii) Where the accused was himself a Chief.
(iii) Where the offence committed was so serious as to
exceed the powers of any other court established
12under the Ordinance.
These circumstances were defined possibly to guide the 
Governor, who was a layman, in the exercise of his 
discretion. Presumably the Governor was authorised to 
establish courts in the South because the Chief Justrice 
sat in Khartoum which is extremely distant from the South. 
There were two categories of Chiefs appointed by the 
government on grounds of "good character" and ability.
"Paramount Chiefs" were appointed by the colonial 
government to supervise and coordinate the work of other 
Chiefs. Below the Chiefs were the Wakil (sub-chief) and 
the Mukungu (sub-sub-chief).
The ordinary Chiefs were responsible for peace, order 
and security in the tribal areas. They were also 
responsible for the trial of cases in accordance with
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customary laws and the registration of marriages.
The Wakil was the second in line and was appointed by 
the Chief alone; he was usually selected for his ability to 
control a tribal clan. He forwarded taxes collected by the 
Mukungus to the Chief. He also helped to maintain peace 
and order in the community, tried minor cases of theft, 
fornication and libel according to customary laws. He 
forwarded other serious cases to the Chief.
The Mukungu was the lowest officer, and was normally 
appointed by the Chief in consulation with the Wakil. He 
collected taxes for nominal remuneration.
Thus the functions of Native Administration were 
primarily judicial. They tried all minor offences in 
accordance with customary laws. In addition they also 
tried criminal cases except cases tried by major courts as 
seen in the case of Sheikhs. They could impose penalties
13of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years and a fine of £150.
Lately, they rendered very limited social services 
such as village school education, sanitary and medical 
services, which were extended to include notification and 
control of cattle diseases, enforcement of quarantine 
measures, agricultural development, forestry protection, 
assessment and collection of taxes, maintenance of minor
roads, upkeep of ..... and wells and other sources of water
supply, and the supervision and control of local markets.
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A case study of Native Administration in the Eastern 
Nuer District (Eastern Jekaing-Jatjok Section in August 
1 9 4 0 ) ^  revealed in greater detail how justice was 
administered by the Chiefs' courts.
The organisation of Chiefs Courts in Eastern Nuer District
The government imposed 19 unpopular Chiefs in the 
district. They were unpopular because the Nuer preferred a 
multitude of little independent gut-twats (Headmen) with no 
Chiefs at all. Each Chief was responsible to the District 
Commissioner for "preservation of order and administration 
of justice and the law in his section".
The procedure for raising suits and conducting trials
The theoretical procedure for raising suits was as 
follows:- The plaintiff was to apply to the Chief of the 
defendant who would summon the latter, either sitting alone 
or with such of his Headmen as he wished to call. The case 
would be heard and judgment delivered. The judgment was to 
be recorded by the Clerk in the book. If cattle were 
awarded or any were available, the Chief's police would 
take them and hand them to the plaintiff. If the defendant 
resisted execution by force, the Chief would send his 
police with his badge (a red sash) to the nearest 
government police post in the district with a demand for 
government police. The government police would then go and
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act under order of the Chief.
The cases varied in gravity but in some the Chiefs 
arrested the ring leaders of resistance to Native 
Administration. Severe penalties were imposable on 
resisting Native Administration police.
The right of appeal to the District Commissioner was
known to almost everyone. In practice, however, many cases
were side-tracked by the Chiefs;. They neglected to summon
the defendant by finding other means to cause delay until
the plaintiff got tired of waiting and went away.
Nonetheless, as reported by the District Commissioner, "on
15the whole, a good number of cases got settled" and some 
Chiefs were fairly reasonable.
Appeals
The right of appeal was available to either party.
The Court of Appeal consisted of the District Commissioner 
with selected panel of chiefs. The court sat at three 
different places.
(i) Makak (annually).
(ii) Ajungmir (in April).
(iii) Ulang (in May).
The appeal fee was ?.T. 50 (Sudanese piasties equal to half 
of a pound) or a Roth. The fee was returned if the apeal 
was allowed but it would be forefeited if it was not.
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Other aspects
The average number of tax payers per Chief was 350.
The salary of the Chief was also P.T. 50 per month but this 
could be reduced if the work was unsatisfactory.
There were two types of native police, the Chief's 
police and the Head man's police called "Boliiyi Luk" and 
"Bolisini Jal" respectively, although they were integrated 
on an equal footing. Everyone was paid a salary of P.T. 5 
per month (about l/20th of a pound).
Each Headman had one or two police. The Chief could 
use any police in his section if he thought fit. The 
Headmen were allowed to select their own policeman but the 
opinion of the Chief had to be sought first in case of 
doubt about the appointment or dismissal of the policeman. 
The police were used for carrying out execution of 
judgments, collection of tribute and any other purposes. 
They were wisely chosen and were usually the close 
relatives of the Headman.
Every court was to have Clerks and Court Registrars. 
But there were six Clerks in the district only; so several 
Chiefs had to share the services of one Clerk.
C. Finances of Native Administration
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Financially, Native Administration was initially 
dependent on subsidies from the central government only. 
However, some financial powers were delegated to them 
through stages. At first they were made responsible for
tax assessment with the approval of the District
Commissioner, then for payment of salaries to the employees 
out of taxes collected. They were finally allowed to keep 
the monthly collections in their catchment areas, fix the 
salaries of the junior staff, make payments, keep accounts 
and pay the surplus to the central treasury. The revenues 
were collected from various sources which were grouped as:-
(1) Direct Taxes
These included taxes on land, usur tax, poll-tax,
animal tax, tribute and date tax.
(2) Licences
Fees were charged on licences for native liquor,
traders business, sale of food and drink, keeping of dogs,
14market vocations , etc.
Court Fees and Fines
These were the fees and fines collected from the 
Native and Chiefs courts.
Local Dues and Fees
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Dues and fees were collected from activities like 
slaughtering. Public weighing machines, market fees on 
arrivals, produce, contracts, parking and tethering places, 
moradas (shows), public landing places, pounds (fees), town 
rate and conservancy rate.
Elementary Education
School fees were also levied for elementary education. 
M iscellaneous
Miscellaneous collections were made from rents and 
various other activities.
From the collections shown in Table 4.1, it could be 
said that Native Administration performed fairly well in 
the collection of local taxes or fees and even if they did 
face some problems then those were not as much as 
experienced in the latter years as we shall see. Such a 
conclusion can be reached because of the fact that the 
native authorities had surplus funds from their 
collections.
D . Conclus ion
From the above examination, it can therefore be 
concluded that Native Administration was a limited form of
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decentralisation of powers because:-
1. Its powers were severely confined to adjudication of 
cases only.
2. It had no general representative responsibility - the 
members were appointed but not elected. The practice
even discriminated against the elite.
3. It did not have unfettered taxing powers. Its budget 
was liable to approval by the central government.
4. It was subject to central administrative direction.
5. It had no independent expert staff.
For these reasons the educated class viewed Native
Administration as an imperialistic device intended to keep
-t: .
the illiterate in power and isolate the intelligentsia from 
participation in government. This was more so following 
the assassination of Lee Stack in 1924 (see Chapter 2), 
when the colonial authorities did their level best to 
entrench the position of Native Administration in order to 
counter the national elites.
II LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, 1937-1950
As we saw in Chapter 2, Local Administration was 
introduced to overcome the shortcomings of Native 
Administration. How far was this successfully done?
Local Administration consisted, of course, of four
200
local councils - the Province Councils? the Municipal 
Councils; the Town Councils; and the Rural Councils. We 
shall consider them in turn.
A. The Province Councils, 1943
The total composition of the Province Councils was not 
fixed. It was left for the Governor-General to decide what 
number was sufficient to ensure adequate representation. 
However, not less than half of the members were to be 
appointed from amongst persons who were government 
authorities or councils associated with local government 
authorities. The rest were "representatives of the more
16important social and economic interests in the province". 
Whereas the minimum age requirement for the first category 
of members was fixed at 25 years, that of the latter 
category was 30 years. This was probably intended to have 
more matured members on the council. The Governor presided 
over meetings of the council.
The councils had triple functions as already stated.
1. To act as electoral colleges for elections to the 
Legislative Assembloy for the Northern Sudan. This 
role was successfully played in practice.
2. To advise the Governor-General in the performance of
his duties. However, the impact of the councils in 
this respect were not noticed. Apparently, they had 
little or no influence on the Governors.
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3. To assist the Governor in the performance of his
duties and coordinate the activities of the lower
councils. But as Abdel El Rahim Muthathir pointed
out, "it was an open secret that the Governors were
not enthusiastic in delegating their powers to the
17Province Councils".
Therefore the Councils were stilfcborn.
B . The Municipal and the Town Councils
The Municipal Councils and Town Councils were similar 
in structure and organization although different in the 
degree of urbanisation. Municipal Councils were 
established in the larger towns, notably Khartoum, Khartoum 
North, Omndurman and Port Sudan.
Town Councils were, on the other hand, established 
over smaller towns like Elobeid, Kassala, Wadmedain,
Berber, Juba, Wau and Malakal.
Both the Municipal and Town Councils (urban councils) 
were organized along the British model of local government 
in that each had a majority of elected members. Though the 
total membership was not fixed, the smallest council had at 
least 16 councillors. Local administration ceased to be 
based upon the tribe to which a person belonged but 
according to the place he lived, a healthy development.
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Voters were required to be at least 25 years old and 
in occupation of some premises valuing between £3.600 to 
£6.00. They were also required to have resided in the area
for not less than six months. The qualifications for
voting appear English in orientation.
1. Meetings
The councils met monthly under the chairmanship of the 
District Commissioner or some body acting on his behalf. 
Decisions of the Council were passed by a simple majority 
vote.
2. Committees of the council
Every council had the following committees:
i. Finance Committee
ii. General Purpose Committee
iii. Works Committee
iv. Planning Committee
v. Education Committee
The committees were charged with, of course, detailed 
planning and submission of proposals to the council for 
cons ideration.
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3. Powers and functions of the councils
The powers of those councils were comparatively wider 
than those of the Native Authorities (examined earlier) . 
They were responsible for the provision of services which 
included the erection and maintenance of minor buildings, 
sanitation, health, sub-grade schools, maintenance of 
roads, ferries, water supplies and similar local services.
C . Rural Councils
Rural Councils were established in the non-urban areas 
with rural population. Examples are the Rural Districts of 
Gedaref, Eastern Kordofan, Merowe and Dongola.
Incidentally, most of Southern Sudan had Rural Councils due 
to the low level of economic and social development. The 
composition of these councils differed from one to the 
other depending on whether the majority of the council 
members were nominees of the Governor or not. The District 
Commissioners also acted as ex offico chairmen in them.
They met regularly four times a year, conducted in the form 
of a tribal gathering. Rural Councils had committees too 
but those were fewer in number compared to the committees 
of the urban councils.
1. Powers and functions
204
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Rural councils acted^both ' legislative and executive 
bodies. They passed more bye-laws than the urban councils 
did with or without the consent of the Governor. 
Understandably they were often very far from the Provincial 
Headquarters where the government was stationed and means 
of communication were difficult.
2. The staff
The Assistant District Commissioner or the Executive
Officer (Mamur) acted as Chairman for these councils. All
officers worked on a part-time basis. The rest of the work
was done by the members of the tribal hierarchy. As
Mukhtar Alassam put it, the councils were "little more than
18traditional authorities with warrants".
D. Finances of Local Administration
Like the Native Administration authorities, the local 
councils derived their revenue from the same local sources 
detailed earlier. Those earmarked for the urban councils 
included:-
(i) Rates from occupied council property.
(ii) Market dues.
(iii) Miscellaneous sources.
They were also entitled to grants from the central 
government but only for specified purposes which were:-
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(a) Subgrade education; and
(b) Salaries of seconded officials.
On the whole no regular financial assistance came from the 
central government. All proposed expenditure was subject 
to central government scrutiny done by the District 
Commissioner, the Provincial Governor and the Financial 
Secretary.
Rural Council finances were entirely dependent on the 
additional rates to the direct taxes, which were paid to 
them as remuneration for collecting the taxes. However, 
certain of their expenses were ear-marked as central 
government expenditure. These included the administration 
of justice and the salaries of the tribal hierarchy. The 
financial supervision over Rural Councils was more 
stringent than had existed in the case of urban councils. 
Apparently, the local councils collected sufficient revenue 
out of which they were able to contribute to the central 
government in addition to meeting their normal expenses, as 
can be seen in Table 4.2.
Inspite of the improvement in the functions of local 
administrations and the assignment of more financial 
responsibilities to them (by enabling them to have 
independent budgets), the councils were still weak due to 
lack of corporate personality. They were therefore not 
autonomous, self-governing councils. They were entirely 
dependent on powers delegated to them by the Governor. The 
provision for the Rural Councils, for example, read that 
the Governor-General could
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"appoint by warrant any person either by 
name or by office and either singly or 
associated with the council or anybody of 
persons as the local authority for any 
area specified in such an appointment.
The local authority so appointed could also delegate its
powers to any person or body of persons. Commenting on the
Local Administration system, Zarough, K. from the Ministry
of Local Government, wrote:
"To dispell the prejudice of the small 
but growing educated class for whom 
Native Administration provided little 
scope, the term "Native Administration" 
was changed and replaced by Local 
Administration."2q
The comment implies that the change from Native
Administration to local administration was a mere change of
name without substance. The comment was too inconsiderate
concerning the changes that took place in the urban
councils whereby the majority of councillors were elected
regardless of their tribal background. Moreover, they
functioned according to laid down regulations and not
traditional practices.
Ill LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1951-1959
As we saw in Chapter 3, Local Government Councils 
established under the 1951 Local Government Ordinance were 
at different stages. However, those which had reached the 
fifth stage were responsible local government councils with 
corporate status. They were therefore autonomous as
208
required by Section 6 of the Ordinance.
A. The Composition
The composition of every council was to be fixed by 
the warrant of its establishment. So, the number varied 
from one council to the other. Usually the total 
membership ranged from ten to forty, consisting of both 
elected and appointed members. The Governor was authorised 
to appoint up to one-third of the total membership. These 
were normally appointed from retired government officials 
or persons whose education and experience would ensure 
success.
Elections were both direct and indirect depending on
the level of development in the area where the council was
situated. Whereas elections in urban areas were direct 
from single member constituency wards, those in rural areas 
were indirect. In case of indirect elections, the Governor 
nominated the members who could then elect their 
representatives to the councils.
Generally, the Rural Councils consisted predominantly
of traditional leaders elected through the indirect method.
This point was also cofi^r-i^ l by Gallobawi Mohamed Sallih:
"In Shukriya Rural Council where I worked 
as an Executive Officer for more than 
three years, more than half of the 
Councillors came from the tribal chiefs,
the nazirs, the omdas and the sheikhs.
This is not taking place in Shukriya
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alone. It is happening in most Rural 
Councils."21
Moreover, those in Shukriya Council were entirely from 
members of the Abu Sin family.
There were also qualification requirements attached to 
the elected members - which were similar to those of the 
voters. The qualifications of a voter included being a 
male, aged 25 years old, of sound mind, and resident in an 
electoral ward for not less than one year prior to the 
election. He must have also paid his taxes in the area.
The elections were therefore rigid and discriminatory 
against women. The following categories of people were 
disqualified from the elections. These included servants 
of the council except with an order of the Minister, 
Ministers, members of the judiciary, civil servants,
2 2members of the Armed Forces, and undischarged bankrupts.
B. Meetings of the Councils
Council meetings were presided over by an elected 
chairman or his vice or an appointed councillor in the 
absence of both. The council chairman was selected 
annually either by appointment or election amongst the 
members and in accordance with the specific provision of 
the council's warrant. However, no person was to be 
eligible for re-election as council chairman for more than 
three successive elections, unless the warrant so
210
23prescribed. Invariably, Municipal Councils had elected 
chairmen while local government Inspectors were appointed 
as chairmen for less developed areas. An appointed 
chairman usually had an elected vice-chairman. Tribal 
chiefs or Nazirs were appointed as chairmen in the more 
rural areas. The quorum was constituted by simple majority 
and decisions were also passed by simple majority of the 
members present. The chairman and the vice-chairman had 
original but not casting votes. A matter was deemed lost 
if the votes were equally divided.
C. Committees of the Council
Committees are a cardinal aspect of the English system
of local government. The appointment of committees was
provided for by Section 26(1) of the Local Government
Ordinance, 1951.
"A council shall appoint a Finance 
Committee and a Personnel Committee and 
may from time to time appoint other 
committees of general and special nature, 
consisting of three or more persons for 
the purpose of examining and reporting on 
any matter or for performing any act 
which in the judgment of the council 
would more conveniently be examined or 
performed by a committee ...".
Other committees were appointed according to the needs of
the council. Those appointed included:-
1. Committee for Planning.
2. Committee for Education.t
! 3. Committee for Public Health.
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4. Committee for General Purpose.
Joint Committees could also be convened on agreed 
conditions in matters of common interest. Co-option of 
members was allowed in the case of other committees except 
the Finance Committee. However, the total number of 
coopted members was not to exceed one third of the total 
membership. The provision for coopted members was to 
enable the councils to make use of specialised technical 
men who were not necessarily members of the council.
D . The Powers and Functions of the Councils
The powers and functions of the councils were listed 
generally in the schedule to the Act. The councils could 
also be granted more powers pursuant to subsequent 
legislations. For example, the Rates Act, 1954 empowered 
the councils to assess and collect local rates. However, 
the powers of a particular council were specified in its 
warrant of estabishment which depended on the ability and 
level of the council.
In the field of public order (not public security) the 
councils were responsible for the cleanliness, tidiness and 
public morality in their districts and the ordinary 
functioning of civil life therein. These included the 
reduction of juvenile delinquency; eradication of begging 
and prostitution; the establishment and regulation of 
markets, slaughtering places, bathing, washing and watering
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places; supervision of places of public resort; the 
construction and upkeep of local roads and bridges; the 
regulation or prohibition of the carrying of fire-arms and 
other dangerous weapons. In the sphere of public health 
the duties of the councils involved the supervision of food 
and water supplies, the removal and destruction of rubbish, 
the provision of public lavatories and sewage and sanitary 
services, the control and assistance of midwifery, the 
maintenance of dispensaries, clinics, public health centres 
and ambulance services* In the field of education, the 
councils had to provide and maintain village schools - and 
in some councils - elementary schools plus boarding houses 
for them, clubs and adult education courses, reading rooms 
and libraries. Concerning agriculture the councils were 
responsible for the control of agriculture, grazing areas 
and watering places, the organization of soil conservation 
measures and measures against agricultural and other pests 
and granting of loans for agricultural purposes to small 
farmers and cooperative societies. Finally, the councils 
also participated in planning for towns and villages - in 
particular for the provision of public utilities such as 
water and electricity supplies, public transport, flour 
mills, oil mills, etc.
In order to carry out these duties effectively, the 
councils were empowered to make local orders having the 
force of law in their areas. However, these orders had to 
be confirmed by the Governor or some other authority 
appointed by the Minister of Interior.
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The conferment of these functions were based on Dr.
Marshall's recommendation that:
"Upon all local government authorities 
should be placed some responsibility for 
all local government services, except 
those which [were] so highly technical 
that the state must administer them 
direct."24
In ether words, no services were to be allotted to a local
government authority "unless there [was] likelihood of
2 5operating the services effectively". As for trade and
commerce, Dr. Marshall recommended that a council was "only
to engage in business activities when the private sector
2 6failed to offer a reasonable service". This was a 
special feature for the Sudan not found in the UK.
E. The Finances
Regarding finances, Dr. Marshall had raised the
following caution:
"... one aspect of Local Government which 
never reaches finality, is the financial 
relation of the local and central 
government; the centre thinks that the 
local authorities expect too much, whilst 
the local authorities believe themselves 
to be robbed of their deserts ... a 
universally accepted relationship is 
impossible of attainment."^
With this caution in mind, we proceed to examine the
financial position of the local councils under the 1951
Ordinance. According to Section 42 of the Ordinance a
Council was to:
" [Obtain] its revenue by grant from the 
government, which may be by assignment of 
the produce of a tax or rates subject to
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a fixed contribution to the government 
... and from local rates under the Local 
Taxation Ordinance, and from any other 
charge, due, or fee which [was] lawfully 
payable to the council."
Thus the councils were entitled to grants, taxes, rates,
fees, dues and other charges. These will be considered in
turn under the general headings of taxes, rates, fees,
licences and grants in aid.
1. Taxes
Taxes were provided for by the Local Government
2 8(Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance 1954, and the
29Entertainment Tax Act, 1956. The taxes which the 1954 
Ordinance authorised the councils to levy and collect were 
Animal tax, Land tax, Usur tax, Date tax, Tribute tax, Poll 
tax, House or Hut tax. We shall also consider them in 
tur n .
(i) Animal tax
This tax was levied on animals like camels, cows, 
sheep, goats, horses and donkeys according to the 
provisions of Animal Tax Ordinance, 1925.^® The rates 
varied from one animal to the other. The problem with the 
collection of these taxes was that the traditional rulers 
could not obtain the exact statistics of the animals and 
the individuals who owned them. This was particularly 
difficult in the case of the nomadic tribes who kept moving
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from one place to another with their animals. So the 
Sheikhs and Omdas had to guess how many animals an 
individual in the community had. Therefore the taxes 
collected were not so realistic.
(ii) Land tax (usur tax)
This usur tax was levied on crops grown on rainlands
as provided by the Rainlands (Usur) Tax Act 1925.
Rainlands included "lands watered periodically by rain or
river on which no land tax or rent in lieu of tax 
32leviable". The problem with this tax was that its yield 
depended on the success of the crops. It was profitable 
before the inflation of the 1970s.
*
(iii) Date tax
Date tax was levied on "every male date tree which
[had] reached the flowering stage and every female date
33tree which [had] begun to bear fruit." It was the most 
predominant form of revenue in the Northern Province which 
was the greatest grower of palm trees. The tax revenues 
also depended on the yields.
(iv) Tribute tax
Tribute tax was imposed on tribes or sections of
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tribes within a province in accordance with the provisions 
of Tribute Ordinance, 1 9 2 5 . ^  The amount was assessed by 
the Governor from time to time. He also made regulations 
for the collections by the Sheikhs or Chiefs.
(v) Poll tax
Poll tax was imposed under Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, 
35192 5, on all adult males at a fixed rate of one Sudanese 
pound per annum. It was easier to collect this tax in the 
countryside through the traditional rulers than in the 
towns. Whereas the traditional rulers knew all the adult 
males in their jurisdictions, no effort was made to round 
up the adult males who lived in the towns. So some adults 
managed to evade taxes by migrating to the towns.
(vi ) House tax
House tax was imposed under the House Tax Ordinance 
361918 at a rate equal to one-twelth of the annual rental 
value of the house. It was immaterial whether the house 
was occupied or vacant.
(vii) Entertainment tax
As from 1956, the Entertainment Tax Act, 1956, 
authorised that taxes be "levied and paid to the government
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3 7on all payments for admission to any entertainment" and
3 8"on every complementary ticket issued by the proprietor". 
Exemptions were only allowed for entertainments, the 
proceeds of which were wholly devoted to purposes of 
education, charity, religion, science or any other purpose 
of which notification was given by the Minister.
2. Rates, fees and licences
Rates were imposed under the Rates Act, 1954 on 
buildings in the relatively developed areas calculated on 
the basis of the annual rental value of the property. 
Latrine rates were also collected in addition to those 
rates. The problem with the rates was the technical 
difficulty in assessing the value of the property. It 
needed more technical and experienced personnel..
Fees v/ere collected from many activities such as fees 
on sale of livestock, manufacture of driving licences, 
possession of arms, slaughtering and taking goods to the 
market in general.
Furthermore, the Traders Licence and Taxation of
3 9Business Profits Act, 1930 , and the Native Liquor
Ordinance, authorised the councils to collect taxes from 
profits made out of business and fees on sale of native 
liquor respectively. Table 4.3 shows that the collection 
from the local sources of revenue were fairly adequate 
since they could contribute some to the central government
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too.
3. Grant in Aid
The Local Government Ordinance, 1951, also entitled 
the councils to grants from the central government (as seen 
earlier). The central government gave two types of grants 
to the councils. These were percentage and deficit grants.
(i) Percentage grants
Percentage grants were meant to cater for the salaries 
of the senior officials and for services in the field of 
agriculture, education, health, roads and police in the 
following proportions.
(a) 50% for the maintenance of roads outside the 
boundaries of local council areas and within the 
responsibility of the central government.
(b) 75% and 33£% for the salaries of the judiciary and 
Native Administration respectively.
(c) 40% and 75% of the cost of Subgrade and Primary 
education respectively.
(ii) Deficit Grants
Deficit grants were given to "proper areas" or 
councils in order to bridge the gap between income and
220
expenditure. (For more details on types of grants, see
Chapter 9.) In this connection an agreement was entered
into between the Financial Secretary and the Ministry of
Local Government whereby the grant system was revised
periodically so that actual stages of development in the
different areas and the financial resources of those areas
could be taken into account. The relatively richer areas
had to contribute to the central government according to a
formula based on "average revenue minus expenditure - plus
- surplus", relying on the figures of the previous four
years - a formula whose contradictory nature was described
by Buchanan:
"Paradoxically, financial flexibility is 
maintained in this way; sufficient water 
is kept in the council bath by having the 
tap running full on and the plug removed 
at the same time."^g
According to Mukhtar Alassam, the total contribution of the
rich councils to the central government amounted to
£240,000 in the fiscal year 1957/58. It was over and above
the total deficit grant given to the poorer councils in the 
41same year. Though paradoxical, the formula was rational 
in that it enabled an equitable system for the distribution 
of revenue.
4. Loans
A Local Government Council could with the consent of
the Minister of the Interior "raise a loan ... by mortgage,
42overdraft, issue of stock or any other method ..." for 
approved purposes and according to prescribed conditions.
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However, few loans were obtained in practice because the 
success of an application depended on the availability of 
funds, the merits of the case, and the ability to repay. 
Priority was accorded to councils which had insufficient 
revenues to meet the cost of capital projects that were 
essential to the well-being of the community. Loans were 
repayable within a 30-year period at an annual interest 
rate of 4%, as directed by the Civil Secretary. In fact, 
the Civil Secretary and the Governor were responsible for 
the approval of loans which were initially at the disposal 
of the Civil Secretary. After the creation of the Ministry 
of Local Government in 1954, an Advisory Board for Loans 
and Grants was estabished also in the same Ministry.
5. Financial management
The councils were empowered to prepare their own 
budgets for approval by the Ministry of Interior and they 
could spend freely within that budget as long as the 
expenses were incurred in the proper performance of its 
assigned duties except in the case of capital expenditure 
which needed the approval of the Minister of Interior. 
Understandably capital expenditure requires large sums of 
money since it is investment-oriented; so closer 
supervision and control was necessary as will be shown 
further on. In order to meet certain specific purposes,
Dr. Marshall's recommendation requiring each council to 
open security or equalisation account, renewal accounts and 
capital account was adopted.
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(i) Security or equalisation account
This account was financed from initial grants from the 
central government "to meet an annual deficiency due to 
acts of God in tax collection in rural areas".
(ii) Renewal account
The funds for renewal accounts were derived from 
annual appropriation in the budget. This fund was meant 
for replacing buildings, plants and machinery.
(iii) Capital account
The sources of revenue for capital account depended on 
specific appropriations in the budget transfers of surplus 
money from security account. Other sources included Premia 
on lease of governme nt lands, proceeds of local assets and 
items of capital expenditure which were too larqe to be met 
out of current revenue but for which the local authority 
was not allowed to borrow. Strict financial control was 
maintained through the requirement imposed on the councils 
to keep proper accounts showing all financial transactions 
maintained by every council and an annual balanced sheet 
audited annually by the Auditor General appointed by 
Minister of the Interior. Apparently no cases of financial
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mismanagement or misappropriations were recorded thus 
showing a high standard of financial management.
F. Staff of the Councils
Section 31 of the Ordinance stipulated that:
"The Minister may make regulations 
providing for the grading of certain 
posts under the council or for an 
establishment of such posts, and 
governing the employment, status, pay, 
recruitment, training and conditions of 
the service of the holders of such posts 
. . . such regulations may regulate 
secondment between the government and a 
council, and may provide for the creation 
of a Local Government Service."
Clearly the Minister had the power to establish a separate
local government service with different conditions of
service or depend on seconded staff from the central
government. In the second case he could prescribe specific
conditions which were suitable to those officers too.
In practice the Minister did not create any separate 
personnel system for Local Government. Staff of the 
councils were either seconded from the central government 
or recruited locally. The Ministry of Local Government was 
responsible for the recruitment, training, posting, 
transfer and promotion of the senior personnel. Personnel 
of local government were categorized as officers, officials 
and employees.
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1. Officers
The Ministry recruited officers from amongst 
university and college graduates after which they were sent 
for post-graduate studies and training at the School of 
Administration and Law run by Khartoum University. The 
school also offered a short summer course for the older 
Executive. Officers who had been recruited earlier with 
secondary school certificates or less. It was this school 
which was developed into the Institute of Public 
Administration in 1960 to offer Diplomas in Public 
Admini stration.
2. Officials
The officials were locally recruited by the councils 
subject to rules and regulations prescribed and approved by 
the Under-Secretary of the Ministry. This category had a 
chronic lack of officials to run the various local 
government services. There were shortages of accounts, 
public health officials, education officials, etc. There 
were, however, accountants and bookkeepers recruited as 
apprentices who i were occasionally given courses of 
instruction at the Ministry Headquarters in Khartoum.
3. Employees
The employees were recruited under the provisions of
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The Employers and Employed Persons Ordinance, 1948. They 
were the unskilled and semi-skilled personnel. Their 
conditions of service depended on the local conditions, 
details of which were specified by local government 
circulars which are not readily available. The Local 
Government Ordinance, however, made the appointment of two 
officers mandatory. These were the Executive Officer 
(E.O.) and the Treasurer.
(i) The Executive Officer
Section 32(1) of the Ordinance stated that "Every 
Council shall have an Executive Officer ...". The 
Executive Officer was the Chief Officer of the council. He 
was responsible for all council matters not specifically 
assigned to others.
Owing to the importance of his position, it was 
compulsory for him to participate, but without voting, in 
every council, committee, and subcommittee meetings unless 
he had been excused by the chairman. He also kept custody 
of the council's warrants, all deeds and other council 
documents. As chief administrator of the Council, he was 
also its ex-officio Secretary. He was, therefore, the 
council's "keyman". An Executive Officer had to be well 
qualified and efficient to guarantee the success of a 
council. But it was impossible to find enough people at 
local level for the post. So Executive Officers were 
seconded from the central government.
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(i i) The Treasurer
The appointment of the Treasurer was provided for by 
Section 33(1) of the Ordinance which stated that "every 
Council shall have a Treasurer ..." appointed in accordance 
with the terms of the warrant. He was the financial 
officer "responsible through the Executive Officer to the 
Council for the supervision, conduct and carrying out of 
financial functions and responsibility of the Council".
Like the Executive Officer, he was required to attend
all council, committee and sub-committee meetings but also
without voting rights. The requirement was deemed
necessary to enable him to render advice in the proceedings
of the council. Although Executive Officers were allowed
to appoint their own Treasurers, the Executive Officer in
many cases became the Treasurer himself. This was so
because the councils were still too weak to afford this
extra post. Incidentally, this practice was encouraged by
Dr. Marshall:
"I should prefer to see the continuance 
of the present practice of allowing the 
Executive Officer to give financial 
advice and supervise collections until 
the authorities’ activities are extensive 
enough to warrant the appointment of a 
separate highly trained officer.
Having examined the internal operation of the councils, we 
shall proceed to consider the relationship of the councils 
and the central government.
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G . C entral-local relations
Although the local government councils were corporate 
and autonomous under the 1951 Ordinance, f were not 
completely independent. For their remained under the 
control of the central government in various ways.
Theoretically, the central government was to control
the councils through supervision, inspection, approval,
direction and suspension. These were broad powers
exercised by employees of the central government, specific
examples are as follows:-
The Minister had powers to approve local government
44budgeting estimates and tax rates ; confirm local 
45orders , and indemnify executed local government 
46officials. The Governor had powers to confirm local
47orders made by the council , and suspend local councils
temporarily. The Minister of Finance could make conditions
4 Rfor local councils contribution to central government, 
and make loan funds to local councils. The Attorney 
General had authority to approve local government legal 
notices. However, most of the powers were excisable by the 
Minister for local government. But the practice was rather 
different, most of the powers were never used for two 
reasons. In the first place, being a large country with 
inadequate communications facilities, it was difficult to 
travel. Secondly, although many councils exceeded their
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powers, they could not be suspended because that would have 
led to the political unpopularity of the individuals 
involved as well as their political parties in the local 
areas.
So effective control was only maintained through:-
A. Financial control; and
B. The role of Ministry of Local Government.
We shall consider them in turn.
A . Financial Control
There were five forms of financial control which can 
be listed as follows:-
1. Control over revenue and financial resources.
2. Control over expenditure on current account.
3. Control over expenditure of capital accounts.
4. Control through the accounting system and procedure.
5. Control through auditing.
These measures were exercised through several ways. For 
example in all tax laws the central government determined 
the rates, assessed and collected the levies. Powers of 
collections exercised by the councils were delegated by the 
central government which were limited to the ability of 
each council. Where opportunity was given for local 
councils to propose the amounts as in the cases of Dates, 
Hut, Poll, Animal, Taxes, etc., the Minister of local 
government had to approve the proposals.
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Furthermore all grants and loans had to be determined 
and approved by the central government.
Expenditure was centrally controlled through the
budget. Although a council was empowered by Section 43 to:
"expend monies in the proper exercise of
its powers and any matters necessarily 
incidental thereto, and arising therefrom 
and to meet its lav/ful debts or 
obligations",
this was strictly done within the council's approved
budget. For, the vetting was very meticulous and had to be
endorsed by the Province authority and finally approved by 
the Minister of Local Government. Even after the approval 
of the budget, the council had no authority to expend money 
appropriated for any item on another item within the budget 
without the approval of the Minister of Local Government.
In the field of capital account, the councils were 
obliged to keep "such capital, equalization, renewals, and 
such other special accounts" as discussed earlier. They 
were not to incur any capital expenditure without the 
approval of the Minister of Local Government.
Accounts of the councils were to be regulated. Every
council had to:
"Cause proper accounts to be kept in such 
a manner as shall show all financial 
transactions of the council in 
appropriate detail.
The accounting forms, books, receipts etc. were to be
specified by the Minister.
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Auditing had to be done annually by the 
Auditor-General as stated earlier.
B . The Role of the Ministry of Local Government
The Ministry of Local Government was established in
May 1954 to act, of course, as agent of the Central
Government and provide clearing house for local governments
and provincial administrations' affairs. It directed,
coordinated, supervised and guided the local councils
subject to logistical limitations like inadequacy of
skilled personnel and so forlh. It also acted as a liaison
between the local governments and the central government,
ministries, departments and other agencies. The
experienced and professional senior administrators made
special efforts through written circulars and directives
which were widely used to explain, comment and elaborate on
the way statutory provisions should be applied. According
to Galobawi Mohamed Salih, Director of the Institute of
Public Administration (1970):
"over 700 administrative local government 
circulars [were] ... issued from the 
Ministry of Local Government to the
councils and provinces since 1951."j-q
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IV PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION
As stated earlier, the organisation of Provincial 
Administration consisted of:-
A. The
B. The
C. The
We shall
A. The Government Representative
The Government Representative was appointed in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the 
Provincial Administration Act, 1960.
"The Supreme Council shall by written 
order appoint in every province a fit 
person to be the representative of the 
Government in that Province."
He was directly answerable to the Supreme Council for "good
government in the province". He, too, was responsible
for: -
1. The supervision of all government officials in the 
province.
2. The coordination and reporting of the activities of 
the government units.
Invariably all government representatives were military 
personnel as recommended by the Commission (see Chapter 3). 
So competition for the post was limited to the army.
B. The Province Council
The Province Councils were established by warrants 
issued by the Council of Ministers. Every Province Council
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was a body corporate. Their compositions were specified by 
the warrants. Although they differed from one council to 
the other, their maximum limit was fixed at 40 members 
except for Blue Nile Province which had up to 50 due to its 
extremely large population. The members were comprised 
o f : -
1. All elected chairmen of local government councils in 
the province.
2. All Heads of Government Units, except the judiciary, 
in the province.
3. Elected members.
4. Appointed members, who were selected on the basis of 
their prominence in the area or for their technical 
and professional experience or for their general 
exper ience.
Wallis described the principles for the selection as 
follows:-
"A list of 'possibles’ [would] be 
prepared by the Province Authority and 
submitted to the Ministry of Local 
Government. Thence it [would] go to the 
Council of Ministers and then to the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for 
final approval . u ^ 2
As for the elected members, they were required to be males,
aged 25 years old or above, of sound mind and must have
53resided in the province for at least 6  months.
In deciding the compositional arrangements for the 
councils, the Commission had intended to achieve maximum 
representation and participation of the different 
categories of people in the province. Whereas elected
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members would speak for the people, the appointed ones 
would do so for the Supreme Military Council. As for the 
prominent technical and professional cadre and those with 
practical experience, their duty was to make available to 
the Council all necessary information, data and facts based 
on the knowledge of the laws and regulations.
Unfortunately, however, no provision was specifically 
inserted for the representation of the tribal leaders, 
despite their influential role in the society [as seen 
earlier].
The Commission preferred the appointment of the 
Government Representative as the ex officio chairman for 
the councils allegedly on the basis of a Proclamation 
issued by the President of the Supreme Military Council in 
February 1959 vesting responsibility for Public Security in 
the various provinces in the Military Governors. The 
Commission added that the Chairman of the Council should 
not be from amongst the members of the Province Authorities 
in order to ensure the separation of legislative and 
executive powers.
Inspite of these arrangements, the situation was 
capable of causing friction in that the former civilian 
governor, who was head of the administration, became 
subordinate to his military counterpart; a change difficult 
to accept.
234
1. Committees
There was no provision for the appointment of any 
committee, general or specific, which is very uncommon with 
local government authorities supposed to be modelled along 
British lines.
2. Council meetings
The council was required by the Act to meet at least
54four times in a year at an interval of not more than 
three months. However, it could convene extraordinary 
meetings at any time. The quorum would be valid by simple 
majority and so would decisions be.
3. Powers and functions of the councils
The councils had fairly wide powers and functions 
which inc.luded:-
(i) The promotion and suspension of local government in 
the province (tutelage);
(ii) The approval of annual budget for the local councils 
and for themselves;
(iii) Deciding on the amounts and types of taxes and rates 
to be levied;
(iv) Passing votes of censure on Province Authority in 
case of mal or non-execution of council decisions.
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In such a case either the chairman of the council in 
his capacity as the Government Representaztive or 
Minister to whose function the default is related 
could exercise his supervisory powers over the 
authority.
(v) Making formal recommendations of important 
development schemes in the province to the 
appropriate Minister.
(vi) Suggesting improvements in all branches of 
administration.
(vii) Advising the government on legislation and other 
matters referred to them by the government through 
their chairmen.
(viii) Their powers of first instance as those of local 
councils ranged from education below secondary 
school level to culture, social welfare, economic 
welfare, public health and public works.
Clearly, this was a duplication of functions of the local
government councils. However, to avoid any conflict of
jurisdiction between the Provincial Administration and the
Local Government Councils, the following provision was
inserted into the Act:
"... action by the province council shall 
be limited to instances where the local 
government authority is unable or 
incapable of rendering the service, or up 
to the standard required by the province 
council . " 5 5
Although a local council had priority in performing the 
relevant functions, it could refrain from rendering a 
particular service for several reasons: it could be due to 
shortage of funds, lack of competent staff to carry out the
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service, the unimportance of the service to the council, 
low priority or lack of urgency on any other reasonable 
consideration. As it transpired, financial inability 
inhibited the local councils from undertaking most of the 
functions. Conflicts, therefore, either did not arise or 
were minimal and negligible.
Intervention by the council in cases of default or 
failure depended on the urgency of the matter. In normal 
matters, consultation was necessary but if the need for the 
service was one of great urgency and further delay could 
have caused some public danger, immediate intervention was 
necessary.
Generally, the council was empowered to pass bye-laws
which were not contrary to the general laws of the country.
However, in cases of urgency, the Province Authority could
pass them as provisional byelaws as we shall see later.
All bye-laws were required to be confirmed by the
56authorized Minister.
C . The Province Authority
The Province Authority was by itself a body corporate 
established by the Council of Ministers by a separate 
warrant from that of the Province Council.
The Authority was composed of the Provincial Governor
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as Chairman, and the government officials in the province 
as ex officio members. The Deputy Governor was the ex 
officio Secretary. In fact the former civilian Governor 
and his Deputy occupied these positions. They became 
representatives of the Ministry of Local Government but not 
the Ministry of Interior. No Head of Department was to 
delegate his responsibilities to any of his assistants 
except during his absence, whereby he was required to be 
represented by the next senior officer. This was meant to 
accord importance to the work of the Authority. The 
members of the Authority were individually responsible to 
their own Ministries for matters falling outside the 
jurisdiction of the council. This provision undermined the 
Authority's collective responsibility to the council.
Powers and functions of the Authority
Unlike those of the council, the functions of the 
Authority were purely administrative. It executed policies 
decided by the Council. In addition to that it was 
empowered to:-
(i) Study development projects and submit proposals to 
the council.
(ii) Prepare the budget estimates for the approval of the
council.
(iii) Submit the proposed laws and regulations to be 
passed by the council or pass bye-laws of urgent 
nature as stated earlier.
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According to Section 32 of the Act:
"If certain bye-laws are certified by the 
chairman of the Province Authority as 
urgent and should not await the next 
meeting of the Province council, the 
Province Authority may pass such bye-laws 
as provisional bye-laws."
Provision^bye-laws would, however, cease to have force if
not confirmed by the Province Council within three months.
Provisional bye-laws were normally passed during the lapse
period between council meetings.
D. Provincial Finance
On the question of finances for the Provincial
Administration, the Commission had stated:
"No doubt the performance of such 
functions requires some permanent sources 
of revenue for benefits of these councils 
and necessitates the conferment of 
financial powers which would grow as the 
council themselves develop and prove 
their ability to carry out their duties 
and such other functions as may be 
entrusted to them by the central 
government."^
This statement was undoubtedly intended to persuade the
government to assign specific sources of revenue to the
Provincial Administration in addition to whatever grants
they would receive from the central government. In
fulfilment of the above suggestion section 37 of the Act
assigned the following sources of revenue to the provincial
governments:-
(i) Business Profit Tax, assessed on traders whose 
profits exceeded £1000 per annum.
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(ii) Royalties on firewood, charcoal, melon seeds and 
ivory.
(iii) Excise duty on beer and mineral water.
(iv) Sugar tax on government profits on monopoly of sugar 
sales.
(v) Licences on liquor, firearms, pump schemes, motor 
vehicles.
(vi) Fees and charges on ferries and gardens.
(vii) Rents on government lands, public buildings, 
electricity and water undertakings*
(viii) Contributions from (rich) councils.
Almost all sources mentioned above were not different 
from those of the local councils except for tax on 
government, on monopoly of sugar sales and excise duty on 
beer, mineral water, and so forth. It must also be added 
that a revenue source like rents on government and public 
buildings was a source of friction between the Provincial 
and local councils.
Inspite of the numerous sources of revenues assigned 
to the provincial council, the grants in aid, formed the 
greatest contribution for the finances of a Province. For 
example, Table 4.4 shows that central government grants to 
the local government councils constituted 80% of their 
total revenue between 1966/67 and 1970/71.
E . Central-Provincial-Local Government Relationship
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Predictably, the establishment of Provincial Councils 
altered the chain of relationship that existed between the 
local government and the central government. The local 
government councils became answerable to the Province 
councils instead of the central government. The chain of 
the new relationship was explained by the Commission as 
follows:-
"... the local council is free to 
exercise its powers, but at the same time 
is subject to the directives of the 
province council, which in its turn 
exercises its powers within the framework 
of the directives and the general policy 
drawn up by the Central Government for 
the whole country an unseparable unit."^g
The introduction of Provincial Administration thus brought
in the problems of multiplicity of tiers and in particular
the conflict of loyalty of the field officials to the
various levels of government. Although every Minister had
the power to supervise and inspect over province
administration in matters pertaining to his ministerial
functions, such a provision only served to clarify the
powers of the Ministers but not the loyalty of the
officials. A Minister could suspend the decision of a
province council subject to reference to the Council of
Ministers but that was of course done on the advice of the
Departmental Head in the council.
CONCLUSION
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The period between 1922 and 1969 revealed the 
implementation of three patterns of decentralisation. The 
Native Administration period (1922-1936); the Local 
Administration era (1937-1950), and that of Local 
Government as from 1951 onwards. Although Provincial 
Administrations were established in 1960, they never 
altered the system of government at the local level.
Native Administration did not only help the 
colonialists to maintain the status quo but became so 
deeply entrenched into the politics and administration at 
local level that they are a force to be reckoned with. 
Inspite of efforts by the 'May regime' to isolate 
traditional rulers from local government their role and 
influence has remained quite predominant in tax assessment 
and collections, settlement of traditional disputes and 
allocation of land in the rural areas. This will become 
clearer when we come to Chapters 5 and 6.
The period of local administration was a transitional 
stage between indirect rule and local government. It shows 
how Native Administration was gradually transformed into 
responsible local government councils. The elected and 
autonomous local government councils which finally 
superceded the former administrative systems have remained 
the basis of local government in the Sudan today. Although 
temporarily abolished in 1971, a retreat was found 
necessary ten years later - when the idea of Area councils 
had to be introduced. The establishment of the people's
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Province Executive Councils in 1971 were most likely based 
on the dissolved Provincial Administrations. The sources 
of revenue assigned to them have since remained with local 
government too. It remains to be seen in the next chapters 
how far the 'May regime1 revolutionized the system of 
government in the Sudan.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DECENTRALISED GOVERNMENTS 
BY THE * MAY REGIME1; 1969-85
The 'May regime' came to power with a clear-cut and 
concrete policy of decentralising powers to the regional 
and local governments. This was the first time the Sudan 
was to have three tiers of government - central, regional 
and local.
Regionalism was initially perceived as the necessary 
solution to the chronic and endemic Southern problem and 
through it, the achievement of unity in diversity. When 
regionalization appeared capable of solving several other 
problems, the principle was later extended to the whole 
country with the establishment of five more regions in the 
Northern Sudan in 1980. Following the 'redivision' of the 
South in 1983, the number of regions was increased to 
nine.
The regime also introduced considerable reforms at 
the local level. The District Councils were abolished and 
replaced with nine People's Province Executive Councils, 
established over the then existing provinces but this 
number was doubled to eighteen by 1976. More reforms came 
in 1981 following the replacement of the Executive 
Councils with Area Councils. The intention of doing so 
was to promote popular participation in government and
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isolate the traditional rulers at the same time.
According to the regime, the success of these 
programmes could only be guaranteed under a socialist 
system. Hence the establishment of a one-party state 
democracy run and supervised by the Sudan Socialist Union. 
The scene had therefore changed drastically from a 
centralised government in a multi-party system to a highly 
decentralised administration in a one-party state.
This chapter analyses the establishment of the 
various tiers of government and the party between 1969 and 
1985 as a prelude to more detailed examination and 
assessment of the implementation of decentralisation 
during the same period. Where they can illuminate 
matters appropriate parallels from Tanzania, Uganda, Papua 
New Guinea and Iraq have been drawn and discussed. It is 
proposed to consider the establishment of the central 
government before those of the regional and local 
governments.
I THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
On s .ejzing power in a military coup d'etat supported
by left-wing politicians the May Revolutionary Government
announced on May 25th, 1969:
M ... the People's Armed Forces in 
alliance with other patriotic forces has
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seized power ... for the benefit of the 
people, thereby leading our country into 
a new era, building its unity, 
formulating its social life along the 
lines of socialist development."^
Phrases like "new era" and "socialist development" were
illustrative of the revolutionary changes proposed. The
nature of these changes will become clearer as we proceed.
Republican order No. 1 suspended the Transitional
Constitution, 1956. Consequently, the Supreme Commission,
the Council of Ministers, the Constituent Assembly, the
Public Service and all political parties were dissolved.
However, no mention was made of the 1968 constitution.
Surely it was considered to have been overthrown by the
coup. The same order vested sovereignty over the Sudan in
the people, but it had to be "exercised on their behalf by
2
the Council of the Revolution". A Council of Ministers 
was appointed "to exercise executive and legislative 
powers" but it was also made responsible to the Council of 
the Revolution. Numeiri was appointed Chairman of the 
Council with Babikir Awadallah (former Chief Justice and a 
Communist) as Prime Minister.
The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of 
the Sudan to emphasise the intention of the government to
3
"place power in the hands of the people by every means".
We shall see further below how this was achieved.
Unfortunately, the relationship between the 
communists and non-communist members of the Council 
deteriorated very rapidly due to their ideological
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differences. After only five months, Awadallah was 
demoted to Deputy Prime Minister and Republican Order No. 
4 was swiftly issued empowering the government to deal 
firmly with members of the opposition. Hence the new 
democracy had started with a bad omen!
A. The Establishment of the Sudan Socialist Union
Diagram 5 shows the structure of the Sudan Socialist 
Union (SSU). Clearly it permeated all hierarchy of 
government in the country. It was responsible for policy 
formulation at the local, district, regional and national 
levels of government as the diagram demonstrates.
The SSU, the sole political organization in the 
country was to replace all political parties in the search 
for a new political system. Its formation was announced 
by Numeiri in January 1970 and was preceded by a national 
political organization called the "National Democratic 
Front". Composed of an alliance of workers, peasants, 
intellectuals, soldiers, free officers and national 
capitalists, this was the fore-runner of the SSU.
In January 1972, the government's draft National 
Charter was adopted by the National Congress of the SSU.
The Charter emphasized the regime's decision "to 
break free of capitalism". It rejected parliamentary
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democracy in favour of scientific socialism" which would 
transform the poverty of the masses into prosperity". The 
Charter also promised to put "power on all its levels in 
the hands of the people through the application of new 
democracy"^ based on the principle of "enabling the people 
to exercise their will on all levels, political, social 
and administrative, in a sober and responsible way".^ The 
Charter stressed the Government's policy of "realizing 
national unity by ... application of regional 
self-government within the framework of one Sudan in the
g
Southern part of our country". This was to be reinforced
by the establishment of "popular local government bodies
..." side by side with self-government in the South.
Native administration was to be abolished like the
sectarian political parties because they denied the people
"their basic legitimate rights as the makers of the
7
political life of our country". It must be emphasised 
that most importantly, however, the Charter made the SSU 
primarily responsible for the political, economic and 
social leadership from the local level in the village to 
national level in the capital as stated above.
Meanwhile, Republic Order No. 5 was promulgated to 
act as the temporary constitution.
B. Republican Order No. 5
Republican Order No. 5 contained three important
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points relevant to this study.
1. It declared the SSU "the only political organization
o
in the Sudan". Thus the Sudan, like Tanzania, had 
become a de jure one-party state.
2. It empowered the president to "issue a decree
determining the number of the members of the People’s
Assembly and the method of their election".
Ministers were to be ex officio members of the
Assembly. The Assembly was to "prepare the draft of
the permanent constitution and approve it by a
two-thirds majority during the period to be specified
g
by the president". The Assembly was to dissolve 
automatically upon the approval of the constitution 
as directed by the president. The members of the 
Assembly were required to be Sudanese, at least 25 
years old, literate, of sound mind and enjoying 
political rights.
3. It vested legislative power in the president and the 
People's Assembly but the president could 
"unilaterally carry out the duties of the legislative 
authority, except the power to amend [this] order 
until the People's Assembly [was] formed."^ This 
provision enabled the president to decree the 
People's Local Government Act, 1971 and the Southern 
Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972 which 
decentralised powers to the People’s Province 
Executive Councils and the Southern Regional
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Government respectively, even before the permanent 
constitution could come into being.
C . The Adoption of the Permanent Constitution, 1973
The adoption of the permanent constitution was 
preceded by the formation of the People's Assembly. In 
August 1972, the president issued a decree forming the 
People's Assembly consisting of 207 members to adopt a 
draft permanent constitution within six months.
The Assembly consisted of appointed and elected 
members representing multi-seat constituencies, the 
revolution's popular organizations, group organizations, 
skills necessary for drawing up the constitution, people's 
armed forces and graduate cadres. Seats for regional and 
popular organizations were based on population 
distribution in the provinces. Details of the composition 
of the Assembly are shown in table 5.
According to Collin Legum, the process "produced an 
undistinguished Assembly in which conservative, 
middle-class townsmen and traditional rural leaders were 
strongly represented".^ Although Muslim brothers were 
included, all pro-Egyptian elements had been removed. 
Observers felt that the Council "offered no dangers to the 
regime, even though elements associated with the banned 
National Unionist Party and the Umma Parties had done
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Table 5:
DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCIAL SEATS
Province Population No. of 
Regional 
Constit­
uencies
Seats of 
popular 
organisa­
tions
Appointed 
Member s
Khartoum 945,000 5 3
Northern 1,220,000 7 3
Kassala 1,347,000 9 5
Kordofan 3,027,000 17 7
Darfur 1,825,000 9 5
Blue Nile 3,398,000 18 9
Baker El Ghazal 1,527,000 9 4
Upper Nile 1,380,000 8 4
Equatoria 1,403,000 8 4
Total 90 44 32
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONAL SEATS
Tenants Association 9
Trade Unions 7
Private Sector 5
Medical Services 1
Agricultural vocations 
Engineers
Veterinary graduates 
Law vocation 
Economists
Academic researchers
Semi Technical employees 2
Teachers of non university higher
institutes 1
Secondary Schools and higher second­
ary schools 3
Elementary school teachers _3
Total 41
Grand total 166 + 41 dr 207 members
Source: Voice, Special Issue, vol. no. 15, March 16th to
April 1st, 1973, p. 11.
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12well." The draft constitution was therefore expected to 
pass without much challenge. The Council held its first 
meeting in October 1971 but the constitution was not 
adopted until April 1973 due to disagreements over issues 
of nationality, the official language, religion and 
sources of law which were also discussed in Chapter 3.
This time these issues were resolved as follows:-
1. Nationality
The Sudan was defined as "a unitary, democratic, 
socialist and sovereign Republic, and is part of both the 
Arab and African entities" (emphasis added).
The phrase "part of both Arab and African entities" 
is ambiguous. How can it be part of both Arab and African 
entities when the Sudan is politically and geographically 
an African state. Moreover, the name "Sudan" originated 
from the Arabic words "Bilad al Sudan" meaning the country 
of the blacks. There could be no solution to the problem 
by failing to state the exact identity of the country and 
i ts 1 peoples'.
2• Official Language
Article 10 of the Permanent Constitution stated that 
Arabic was the official language of the Sudan, without any 
concessions for the use of other languages. However,
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sections of the Self-Government Act modified this 
provision by adding that "and English the principal 
language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the 
use of any other language or languages The word
"principal" has no special meaning in law. Ordinarily it 
means "the highest in the order of importance. Therefore 
the status of English could not be equated with that of 
Arabic. Thus the language problem still remains 
unresolved.
3. State Religion
The constitution attempted to accommodate the 
competitive religions of Islam and Christianity in the 
Sudan in Article 16 thereof:
"(a) In the Democratic Republic of the
Sudan Islam is the religion and the 
society shall be guided by Islam 
being the religion of the majority 
of its people and the state shall 
endeavour to express its values.
(b) Christianity is the religion in the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 
being professed by a large number of 
its citizens who are guided by 
Christianity and the State shall 
express its values." (emphasis 
added).
Certainly Islam was meant to enjoy a superior status 
according to the wording of the provision. This is clear 
from phrases like "Islam is the religion" and "being the 
religion of the majority of its people". These religions 
could have been at par had the the provision stated that 
both Islam and Christianity are recognized religions in the 
Sudan without laying more emphasis on one or the other.
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4. Sources of Law
Article 9 stated that there were to be two sources of 
law - "Islamic law and custom". Such a provision was not 
only extraordinary but contradicted the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty which dictates that Parliament is 
free to legislate on any matter as it deems fit.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR DECENTRALISATION OF 
GOVERNMENT
In addition to the establishment of the Central
Government as already stated, the permanent constitution
provided for the decentralisation of government as contained
in the Charter for National Action. Firstly, it directed
that the Sudan be administered under a decentralised form of
government:
"The Democratic Republic of the Sudan 
shall be administered in accordance with 
the system of decentralisation as 
prescribed by l a w . " ^
To make this possible, it further directed that the Sudan
be "divided into administrative units, the numbers,
boundaries and names of which shall be prescribed b e l o w . ^
Thus the policy of decentralisation was constitutionally
enshrined as a directive principle of state policy.
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Secondly, it specifically provided for the
establishment of the Southern Regional Government:
"Within the Unitary Sudan, there shall be 
established in the Southern Region a 
Regional Self-Government in accordance 
with the provisions of the Southern 
Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972, 
which shall be an organic law, and shall 
not be amended except in accordance with 
the provisions thereof.
The complication in this provision was the reference made
to the amendment procedure of the Self-Government Act,
1972, which was to be followed in case of its amendment.
That provision read:
"This Act shall only be amended by a 
majority of three-quarters of the 
People's National Assembly and the 
approval of a majority of two-thirds of 
the citizens of the Southern Region in a 
referendum to be carried out in that 
Region.
Three important points are worth noting at this stage:
(i) Article 8 quoted above, indirectly entrenched the 
provisions of the Self-Government Act into the 
permanent constitution.
(ii) The same article, ipso facto, acknowledged the
formation of the Southern Regional Government with 
retrospective effect.
(iii) The amendment provision of the Self-Government Act
was too rigid. It was even more rigid than that of
the constitution which stated:
"... the amendment [of the Constitution] 
shall come into force if ... passed by 
the People's Assembly by two-thirds 
majority and assented to by the President 
of the Republic.
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The amendment would only be put to referendum if there was 
disagreement between the President and the People's 
Assembly. This raised the issue of whether the 
Self-Government Act (an organic law) could be regarded as 
superior to the constitution because of the latter's less 
rigid amendment provision and the fact that it had omitted 
to expressly state that it was the supreme law of the 
land. Although this is still a grey area of the law, no 
degree of rigidity in any organic law would be expected to 
elevate it to the level of the constitution even if the 
constitution failed to expressly declare its supremacy. 
Organic laws are usually subject to amendment by 
Parliament but constitutions are amended by a constituent 
Assembly. Although organic laws are superior to ordinary 
laws they are by no means equal to status to the 
constitution. To insert an amendment provision in the 
Self-Government Act which was more rigid than that of the 
constitution was quite absurd but the absurdity explains 
the underlying problem - the deep mistrust between the 
Northern and Southern Sudanese.
According to Alier, the principal architect of the
law:
"... it was of ... ingrained history of 
mistrust that in 1972 [they] worked out
this document so that certain elements
would not have the chance to bring 
discord to the country. There [were] 
strict provisions about amendments to the 
Act; this [was] not accidental but based 
on past experience and foresight.
Alier and others were genuinely afraid that due to the
long mistrust between Northerners and Southerners, the Act
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would be easily eroded if not adequately protected.
Hence, the extreme rigidity of its amendment provision. 
However, the absurdity would have been avoided if the Act 
had been incorporated into the body of the constitution 
itself and the amendment thereof entrenched as stated 
above.
Thirdly, the constitution provided for the
establishment of local governments as a third tier of
government in the country.
"... the Executive shall by warrant 
establish, in each province, a People's 
Province Executive Council having a 
corporate personality. The law shall 
prescribe ... their financial legislative 
and executive powers and functions ... 
subject to the provisions of Article 8 of 
the constitution.".^
Despite the fact that local governments had been in 
existence in the Sudan since 1922 (see Chapters 2, 3 and 
4), this was the first time constitutional recognition had 
been accorded to local governments. Presumably this 
explains the importance attached by the 'May regime' to 
the decentralisation of powers to all levels of 
government.
Following the second constitutional amendment in 
1980, certain provisions of the permanent constitution 
were modified to suit the establishment of regional 
governments in the Northern Sudan and creation of a 
government for the national capital. The changes were as 
follows:-
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(i) Article 182 was amended to read:
"A.1 8 2 (A):
Subject to the provisions of Article 8 
hereof; there shall be established in the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan the 
following regions:-
(a) The Northern Region.
(b) The Eastern Region.
(c) The Central Region.
(d) Kordofan Region.
(e) Darfur Region."
Their boundaries and capitals were to be defined by a 
separate law.
Article 13 was also amended to read
"A13(b). The administrative position of 
Khartoum province shall be prescribed by 
law."
Thus with the insertion of the 1980 amendments, the 
constitutional basis for the decentralisation of 
government in the whole Sudan was complete.
We now proceed to examine how the regional and local
i
governments in the Sudan were established. We shall 
consider the establishment of regional governments before 
that of the local governments.
Ill THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Regional governments in the Sudan were established at 
the following d i f f e r n t  times:-
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A. The Southern Regional Government, 1972
B. The Regional Governments in the Northern Sudan, 1980
C. Redivision of the Southern Region into three Regional 
Governments, 1983
D. The* conversion of the administration of the National 
Capital into a Quasi-Regional Government, 1984.
We shall examine each of these according to the above 
sequence.
A. The Southern Regional Government
The Southern Region was defined as:
"The Provinces of Baher El Ghazal,
Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance 
with their boundaries as they stood on 
January 1st 1956 and any other areas that 
were culturally and geographically a part 
of the Southern Complex as may be decided 
by a referendum."2 Q
The boundaries of the Southern Region as given above are
shown in Map 2.
Map 2
Map of the Southern Region
The map shows the new provinces of the South after 
the redivision of the old provinces in 1976 discussed 
later. According to the 1956 boundaries, Equatoria 
included Eastern and Western Equatoria; Baher El Ghazal 
was composed of Baher El Ghazal and Lakes Provinces; and
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Upper Nile was made up of Upper Nile and Jonglei 
provinces.
The problem was that the areas regarded as 
"culturally and geographically part of the Southern 
Complex" remained in the North. They included Abyei, 
Kurmuk, Chali El Fil and Kofia Kingi which were transfered 
to the North either during the colonial period or by 
Abboud's Military Government. The fact that the promised 
referendum was never held due to the unwillingness of the 
central government constituted a serious boundary issue 
between the North and the South. Therefore a solution to 
the Southern problem in disregard of an appropriate 
decision on the future of these areas would still be 
incomplete.
The South was accorded constitutional status by the
memorable 9th June declaration when, two weeks after the
coup President Numeiri announced that:
"The Revolutionary Government is 
confident and competent enough to face 
existing realities. It recognizes the 
historical and cultural differences 
between the North and the South and 
firmly believes that the unity of our 
country must be built upon these 
objective realities. The Southern People 
have the right to develop in their 
respective cultures and traditions within 
a united socialist Sudan. In furtherance 
of the objectives, the Revolutionary 
Council and Council of Ministers held 
joint meetings and after careful 
discussion of the matter, resolved to 
recognize the right of the Southern 
People to a Regional autonomy^-^."
(Emphasis added.)
Obviously this declaration was a restatement of the
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historical, ethnic, religious, linguistic and other 
differences between the North and the South mentioned in 
the introduction to the study. This was the crux of the 
Southern problem. Yet as we have shown, none of the 
independent governments in the Sudan had been prepared to 
admit the facts as the May Revolutionary Government had.
The fact that this government accepted to build the unity 
between the North and the South on these differences 
constituted one of the most important attempts at 
decentralisation in the Sudan in the 1970s. The aim was 
to achieve unity in diversity - diversity of cultures, 
religions, languages, customary laws and so forth but at 
the same time remaining one on national matters like 
foreign affairs, defence, currency and others.
Local autonomy was decided as the form of 
decentralisation for the South but this was without the 
prior consent of the Southerners. It will be called that 
during the period of self-determination in 1955 (see 
Chapter 2) the Southern Members of Parliament had demanded 
federation and not local autonomy. Thus, to propose the 
latter was a substitute solution not likely to prove 
satisfactory. However, the promised local autonomy was 
not implemented before the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 
whereby the Southerners, albeit half-heartedly, accepted 
the local autonomy. For their bargaining strength was too 
weak to achieve something greater.
The next day, June 10th 1969, the government 
announced the Regional autonomy programme as follows:
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"(1) The continuation and further 
extension of amnesty law.
(2) Economic, social and cultural 
development of the South.
(3) The appointment of a Minister for 
Southern Affairs.
(4) The training of personnel."22
The amnesty law was understandably extended to persuade 
the Anyanya fighting forces to surrender to the 
government. However, nobody responded to the law until 
the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972.
An economic planning board and a special budget were 
created for the South to bring about "rapid socio-economic 
development". Joseph Garang, a communist, was appointed 
Minister for Southern Affairs but was executed for 
participation in the abortive communist coup in 1971. He 
was succeeded by Alier soon to become the first Southerner 
ever to be appointed to the post of Vice President. Three 
Southern Commissioners, Toby Madut, Hillary Logali and 
Luigi Adwok were appointed to administer the provinces of 
Baher El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile respectively. 
This was also the first time for Southerners to hold 
commissionerships.
All these arrangements were preliminary to the 
establishment of the Regional Government in the South 
which was finally agreed upon in Addis Ababa.
1. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern
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Sudan, 1972
The Addis Ababa Agreement provided a temporary peace 
formula in the Sudan from 1972 to 1983 between the Sudan 
Government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SSLM). The gist of it was to offer the Southern Region 
local autonomy within a United Sudan as embodied in the 
Southern Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972.
The circumstances which surrounded the Agreement 
merit some detail. Though popular, the Revolutionary 
Government's position was still shaky due to opposition 
from the Ansar and the communists. The government's 
response was to suppress both groups, the first in March 
1970 and the latter in July 1971. However, these actions 
alone could not guarantee adequate security for prolonged 
existence of the regime. Desperate attempts were also 
made in January 1971 to crush the Anyanya in the South but 
the government's military ventures were disappointingly 
unsuccessful. The appropriate alternative was to come to 
terms with the Anyanya through political rapprochement.
There were political weaknesses on the part of the 
Anyanya too. They had fought for a long time as divided 
groups and due to the lack of strong projected image, they 
were little known outside the Sudan. The unity among 
Southerners which Lagu had started to build in 1969 was 
still too weak when pressures started to be exerted for a 
settlement by negotiations. The pressures which came 
mainly from church organizations which were also
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sympathetic to the movement could not be withstood as 
there were no other supporters to replace them. A further 
blow to the SSLM was the loss of Israeli aid which wholly 
came through Uganda, as a result of Uganda's breaking off 
of relations with Israel in 1971. So it became apparent 
to both sides that there was no other option than to reach 
a negotiated settlement. This led to the signing of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement which constituted the corpus of the 
Self-Government Act. The proposed federation between 
Egypt, Libya and the Sudan when Numeiri came to power had 
to be abandoned as the South did not want to see the Sudan 
very closely associated to any Arab countries so as to 
project the country's own identity. Thus Numeiri emerged 
as a heroic African leader for settling communal violence 
through peaceful machinery and thereby set a precedent for 
other countries afflicted with similar problems. The 
success of this achievement remains to be evaluated in the 
following chapters.
Through the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act, 
1972, a Regional Government was established in the 
Southern Sudan. It had an executive and legislative organ 
called the High Executive Council and the People's 
Regional Assembly respectively. The judiciary was 
regarded as wholly a central government organ and thereby 
omitted from the provisions thereof. But before examining 
the details of the Self-Government Act we should consider 
the amendments which were proposed to the Agreement by the 
SSLM but these were never effected. It is believed that 
President Numeiri manipulated Joseph Lagu, leader of SSLM
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to abandon the idea.
For the sake of comparison with the provisions of the 
Act some of these crucial amendments proposed were as 
follows:-
(i) The Agreement was to be "incorporated in letter and
33spirit into the future constitution of the Sudan".
In other words, the Agreement would have become part 
and parcel of the constitutional document instead of 
being refered to as an organic law. Thus the 
Agreement and the constitution would have had equal 
status at law.
(ii) The Head of the Regional Executive organ was to be 
called the Prime Minister instead of the President 
of the High Executive Council. It was not, however, 
certain whether he would by virtue of that assume 
premiership of the country but such a possibility 
could not be ruled out.
(iii) Both English and Arabic were to be the official 
languages for the Sudan without prejudice to the use 
of other languages. Making English and Arabic at 
par would have resolved the language problem in the 
Sudan.
(iv) The list of national matters was limited to:
"1. National Defence.
2. External Affairs.
3. Currency and Coinage.
4. Nationality and Immigration.n
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Obviously the Southern Region would have had 
enormous powers devolved to it compared to what 
existed under the 1972 Act. (For details see 
Chapter 7.)
(v) It was to be mandatory for the President to accede 
to any request of the People’s Regional Assembly so 
long as it was not adverse to the welfare and 
interests of the citizens in the South. Such 
requirement would have guaranteed adequate 
protection to the interest of the South rather than 
leaving it wholly to the discretion of the President 
as was the case in the 1972 Act. (For more details 
see Chapter 8.)
(vi) The Regional Executive was to be answerable to the
Regional Assembly only. Thus it would not have
become a mere agent of the president of the Republic 
as it later transpired.
(vii) The central government was to be obliged to transfer
a minimum grant of 35% of the total national revenue
to the Southern Region for its administration and 
development projects. This figure would have been 
probably very irrational considering the fact that 
the region had also been assigned its own sources of 
revenue.
(viii)The region was expressly empowered to borrow from
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abroad and receive foreign aid which would have 
saved the South from having to seek funds through 
the central government. This would have been a 
solid achievement.
(ix) The South was to have its own military command
composed of not less than one third of the Sudanese 
Armed Forces. The Commander was to be the Deputy 
Commander-in-chief of the Sudan Army. It was to be 
controlled by the Regional premier. This would have 
safeguarded the South from unwanted Northern 
interference.
These amendments which were suggested by the SSLM 
revealed that the degree of decentralisation favoured by 
the south resembled more of a confederal government than 
local autonomy. However, failure of the Sudan government 
to accept these amendments left the problem inadequately 
resolved.
According to the Self-Government Act, the southern
Region was responsible for:
"The preservation of public order, 
internal security, efficient 
administration and the development of the 
region in cultural, economic and social 
fields."
These included the development of regional financial 
resources, organization of regional and local governments, 
legislation on traditional law and customs, establishment 
of social services, schools, hospitals, internal security 
forces, promotion of trade and industry, etc.
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By the same Act the region was expressly prohibited 
from participating in the following matters regarded as of 
a national nature; such as national defence, external 
affairs, currency, telecommunications, customs, 
immigrations, development planning, educational planning, 
public audit and foreign trade (with the exception of 
border trade). (For details see Chapter 7.)
The region was empowered to impose local duties and 
taxes in addition to the grants in aid it was entitled to 
from the central government. These powers of the regional 
government were, however, so generally and imprecisely 
defined that serious contradictions resulted. These 
problems are examined in Chapter 7.
Comparative Development
2. The Kurdish Region in Iraq
The problem between the Arabs and Kurds in Iraq is 
very similar to that of Arabs and Africans in the Sudan. 
Iraq is a fairly large country measuring 169,240 square 
miles with a population of 14.7 million in 1983. The 
people are of two races (as stated), Arabs and Kurds 
(indo-Chinese by origin). They are in the ratio of 2 to 1 
similar to that between Northern and Southern Sudanese.
The origins of the problem are also traceable to the
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colonial period. Iraq became a British dependency in 
about 1915. A highly centralised system of government was 
established in Iraq too. As in the case of the Sudan, 
the British favoured the Arabs and Emir Faisal son of 
Hussein was proclaimed king in 1921 with the support of 
the British. That was the beginning of Kurdist discontent 
which did not explode until 1932. Since then the Kurds 
have fought continuously for self-government through 
guerrilla wars and their political party (The Kurdish 
Democrats) but the Iraqi government made very limited 
concessions for the Kurds. However, in 1970, President El 
Baker announced the conclusion of a fifteen-point 
agreement with the Kurds. The Agreement, inter alia, 
granted the Kurds more far-reaching concessions than 
Southern Sudan ever obtained from the Northern government. 
Examples of some of the concessions incorporated into the 
"Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 1970" are 
given as follows:-
1. The Kurds were to have an autonomous government 
within the Iraqi Arab socialist state.
2. There was to be a Kurdish Vice-President.
3. There were to be two nationalities in Iraq:
"Iraqi people are composed of two 
principal nationalisms: The Arab
nationalism and the Kurdish nationalism.
This constitution acknowledges the 
national rights of the Kurdish people and 
the legitimate rights of all minorities 
within the Iraqi unity.
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4. The Kurds were to establish a legislature and an
executive under the said Kurdish Vice-President.
5. The Iraqi National Assembly (the National Council), 
is composed of people's representatives from the 
various political, economic and social sectors.
6. The constitution recognises Arabic as the official
language but "the Kurdish language is official
27besides Arabic in the Kurdish Region."
7. Kurdish culture was recognized and a complete amnesty 
was granted to those who had been in rebellion.
8. The Kurds were granted proportional representation in
the Revolutionary Command Council, the Cabinet, Civil 
Service and Armed Forces.
Obviously the recognition of two nationalities, two 
official languages, porportional representation in the 
National Assembly, the Revolutionary Command Council, the 
Cabinet, the Civil Service and the Armed Forces could be a 
useful model for solving the Southern problem in the 
Sudan.
B. The Regional Governments in the Northern Sudan, 1980
In his keynote address to the Central Committee
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Meeting of the SSU in March 1979, President Numeiri 
proposed the division of the Northern Sudan into three 
regions - the Western, the Eastern and the Northern. The 
Southern region was to remain as it was, thereby 
constituting the fourth region. Certainly the extension 
of decentralisation to the whole country was seen as as 
step forward. For to have confined it to the South would 
have been, as Professor Nuwabueze put it, to place the 
South and the North in such a way as to pitch them against
o o
each other "in a continuous battle for ascendancy".
Several important criticisms were levelled against 
the proposal, namely: that it was ill-timed in view of the 
instabilities of the neighbouring countries (Ethiopia and 
Chad where secessionist wars were being fought); that the 
skilled manpower in the Sudan was too scarce to manage 
more decentralised systems; and that the experience with 
devolution of powers to the Provinces under the People's 
Local Government Act, 1971 had proved to be a failure. 
Though the criticisms were sound, they were disregarded 
and dismissed as "teething problems". The proposal was 
adopted and two committees were appointed "to make 
comprehensive studies and specific recommendations on the
o Q
proposal for regional government."
1. The Technical Committee on Regional Government, 1979
The Technical Committee was chaired by Abel Alier, 
Vice-President of the Republic. It was commissioned to:
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"undertake the study of the basic aspects 
of the Regional Government according to 
the recommendations and resolutions of 
the [SSU] Central Committee . .."^q
The Committee submitted its recommendations within the
year. These were briefly:
(i) That the powers of the regions should be similar to 
those of the Southern Region.
(ii) That the regional governments should have 
independent sources of revenue in addition to grants 
received from the central government similar to that 
of the Southern Region.
(iii) That there should be four regions in the Sudan, the 
Eastern, the Central, the Western and the Southern.
The committee thus merely confirmed the President*s 
proposals with minor modification of preferring the 
Central Region to the Northern Region.
2. The National Committee on Consolidation of
CL .
Decentraliyion, 1980
The National Committee worked under the close 
supervision of the President of the Republic.
Surprisingly the committee did not confine its studies to 
countries with decentralised systems of government. It 
looked at the unitary system in the UK, the various 
federal systems of the USA, the Federal Repubic of Germany 
and Nigeria, as well as the communist system in Russia and 
the Socialist one in China. It recommended that the 
federal system in Nigeria was unsuitable for the Sudan
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because:-
(i) The first federal experience in Nigeria had led to 
devastating civil war.
(ii) During the military period the State Governors
acted as agents of the Federal military 
governments.
(iii) That the federal scheme under the 1979 
constitution was too recent for any sound 
judgement regarding its operation.
(iv) That a federal system, anyway, requires a strong
economy which the Sudan did not have.
(v) That the systems of government in the other
countries were alien.
These recommendations would indicate that the committee 
was finding excuses to stif le any argument for the 
establishment of a federal system of government in the 
Sudan.
So, both committees were in favour of regional 
governments more or less on similar terms with that of the 
South. Those minor differences between the committee's 
draft which was adopted as the Regional Government Act, 
1980, and the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act are 
examined and discussed in Chapter 7. In light of these 
recommendations, the National Assembly enacted the said 
Regional Government Act of 1980, details of which are 
considered in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Briefly, the Regional Government Act provided for the 
establishment of fir ? regional governments in the Northern
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Sudan instead of three. These included the Northern, 
Eastern, Central, Kordofau and Darfur Regions. Historical 
differences and competitive interests between the Eastern 
and Northern Regions and between Kordofan and Darfur led 
to their desire for separate regions. The legislative 
and executive powers including financial ones as stated 
earlier were similar to those of the Southern Region 
except for the said differences. Thus the Sudan had a 
total of 6 regions by 1980.
Comparative Development
3. The Buganda Kingdom in Uganda
Unlike the Sudan, Uganda is a very small country of
about 236,000 square kilometres with a population of 13
31million people in 1981. The Baganda are a tribe 
occupying the central part of the country around Kampala, 
the capital.
At the time of its occupation, the British made an 
agreement with the King of the Baganda (the Buganda 
Agreement, 1900) whereby the Baganda enjoyed a special 
constitutional status in the whole country. The 
autonomous status of the Baganda are in some ways similar 
to the local autonomy granted to the South in 1972. At 
the time of independence in 1962, the Agreement was 
incorporated into the Uganda Constitution 1962 as a 
schedule. Other kingdoms were also established for
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Ankole, Bunyoro Toro, and Busoga but their powers were 
inferior to those of the Buganda Kingdom, especially in 
terms of financial responsibilities and range of 
activities assigned. Their relative inferior status was 
similar to that of the regions established in the Northern 
Sudan in 1980 when compared to the South.
The Buganda constitution provided, inter alia, for:-
(i) The establishment of Buganda Government within 
Uganda under the Kabaka (King).
(ii) There was to be a Lukiiko (Legislative Assembly) 
composed of appointed, elected and ex officio 
members. The Kabaka was to appoint six members and 
the saza chiefs (not exceeding twenty) Members of 
the Kabaka Council of Ministers were to be ex 
officio members of the Lukiiko.
(iii) The Kabaka was to be elected by a majority vote in 
the Lukiiko. However, the range of candidacy was 
to be limited to members of the royal family, and 
in particular the descendants of Kabaka Mutesa I.
. . 32
(i v ) The "Council of Ministers" (the executive organ), 
commonly referred to as the "Ministry for Buganda" 
consisted of the Katikiro (Prime Minister), other 
Ministers and the Attorney General for Buganda.
(v) Kabaka1s Government also had a Public Service 
Commission.
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(vi) Powers of the Buganda Government included provision 
of health services, education, works, internal 
security etc.
(vii) The government had a separate budget with its own 
sources of local revenue. However, customs, import 
duties and major sources of revenue which normally 
accrue to central governments were excluded.
Inspite of the difference between the Buganda Kingdom 
and the Southern Region due to the monarchical status of 
the former, the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, 
the rest of the provisions were similar to those of the 
Self-Government Act. What emerges from the comparison is 
that the Buganda Kingdom had more impact on national 
politics of Uganda than did the Southern Region on the 
Sudan as a whole. There were three obvious reasons for 
this difference. The first was that the Kabaka was the 
President of Uganda more or less by virtue of his position 
as King, and acted as the (ceremonial) Head of State.
Secondly, members of the Lukiiko were elected to 
represent the Baganda in the National Parliament. So they 
behaved as delegates of the Baganda rather than as 
representatives of the people. Finally, the location of 
Buganda in a rich fertile area offered a bouyant financial 
base for the autonomous region. Accordingly, it was 
financially more powerful than the Southern Region which 
had a very poor tax base (for details see Chapter 9).
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This privileged position of Buganda led to the 1966 
constitutional crisis in Uganda whereby the kingdom was 
destroyed. It therefore exposes the dangers inherent in 
imbalanced administrative arrangements.
C . The 'Redivision' of the Southern Region, 1983
The 'redivision' of the South was and still is a 
controversial and explosive issue. Basically, three 
important reasons are identifiable for the 'redivision’ of 
the Southern Region in 1983. The first two were internal, 
namely tribal conflicts over land use and the domination 
of the political machinery by the Dinkas being the 
majority tribe in the South. The third was an external 
factor from the North. Clearly political division of the 
South would guarantee the Northern superiority in the 
Sudan above challenge.
In his opening address to the SSU in March 1981,
President Numeiri suggested:
"The South has led the Sudan successfully 
on the path of regionalisation. Now that 
the devolution of powers has become a 
reality in the North, which has now five 
regions ... is it not time that we 
consider the possibility of devolving 
administration in the South itself? ... 
the proposal would bring administration 
nearer to the people and make government 
more efficient, given the vastness of the 
region. This would be in keeping with 
the resolutions to hand power to the 
people ... it might be a good way of 
avoiding Southern Region's administration 
by a single ethnic group."23
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Numeiri's provocative arguments were however very general. 
We shall examine the main reasons for the division in 
turn.
1. Domination of the Regional Minority 'Peoples'
The practice of the domination of regional minorities 
by the regional majorities is not strange in Africa. It 
was the case in Nigeria for several years when the 
minority tribes surrounding the Hausas and the Fulaunis 
were ever dominated by those major tribes. This problem 
has, however, been finally resolved by the division of 
Nigeria from 4 to 12 states in 1967 and 19 states in 1976.
The Sudan did not, however, learn any lessons from
Nigeria. The Southern Provinces Self-Government Act did
not offer adequate protection to the regional minorities
either. Apart from a few "Human Rights" provisions
offering guarantees of "equal opportunity of education,
employment, commerce and practice of lawful profession"
and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of "race,
34tribal, origin, religion, place of birth or sex", the 
Act went no further on this matter. Considering the 
heterogeneous nature of the South (see Introduction), 
adequate protection for the regional minorities was 
necessary.
These "Human Rights" provisions moreover proved to be 
inadequate. The minority tribes in Equatoria and Baher El
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Ghazal Provinces felt aggrieved by the over-representation
of the Dinka tribe in the government. The ex-President of
the High Executive Council, Joseph Lagu, in an interview
with Sudan in 1980 said:
"Tribalism and partisanism is a threat to 
stability and maybe even peace in the 
Southern Sudan ... today ten out of 
twenty ministers in the Regional 
Government, including the President of 
the High Executive Council come from one 
tribe. This is over-emphasising 
tribalism. ... The Dinka may not even be 
a quarter of the population of the South; 
how can they be represented as half of 
the Cabinet? They can meet alone and 
their meeting can be valid."35
However, no comprehensive statistics were produced to 
show Dinka domination in the Public Service and other 
public institutions. This argument proved to be partially 
incorrect when after 'redivision1, about 65% of the 
employees of the former Southern Region were left in 
Equatoria because of being Equatorians by origin (see 
Chapter 10).
Other criticisms were focussed more specifically on 
certain individuals, a 5 a Dinka Regional
Police Commissione^was most unpopular among the minority 
tribes for his tribalistic tendencies and partiality in 
the recruitment of the Regional Police Force. Once again 
no figures were produced to substantiate this point 
although it contained much truth. This tribal police 
force was also unofficially accused of mistreating members 
of the minority groups of people through unlawful arrests, 
detention and torture.
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2. Tribal Conflicts Over Land
The conflicts over land were between Baris living 
around Juba and the Dinkas migrating in large numbers from 
Bor due to floods. The settlement pattern of the Baris as 
agriculturists and the Dinka as cattle-owning pastoralists 
could be expected to lead to conflicts over use of land 
resulting in disputes of a serious nature. Complaints 
raised by the Baris to the Regional Government got passive 
response, and since both the President of the High 
Executive Council and the Regional Police Commissioner 
were Dinkas from Bor, it appeared as if they condoned the 
attrocities of their tribesmen when their cattle destroyed 
the crops of the Baris. Even if the Self-Government Act 
had omitted to assign the responsibility over internal 
migration to the Regional Government the logical 
interpretation was that it was incidental to keeping peace 
and order, which squarely lay within the jurisdiction of 
the region.
The passive attitude of the Regional Government 
towards resolving communal problems over land was 
therefore one of the critical reasons for 'redivision' as 
expressed by Lagu in his pamphlet, Decentralisation a 
Necessity for the Southern Provinces of the Sudan. He 
said:
"Unfortunately people now responsible for 
the Southern Sudan Government ... show no 
respect for political sentiments of those 
whose destiny they guide. Some areas
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such as Mongalla, Luri and Logo and Koyla 
and Rejaf (to mention a few) have been 
forced to living in a state of 
uncertainty because of unplanned Dinka 
settlements and movements. No decision 
taken by any council at any level in 
those areas would have any weight since 
the Regional Government apparently 
connives at the activities of the Dinka 
tribesman•"3 ^
The proponents of 'redivision* also argued that the South 
was too large to be ruled from Juba. That in order to 
promote rapid economic development further 
decentralisation was a necessity. They added that having 
more regions would increase the share of the South in the 
national financial allocation; an argument based on simple 
logic.
Unfortunately, not all the arguments raised above 
were very convincing. Apart from the argument against 
unplanned settlements and Dinka domination in the High 
Executive Council which carry some weight, the rest were 
very light. It is true that the South was large enough to 
be divided but the financial and skilled manpower 
resources were too inadequate to maintain the new regions. 
The argument about getting more share of the national cake 
was too shallow because the distribution of national 
revenue did not depend on the number of regional units 
established. As we shall see in Chapter 9, it was based 
on the formula of deficit financing. It later transpired 
that the three new regions in the South received no more 
funds than what the Southern Region had been entitled to 
before the division.
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Those opposed to the division put their argument more 
strongly. Apart from the lack of resources as already 
mentioned, they pointed out that the division would weaken 
the South politically especially in its ability to 
withstand Northern interference through the central 
government. However, they overlooked to propose any 
concrete solutions to the above problems. They were 
overoccupied with the question of Northern intention to 
divide the South politically.
3. Northern Interest in the Division of the South
Northern interest in the division of the South was 
seen to be based on the policy of "divide and rule". Such 
a policy was seen in terms of the North’s secret plans of 
expansionism, Islamisation and Arabization of the peoples 
of the South and the Nile valley as a whole. Southern 
resistance to the spread of Islam and Arabisation has been 
explained above (see Chapter 1). Since 1965, the North 
had wanted the South to exist as three regional entities 
and not one. (See recommendations of the twelve-man 
committee in Chapter 3.) However, the South had 
successfully resisted attempts to divide it.
Southern unity was seen to be dangerous to the North 
and its political aspirations as illustrated for example 
in 1980 during the boundary crisis and at the refinery 
trauma period in 1981 (see Chapter 8 for details of both 
incidents) when the South had stood as one. Therefore,
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the only alternative for the North to pursue its 
objectives was to destroy the unity of the South by 
exploiting their tribal, internal and personal 
differences. If this plan succeeded then it would be 
possible to implement Islamic Sharia laws already in the 
pipeline but bitterly opposed in the South. On balance, 
it would seem that the division of the South politically 
to weaken it to withstand Northern plans was the most 
crucial reason for the division of the South compared to 
the complaints raised by Equatoria examined earlier.
The division came as a gradual process. After the 
President's proposal of the issue to the SSU Central 
Committee Meeting, the motion was adjourned at the request 
of some Southern Members on the grounds that it had not 
been debated in the South. The debates held in the 
Regional Assembly and SSU Congress were very emotional. 
Following the defeat of the issue in the People's Regional 
Assembly in 1981 the Regional Government declared further 
discussion of the matter illegal. President Numeiri, 
however, interpreted this as obstructive on the part of 
the Regional Government and so dissolved it in October 
1981.
A caretaker government was appointed under Major 
General Gismala Abdalla Rasas to, among other things, 
conduct a referendum in the South on the issue of 
'redivision' in accordance with the amendment provision of 
the self-government which as we have seen stated that any 
amendment to the Act required a special majority of
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"three-quarters of the People's Assembly and the approval 
of the majority of two-thirds of the citizens of the 
Southern region in a referendum to be carried in that 
region". The referendum was to be conducted within six 
months but the President changed his mind and called it 
off. Presumably he had foreseen the futility in holding 
the referendum which would have failed the question of 
'redivision'.
However, 'redivision' remained a burning issue even
after the formation of a new Regional Government under the
presidency of James Tombura in 1982 - a proponent of
'redivision'. This time the president decided to decree
the division of the South allegedly on the recommendation
of the President of the High Executive Council which read:
"... The Regional Congress after lengthy 
discussion of the matter resolved to 
endorse the policy of decentralisation as 
highlighted in the policy statement of 
the Regional Government; while the matter 
of re-division or no-redivision was left 
in the protective hands of the President 
of the SSU and the Republic.
The procedure used was clearly unconstitutional and
illegal but it was not challenged in court as no one would
dare to question the President's decision.
4. Presidential Order No. 1, 1983 on the Organization of 
Regional Government in the Southern Provinces
Presidential Order No. 1 of 1983 on the organization 
of Regional Government in the Southern Provinces
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(hereinafter referred to as Order No. 1 of 1983) divided 
the former Southern Region into the three regions of Baher 
El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile along their 
provincial boundaries in 1956 (see Map 2). Every region 
had an executive and a legislature, composed of the former 
members of the Regional Assembly for the South plus a few 
presidential appointees. An MP had to go back to his 
region of origin. So did the Public Servants.
The Powers (legislative, executive and financial) 
were identical with those of the Northern Regions 
established under the Regional Government Act, 1980. Thus 
the Sudan acquired nine regions with uniform powers and 
more or less equal geographical sizes. Hence regional 
imbalances had been drastically eliminated.
Comparative Development
5. Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea is a conglomeration of 19 islands
(provinces) measuring 462,000 square kilometres with a
3 8
population of 3.1 million. It has a uniform 
decentralised system of government similar to that of the 
Sudan in 1983. The 19 Provincial Governments of Papua New 
Guinea were established under the Papua New Guinea 
Constitution, 1975 (as amended in 1976).
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea as already
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stated in Chapter 1, was introduced on two grounds - to 
accommodate secessionist pressures and promote popular 
participation in government.
The threat to secession was born on the eve of Papua 
New Guinea's independence from Australia in 1975. After 
the granting of full internal self-government in 1973, a 
constitutional commission was set up to draft a new 
constitution. In the political debates that followed
devolution was discussed at length. The constitutional✓
Planning Commission advocated more substantial political 
and administrative decentralisation within a unitary 
framework than the government was willing to concede. 
Decentralisation was seen as a compromise solution that 
would unite the fragmented society living in the 19 
islands. Islands like Papua and Bourgainville meanwhile 
had opted for separate statehood. Papua declared 
unilateral independence in March 1976 under Mrs.
Josep-hine Abaija on the grounds that Papuans were more 
advanced economically and socially than the new Guineans, 
so there was no reason for unification. Two weeks prior 
to that the copper-rich island of Bougainville had also 
declared unilateral independence under Dr. Alexis Serei, 
as chairman, and had named itself the Republican 
Government of North Solomons.
However, through the persistence and diplomacy of the 
Minister for Provincial Affairs, Bougainville and Papua 
agreed to remain part of Papua New Guinea under the 
arrangement of a decentralised government. Hence the
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constitutional amendment of 1976 to provide for the
establishment of Provincial governments. The relevant
constitutional amendment read:
"There shall be a system of Provincial 
Government for Papua New Guinea in 
accordance with this part ... An organic 
law shall provide for, or make provision 
in respect of, the granting of a province 
of a Provincial Government after 
consultation, as prescribed by an organic 
law, with the Province."39
The organic law on provincial government (the constitution
for the provincial governments) came into force in March
1977. It established the provincial governments and
defined their legislative and executive authority.
Section 16 provided that "the legislative power of
province shall be vested in the provincial legislature"
composed of not less than fifteen elected members" and
"each member of the National Parliament representing the
electorate in the province" plus other members locally
nominated by the community.
The provincial governments were responsible for the 
keeping of "peace, order and good government of the 
province". In particular, they were responsible for:-
" (a) the control by licensing of mobile 
traders (other than mobile banks); 
and
(b) primary schools (including community 
schools and village self-help 
schools) and primary education other 
than curriculum; and
(c) the sale and distribution of 
alcoholic liquor; and
(d) the control by licensing of public 
entertainments and places of public 
entertainment; and
(e) housing (other than housing owned or 
to be owned by the state); and
(f) libraries, museums, cultural centres 
and cultural councils; and
(i) ... local and village governments
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Certain matters were concurrent between the Provincial
Assembly and the National Assembly. These include'!:-
" (a) community development and rural 
development;
(b) primary school (including community 
school and village self-help school) 
curriculum;
(c) agriculture and stock;
(d) fishing and fisheries;
(e) health;
(f) public works;
(g) trade and business, and commercial 
and industrial investment and 
development;
(h) high schools, and vocational and 
technical schools;
(i) gambling, lotteries and games of 
chance;
(j) tourism;
(k) transportation and transportation 
facilities;
(1) town planning;
(m) land and land development;
(n) forestry;
(o) wild life protection;
(p) parks and reserves;
(q) family and marriage laws (including 
laws relating to divorce and other 
matrimonial proceedings;
(r) courts and tribunals (other than 
village courts), and their 
jurisdiction;
(s) communications and mass media; and 
(t) wharves and harbours;
(u) aviation;
(v) labour and employment;
(w) research and training institutions;
(x) marketing;
(y) renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources 41
The executive powers of a provincial government are vested 
in the provincial executive. The provincial executive 
consists of:-
" (a) a head of the provincial executive 
(Governor)
(b) such other members as are provided 
by or under the constitution of the 
province (Ministers); and
(c) two members of the National 
Parliament who represent electorates 
in the Province •••"42
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The Provincial Governments have very limitedjudicial 
powers. They can only establish and administer village 
courts and other minor courts.
The Provincial Governments also have their own 
sources of revenue from taxes on entertainments and 
produce sales and fees on various licences in addition to 
the grants in aid from the Central Government.
Thus Papua New Guinea's decentralisation of powers 
through devolution is very similar to that of the Sudan. 
Both are quasi-federal systems of government intended to 
promote popular participation and accommodate secessionist 
pressures.
IV THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE SUDAN: 
1971-1985
As stated in the Charter for National Action, the 
government intended to put "power on all its levels in the 
hands of the people" by establishing "popular local 
government bodies ... side by side with
A O
Self-Government". Dr. Gaafar Ali Bakheit of the 
University of Khartoum and a former Minister of Local 
Government, influenced the ideas for the reform of local 
government in the Sudan during this period. He criticised 
Dr. Marshall's model of local government on the grounds of
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its foreign inspiration, apparent ineffectiveness and for 
inadequate political conception. He said that it had 
"failed even in its functional roles in the limited 
framework of Dr. Marshall and the condominium rule, 
philology, aiming at rejecting the people's aspirations 
and the national movement of rural and municipal services 
with their limited local character".^
He advocated an administrative revolution:
"We in the Sudan ... should pay more
attention to administrative revolution,
one being able to bring about the desired
administrative effectiveness.".c4 5
The desired administrative effectiveness according to his 
proposals was to be brought about by reconstructing the 
local government system. He challenged the concept of 
the so-called "two governments" central and "local" on the 
grounds that he did not see any reason for distinguishing 
between them. He argued that in less developed countries 
like the Sudan, the practice was never one of partnership 
because the central government enjoyed full control over 
resources, responsibility for major services, attracted 
more able and ambitious people while local government 
suffered from inadequate finance, responsibility (over 
minor services only) and attracted neither good 
councillors nor skilled personnel. He therefore advocated 
the implementation of full-fledged autonomous local 
government suitable for developing countries where civil 
servants would be politically active instead of 
maintaining dormant neutrality. Bakheit's ideas were to 
dominate the Khartoum National Conference on local
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government held in April 1971.
A. The National Conference on Local Government
The National Conference on local government was 
attended by political dignatories and experts on local 
government. These included members of the Revolutionary 
Council, Ministers, Senior Civil Servants, Local 
Government staff, Lecturers from the University of 
Khartoum and representatives of various organizations.
In his opening speech, President Numeiri reiterated
the government's commitment to decentralisation:
"The administration of the Sudan from
Khartoum is politically impossible and if
it were even possible it is never
desirable. We are all for
decentralisation whether by delegation or
devolution."AC 46
Clearly, the government was committed to further 
decentralisation of powers in the Sudan. The changes 
suggested were compiled by Dr. Bakheit into two documents 
and were all adopted by the conference. They were later 
embodied in the People's Local Government Act, 1971.
After the conference, the government appointed a 
working committee on the reform of local government 
consisting of local government experts, practitioners, 
public administrators and political scientists including 
Dr. Bakheit. The terms of reference were broad and
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included, inter alia,
"Revision of Local Government system with 
the purpose of orienting and reorganizing 
it on the basis and principles of the May 
Revolution, especially those of People's 
democracy and socialism.
The words "revolution, people's democracy and socialism"
deserve serious attention since a totally new socialist
system was anticipated to replace the British model of
local government. As already mentioned, the changes were
contained in the People's Local Government Act, 1971,
promulgated by the President in the same year.
B. The People's Government Act, 1971
4 8The People’s Local Government Act, 1971, repealed 
and replaced, as expected, all the previous laws on local 
government - notably The Local Government Ordinance, 1951, 
and the Provincial Administration Act, 1960. It provided 
for the establishment of People's Province Executive 
Councils with corporate bodies in the then existing 
provinces of the Sudan by warrants issued by the Council 
of Ministers. The People's Province Executive Council 
consisted of the Commissioner and the Executive Council 
composed of the alliance of the working forces, youth, 
women and government officers in the Province. The 
Executive Councils were also empowered to establish 
subordinate councils "regions, towns, rural areas and 
villages" as it thought fit "to achieve the most that[ 
could] be achieved in the actual decentralisation and
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rendering of social services. Their powers were to be 
delegated by the Executive Councils and were to work under 
its supervision.
The functions of the Councils included rendering of 
social services such as lower level education, public 
health, public works, argiculture, animal health, general 
culture and internal security. The councils were also 
empowered to participate in economic development as well 
as mobilise the masses politically. Details of the 
functions of the Councils are examined in Chapter 7. The 
councils could also raise local revenue from local fees on 
land, crops, and rates and licence fees on minor 
activities in addition to grants-in-aid given by the 
Central Government. Thus the establishment of nine 
provincial administrations.
C . The Reform of the People’s Local Government
The period between 1974 and 1980 was one of reform 
and reconstruction of the People's Local Government.
The first of these reforms was made in 1974 with the
SOenactment of "The Provinces Redivision Act, 1974".
This Act redivided the provinces in the North Sudan
as follows:-
" (a) Blue Nile Province ...
(i) White Nile Province;
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(ii) Gezira Province;
iii) Blue Nile Province;
b) Northern Province ...
i) Northern Province;
ii) Nile Province.
c) Kordofan Province
i) North Kordofan Province
ii) South Kordofan Province
d) Darfur Province
i) North Darfur Province,
ii) South Darfur Province."
The boundaries of Khartoum Province and Kassala Province 
were amended. Red Sea Province was, however, left intact. 
Provision was made for the High Executive Council to 
consider the redivision of the Southern Provinces. This 
was done by the Reorganization of Provinces (Amendment) 
Act, 1976.
1. The Reorganization of Provinces (Amendment) Act, 
197652
This Act provided for the redivision of the three
Southern Provinces as follows:-
"(e) The Equatoria Province ...
... Eastern Equatoria Province 
... Western Equatoria Province.
(f) Baher El Ghazal Province
... Baher El Ghazal Province 
... The Lakes Province.
(g) The Upper Nile Province
... The Upper Nile Province 
... The Jonglei Province."^
(See Map 2 for details.)
The redivision of the Provinces was necessitated by the
non-viability of the sizes of the former nine provinces of
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the Sudan. Being a large country of about one million 
square miles (as stated earlier), each of the nine 
provinces in the Sudan was approximately 100,000 square 
miles, which was obviously too large for a viable local 
government council. Moreover, lack of adequate 
infra-structure coupled with insufficient transport 
facilities rendered meetings of the Council practically 
impossible. Yet the redivision of the Provinces left the 
Councils far too large, each Council being approximately
50.000 square miles. Southern Darfur as an example was
70.000 square miles. The second major reform of the 
People's local government came in 1979 when the President 
issued a series of decrees which brought about changes.
2. The 1979 Reforms in the People's Local Government
The 1979 Decrees on local government did four 
important things:
(i) Ministries of Education, Interior, leligious 
Affairs, Youth and Sports, Cooperation, Social 
Affairs, Commerce and Supply were abolished. Their 
functions were transferred to the People's Province 
Executive Councils.
(ii) The Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Health and 
Construction had their powers drastically reduced 
and devolved to the People's Province Executive 
Councils.
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(iii) New Ministries of Education, Guidance and 
Cooperation; Commerce and Supply were created to 
perform functions which had not been transfered to 
the People's Province Executive Councils.
Basically, the functions of the reorganized central 
government ministries are limited to policy-making 
and personnel administration.
(iv) The Ministry of Local Government was suppressed 
into a unit for local government affairs in thge 
president's office. Later the President assumed 
the Patronage of Local Government Affairs.
The reforms were apparently influenced by the 
recommendations of the Select Committee of the People's 
National Assembly, 1976? the study on Local Government in 
Southern Darfur 1976; and the deliberations of the first 
local government conference held in Nyala in the same 
year. However, most of the recommendations of the 
Committee were not implemented by the reform. In 1981, 
the People's Province Executive Councils were finally 
abolished and replaced by Area C o u n c i l s ^  under the 
People's Local Government Act, 1981.
D . The People's Local Government Act, 1981
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The enactment of the People's Local Government Act, 
1981 was based on two grounds:-
1. Following the introduction of regional governments in
the Northern Sudan in 1980, it was necessary to redefine
the relationship between local governments and the
regional governments since the responsibility for local
government had been shifted from the Central Government to
the regional governments. This was not seen as necessary
when there was only one regional government in the Sudan
before 1980. That time the People's Province Executive
Councils in the South were answerable to the Central
Government through the High Executive Council.
"The People's Local Councils in the 
Provinces of the Southern Region shall be 
the basis of organization of Regional 
Self-Government provided by the 
constitution for these Provinces.
Though this provision did not specifically define the
relationship between the People's Province Executive
Council and the Southern Regional Government, it implied
the subordination of the former to the latter.
Furthermore, Section 28 of the Distribution of Legal
Powers between the Central Ministries and the Ministries
of the Southern Region of the Sudan Act, 1977 vested
powers of the Minister of the People's Local Government in
the Regional Minister of Administration, Police and
Prisons and powers of the president with regard to local
government in the High Executive Council.
2. The recommendations of the Select Committee of the 
People's National Assembly which had not been implemented,
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had to be reconsidered and adopted. The People's Local 
Government Act, 1981 repealed and replaced the People's 
Local Government Act, 1971.
It provided for the establishment of Area Councils in
the place of People's Province Executive Councils.
"There shall be established in each 
Province a number of Area councils by 
warrants of establishment issued by the 
Regional Executive Authority.
By definition as contained in Section 2 of the Act, the
Regional Executive Authority was the Governor of the
Region. This clearly shows the shift of the
responsibility already mentioned.
An area council was empowered to establish
"People's Local Councils for towns, rural 
areas, quarters, villages, camps, 
industrial areas and markets."57
The Area Council was to delegate "such powers and limited
financial resources as it [deemed] necessary for the
5 8performance of services". The establishment of a single 
tier of local government under the 1981 Act was a return 
to the recommendations of Dr. A.H. Marshall discussed in 
Chapter 3 so as to overcome the problems of confusion 
caused by the presence of several tiers discussed in 
Chapter 6 .
Considering the confusion that arose from the 
multiplicity of tiers of local councils, which had been 
established under the 1971 Act, this change was a step in 
the right direction.
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The composition of the Council was considerably 
modified. Although the representation of the alliance of 
working forces was maintained, the ex officio members were 
excluded from the Council and the number of appointed 
members was drastically reduced. The Regional Executive 
Authority was empowered to "on the recommendation of the 
commissioner" appoint experienced members who were 
interested in public work up to 10% of the total 
membership.59
The provision for women was modified from a fixed 
percentage of 25 to read "a reasonable number of seats for 
w o m e n " . I t  was necessary to do so because women very 
rarely took up their seats due to social inhibition 
against participation by women in public affairs.
Every Council was to elect its own chairman from
amongst the councillors instead of the provincial
commissioner. The functions of the Councils remained the
same as under the 1971 Act except the role of the Council
to act as political mobilizer of the masses was deleted.
In this connection the select committee had recommended:
"The removal of political enlightenment 
since the political system through its 
organizations undertakes this 
responsibility.
The sources of revenue for the Area Councils also remained
the same as those of the People's Province Executive
Councils except that the Regional Executive was to decide
the financial support to be given to the Area Councils.
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This provision was not clear because it did not specify 
whether or not this support was to come from the regional 
government itself. It did not even state what percentage 
of the grants accruing from the central or regional 
government would go to the Area Councils. In this case 
the central government could not guarantee how much of the 
national revenue was made available by the regional 
governments to the local government. It would therefore 
be impossible to maintain some degree of national 
standards. However, the reforms introduced by the 1981 
Act very much appears a retreat to Dr. Marshall’s model of 
1951 and is welcome.
Comparative Development
E . Tanzania, 1972-1982
Government reforms in the Sudan since 1971 have their
parallels in developments in Tanzania since 1972.
Tanzania, like the Sudan, is a fairly large country with
an area of 945,000 square kilometres and population of
6 2
19.1 million (in 1983). it became a de jure one-party
democracy in 1965.
"There shall be one political party in 
Tanzania ... All political activity in 
Tanzania ... shall be conducted by or 
undertaken under the auspices of the 
party.»63
The Party was at first called Tanganyika National African 
Union (TANU) but has since 1977 been renamed Chama Chama
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Pinduizi (no translation), following its amalgamation with 
the Afro-Shirazi party in Zanzibar.
The administrative reforms in 1970s were primarily
influenced in Tanzania by the need to promote popular
participation in government (as already mentioned in
Chapter 1). After the Arusha declaration of 1967, the
Tanzanian Government appointed the Pratt Commission on
Decentralisation. This commission in turn invited
McKinsey and company (an American consultancy firm).
Announcing the 1972 changes to the Nation President Julius
Nyerere said:
"It is proposed that, in general, Regions 
and Districts should plan and implement 
local development activities as well 
administer local affairs with the very 
minimum of interference from Dar Es 
Salaam ... Therefore it is proposed that 
single strong Regional and District 
organization will be set up to cover all 
rural areas ... The present system of 
rural local government will be abolished 
as will the present practice of each 
Ministry having its own offices working 
in Regions and Districts •••"54
The announcement was followed by the enactment of the
"Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim
Provisions) Act, 1972^~* in the month of July. Although
this law should have expired on the first day of July
1973, the system of government established under it
remained operative until the 1982 reforms dealt with
further below. According to that law, Tanzania had 20
regions and 64 districts. Section 4 of the Interim Law,
empowered the President to appoint "in respect of each
region, a Regional Development Director", and "in respect
of each District, a District Development Director".
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The President had also to appoint or post in every
region and every District:
"(a) Staff officers,
(b) functional officers, as may be
necessary to assist the Development 
Directors in the performance of 
their functions."
Furthermore, the Act established a Regional Development
Committee in every region and empowered the Prime Minister
to establish a District Development Council in an area
which he chose to be declared a district by publishing an
order to that effect in the gazette.
"Every District Development Council shall 
establish a District Development and 
Planning Committee which shall be vested 
with the functions of formulating 
projects and programmes for consideration 
by the Council and supervising 
implementation of the projects and 
programmes approved by the Council."gg
The functions of the Regional Development Committee were:
"(a) To consider, advise upon, formulate 
and implement development projects 
affecting the whole of the region;
(b) to advise upon and assist in the 
implementation of development 
projects undertaken in respect of 
any district within the region by 
District Development Council of 
that District;
(c) to do all such acts and things as 
may be directed to do by the 
Minister or which in its opinion 
are necessary for the efficient 
performance of its functions."g^
Similarly, functions of the District Councils were to:
" (a) be responsible for planning and 
implementation of projects and 
programmes affecting agriculture, 
public health, education, commerce, 
industry, promotion and development 
of Ujamaa and cooperative 
movements, natural resources, 
public works, water and land 
development within the district for 
which it is established; ...
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(c) perforin such other functions as may 
be conferred upon it by the 
Minister • • • "gg
Unfortunately, the decentralised governments in Tanzania
did not have independent sources of revenue:-
"Parliament may, in an appropriate Act, 
provide for allocation of funds to every 
region to meet the estimated expenditure 
of the Regional Directorate and for the 
implementation of development projects 
and programmes in the region and in every 
district in the region.
Furthermore, the Tanzanian governments below the Central
Government had no corporate status and were directly
responsible to the Prime Minister's office. Thus although
there was considerable decentralisation of powers in
Tanzania, it differed from that of the Sudan in that the
decentralisation was one through "deconcentration" and not
"devolution" as was the case in the Sudan. Moreover,
decentralisation in the Sudan was quasi-federal in
character.
After a decade of futile experiment in 
decentralisation, Tanzania abandoned the McKinsey model 
and retreated to the local government system as inherited 
at independence, although with some modifications.
Tanzania enacted the "Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act, 1982? Local Government (Negotiating 
Machinery) Act, 1982; Local Government Service Act, 1982; 
The Decentralisation of Government Administratration 
(Interim Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1982". Under these 
new laws, the Regional Development Committee played the 
role of coordination and consultation only, similar to 
that of the Commission in the Sudan under the 1981 Act.
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All powers and functions of rendering services and 
development are transferred and vested in the local 
government now at the district level. In other words, the 
District Councils and not the District Development 
Committees are the focus of local government established 
in accordance with Section 5 of the Local Government 
(District Authorities) Act, 1982 which empowers the Prime 
Minister to establish with the consultation of the 
President:
"Such number of District Councils as may 
deem necessary, expedient or desirable 
for the purpose of establishing, 
promoting, developing and maintaining an 
effective and efficient system of local 
government."
The Minister could, in addition to that, establish 
Township Authorities in the urban areas.
Village councils from the lowest tiers of government, 
but unlike those in the Sudan, enjoy corporate status.
This time the Tanzanian District Councils like the 
Area Councils in the Sudan have independent sources of 
revenue which include local taxes, fees, rates and rents. 
They are also entitled to grants in aid from the Central 
Government and may obtain loans with the approval of the 
Minister in consultation with the Minister of Finance from 
the revived Local Government Loans Board.
Having analysed the establishment of decentralised 
governments in Sudan from 1969 to 1985 in detail, we shall 
proceed to examine how successfully they operated in
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practice. This will be the primary objective of the 
following chapters 6 , 7, 8 9 and 10.
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CHAPTER 6
THE STRUCTURE OF DECENTRALISED GOVERNMENTS IN THE SUDAN
1969-1985
The general structure of decentralised governments in 
the Sudan between 1969 and 1985 was similar to that of a 
federal government. However, the second tier of government 
was called regional rather than state government.
This chapter examines in detail the structure of
<5*
decentr^l ised governments m  the Sudan during the said 
period. It starts by briefly looking at the organization of 
the Central Government before descending downwards. This is 
followed by the examination of the regional governments 
which, initially, had two different structures; the 
structure of the Southern Regional Government and that of 
the Regional Governments in the Northern Sudan. These two 
structures were made uniform after the division of the 
Southern Sudan in 1983.
The structure of the local governments also differed 
during this period between the People's Province Executive 
Councils and the Area Councils. The various structures of 
governments are shown by diagrams 6, 7 and 8.
Diagram 6 shows:
(i) The Central Government (1969-1985)
(ii) The Southern Regional Government (1972-1982)
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(iii) The People's Province Executive Councils (1971-1980)
Diagram 7 shows:
(i) The Central Government (remains the same)
(ii) The Regional Governments in the Northern plus the 
Regional Governments in the Southern Sudan after 
redivision (1980-1985)
(iii) The Area Councils (1981-1985)
Diagram 8 shows:
The National capital.
These structures will be examined in the following 
order.
I. The Central Government
II. The Regional Governments
III. The Local Governments
IV. The National Capital
I. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
The Central Government comprised:
A. The Central Executive organ (or the Council of 
Ministers)
B. The People's National Assembly (the central 
legi slature)
C. The judiciary.
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DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE IN  THE SUDAN |: TH E  SO UTHERN  
REGION 1972-1982
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A. The Central Executive
The Central Executive organ was composed of the 
President, the Vice-Presidents, the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers.
1. The President
The Sudanese President like those of other one-party 
presidential systems in Africa, (e.g. Tanzania, Zambia, 
Malawi, Sierra Leone), was the the Head of State, President 
of the political party, Head of the Executive and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He also 
participated in law-making togethr with the National 
Assembly.
The President was elected through plebiscite for a 
6-year term of office and was eligible for re-election 
without limit. He was to be nominated by the SSU in 
accordance with its Basic Rules which stipulated, "the 
President of the Sudanese Socialist Union will become the 
nominee of the President of the Republic". Thus no other 
person was eligible to compete with him.
The powers of the President were enormous and 
overriding. We have already seen that he is the head of the
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Executive of the, political party and commander in chief of 
the Armed Forces. So all executive powers were vested in 
him. He was responsible for the appointment of 
vice-presidents, the Prime Minister, Ministers,
Commissioners, Ambassadors and Members of the Diplomatic 
Mission, senior officials in the Public Service, public 
corporations, members of the security forces and so forth.
His legislative powers included issuing of provisional 
orders, consenting to national bills and bills of the 
People's Regional Assembly for the South, dissolution of all 
Assemblies, vetoing of Bills and declaration of states of 
emergency. Finally, he was also the protector of the 
constitution, the independence of the country, its 
territory, people and victories of the May Revolution.
2. The Vice-Presidents
The constitution provided for the appointment and 
removal of vice-presidents by the president of the Republic. 
He was to determine their number and responsibilities. In 
practice there were normally two vice presidents, one called 
the First Vice President and the other a Vice President.
The First Vice President was invariably a Northern Sudanese 
who assisted the President directly in the discharge of his 
functions and acted as Head of State in the absence of the 
President. All Vice Presidents were Southern Sudanese, Abel 
Abli from 1971 to 1981, and Joseph Lagu from 1982 to 1985. 
They were less effective, had no definite assignments and
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usually received foreign visitors or chaired meetings like 
those of charitable organizations.
3. The Prime Minister
According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister was 
"to assist" the President "in the discharge of any functions
assigned to him by a presidential order". He was to be
appointed and removed by the President like the Vice 
Presidents. In practice, however, the role of the Prime
Minister was insignificant because none of them remained for
long in the office. Awadallah, as we have seen, was the 
first Prime Minister but was soon removed and replaced by 
Rashid El Tahir who did not last in the office too. 
Thereafter Numeiri combined both posts of Presidency and 
Prime Minister and all functions were performed in the name 
of the President.
4. The Council of Ministers
As in the case of the Vice Presidents, and Prime 
Minister, the President could appoint and remove Ministers 
either from amongst or outside the members of the Assembly. 
The number varied considerably between 1969 and 1985. 
However, the Prime Minister and Ministers were all 
answerable to the President and the Assembly for the 
performance of their duties.
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B. The National Assembly
The National Assembly was composed of 250 members,
appointed and elected. The elected members were the
majority representing geographical constituencies and the
alliance of the working forces as stated by the Permanent
Constitutions. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan "is
founded on the alliance of working forces of the people as
represented by the farmers, workers, intellectuals, national
3
capitalists and soldiers".
The President was empowered to appoint some members 
"not exceeding one tenth" of the total membership "to 
represent different talents" but they were not to be from
4
among Ministers. This method of having an Assembly of both 
appointed and elected members is typical of one-party State 
democracies like Tanzania, Zambia and others. In addition 
to their other qualities, they are essentially loyal to the 
Heads of State.
C . The Judiciary
The administration of justice was vested in the 
judiciary which was independent and directly answerable to 
the President of the Republic for the proper performance of 
their duties.
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The President appointed and removed "the president and 
judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Courts of 
Appeal and judges of other courts".^ Surprisingly, no 
members of the judiciary enjoyed security of tenure in the 
Sudan. Thus the President could dismiss them at will as he 
did in 1983** when he dismissed 41 judges when they went on 
strike.
Justice was administered by:
"(a) The Supreme Court.
(b) Courts of Appeal.
(c) The Other Courts.
There was one Supreme Court for the Sudan and Regional 
Courts of Appeal. The government intended to establish a 
Court of Appeal for every region.
II. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
The structure of the Southern Regional Government will 
be examined before that of the regional governments in the 
Northern Sudan (which were similar to the Regional 
Governments in the South after redivision.
A. The Southern Regional Government
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The Southern Regional Government consisted of:-
(1) The High Executive Council; and
(2) The People's Regional Assembly.
The judiciary remained a Central Government organ of 
government for no given reason. It was simply omitted from 
the provisions of the Self-Government Act. Presumably this 
was intended to comply with the practice in other 
decentralised governments like Tanzania and Zambia where the 
judiciary is entirely also a central government matter.
1. The High Executive Council
The High Executive Council was composed of:-
(i) The President of the High Executive Council.
(ii) The Vice-President of the High Executive Council.
(iii) The Members of the High Executive Council.
Table 6.1 shows the list of Presidents and Vice 
Presidents of the High Executive Council from 1972 to June 
1983 (that is, before the dissolution of the Southern 
region).
(i) The President of High Executive Council
The President of the High Executive Council was the 
Chief Executive in the region. He was "to lead the 
executive organs responsible for the administration of the
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Table 6:1
Presidents of the High Executive Council 1972-1983
President Vice-President Period
1 . Abel Alier 
(interim)
- April 
- Dec .
1972
1973
2. Abel Alier 
(substantive)
- 1974 -  1977
3. Joseph Lagu 
(substantive)
Samuel Aru Bol & 
Peter Gatkouth
1978
Feb.
July
-  1979 
1980 - 
1980
4. Abel Alier 
(substantive)
Peter Gatkouth June 1980 - 
1981
5. Mag. Gen. Gis . - 
alia Abdalla 
Rasas (interim)
Andrew Makur Thau O c t . 
June
1981 -
1982
6. Joseph James 
Tombura
Hugho Dhol Accul 1982 - June 
1983
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Southern provinces".
(a) The Appointment of the President of the High Executive
Council
The appointment of the President of the High Executive 
Council depended on whether he was an interim or substantive 
President.
The Self-Government Act specified no procedure for the 
appointment of an Interim President of the High Executive 
Council. However, according to Appendix 1 of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, the Interim President of the High Executive 
Council was to be appointed by the President of the Republic 
in consultation with the SSU organs in the region. This was 
the case in Abel Alier's appointment as Interim President of 
the High Executive Council in 1972. Whereas Alier was 
appointed to establish the provisional Regional Government 
for the South, Rasas was appointed, among other things, to 
conduct a referendum on the burning issue of whether or not 
the South should be "redivided". But, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, the referendum was abandoned.
The appointment of a substantive President was provided 
for in Section 18 of the Self-Government Act: "The President 
of the High Executive Council shall be appointed ... by the 
president on the recommendation of the People's Regional 
Assembly".
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The recommendation was by way of electing a candidate 
for the presidency in the Regional Assembly for confirmation 
into office by the President of the Republic.
Invariably, all candidates elected by the People’s 
Regional Assembly for Presidency of the High Executive 
Council were automatically confirmed into office. The 
appointment of the President of the Republic was therefore a 
mere act of formality. Presumably, the election of the 
presidential candidate by the Assembly for appointment by 
the President of the Republic was meant to guarantee the 
electorate their democratic rights in electing their leader, 
as well as to safeguard the inherent rights of the Head of 
State over the appointment of important office bearers in 
his government. Therefore the problem of accommodating both 
regional and national interests in the appointment of the 
regional Chief Executive which arrested the progress of the 
members of the Twelve Man Committee in 1965 (see Chapter 3), 
had been adequately overcome.
Theoretically, the qualifications for the President of
the High Executive appeared very simple. Like the president
of the Republic, he had to be a Sudanese, aged at least 35
. . . 9years, of sound mind and enjoying his political rights. He 
did not have to be a member of the People's Regional 
Assembly; he was not even a sole nominee of the SSU as in 
the case in other one-party State democracies like Tanzania, 
Zambia, Malawi and Sierra Leone.
Practically, the role of the SSU was very minimal in
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the election of the president of the High Executive Council. 
It was only that the nomination of a presidential candidate 
was determined in a meeting of the SSU Assembly body (the 
functions of which are explained later) before it could 
formally be adopted by a meeting of the Assembly proper.
The issue was whether the SSU could impose its 
candidate for the presidency?
Though such a possibility existed, SSU intervention was
seriously curbed. For example in 1973, the President of the
Republic and the SSU nominated Alier as the sole
presidential candidate. The nomination was seriously
challenged by Clement-Mboro and Joseph Oduho on the grounds
of illegality. Unlike Article 80 of the constitution which
provided for the nomination of the presidential candidate
for the Republic by the SSU, there was no similar provision
in the Self-Government Act. Alier was eventually elected as
President but it was purely in the interest of peace and
national unity as was obvious from the comments of Joseph
Oduho, a veteran Southern politician and Member of
Parliament"
"In the interest of national and Regional 
unity, no other candidate would be 
proposed as would have been the case.
But we hope the issue of the method used 
to suggest the nomination of a given 
candidate by the President of the 
Sudanese Socialist Union will be 
clarified to the Assembly at a later
date.“io
However, no explanation was given. The procedure was 
quietly abandoned, because the SSU never nominated a 
presidential candidate thereafter. So this procedure
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remained an exception to the rule.
The lack of effective control by the SSU in the conduct 
of elections preempted the politics of tribalism in the 
Southern region. Clearly, in order to win elections one had 
to rally tribal support. The incipient Southern nationalism 
which had brought Alier and Lagu to power before 1979 was 
rapidly overtaken by tribalism in 1980. Undoubtedly, the 
return of Alier to power in the same year was backed by the 
call for "Dinka unity" (the Dinkas being the majority tribe 
in the region). Likewise Tombura surprisingly rose to power 
because of the Kokora (redivision) slogan. Admittedly 
tribalism had emerged to dominate events of the day quite 
overwhelmingly. This was clear from the appointment of 
Ministers, Commissioners, Managers of Parastatal bodies and 
Directors of Ministries and Departments. For example, the 
1980 Members of the High Executive Council had 50% from the 
Dinka and about the same number as Directors. An incumbent 
President was obliged to reward his tribal supporters by 
appointing their members to the above posts. Had it not 
been for "redivision" a loose and informal alliance of the 
major tribes (Dinka, Nuer and Azande) already in formation 
would have prevented members of the minority tribes from 
coming to power.
(b ) Functions of the President of the High Executive
Council
As stated earlier, the President of the High Executive
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Council was the Chief Executive in the region. He was,
therefore, in charge of the administration, good order and
security in the region together with legislative
responsibilities as well. He was to participate in law
making by initiating a Bill in the As s e m b l y . ^  No Member of
the Assembly was to present a Bill without sufficient notice
having been given to the President of the High Executive 
12Council. The exact period for sufficient notice, however, 
remained uncertain since no problem arose over it.
All petitions to the Regional Assembly requesting the
President of the Republic "to postpone the coming into force
of any law or withdraw any Bill before the People's National
Assembly" had to be presented through the President of the
13High Executive Council". Therefore, he was also a liaison 
officer between the People's Regional Assembly and the 
President of the Republic in matters to do with the 
postponement or withdrawal of legislation.
(c) Removal of the President of the High Executive Council
The President of the High Executive Council could be 
removed in two ways, either by dissolution of the Assembly 
or by impeachment of the Assembly. The procedure through 
dissolution is considered in Chapter 7.
The procedure for impeachment was contained in Section
12(1) of the Self-Government Act:
"The People's Regional Assembly may by a 
three-qua'jtm s majority and for specified
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reasons relating to public interest, 
request the president1® T5Nany member of 
the High Executive Council from office.
The President shall accede to such 
request."
The impeachment of the President of the High Executive 
Council was therefore mandatory on the recommendation of the 
three-quarters special majority of the members of the 
Assembly. However, to obtain that high percentage was 
totally impossible in the history of the South due to the 
loyalty of the Members of Parliament who formed the 
government to the President of the High Executive Council. 
Although there was only one attempt to impeach the President 
of the High Executive Council any other attempts would have 
been equally unsuccessful for the same reasons. This was 
shown by the futile attempt to remove Lagu in 1979.
In May 1979 the People's Regional Assembly attempted to
impeach Joseph Lagu from presidency of the High Executive
Council by invoking the provisions of Section 12(1) quoted
above. The charges raised against him included "corruption
... nepotism ... factionalism ... and massive acquisition of
14large amounts of property". a  cheque worth 2.1 million 
American dollars was alleged to have been deposited by his 
wife in a Nairobi bank but there were no documents to 
support this accusation.
A request for the removal of the President of the High 
Executive Council had to be presented by way of a motion to 
the Speaker signed by at least twenty members. Thereafter 
the Assembly would either recommend his removal or refer the 
motion "to any committee, standing or select, to investigate
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the petition of the High Executive Council".^  it was 
discretionary to the Assembly to adopt either of the 
alternative procedures. Apparently, there was a general 
consensus to appoint a committee to probe further into the 
matter but government supporters demanded the production of 
some documentary evidence before such a committee could be 
appointed. Although this was not a stipulated requirement 
it accorded with the tenets of natural justice.
The question of whether or not documentary evidence 
should be produced before the appointment of a committee led 
to the adjournment of the Assembly each day for two days. 
Finally, there was a deadlock. On the third day the 
President convened a meeting of the SSU Assembly body which 
empowered him to convene and chair an extraordinary meeting 
of the Assembly. All allegations against the President were 
dismissed as "baseless and unfounded". After renewing its 
confidence in the President, the Assembly dismissed the 
speaker, his Deputy and the Controller. (Further details 
are recorded in Chapter 8.)
(ii) The Vice-President of the High Executive Council
The Self-Government Act made no provision for the post 
of the Vice-President of the High Executive Council.
Although the post was introduced in 1978 with the 
appointment of Samuel Aru Bol as Vice President of the High 
Executive Council. He was to assist the president of the 
High Executive Council and act as President in his absence.
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Before that, the President of High Executive Council used to 
delegate any member of the High Executive Council to act in 
his absence as he had no assistant or deputy. The
appointment of Vice-Presidents became an established
practice after the appointment of Aru Bol. Although Peter
Gatkouth acted as President for three months following the
removal of Lagu in 1980, it was not automatic that the 
Vice-President for the High Executive Council would act in 
the place of the President if he were removed, or he died or 
resigned for the post of Vice President was presumed to 
terminate with that of the President.
(ill) The Members of the High Executive Council
The size of the High Executive Council varied from time
to time. The Provisional High Executive Council appointed
in 1972 comprised:
(a) Financial and Development
(b) Education
(c) Information, Culture and Tourism
(d) Transport, Roads and Communications
(e) Agriculture and Animal Production
(f) Public Health
(g) Regional Administration [Local Government, Legal 
Affairs, Police and Prisons]
(h) Housing and Public Utilities
(i) Natural Resources and Rural Development [included Land 
Use, Rural Waters, Forests and Cooperatives]
(j) Public Service and Labour
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(k) Mining, Industry, Trade and Supply 
The following additional ministries were created in 
subsequent years.
(1) Cabinet Affairs (in 1973)
(m) Trade and Industry - separated from commerce in 1978 
(n) Legal Affairs - separated from Regional Administration 
in 1978
(0) Wildlife
(p) Youth and Sports, 1978
(q) Cooperatives and Rural Development, 1978
(1) Appointment of the Members of the High Executive 
Council
The Self-Government Act provided that members of the 
High Executive Council were to be "appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the President of the High 
Executive Council". ^  The total number depended on the 
needs of the region and the regional government's ability to 
meet their salaries and allowances. As shown above, the 
total varied between eleven in 1972 and 17 in 1980 and 1982 
but these only amounted in amalgations and creation of new 
ministries which never exceeded the total number of 
seventeen.
Like the president of the High Executive Council, no 
specific qualifications requirement was attached to their 
appointments. Thus members of the Executive Council were 
selected from within or outside the People's Regional 
Assembly. Presumably the intention was to enable the
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President of the High Executive Council to choose the most 
able men and women. Executive authority was collectively 
vested in the High Executive Council "which [acted] on 
behalf of the President". The duties of the High Executive 
Council were therefore primarily administrative.
(2) Legislative Powers of the High Executive Council
It was not certain from the reading of the
Self-Government Act whether the High Executive Council could
also legislate. The relevant section read:
"Neither the People's Regional Assembly 
nor the High Executive Council shall 
legislate or exercise any powers on 
matters of national nature which are
tl
* * ' 18
Thereafter the section proceeded to list those matters as 
national defence, foreign affairs, currency and coinage, 
etc. The issue was what about the other matters which were 
not mentioned in the list. Could the High Executive Council 
therefore legislate on them? If so, why did the Act not 
expressly say so?
Incidentally, legislation through provisional orders 
had been a normal practice since the colonial days. If that 
was even the practice in the Central Government, then why 
was this not so in the Regional Government too? Views 
differed as to whether or not the regional government could 
pass provisional orders. One view was that it could not, 
because omission to expressly empower the regional 
government, to do so implied denial of that authority. So
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any provisional order passed by the High Executive Council
was null and void. However, it was also arguable that the
Council could legislate on matters not enlisted in the
section quoted above. These matters were regarded as being
of regional nature. After all, the conduct of Business
Regulations 1973 provided:
"Every provisional order enacted by the 
High Executive Council when the Assembly 
was not in session shall be presented to
the Assembly within 15 days." Q
-L y
This regulation implied that the High Executive Council
could legislate through provisional orders which would then
be confirmed by the Regional Assembly. According to this
argument, provisional orders like the Wildlife Conservation
20and Parks Act, 1975 , the Registration of Business Names
21Act 1976 and several others, were valid law. Furthermore, 
it was also arguable that since the High Executive Council 
acted on behalf of the President of the Republic in the 
Southern Region [see Section 16 of the Self-Government Act, 
1972], then it could exercise the powers of the President 
authorising him to legislate by provisions/orders. In this 
case the provisional orders passed by the High Executive 
Council would be as valid as if they had been passed by the 
President of the Republic as authorised by the 
constitution.lt would therefore seem that whether the High 
Executive Council was acting on behalf of the President or 
using its implied powers as argued above, all provisional 
orders passed by it were valid in law.
We now proceed to consider the removal of the members 
of the High Executive Council.
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(3) Removal of the Members of the High Executive Council
Members of the High Executive Council could either be 
removed on the recommendation of the President of the High 
Executive Council or impeached by the Assembly in the same 
manner as the President of the High Executive Council 
(discussed earlier). But for several reasons, the 
impeachment of a member of the Council by the Assembly was 
impossible.
The People's Regional Assembly, for example, attempted
to impeach Samuel Aru Bol as Vice President of the High
Executive Council and Regional Minister for Administration,
Police and Prisons in 1979. Aru Bol had deposited a sum of
£s 30,000 belonging to the government into his personal
accounts. Aru Bol was therefore impeachable for "reasons
22relating to public interest". He was also liable to
prosecution for Criminal Breach of Trust under Sections 351
23
and 349 of the Sudan Penal Code Act, 1974. if sentenced 
to imprisonment, his membership would have been withdrawn 
for comitting an offence "against the political system or 
affecting the dignity of the Assembly". However, the 
Assembly failed to remove him and he was not even brought to 
a court of justice. The Assembly deliberations were so 
unnecessarily delayed that Aru was removed from the 
Ministerial post only through a government reshuffle in the 
same year; and having refunded the money, the intended 
prosecution against him was dropped. Though this was
336
blatantly unlawful, it was never challenged. During the 
same period, cases of corruption, nepotism and others were 
framed against Lawrence Wol Wol and Samuel Gaitut (both 
Ministers of the Regional Government) respectively but the 
Assembly never disposed of any for similar reasons as those 
of Aru Bol.
2. The People’s Regional Assembly for the South
As already stated, the Self-Government Act provided for 
the establishment of a Regional Assembly for the South.
(1) The Composition of the Regional Assembly
The Assembly was composed of 110 Members constituted as 
follows:
(a) Seats for geographical constituencies 60.
(b) Seats for the alliance of working forces 44.
(c) Administrative seats 6*24
Whereas the distribution of geographical constituencies 
Kas based on population, those for the alliance of working 
forces were categorized as farmers, workers, intellectuals, 
national capitalists and soldiers as stated in the Charter 
for National Action and the permanent constitution.
Everyone of the six provinces had an administrative seat and 
any person including administrative officers competed for 
the seats.
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The qualifications for candidates and voters as laid
down by "The People's Assembly and Regional Assembly
Elections Act, 1 9 7 3 " ^  were similar for the whole country.
A candidate had to be a Sudanese, aged at least 21 years
old, of sound mind, literate and without record of
convictions for offences connected with "honour, morals or
26
security of the state". However, the degree of literacy 
was never specified, so any Sudanese who could read or write 
(in English or Arabic) qualified as a candidate. This 
lowered and degraded the calibre of the Members of the 
Assembly since semi-illiterates found their way to the 
Regional Assembly in considerable numbers. Furthermore, the 
Electoral Act did not fix the period for which a convicted 
person would be barred from contesting. This meant that 
once convicted, a citizen would remain disqualified from 
becoming a candidate indefinitely and was therefore contrary 
to the notion of natural justice according to which convicts 
are released after serving their sentences.
A voter was also required to have the same
qualifications as a candidate except that he could be
illiterate and aged 18 years at the minimum. He or she was
needed to have resided in the constituency in question for
at least three years before the closing date of registration
27unless he or she was a nomad.
Elections to the first People's Regional Assembly were 
held in November and December 1973, filling *^ 7 of the 110 
seats. The remaining three were appointed in accordance 
with Section 9(1) of the Self-Government Act, which stated:
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"For the first Assembly the President may 
appoint members to the Regional Assembly 
to represent areas where conditions were 
not conducive to such elections."
It goes without saying that, having just emerged from war
then, the whole South could not be ready for elections. It
should, however, be noted that the appointed members were
not to exceed a quarter of the total membership. Probably
the underlying objective of having no appointed members in
the Assembly was to promote popular participation in
government as far as possible.
A person could nominate himself as a candidate but 
contrary to the practice in Tanzania and Zambia, there was 
no limit to the number of candidates in a constituency. In 
this regard the Sudanese practice was comparable with that 
of Sierra Leone. Whereas the maximum number of candidates 
was fixed at two and three per constituency in Tanzania and 
Zambia respectively, Sierra Leone had no limits. Both 
Tanzania and Zambia disqualify their additional candidates 
at the primary elections held in the districts.
The Sudanese practice also differed from those in
Tanzania and Zambia in that the candidate and not the party
met his electoral expenses. All the party did was to
scrutinize the application of a candidates and grant "a
certificate of no objection" to his nomination. According
to the SSU Basic Rules, certificates of no objections were
2 8to be issued by the SSU Provincial Secretaries. However, 
it seemed that the implementation of this provision was not 
strictly adhered to. For example, in the 1980 elections, 
the SSU Provincial Secretariat at Malakal (Upper Nile
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2 9Province) refused to "issue a certificate of no objection" 
to Othwan Dak because his application was late. But through 
his political connections and influence Dak obtained a 
certificate from the SSU Headquarters in Khartoum.
(ii) Loss of Membership of the Regional Assembly
Membership of the Assembly could be lost under any of 
the following circumstances:-
(a) Where a member could not participate in the 
deliberations of the Assembly due to physical 
disability.
(b) Where a member was absent from the Assembly sittings 
for eighteen or more times without the permission of 
the Speaker.
(c) Where a member was imprisoned for an offence against 
the political system or affecting the dignity of the 
Assembly.
(d) If his membership was annulled by two-thirds of the
30Assembly "for any reasonable cause". Reasonable 
cause in this case depended on the judgement of the 
Assembly.
In the case of Debora Agok, the Assembly annulled her 
membership after the allegation that she had rigged
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elections in the Gogrial Women's Constituency seat in 
1978. Precisely women who were not registered to vote 
were alleged to have also voted.
Although the Electoral Commission was empowered to 
cancel results of elections improperly conducted, it 
never did so in the case of Debora and no reason was 
given either. Debora was successfu lly unseated by the 
Assembly because her opponents were the majority in the 
House and had formed the government. It was therefore 
possible to victimise her even if she had not rigged
the elections. However, Debora's failure to pursue the
matter further coupled with her disastrous failure in 
the following by-elections indicated that the decision 
of the Assembly was probably right in those particular 
ci rcumstances.
(e) Membership could also be lost on the dissolution of the 
Assembly by the President of the Republic. This is 
considered in detail in Chapter 8 .
3. The Officers of the Assembly
The officers of the Assembly in this context include 
the Speaker Deputy, the Controller, the Leader and the
Chairman of the SSU Assembly body.
(i) The Speaker
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The Self-Government Act provided that "The People's
Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a 
31
Speaker The Speaker was elected in the first
sitting of the Assembly usually chaired by the interim or 
outgoing president of the High Executive Council. Two 
deputy speakers were normally elected to assist him in 
chairing the Meetings of Assembly.
However, the Self-Government Act omitted to provide for 
the removal of the Speaker and his deputy. Presumably the 
Speaker was regarded as being impartial and therefore 
immovable as found in the liberal democracies like that of 
the UK. This practice was, however, contrary to that of 
one-Party state democracies where every officer of the 
Assembly including the Speaker is supposedly a supporter of 
the government. So the role of the Speaker in the South and 
the method of his removal became very controversial.
(a ) The Attempted Removal of Lubari Ramba
The first incident arose over the removal of Lubari 
Ramba from the speakership in 1975. The Assembly resolved 
to remove Ramba for alleged obstruction of the investigative 
process of a committee it had appointed to probe into the 
affairs of the regional government. Three important matters 
had been brought to the attention of the Assembly. They 
included the loss of a large number of school books 
belonging to the Regional Ministry of Education, the loss of
342
tea worth one million Tanzanian shillings donated to the 
regional government by the Government of Tanzania in 1972, 
and the conclusion of an illegal contract between the 
regional government and Techma Ltd (a "fictitious" British 
firm). The proprietor of Techma Ltd disappeared immediately 
on receiving the first instalment of £s 90,000.
The Committee's accusation against the Speaker was that
he had obstructed them from investigating the documents of
the Regional Ministry of Education where he, (the Speaker),
had been the Director in charge before assuming his new
office. Apparently, the Committee was of the opinion that
the Speaker was not only a right-hand man of the government
of the day, but was also involved in corrupt practices. The
decision to remove the Speaker was not based on any law but
presumably on the logical argument that the right to elect
implied the right to remove. However, Alier refused to
endorse the resolution on the sound argument that there was
no law authorizing the removal of the Speaker. He wrote:
"I am ... unable to find any law, 
substantive or otherwise to support this
resolution ... that the act of the
Honourable People's Regional Assembly in 
so far as it attempted to remove the 
Honourable Speaker was, in the absence of 
any implicit provisions of any law, null 
and void."22
Meaning to avoid humiliation of the Assembly Ramba was asked 
to resign by the President of the High Executive Council who 
reappointed him as Regional Minister for Public Service.
(b) The Removal of Clement Mboro and Others
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The second incident occured in 1979 which included the 
removal of the Speaker Clement Mboro, his deputy Zakaria Bol 
and the Controller Phillip Akot. Some light will be shed on 
the role of the Controller later.
The background to the removal of the above three
officers can be traced to the time when the Assembly
unsuccessfully attempted to impeach President Lagu as
already discussed. After renewing its confidence in Lagu,
the Assembly proceeded to impeach these officers for charges
read by Phillip Yona, Leader of the Assembly:
"In the past few months during the 
committee of the business of the Assembly 
important government Bills have not been 
passed through ... [because they] ... 
have been impeded and obstructed ... [by 
the above officers] ... the President of 
the High Executive Council has nominated 
people whom he can work with as leaders 
of the Assembly and he has withdrawn
confidence from those who were there
before.”
It was rather extraordinary to say that the President had 
lost confidence in the Speaker and some members of the 
Assembly and for him to choose people with whom he could 
work. The doctrine of responsible government has it that 
members of the executive are there because of the confidence 
members of the legislative have in them. If this confidence 
is lost then they ought to automatically resign. It should 
therefore be the members of the Assembly who lose confidence 
in the President rather than the other way around. 
Nevertheless the two Speakers and the Controller were 
removed by a simple majority of seventy-two votes out 1 1 0 . 
Like the case of Lubari Ramba, the removal of these officers
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had no legal basis and should have been declared null and 
void.
Furthermore, seventy-two out of one hundred and ten was 
a simple majority, how could important officers like the 
Speaker and Controller be removed by this majority when, as 
we have seen, the annulment of the membership of Debora 
required a special majority of two-thirds. By analogy the 
deprivation of the Speaker and the Controller of their 
offices should have required much more. The decision was 
also illegal on the ground that even the convening of the 
extraordinary meeting by the President under his 
chairmanship were unauthorised and illegal. The 
Self-Government Act authorised the Interim President of the 
High Executive Council to chair the first meeting of the 
Assembly for the election of the Speaker only and no more.
This matter was not, however, pursued in a court of
law. The Speakers and the Controller raised their
complaints to the President of the Republic, who after
conducting his own investigations34 into the matter decided
to dissolve both the Regional and National Assemblies. By
then the High Executive Council and People's Regional
Assembly Act, had been promulgated as a provisional
empowering the President to dissolve the Regional Assembly 
%
as discussed in Chapter 8 .
(ii) The Controller
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There was no provision for the appointment of a 
Controller in the Self-Government Act. However, regulations 
of the Assembly provided that the Controller and the Deputy 
Speaker were to be elected immediately following the 
election of the Speaker, and in the same manner but the 
setting for their election had to be chaired by the 
Speaker.35
In the Sudan the Controller of the Assembly was 
regarded as the leader of the opposition but he was also a 
prominent official in the Party. His duty was to lead 
commentary and present "alternative views" to that of the 
government in the Assembly, so as to facilitate discussion 
and appropriate conclusion on any matter. He was not, 
however, meant to oppose the government. As long as 
criticisms came from individuals they were not regarded as 
opposition but they would be considered so if they appeared 
to have been supported by an organized group. Therefore the 
demarcation between criticism and opposition was very thin.
Reliable sources hold that the removal of Akot arose 
from the fact that he had rallied supporters against the 
government within the Assembly which amounted to an 
opposition. However, the problem which remained was that 
there was no law for the removal of the Controller which was 
similar to that of the Speaker. As already stated, the 
decision should have been null and void.
The presence of the Controller in the Sudanese 
Socialist one-party system was an innovation which offered a
lvT
sJ
346
new departure from the practice obtaining in other one-party 
states in Africa. His role as a moderator was a healthy 
innovation but could be a dangerous one as well as seen in 
the case of Akot.
(iii) The Leader
Conventionally, the Leader was appointed by the 
government to present her views in the Assembly. He could 
be regarded as the equivalent of the Chief Whip in the UK.
(iv) The Chairman of the SSU Assembly Body
The Chairman of the SSU Assembly body was the person 
appointed by the government to chair meetings of the body. 
In practice members of the SSU Assembly body were identical 
with that of the Assembly except that their sittings were 
not regarded as those of the Assembly.
Their function was to ensure that the Assembly was
observing "the principles of May Revolution" in all its
actions so as to secure party supremacy and a voice in all
matters of the Assembly. In order to do so the body was
required to debate all major issues before the sitting of
the Assembly with the view of reaching prior appropriate 
. . 37decisions to be rubber-stamped by the Assembly. The body
had to comply on all issues with the resolutions of the
3 ft
central organs of the party. ° The debates were
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confidential and the decisions reached had to be defended by
3 9the members in the meeting of the Assembly proper. It was 
also to lay down a general framework for the control of the 
executive of the Assembly. It therefore operated as an 
instrument of coercion.
(v) Functions of the Assembly
The People's Regional Assembly was obviously assigned 
the traditional functions of a legislature which include law 
making; utilization and control of financial resources; 
criticism and control of the executive and the general 
involvement of the people in politics.
In the field of law-making, Section 7 of the
Self-Government Act stipulated:
"Regional legislation in the Southern 
Region shall be exercised by ... People's 
Regional Assembly elected by citizens 
resident in the Southern Region."
The People's Regional Assembly did of course make some laws
40such as the Public Service Act 1975, The Registration of
« ^ A
Business Names Act 1976, Land Acquisition Act 1976 and 
several others but unfortunately this vital role of the 
Assembly was not sufficiently carried out. For most of the 
time the Assembly was either on recess or dissolved. There 
were three dissolutions in 1980, 1981 and 1983. This was so 
because the Members of the Assembly were constantly 
bickering over leadership, as seen above, for example in the 
removal of the President and the Speakers. Therefore many
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important fields like traditional law and custom, land law 
remained uncovered. Most of the legislation; w a s  enacted 
by the First People's Regional Assembly only.
On the subject of economic development, the
Self-Government Act stated that the People's Regional
Assembly was responsible for:
"Promotion and utilization of regional 
financial resources for the development 
and administration of the Southern 
Region."43
It was empowered to "levy regional duties and taxes in
44addition to the national and local duties and taxes".
This was the area where the regional assembly was most
active. From 1972 to 1983 the regional government enacted
4 5 .the Finance Act, 1974, the Excise and Consumption Duties
Act, 1977,46 and the Surcharge Tax Act, 1980.47 These laws
imposed various categories of taxes on people, goods and
commodities in the region. (For more details, see Chapter
9.) In doing so, the region was pressed^by the desperate
need for funds to run the government concerning the control
of the Executive by the Assembly through criticisms and
impeachment of the members of the Executive was too relaxed.
Section 20 of the Self-Government Act expressly made the
High Executive Council responsible to the People's Regional
Assembly.
"The President of the High Executive 
Council and its members are responsible 
to the President and the People's 
Regional Assembly for the efficient 
administration of the Southern Region."
But, as we have already seen, from the cases of Lubari
Rumba, Joseph Lagu, Samuel Aru Bol and others, the Regional
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Assembly failed disastrously to control the High Executive 
Council. On the contrary it was being controlled by the 
High Executive Council - note especially the removal of 
Clement Mboro and others.
All in all, the Southern Regional Assembly was very 
weak, ineffective, and incompetent. The members never 
involved people in politics and made only a few laws which 
were inappropriately considered or researched into. They 
never pulled up the strings of development and totally 
failed to control the Executive. Being mainly composed of 
people with little education, they were preoccupied in 
squabbles for leadership and issues of tribal balance in the 
Executive. It was largely a worthless Assembly.
B. Other Regional Governments
A Regional Government established under the provisions 
of the Regional Government Act 1980 or Presidential Order 
No. 1 of 1983 consisted of two organs.
1. A Regional Executive Authority
2. Other People's Regional Assembly.
"The Judiciary, Public Prosecution and Advocacy" were 
expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the regional 
governments.
1. The Regional Executive Authority
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The Regional Executive Authority was comparable to the 
High Executive Council in the South. It was composed of:-
(i) The Governor
(ii) The Deputy Governor
(iii) Members of the Authority (or Regional Ministers).
(i) The Governor
The Governor was the Chief Executive in the region 
comparable to the President of the High Executive Council in 
the South. However, his appointment differed from that of 
the President of the High Executive Council. There were 
express provisions for the appointment of both the Interim 
or Substantive Governor.
(a) Appointment of Governor
The provision for the appointment of the Interim
Governor read:
"The President of the Republic shall 
appoint the first Governor of the Region 
for a transitional period not to exceed 
eighteen months from the date of the 
appointment.
Since the President also appointed the interim Governor in 
his absolute discretion as the interim president of the High 
Executive Council, the difference rested entirely on the 
omission of the provision for the appointment of the latter. 
From the case of Omer El Mardi, it would, however, appear
352
that the discretion of the president in the appointment of 
the Interim Governor was never absolute in practice. Omer 
El Mardi was appointed as Interim Governor for Darfur Region 
in 1980 but his appointment was rejected by the people of 
Darfur on the ground that he was not born and bred in the 
area. The bitter opposition to El Mardi's appointment 
compelled the President to remove and replace him with Ahmed 
Ibrahim Direig.
The provision for the appointment of a substantive
Governor stated;
"... The President of the Republic shall 
appoint the Governor of the Region from 
three candidates selected by a common 
meeting between the Regional People's 
Assembly and the Regional conference of 
the Sudanese Socialist U n i o n . " ^
The President was supposed to prescribe regulations for such 
51a meeting .... no such regulations were ever made. In 
practice, the president continued to appoint the Governors 
in disregard of the law. There was therefore a drastic 
difference between the appointment of the Governor and that 
of the President of the High Executive Council. The people 
hardly participated in the appointment of the Governor which 
was not democratic.
The procedure for the appointment of the Governor 
appeared to have been partly borrowed from the 
recommendations of the All Political Parties Conference in 
1966 [see Chapter 3 for more details].
The qualifications of the Governor also differed from
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that of the President of the High Executive Council in 
certain respects. He was required to be a Member of 
Parliament, which, as we have seen, was not the case with 
the President of the High Executive Council.
(b) Functions of a Governor
Executive powers in the region were vested in the
Governor personally.
"... Executive power in each Region shall 
be vested in the Governor of the Region 
who shall be assisted by a Deputy and an 
adequate number of Regional Ministers.
Therefore compared to the President of the High Executive
Council, the Governor was more powerful within his region.
(c) Removal of a Governor
There were two procedures for the removal of the 
Governor.
(1) On. the recommendation of a three-quarters majority of
the members of the Regional Assembly and the
conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union in a joint 
meeing for loss of confidence in h i m . ^
(2) The President could remove him at his own motion if he
thought the Governor no longer had the ability for
5 4good leadership.
55(3) Upon dissolution of the Assembly as in the case of
the President of the High Executive Council.
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Inspite of the enormous powers of the President for the 
removal of a Governor, no Governor except El Mardi was 
dismissed, the implication being all Governors were loyal to 
the President.
(ii) The Deputy Governor
Section 14 of the Regional Government Act stipulated:
"The President of the Republic shall 
appoint a Deputy for the Governor of the 
Region and may remove him on the 
recommendation of the Governor."
This provision appears badly drafted. It is absurd that the
President could appoint a deputy for the Governor without
the recommendation or consultation of the latter if the
working relationship between the Governor and his deputy is
to be convenient. What would happen if the governor of a
region recommended the removal of his deputy but the
President refused to remove him?
The implementation of a similar provision in order No.; 
1 of 1983 caused a problem in 1983 over the appointment of 
Francis Wajo as the Deputy Governor for Equatoria. James 
Tombura, the Governor, had recommended Wajo for the post but 
President Numeiri and his Vice-President Joseph Lagu 
preferred 0 1 iv2r Albino. According to the above-quoted 
provisions, the President did not need the recommendation of 
a Governor for the appointment of his deputy. Tombura was 
prepared to resign rather than work with Albino and the
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matter was resolved in his favour. The appointment of Wajo 
was legally unprocedural though politically appropriate and 
logically sound if there is to be some meaningful 
relationship between the Governor and his Deputy, 
providing for the President to appoint a Deputy for the 
Governor without the latter's consent was quite illogical.
(iii) Members of the Regional Executive Authority
Regional Ministers who formed the Regional Executive 
Authority were fewer than the Regional Ministers of the High 
Executive Council. They held the following portfolios:-
(a) The Regional Minister for Finance and Planning.
(b) The Regional Minister for Regional Administration and 
Regional Affairs.
(c) The Regional Minister for Agriculture and Natural 
Resources.
(d) The Regional Minister for Regional Services (Health, 
Education and Information).
(e) The Regional Minister for Communications Works and 
Housing.
Like the members of the High Executive Council, they did not 
have to be members of the Assembly.
They assisted the Governor and his Deputy generally and 
were "responsible for the framing and directing the policy 
of his Ministry within the limits of the general policy and 
the policy of the r e g i o n " T h e y  were appointed and 
removed from office by the President on the recommendation
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of the Governor. It was not, however, certain whether the 
President could relieve a Regional Minister before the 
recommendation of the Governor, in cases of emergency.
For example, in June 1984, the President relieved 
Ceasar Baya from his post as Regional Minister for 
Agriculture in Equatoria. Baya was involved in a motor 
accident while driving under the influence of alcohol at the 
time when Sharia law which forbade drinking was in force. 
Baya was instantly removed in Khartoum, where the accident 
took place but his Governor was isolated in Juba over one 
thousand miles away. It was alleged that the Governor’s 
recommendation had been obtained but doubt remained as to 
whether the recommendation was obtained before or after his 
removal.
2. The Regional Assembies in the Other Regions
Table 6.2 shows the composition of the other Regional 
Assemblies compared to the Area and total population of the 
respective regions. The difference between the other 
Assemblies and the Regional Assembly in the South was that 
they had appointed members.
It would seem that the seats were distributed according 
to the population of the regions in that regions with larger
had more seats. However, there was no justification 
for equalizing the number of seats between the Eastern and 
Northern regions. If population was the criteria used, then
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the Eastern Region should have had nearly twice the number 
of seats allotted to the Northern Region. Moreover, the 
population of the Central Region was over-represented in the 
Assembly.
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Diagrams 6 and 7 show the two structures of Local 
Governments established.
A. The structure of the People's Province Executive
B. The structure of Area Councils.
A . The Structure of People's Province Executive Councils
The People's Province Executive Councils consisted of 
the Commissioner and the Province Executive Council at the 
apex.
1. The Commissioner
Section 6 of the People's Local Government Act, 1971 
provided:
"The President of the Republic shall 
appoint for every province a Commissioner 
who shall be qualified and experienced 
person of high administrative ability and
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of political consciousness and who is 
also an ardent supporter of the aims of 
the Revolution."
It was, however, by no means certain that the appointment of
Commissioners followed these criteria. Experienced public
administrators as well as inexperienced school graduates,
semi-illiterate people as well as Members of the Armed
Forces were appointed Commissioners. Therefore the
appointment of Commissioners fell below the expectations of
the law.
The responsibilities of the Commissioner were very 
wide. The Commissioner was the Chief government 
representative in the province, the SSU Provincial Secretary 
and the person in charge of civil servants in the province. 
He was also to maintain security in the province, chair 
council meetings and act as Treasurer for the Council. The 
implications of these functions will be analysed separately.
(i) The Commissioner as Chief Government Representative
The People's Local Government Act 1971 stated:
"The Commissioner shall be the Chief 
Representative of the Government in the 
province and shall be responsible for the 
execution of the general policy of the 
government and for fostering and 
consolidating the revolutionary socialist 
regime of the May Revolution and for the 
functional organizations.",.^
He was therefore the key figure in the province responsible
for government policies and functions. He was the Central
Government Agent in the province.
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(ii) The Commissioner as SSU Provincial Secretary
According to the SSU practice, the Commissioner by 
virtue of his office was the SSU Provincial Secretary 
responsible for the propagation of SSU objectives in the 
province. He chaired meetings of the SSU Provincial 
Secretariat as well.
(ill) The Commissioner as the Administrative Supervisor in 
the Province
The Act provided:
"The Commissioner shall be responsible 
for the general supervision, coordination 
and control of the government units in 
the province and he shall exercise 
control over civil servants working in 
the province and shall render reports on 
the effective discharge of their duties 
to their respective Ministries •••"53
He was also empowered to discipline any employee under the
Employees Discipline Act, 1976.
In this respect he was assisted by the Executive 
Director who was the Chief Professional Administrator and by 
virtue of his office the Deputy Commissioner and Secretary 
to the Council. (The performance of these functions are 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 8 .)
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(iv) The Responsibility for Order and Security
The Act also stated that the Commissioner was
"responsible for the maintenance of order and security in 
59the province". He was answerable to the Minister of 
Interior or to the High Executive Council in the case of the 
South.
However, this provision was too general to distinguish 
the exact limits of the powers of the Commissioner. In 1979 
Presidential Decree No. 475 transfered the administration of 
police forces to the Province Executive Councils. In this 
respect the Decree was contrary to the provisions of the 
Police Act, 1979 which also transfered responsibility over 
the police to the President of the Republic except for the 
Khartoum Province police. (For more details see Chapter 7.)
(v) The Commissioner as Treasurer
Section 6(7) of the 1971 Act stated:
"The Commissioner shall be the Treasurer 
of the People's Executive Council and 
responsible for the control and carrying 
into effect of all duties of the Council 
and execution of its resolutions."
As the Treasurer, the Commissioner was supposed to:-
(a) advise the Executive Council on financial matters;
(b) prepare the annual recurrent budget as required by the
A c t ;
(c) establish safe and efficient machinery for collection
of monies due to the Council and the disbursement of
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the expenditure thereof;
(d) maintain proper records in accordance with the 
provisions of the Financial Regulations of Monies 
received and payments made;
(e) keep proper records of Council assets and liabilities;
(f) discharge any other functions for efficient management 
of public funds.
However, due to lack of professional knowledge of 
accountancy, the Provincial Commissioners were incapable of 
performing the above functions. There was also bad 
financial management on the part of the junior staff. There 
were no proper records of money received and disbursed. In 
Baher El Ghazal Province development money for example was 
used for paying salaries, the sum of £s 29,109,477 m/ms was 
misappropriated in 1976.
The irony of the situation was that almost all the 
powers that were decentralised to the local government 
councils remained in fact centralised in the Commissioner.
As we shall soon see, the Executive Councils and the Local 
Councils had almost no powers or functions.
2. The People’s Executive Councils
(i) Composition of the Councils
The details of the composition of every Executive 
Council were contained in the Council's warrant of
363
establishment. The warrants were more or less based on the 
requirements of the Act. Every council had representatives 
of the functional organizations (alliance of working forces) 
and the government units in the province.^ Surprisingly, 
there was no specific mention of women, inspite of the 
importance attached to participation by women in the lower 
councils. Invariably, all Executive Councils had a total 
membership of 150 people, of whom a third were ex officio 
members. The ex officio members included the Heads of the 
Provincial Departmental Units like the Assistant 
Commissioners for Health, Education, Agriculture, Works etc. 
Plus some government officials in the Province. The rest of 
the Members were indirectly elected from the lower councils.
The Councils were broadly responsible for:-
"... Political enlightenment, people's 
mobilization, economic and social 
development and consolidation of the 
national unity in accordance with the 
Revolution ... Promotion of new ideas of 
the People's Local Government and for the 
consolidation of the People's and 
official activities and combatting the 
defunct political parties, sectarianism, 
racialism and tribalism.
(ii) Meetings of the Council
The Councils were required to meet regularly but not to 
exceed six times a year under the Chairmanship of the 
Commissioner or the Executive Director in his absence. In 
practice, however, meetings of the councils were rarely held 
due to long distances and the unavailability of transport
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fafcilites. Southern Darfur was for example, abaout 70,000 
square miles yet 50 to 60% of the vehicles in the Province 
had outrun their useful life.
(iii) Committees of the People's Executive Council
It was mandatory for the People's Executive Council to 
appoint "a Central Committee" to assist in the discharge of 
its duties. But it could also appoint other specialised 
committees. Their roles will be examined separately.
(a) The Central Committee
The Central Committee was established under Section 10
of the Act:
"The People's Province Executive Council 
shall appoint a central committee to be 
presided over by the Commissioner and 
with the Deputy Commissioner acting as 
Secretary."
The Deputy Commissioner was the Executive Director who also 
acted as Secretary for the Executive Council. Originally, 
the Central Committee was composed of seven members, of whom 
five represented the usual functional organizations.
However, following the recommendation of the Select 
Committee of the People's National Assembly in 1976, the 
number was doubled in order to make it more representative 
of the people in the Province. But adequate representation 
was never achieved due to the smallness of the number. The 
Committee was to deal with important and urgent matters
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assigned to it by the People's Province Executive Council. 
Since a full meeting of the Council could never take place 
as stated earlier, every matter was treated as urgent.
(b) Specialized Committees
Section 18(1) of the Act empowered the People's
Executive Council to:
"Set up specialized committees which 
shall be responsible for the discharge of 
several activities assigned thereto or 
for the purpose of making a report 
respecting any matter or the performance 
of any work deemed by the Council more 
suitable to be inspected or discharged by 
any such Committee."
The Executive Council was to decide on the total membership
of such committees which were not to be less than five
members. These types of committees were presided over by
the members of the Executive Councils, while the Secretaries
were the professionals in the Council.
3. The People's Rural Councils and the People's Town 
Councils
Powers of the Executive Councils to establish lower 
councils have been examined in Chapter 5. The People's 
Rural Councils and the People's Town Councils were the 
immediate councils below the People's Province Executive 
Councils (following the abolition of the District Councils). 
The difference between the two councils depended on the area
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of location of the council.
(i) The People's Rural Councils (PRC)
In 1971 the Ministry of Local Government issued a
circular concerning the establishment of Rural Councils.
"It is extremely important that these 
divisions shall be based on aspects such 
as local geography, the type of economy 
prevalent in the area, and the common 
interests of the local population. In 
particular there should not be any 
natural barriers within any proposed 
council ..."^
Commenting on this circular M. Allasam wrote that "its aim
was to create smaller and more homogeneous administrative
6 3and public units" , which was in the best traditions of 
forming local councils.
The Rural Councils were composed of the representatives 
of the lower councils (the Furgan and village councils) as 
well as governments in the area such as health, education, 
public works and so on. However, the membership of the ex 
officio members (the government officials) was limited to 
one third of the total. As specified in the Act, a quarter 
of the seats were reserved for women. A study of the 
infra-structure of Gebel Marra by the Huntington Technical 
Services in December 1977 (in Western Sudan) revealed the 
typical composition of a Rural Council, as shown in Table 
6.3.
As can be seen from Table 6.3, the study covered the
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Rural Councils of Zalingei, Garsila and Nyertete. The 
difference between the seats for official members in 
Nyertete and the other two councils was due to the fewer 
number of officials in Nyertete. All other seats were 
filled except those reserved for women who failed to turn 
up. It is to be recalled that the social behaviour of 
Sudanese people inhibits women from participation in public 
life.
The elected members consisted of illiterate traders, 
farmers, primary school teachers and religious leaders, all 
of who commanded little respect or popularity in the 
community. The May revolution's policy of isolating 
traditional leaders and sectarian party influence from the 
councils affected the councils in that the traditional 
leaders and other leading figures boycotted the Rural 
Council elections. The overall impact was that the councils 
remained very weak. The chairman of Nyertete was the only 
effective leader of the three councils. This was because he 
was a trained teacher, the president of a local farmers and 
tobacco growers association and had, paradoxically, been qn 
omda (see Chapter 4). Probably his experience in the 
Omdaship made the greatest contribution to his 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the chairman of Garsila 
was a merchant, while that of Zalingei was a sub-grade 
teacher and both were weak.
(ii) The People's Town Councils (PTC)
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Town Councils were treated on similar lines with Rural 
Councils. Their compositions, however, consisted of 
representatives from the residential councils, Suk (market) 
councils, and industrial area councils. As usual, the 
working government officials formed a third of the total 
membership while a quarter was reserved for women. Once 
again, all rules issued by the Ministry of Local Government 
to Rural Councils also applied to Town Councils.
4. The Village, Furgan, Residential, Market and Industrial 
Area Councils
The Village, Furgan, Residential, Market and Industrial 
Area Councils were the lowest councils in the Sudan 
established under the People's Local Government Act, 1971. 
Their names were indicative of their areas of location.
(i) The Village Councils and the Furgan Councils
The word Furgan stands for a nomadic village. Both the 
Furgan and village councils were governed by the same rules. 
Their sizes were normally determined by a population of 
about one thousand people. Every council had been 20 and 24 
members, (rather similar to that of the Rural and Town 
Councils).
The elected members were informally elected in an 
open-air meeting of the electorate called by the chairman of
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the village committee. Every Sudanese aged 18 years and 
V
abcje was eligible to vote. Reports of such elections are
not readily available. As usual, ex officio members were
added to the elected members. They came from amongst
government officials working in the village as midwives,
c.
nurses, dressers, school teachers, headmasters and so forth. 
Their number was also limited to one third of the total 
membership. The normal quota of one quarter of the total 
seats were reserved for women.
(ii) The Residential, Market and Industrial Area Councils
Under the Local Government Act 1971, every town in the 
Sudan was divided up into residential, market and industrial 
areas for the purpose of establishing local government 
councils. Although all these councils were in urban areas, 
they were treated on equal terms with Furgan and Village 
Councils for administrative purposes. Their compositions 
and rules of elections were also similar to those of the 
Furgan and Village Councils.
(iii) The Residential Area Council
The elected members in the Residential Area Councils 
elected a chairman to represent them in the Town Council.
If the number of the residential area councils exceeded the 
prescribed seats of 20 to 24, the electoral college system 
was applied to get the required number. A group constituted
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of the chairman of the residential councils was sent as 
delegates to the Town Council.
(b) The Market Councils
Market areas in the towns constituted separate
councils. Every business group such as butchers, vegetable
dealers, shop-keepers and so on elected a trade committee.
The elected chairman for these committees constituted a
market council (Suk Council), which was represented on the
Town Council by at least one member each. Commenting on
this arrangement in 1972, J. Howell wrote:
"It is an experiment worth watching for 
political as well as administrative 
reasons. The merchants in the Sudan have 
always been in party politics and are not 
the natural allies of President Numeiri's 
professedly socialist government. But 
the government in its three and a half 
years in office has come to appreciate 
the importance of the merchants to the 
economic wealth of the land, and 
henceforth, they are more likely to be 
courted than harrassed.
It is interesting to see how socialism yielded to capitalism
within only three years in the Sudan. This shows that the
community is not prepared to receive imposed ideology.
There was no provision for the preservation of seats 
for women in the Market Councils, probably because women 
were not found in significant numbers in the field of trade.
(c) Industrial Area Councils
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Industrial Area Councils were formed in the same way as 
the Market Councils but were limited to the towns with 
factories. They were few and were also represented in the 
Town Councils.
5. Functions of the Lower Councils
According to the 1971 People's Local Government Act,
the People's Province Executive Councils were to, after the
establishment of these councils, "delegate some of [their]
6 5powers and functions to the People's Local Councils" to be 
exercised under their supervision.
In practice, the People's Province Executive Councils
never delegated their powers to the lower councils. It was
even very difficult for the lower councils to obtain funds
from the Executive Councils. For example, in Aweil and
Gogrial Districts in Baher El Ghazal Province some Rural
Councils never functioned due to lack of powers and funds.
In Southern Darfur Province, the Administrative Survey Team
of 1976 found that individual consent had to be obtained
from the Provincial Headquarters for spending as small an 
6 6amount as £20. it was a very frustrating and demoralising 
exper ience.
Nevertheless, Southern Darfur was an exceptional case 
when it attempted to delegate powers to the lower council 
through a circular as follows:-
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(i) People's Province Executive Councils
The People's Province Executive Councils were 
responsible for town planning, making building regulations 
and allocation of land for mechanized agricultural scheme.
(ii) District Councils (abolished)
The District Councils were to be the link between 
People's Province Executive Councils and Town Councils.
They were also responsible for airports, agricultural 
exhibitions, receiving recommendation from Rural Councils 
and Town Councils and passing them to the People's Province 
Executive Councils. In addition to those they were in 
charge of the supervision of work of Rural Councils and Town 
Councils.
(iii) Rural Councils and Town Councils
The Rural and Town Councils were responsible for data 
collection, drawing up plans and carrying out research 
studies. But the power to decide on plans and studies were 
reserved to the People's Province Executive Councils. They 
were also to take charge of maintenance of schools, roads, 
public health facilities, control of births and deaths, rest 
houses, and animal movement in disease areas, and 
enlightenment and mobilisation of citizens politically.
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(iv) Village Councils
Inexplicably the Village Councils received no mention. 
The circular also failed to decentralise financial powers. 
PresumabI y they were to receive grants from the Province 
Councils. Though this was a progressive development, it was 
never implemented - no reason was given here either.
This brings us to the structure of the Area Councils.
B. The Area Councils
The composition of Area Councils varied, being governed 
by different principles in different parts of the Sudan. In 
the Northern part of the country the composition was 
determined according to the local population. For example, 
Omndurman Area Council had 60 members and was the largest in 
the country. However, in the southern part of the country 
the size of every Area Council was standardised: each one 
had 30 members only. Table 6.4 shows the composition of a 
typical Area Council in the South: Malakal Area Council is 
used as an example.
Table 6.4 reveals the following points.
1. The majority of the members in an Area Council were 
elected from single member constituency wards.
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Incidentally the elections were conducted by direct 
secret ballot, as opposed to indirect elections used 
for the People's Province Executive Councils.
2. There were no representatives of government departments 
in the membership of the Councils, as there was in the 
People's Province Executive Councils.
3. The representation of the different categories of 
people, like the alliance of working forces, was 
maintained but women were no longer reserved a quarter 
of the seats. This was so because the 1981 Act 
authorised the Regional Executive Authority to
6 7prescribe "a reasonable number of seats for women", 
as had already been pointed out.
4. A few members (usually three in the South) were 
appointed by the Regional Executive Authority on the 
recommendation of the Commissioner. They were regarded 
as experienced people interested in public works, as 
already mentioned.
5. It should be added that the chairman of the councils
were now elected.
"The Council shall, in the first sitting, 
elect a chairman from amongst its 
members; provided that such sitting shall 
be chaired by the Commissioner for the 
said purpose."gg
(i) The Commissioner
According to Section 10 of the Local Government Act
1981:
"The Commissioner shall assume the 
following powers:-
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(a) He shall be responsible to the 
People's Executive Authority for the 
Province Security.
(b) He shall supervise the police, the 
prisons and the fire brigade forces 
in the Province.
(c) He shall be responsible for the 
Heads of the Executive organs in the 
Councils and procedure secondment of 
all employees in the Public Service 
organs to the Councils. He shall 
confirm and render reports on them.
(d) He shall revise the works of the 
Councils and raise reports thereon 
to the Regional Executive Authority.
(e) He shall exercise any other powers 
delegated to him by the Regional 
Executive Authority."
Thus the enormous functions of the Commissioner under the
1971 Act had been drastically reduced to that of
supervision, review and reporting. He was no longer the
Chairman or the Treasurer. However, he remained the
government representative in the province as well as the SSU
Secretary there. His powers of supervision over security
forces in the province and his responsibility for the
secondment of officials left him in a fairly strong
position. Commissioners in the South were still able to
coerce the Councils through the powers. He could label an
individual as security danger and have him detained and
influence the transfer of Chief Executives. Interventions
by Commissioners into the functions of Councils were
frequent. Moreover, he had to endorse resolutions of the
Councils before they could be confirmed by the Regional
Assembly.
If a person was aggrieved by a local order, he would 
petition the Commissioner who would recommend to the 
Regional Executive Authority the suspension, amendment or
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69repeal of the order.
(ii) Committees of the Area Council
Like the People's Province Executive Councils, the Area
Councils were also empowered to "set up committees from
amongst its members to assume the responsibility of
7 nsupervising the basic business assigned thereto". in 
compliance with this provision every Area Council (at least 
those in the South) appointed committees for:-
(a) Public Order and Social Affairs?
(b) Education and Culture;
(c) Public Health;
(d) Public Works;
(e) Agriculture and Animal Wealth? and
(f) Trade and Supply.
The Committees were required to make detailed 
recommendations based on expert knowledge and studies for 
submission to the Council for policy decision-making. 
Expectedly, the Committees were bound to be more effective 
than the Central Committee of the People's Province 
Executive Council, which attempted to do everything on 
behalf of the Executive Council.
( iii) The Rural Councils
The Rural Councils were established by the Area
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Councils as stated earlier. Their composition was similar 
to that of the Area Councils. They exercised delegated 
powers from the Area Councils, which involved the rendering 
of minor services similar to those of the Area Councils in 
their localities.
IV. THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
The National Capital comprised:
A. The Commissioner General
B. The Commissioners
C. The Council for the National Capital.
Below these were the District Councils and the Rural 
Councils. These will be examined in turn.
A. The Commissioner General
The Commissioner General was the Chief Executive of the 
National Capital comparable to the Governor of a region. 
According to Sections 6 and 9 of the National Capital Act 
1983, his appointment and removal were also similar to those 
of regional Governors.
All executive powers for the administration of the 
National Capital vested in him and was directly answerable 
to the President of the Republic only by the said Section 6.
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T H E  STRUCTURE OF THE N A T IO N A L  CAPITAL
COM M ISSIONERS
THE PRESIDENT
RURAL C O U N C IL S
D IS T R IC T  C O U N C ILS
C O U N C IL  OF TH E  CAPITAL
T H E  C O M M IS S IO N E R  GENERAL
Diagram 8
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B. The Commissioners
The Commissioners were appointed by the President on 
the recommendations of the Commissioner General under the 
provisions of the same Section 6. Their number was not 
specified. However, the Commissioner General had the 
discretion to decide on the appropriate number which he was 
to recommend to the President for appointment. They were 
responsible to the Commissioner General and the Council for 
the National Capital for the proper performance of their 
duties.
The duties were not also defined by the Act but the 
President of the Republic in consultation with the 
Commissioner General was to distinguish the functions of the 
Commissioners as opposed to those of the Commissioner 
General. This seemed not to have been done by the time the 
Numeiri government was overthrown in 1985. However, the 
Commissioner could more or less be compared to the members 
of the Regional Executive Authority in a region.
National Public Service Organ
Like the Regional Governments in the Northern Sudan, 
the National Capital had no public service organs. Officers 
for the National Capital were also seconded from the Central
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Government. The Secretary General was the highest civil 
servant in the administrative hierarchy.
C . The Council for the National Capital
The total membership for the National Capital was fixed 
at sixty. The composition and methods of elections and 
appointments were similar to those of a Regional Assembly in 
the North.
Its functions were similar to those of a Regional 
Assembly - legislation, economic development and control of 
the executive organ for the National Capital. Unlike the 
Governor, the Commissioner General chaired meetings of the 
Council.
District Councils
The National Capital was made up of four District 
Councils which were similar to the Area Councils in terms of 
compositions and functions. These Councils were:-
(1) Khartoum District Council.
(2) Omudurman District Council.
(3) Khartoum North District Council.
(4) East of the Nile District Council.
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Local Councils
The Commissioner General was empowered to establish 
Local Councils on the recommendation of the Commissioners 
below the District Councils. These were the equivalent of 
Rural Councils established under the People's Local 
Government Act, 1981.
The difference here was the provision was also made for 
the establishment of Village Councils separate from the 
Rural Councils. They were even assigned separate functions 
and sources of revenue. The functions were listed in 
Schedule 5 of the Act (see Schedule ....)
Their sources of revenue included,
"self help, gifts and donations and 
grants in aid determined by the District 
Councils."
According to National Capital Act, "revenues and functions 
for the District and People's Local Councils were also 
separately defined". Details of these can be seen in 
Schedules 3 and 4 of the National Capital Act 1983.
It could seem as if the draftsman of this law to some 
extent followed the provisions of the People's Local 
Government Act 1971 with regard to the provisions concerning 
Rural and Village Councils. It is to be recalled that the 
Local Government Act 1981 had already replaced the 
provisions of the 1971 Act. This could cause confusion in 
the local administration of the National Capital when 
compared to other Area Councils.
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The organization of the National Capital was, however, 
different from that of the Federal Capital territory at 
Lagos. A comparison between the two will be made to 
illuminate the differences.
According to the Nigerian 1979 Constitution, its 
provisions were to apply to the Federal Capital Territory as 
if it were one of the States of the Federation. This means 
the Federal Capital Territory applied the same laws as the 
States which was not the case with the Sudanese National 
Capi tal.^
In Nigeria too, the National Assembly, the President of 
the Federation and the Federal Courts constituted the 
necessary organs for the Federal Capital territory. The 
constitutional provisions were to be read with modifications 
and adaptations to conform with such ideas. The Federal 
Capital territory was1?v<p.evU4 as a Senatorial District, a 
Federal Constituency and the President regarded as the 
Governor, the Vice President as the Deputy Governor, and the 
Chief Justice as the Chief Judge. Thus organs of the 
Federal Government were inseparable from those of the 
federal capital territory. But in the Sudan as we have 
seen, the National Capital had separate legislative and 
Executive organs from those of the Central Government. The 
Commissioner General was only directly responsible to the 
President of the Republic. Moreover, the relationship in 
the Sudan between the Government of the National Capital and 
the Central Government were not well-defined. Conflicts
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could therefore have been expected to arise although no 
cases came up probably due to the one-party system and 
Numeiri's dictatorial regime.
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CHAPTER 7
THE SCHEME OF POWER-SHARING BETWEEN THE CENTRAL, 
REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Appropriate distribution of powers and functions 
between the central, regional and local governments in a 
decentralised system of administration is imperative. The 
scheme of power-sharing should aim at balancing the 
interests of the respective governments vis-a-vis each 
other. Ideally, regional and local governments ought to 
be as autonomous as possible but they must at the same 
time come under the control of the central government - 
for they are not sovereign entities by themselves. 
Moreover, in the case of decentralised governments, the 
inferior governments must be subordinate and not 
coordinate to the superior government, as would have been 
the case in a federation. It is therefore difficult to 
strike an appropriate balance between the scope and limits 
of jurisdictions of these respective governments.
This chapter attempts to analyse the power-sharing 
scheme in the decentralised system of government in the 
Sudan between 1971 and 1985. In particular it focuses on 
the powers of the regional and local governments. It also 
examines the problems experienced by these governments in 
the process of exercising these powers. Specific 
problematic areas identified for discussion include powers 
to plan for social and economic development, educational 
planning, the control of natural resources, participation 
in commercial and industrial activities, control of
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security, legislation on traditional law, and the 
promotion of local languages.
The question of financial powers is considered in a 
separate chapter, Chapter 9, due to its additional 
importance and complexity.
I THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
IN A DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
As already stated, the question of how much power 
should be decentralised to the regional and local 
governments and how much should be left for the central 
government is a dominant problem facing all decentralised 
governments. Certain general principles which are usually 
followed deserve some detailed consideration. The 
overriding principle is to consider which matters are of 
national nature and which are of regional and common 
interest. Ordinarily matters of regional interest (or 
concern) are vested in the regional governments, leaving 
matters of a national nature to the central governments. 
Experience has generally shown that matters of national 
interest include external affairs, defence, control of the 
armed forces, currency, foreign exchange, foreign and 
international trade, maritime shipping and inter-regional 
communications. The justifications seem to be obvious.
The central government must have the appropriate powers to
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defend itself against external aggression as well as be 
able to restrain any centrifugal forces capable of 
splitting the country. Moreover, it represents interests 
of the nation as a whole.
Matters usually categorized as of regional interest 
or concern relate to agriculture and land, many aspects of 
education, public health, social services, administration 
of local government, public order and public works. 
Understandably the regions must have appropriate powers 
for each unit to develop as fast as possible, especially 
those which have been lagging behind; they should be 
enabled to catch up with the "head starters" in fields of 
political, social and economic development. A workable 
division of powers must also necessarily recognize the 
cultural, political, social and economic history of the 
country and the aspirations of its people.
National and regional interests, however, do coincide 
in certain fields such as civil, personal and criminal 
law, trade, commerce and industry, as well as trade unions 
and industrial disputes. Such matters are normally 
assigned concurrently to both the national and regional 
governments. In any case powers of a regional government 
should be adequate to justify not only its existence but 
also its ability to delegate or devolve some of the powers 
to the local governments.
Secondary to the principle of "interest", "concern" 
or "nature" are the principles that responsibilities
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should be assigned to the government best able to 
administer them and that functions related to one another 
should be entrusted, as far as possible, to the same 
authority. This means the powers decentralised should 
correspond to the financial and skilled manpower, 
resources of the region. However, the exact limits of 
decentralisation are finally determined by the forces 
which bring it about. Decentralisation as generally known 
occurs either due to political decisions from above or 
pressure from below or a combination of both.
In countries where decentralisation has come 
primarily due to pressure from below, such as the Sudan, 
Papua New Guinea and Iraq, the decentralised governments 
have relatively extensive powers compared with those of 
the central governments. In fact even if they have not 
managed to achieve federal status, their constitutions are 
invariably quasi-federal in nature. But in countries 
where decentralisation was decided from above, like 
Tanzania and Zambia, insignificant plenary powers were 
deconcentrated to the regional and local administrative 
units. Even then the position is far from being uniform, 
particularly in the quasi-federal systems, because the 
forces of the central and regional governments are always 
competitive. Whereas the regional governments aspire for 
as much power as they could get, the central governments 
try to retain control over as many matters as possible.
It is therefore not surprising to find that in Cyprus 
responsibility for, and authority over, national defence 
and foreign relations are not vested in the central
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government but with the autonomous regions.
Entities with greater autonomy tend to control their 
own natural resources, as for example in Eritrea and the 
United Arab Emirates. In these countries the autonomous 
entities control the use of water, forests and other 
non-mining resources within their territorial 
jurisdiction. But where there is a strong central 
government, natural resources are undoubtedly central 
government matters - such as is the case in Tanzania and 
Zambia. Financial matters usually fall under the control 
of the central government but the imposition of local 
taxes generally come within the jurisdiction of autonomous 
entities. Control of customs and excise duties are vested 
in the central government but the actual collection may be 
delegated to the autonomous units like that of Eritrea.
The danger is that in countries where there are 
secessionist movements the utmost care must be taken in 
choosing which powers have to be decentralised to the 
regions; else the secessionist areas are only strengthened 
to break away finally.
The question of independent local judiciary has not 
been so significant in decentralised governments. 
Presumably intergovernmental conflicts are resolved by 
consultations and conciliations since decentralised 
governments are unitary in nature. This is the case in 
Papua New Guinea.
Concerning the distribution of powers and functions
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between regional and local governments, similar issues 
arise as mentioned before. The issues which face central 
and regional governments over the division of functions 
more or less apply to regional and local governments. 
However, an important question that must be posed at this 
stage is - why is it necessary to provide functions and 
services through local governments when there are regional 
governments? Why should the regional governments not 
perform all the functions below the jurisdiction of the 
central government?
In large countries like the Sudan, Nigeria and India, 
where the distances are long from the regional capital, 
where there are wide varieties of local communities with a 
firmly rooted sense of ethnic and cultural consciousness, 
local governments are a necessity. Regional governments 
would be totally unable to cope with all the numerous 
services and the multiplicity of interests involved.
This brings us back to the issue of which 
responsibilities should be decentralised to the local 
governments and the limitations which should be imposed on 
them; also of concern is what minimum standards can be 
ensured and what sort of policies should be framed so that 
the activities of the regional and local governments 
complement each other, rather than over-lapping. Possibly 
areas of friction would thus be reduced to a minimum.
In assigning functions to local governments the 
general trend adopted has been to make local governments
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responsible for the provision of local services, such as 
local roads, water supplies, housing for low income, 
primary health facilities, primary and junior secondary 
school (intermediate) education, agriculture, public 
works, animal husbandry, community development, self-help, 
fire brigade services and forestry, but as agents for the 
regional governments.
Having examined the general trend for distribution of 
power between central, regional and local governments we 
now proceed to consider the scheme for distribution of 
power in the Sudan.
II THE DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS 
IN THE SUDAN
The issue to consider here is what were the 
theoretical limits of the powers and functions of the 
regional and local governments in the Sudan. It is 
proposed to consider powers of the regional governments 
before those of the local governments. Furthermore, 
powers of the regional governments will be separated under 
the subheadings of the powers of the Southern Regional 
Government and those of other regional governments because 
of the differences that existed between them.
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A. Powers of Regional Governments
1. Powers of the Southern Regional Government
Powers of the Southern Regional Government were
defined and enumerated in section 10 of the
Self-Government Act, 1972. (For details of the powers,
see Appendix 1 to this chapter. ) However, the most
controversial features of the powers are reproduced below:
"... Preservation of order, internal 
security, development of the southern 
region in cultural, economic and social 
fields and in particular in the 
following:-
(c) Legislation on traditional law and 
custom within the framework of 
national laws.
(e) Establishment, administration and 
maintenance of public schools at all 
levels in accordance with national 
plans for education and economic and 
social development.
(f) Promotion of languages and cultures.
(g) Village and town planning and the 
construction of roads in accordance 
with national plans and programmes.
(h) Mining and quarrying, without 
prejudice to the rights of the 
central government on the discovery 
of natural gas and minerals.
(o) Recruitment, organization and
administration of the services of 
the police and prisons in accordance 
with national policies and levels.
(p) Land use according to national laws 
and plans.
(r) Development, use and protection, of
forests products and pastures 
according to national law.
(t) All other matters respecting which
the President may authorize the 
peoples Regional Assembly to 
legislate."
However, Section 6 of the same Act denied certain powers
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to the Southern Regional Government. It stated:
"Neither the peoples Regional Assembly
nor the High Executive Council shall
legislate or exercise any powers on
matters of national nature which are:-
(i) National defence.
(ii) External affairs.
(iii) Currency and coinage.
(iv) Air and inter-regional/river 
transport.
(v) Communications and 
telecommunications.
(vi) Customs and foreign trade except 
for border trade and certain 
commodities which the regional 
government may specify with the 
approval of the central 
government.
(vii) Nationality and immigration 
(emigration).
(viii) Planning for social and economic 
development.
(ix) Educational planning.
(x) Public audit."
2. Powers of Other Regional Governments
The powers of the other regional governments were 
enumerated in Section 8 of the Regional Government Act, 
1980. (For details of the powers see Appendix 2 to this 
chapter.)
Powers of the other regional governments were similar
to those of the Southern Regional Government except for
the following:
"(d) Supervision of police, prisons and 
fire brigade forces ...
(h) Utilization of water in the region."
Some powers itemised as national matters were also 
excluded from their jurisdiction. There were:- 
" (e) The judiciary, public prosecution
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and advocacy
(i) Export and import trade 
(k ) The national natural mining
resources and the wealths under the 
ground.
(1) Institutions of national and 
regional elections."
All other matters excluded from the jurisdictions of the
other regions not mentioned above were similar to those
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Southern Region.
(For details see Appendix 3 to this chapter.)
3. Comments
The distribution of powers between the central and 
regional governments followed the general pattern of 
distribution of powers in decentralised governments, as 
explained above. Thus matters considered as of national 
nature were expressly denied to the regional governments 
but matters of regional interest were assigned to them 
including responsibility for local governments.
The powers of the regional governments, however, were 
not uniform in the Sudan. Whereas similarities existed in 
the fields of general administration, maintenance of order 
and security, development and utilization of local 
financial resources, local government, public services, 
agriculture, animal husbandry, general economic activities 
and tourism, wide differences prevailed in some important 
matters.
For example, the other regions had no powers over the
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following:-
(i) Traditional law and custom.
(ii) Promotion of languages and culture.
(iii) Mining and quarrying.
(iv) Border trade.
(v) Recruitment of police and prison officers.
The Southern Regional Government had no powers over:-
(i) Control of water.
(ii) Planning for social and economic development.
Certainly, the powers of the Southern Regional Government 
exceeded those of the other regional governments quite 
considerably despite its lack of power to control use of 
water in the region and plan for social and economic 
development. Internal migration was unfortunately omitted 
from the jurisdiction of all regional governments.
The differences which emerge between the schemes of 
distribution of powers in a federal government and a 
decentralised government are minimal. Firstly, powers 
assigned to decentralised governments are invariably 
contained in separate legislation or organic laws as 
usually called. For example, the Self-Government Act,
1972 and the Regional Government Act, 1980 contain powers 
of the regional governments in the Sudan. Similarly, 
powers of the provincial governments in Papua New Guinea 
are found in the organic law on provincial government; in 
Tanzania and Zambia the powers are stated in the 
respective laws decentralising powers to the regional and 
district governments or units. In a federation, however,
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the powers of the federal and state governments are 
guaranteed in the constitution. Guaranteeing all powers 
in the constitution is advantageous in that they are 
superior and any proposed amendment would have to be 
affected by the constituent assembly in accordance with 
the amendment provisions thereof. But where powers are 
not constitutionally guaranteed, the national legislature 
can amend powers of the regional or provincial governments 
at any time. So powers of decentralised governments enjoy 
less protection.
Secondly, the forms for the distribution of 
legislative and executive powers in a federation adopt one 
of the established patterns. The single list pattern is 
where powers are exclusively assigned to either the 
federal or state government leaving the residue to the 
other. For example, the Malaya constitution (1948-1957); 
and the Pakistan constitution, 1962. The two list pattern 
is where there is an exclusive list to either government 
and a concurrent list to both. Examples of these include 
the Buganda constitution 1962; and the Nigerian 
constitution, 1979. The three list pattern is where there 
is an exclusive list of matters assigned to the federal 
government and another exclusive list assigned to the 
state governments plus a third concurrent list assigned to 
both. This was the case with the Indian constitution, 
1950, the Pakistan Constitution 1956 and the Malaya 
Constitution, 1957.
The advantages of a single list arises from its
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simplicity and certainty, making it easier to avoid
conflicts. However, a concurrent list would also have
important advantages as succinctly put by R.L. Watts:
"First [a concurrent] list enhances 
flexibility. In a new federalism it 
permits the central government to 
postpone exercising its authority in a 
field until such time as the matter has 
assumed national importance, while not 
preventing any region which is forward 
looking from going ahead and legislating 
in the meantime on its own account.
Secondly, it provides a means whereby, in 
certain spheres, especially the social 
services, the central government may 
legislate to secure a basic national 
uniformity and to guide regional 
legislation, while leaving with the 
regional legislatures the initiatives for 
details and for adoption to local 
circumstances. Thirdly, a concurrent 
subject allows the general government to 
step into what is normally a regional 
field of activity, in order to provide 
remedies to particularly backward regions 
or for difficulties arising from regional 
legislation which affects other regions.
Fourthly, concurrent list may facilitate 
comparative federalism, by encouraging 
cooperative rather than independent 
action in these fields. Fifthly such a 
list may reduce the necessity for 
complicated, minute subdivisions of 
individual functions assigned exclusively 
to one government or another."^
In the event of conflict, the authority of the central
government prevails based on the reasoning that where the
government with over-riding power has enacted exhaustive
laws on a matter of concurrent jurisdiction "the other
government is ipso facto excluded from entering it in the
first place".^
However, there is no established form or pattern for 
the distribution of powers in a decentralised system of 
government. The Sudan, for example, has adopted a single
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list pattern but with qualifications as we have seen. 
Whereas the powers are enumerated in Sections 10 and 8 of 
the Self-Government Act and Regional Government Act 
respectively, the qualifications are stated in the 
respective Sections 6 of both laws.
Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, has an exclusive 
list for matters regarded as primarily provincial but it 
at the same time has another list of subjects concurrent 
to both the national and provincial governments.
Obviously it has adopted a two list pattern found in some 
federal systems like Nigeria. Tanzania and Zambia simply 
define powers of the decentralised governments without 
listing them.
Thirdly, the extent of powers decentralised to state 
government in a federal constitution is considerably 
greater than those assigned to regional or provincial 
governments in a decentralised administration. As we have 
seen, those of the regional and local units in Tanzania 
and Zambia were mainly plenary. The Sudan and Papua New 
Guinea had comparatively more powers assigned to the 
regional and provincial governments but they could never 
make up to half of the 66 items assigned to the state 
governments in Nigeria for example.
Finally, in a federal constitution, the residual 
powers are usually assigned to either government. There 
is no mention of residual powers in decentralised systems. 
Presumably it remains vested in the central government
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which could delegate some of it to the regional government 
from time to time. This was certain from the provisions 
of Section 1 0 (t) of the Self-Government Act, 1972, which 
stated:
"All other matters respecting which the 
president may authorize the peoples 
Regional Assembly to legislate"?
after lising powers of the Southern Regional Government.
However, the president never did so.
Having examined the powers of the regional 
governments in the Sudan, we proceed to consider which 
powers were also assigned to the local governments.
B. Powers and Functions of Local Governments
The powers and functions of the peoples Province 
Executive Councils and the Area Councils were practically 
identical.
Their powers were listed generally in the Schedules 
to the Peoples Local Government Acts, 1971 and 1981. They 
included the right to provide services like education 
(primary and intermediate), public health, public works, 
agriculture, animal welfare, general culture, social 
affairs, labour, trade and supply, public order plus some 
limited economic and industrial activities.
Surprisingly, they were authorised to participate in
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the "Preparation of economic and social development 
plans''^, while the Southern Region which was more able was 
expressly prohibited from doing so as we have seen. On 
the whole, the type of functions assigned to the local 
governments conformed with the general international 
practice.
We should now examine which of the problems the 
regional and local governments in the Sudan experienced 
from the exercise of their powers.
Ill PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Planning
1. Social and Economic Planning
The decentralisation of planning is an important
element in the decentralisation of government because it
should enable:
"Regional and local level ... officials 
to disaggregate and tailor development 
plans and programmes to the needs of 
heterogeneous regions and groups.
Unfortunately, the legal provisions with regards to
planning have not been consistent in the Sudan as we have
seen. It must be reiterated that whereas other regional
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and local governments in the Sudan were authorised to 
plan, the Southern Region was expressly prohibited from 
doing so. It was therefore inevitable that such a blanket 
prohibition would be ignored by the regional government in 
practice; and so it was. It is difficult to see how it 
would have been otherwise?
Planning as broadly defined by W. Demas, is "the 
formulation and execution of a consistent set of 
inter-related measures desired to achieve certain economic
c
and social goals." From a review of various expert views 
it can be suggested that an ideal planning process usually 
undergoes five distinctive stages.
(i) Plan formulation is the stage when the objectives of 
the plan are defined, the priorities and targets set, the 
resources are determined, surveys and research are 
undertaken, data analysed and draft prepared.
(ii) Plan programming is the stage when the plan is 
translated and broken down into identifiable programmes 
and projects.
(iii) Plan testing comes at the stage when the overall 
objectives of the plan are tested against the priorities, 
whether they are political, administrative or managerial, 
to ensure the administrative and executive capacity or the 
political will to see it through.
(iv) Plan implementation is when the plan is executed.
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(v) Plan review is the final stage when the plan is 
evaluated.
However, not all stages are followed since some plans 
are never implemented. Many examples of the Southern 
Regional Governments plans could be cited, but a few will 
do. These included the special development budget, the 
six-year economic and social development plan for the 
Southern Region, 1977/78 - 1982/83, manpower training 
programme, agricultural extension and rehabilitation 
schemes, Juba University, the Juba-Kapoeta road project, 
the Hydroelectric Project at Baden Falls and many others. 
However, the success of the plans were seriously curtailed 
by financial constraints, lack of skilled manpower, lack 
of appropriate planning and coordinating machinery, as 
illustrated with the examples of the special development 
budget and the six years development plan.
(a) The Special Development Budget
The Special Development Budget was a medium plan for 
the South inherited from the defunct Ministry of State for 
Southern Affairs (see Chapter 5).
The plan consisted of development projects formulated 
by Ministries and Departments of the Central Government 
for the South, requiring an investment of approximately £s 
36 million. it catered for the immediate tasks of
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government as well as its long-term objectives. The 
immediate tasks were the repatriation, rehabilitation and 
resettlement of returnees from refuge in neighbouring 
countries and the Southern forests, including the 
revitalization, renovation and reconstruction of projects 
destroyed during the war.
The long-term objectives were:-
(1) To increase food production in the region with a view 
to achieving self-sufficiency;
(2) To encourage the cultivation of cash crops in order
to commercialise the traditional agricultural sector;
(3) To develop, on a priority basis, the maximum network
of communication links with developing and
development potential areas;
(4) To bring to the maximum member of people 
opportunities for functional and general education;
(5) To encourage productive skills and initiatives, 
particularly in industry;
(6) To encourage the importance of rural development as 
the basis as sustained development through self-help.
The Special Development Plan was approved for 
implementation from 1972/73 fiscal year with an aggregate 
amount of £s 38,362. 633 m/ms. But, as illustrated by the 
Table 7.1, the actual results were much below expectation.
Several factors contributed to the poor performance 
of the plan shown above.
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Table 7:1 
THE SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
Year Budget Alloca­tion (Ls. 000)
Actual Expend- 
ture (Ls.000)
Actual Expend­
iture as % of 
Allocation
1972/73 1 ,400 560 40.0
1973/74 7,300 730 10.0
1974/75 7,100 1,150 16.2
1975/76 7,200 1,630 22.7
1976/77 15,300 3,610 23.6
Total 38,300 7,680 20. 1
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Proceedings of the Conference on Development in the 
Southern Region of the Sudan Juba, 5th Session, 
April 8th, 1983, p. 13.
Table 7:2 
PLANNED AND REALISED INVESTMENT
Fiscal
Year
Annual Plan 
Allocation 
(Ls millions)
Annual Plan 
Actual Expend­
iture (Ls 
millions)
Actual as 
% of Plan 
Allocation
1977/78 32.49 6.13 18.9
1978/79 39.45 7.82 19.8
1979/80 41.59 10.31 24.8
1980/81 38.4 12.80 33.6
1981/82 36.60 13.40 36.6
1982/83 43.04 8.13 18.9
Total 231.31 58.59 25.3
Source: Regional Ministry of Financeand Economic Affairs,
Proceedings of the Conference on Development in the 
Southern Region of the Sudan, Juba, 5th to 8th
A p r i l , 1983, p . 19 .
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(1) The actual receipts of funds from the central 
government were far less than expected?
(2) shortages of technical personnel (for details see 
Chapter 10)?
(3) scarcity of building materials, machinery, equipment, 
vehicles and spare parts;
(4) shortages of fuel;
(5) difficulties in inter-regional and international 
transformation and communication facilities.
(b) The Six Year Economic and Social Development Plan for
the Southern Region 1977/78 - 1982/83
The Six-Year Economic and Social Development Plan for
the Southern Region was based on the national objectives
which aimed at creating balanced development by means of:-
"... spatial distribution of economic 
activities, the promotion of increased
national output and incomes, the
equitable distribution of resources and 
services between regions with special 
treatment being accorded to the depressed 
regions or regions possessing unique 
economic characteristics or social 
conditions.
It was an integral part of the Six-Year Plan for National 
Economic Development but was made in the South. The 
estimated investment was about £s 286.7 million. The 
sources expected to finance the Plan were:-
(1) Regional sources, £s. 231.3 million?
(2) Direct contribution from the central government, £s 
35.9 million; and
(3) External assistance £s. 19.5 million.
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Hence, there was an overall growth rate of 4.5 and 7.0 per 
cent per annum. But as can be seen from Table 7.2 the 
levels of investment were very low compared to the 
expectation.
In view of the poor levels of performance, the 
national and regional plans were both discontinued in 
1978/79 and were replaced by rolling plans. But even 
then, the revised regional investment expenditure was 
drastically reduced, as shown in the Table 7.3.
The implementation of the six-year development plan 
faced similar constraints as the special development plan. 
In particular, the lack of financial resources was the 
greatest constraint. The expected £s. 51.3 million 
surplus from the central government, and the anticipated 
external assistance were never realised.
(c) Planning by the local governments
There were two notable points concerning planning by 
the local governments. One was that the theoretical 
assumptions differed from the practice. The other was 
that planning by the people's Executive Councils in the 
North differed from planning by those in the South.
Ideally, suggestions were to come from the lowest 
councils at the village level to the rural councils (then 
district councils before their abolition) and finally to
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Table 7:3 
REVISED INVESTMENT
Fiscal
Year
Revised Plan 
Allocation 
(Ls millions)
Actual Expend­
iture (Ls 
millions)
Actual Expend­
iture as % of 
Revised Plan 
Allocation (%)
1977/78 32.49 6.13 18.9
1978/79 22.50 7.82 34.8
1979/80 20.50 10.31 50.0
1980/81 20.50 12.80 62.0
1981/82 16.00 13.40 83.7
1982/83 16.00 8.13 50.6
Total 127.99 58.59 45.8
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs, Proceedings of the Conference on 
Development in the Southern Region of the Sudan, 
5th - 8th April, 1983 - Juba, p. 20.
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the Peoples Province Executive Councils where they would 
be coordinated.
The practice, however, was quite different. In the
North, the developmental plans were prepared by the
central government (or the National Planning Committee),
based on the submissions made by the central ministries
and the public corporations. However, plans for recurrent
expenditure were prepared by the People's Province
Executive Councils themselves but in a haphazard manner.
The local government officers disregarded plans made by
the lowest levels and proposed their own budgets. The
Departmental Heads in the provinces also prepared their
own budgets covering expenditure for the whole province,
disregarding the council boundaries. The Finance
Committees of the People's Province Executive Councils
made a few cuts in the proposals, particularly where new
expenditures were envisaged. Finally, the Ministry of
Local Government on the instructions of the Ministry of
Finance, made arbitrary cuts in the whole budget in
Khartoum. For the Minister of Finance was empowered by
the provisions of the Financial Regulations and
Proceedings Act, 1978, to:
"check all expenditure and revenue of all 
Executive Councils in relation to annual 
budget and financial regulations 
thereto."g
So the People's Province Executive councils were required 
to forward their budget proposals to the central Ministry 
of Finance for consideration not later than December of 
every year. This exercise, therefore, seriously
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undermined the objective of decentralisation of planning 
which is an essential component of decentralisation of 
government.
In the South, planning for the People's Province 
Executive Councils was at first done by the Regional 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs on the 
misconceived belief that planning was to be undertaken 
from above. However, in response to Presidential Decree 
No. 52 of 1929, which made provincial budgets the basis 
for the country's budget, the idea of provincial planning 
was started in 1979/80 fiscal year. In that year the 
Directorate of Planning in the Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Affairs concentrated its efforts on 
the establishment of planning units at every provincial 
headquarters. Assistant Commissioners for Planning were 
appointed, with the help of the Regional Ministry for 
Administration, to assist in the formulation and 
preparation of the provincial development plans.
Two events aimed at strengthening the planning 
machinery of these units were organized in 1980. Firstly, 
a course was arranged early in the year for senior 
administrators to be trained in planning. However, the 
attempt was unsuccessful because only two administrators 
turned up. Most provincial commissioners were 
uncooperative in allowing the Assistant Commissioners to 
attend the courses.
Secondly, the Directorates of Planning and
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Administration made two visits to every provincial 
headquarters to assist in the planning process but the 
preparation of the 1980/81 provincial plans coincided with 
unexpected elections announced by the President of the 
Republic which preoccupied the people concerned. The 
Southern Region Provinces, however, succeeded in producing 
their own plans for the year 1981/82 but as pointed out by 
Fred Wessels, the UN Technical Advisor in the Directorate 
of Planning, much was left to be "desired from the point 
of view of participation of provincial headquarters in
Q
identification, formulation and implementation".
Moreover, there were additional problems which faced 
provincial planning.
(1) Some provincial commissioners refused to accept 
Assistant Commissioners for Planning in their 
provinces.
(2) The Assistant Commissioners for Planning had a dual 
role to play - that of routine administration and 
planning. Obviously, it was most inconvenient 
because the administrative burden preoccupied him 
leaving insufficient time for the satisfactory 
execution of the planning function. This problem was 
aggravated by a lack of technical support staff as 
discussed in Chapter 10.
(3) There was lack of reliable data.
(4) Instructions for proper filing were ineffective due 
to frequent changes of stations and the lack of an 
effective system of hand-over notes, which could be 
followed up by successors to the office, indicating
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what their predecessors had requested or done.
(5) The total lack of effective control over development
funds (discussed in Chapter 9) often led to the
diversion of funds meant for specific development 
projects to meet shortages in development expenditure 
such as security or the feeding of school children.
(6) Finally, the serious lack of coordination (discussed
below) among the substantive offices at the
provincial level left project design, implementation 
and evaluation to the carried out in isolation. No 
efforts were made to integrate plans or even to 
consult one another by the different officers.
(d) The Planning Machinery
A decentralised system of government would require 
the establishment of planning institutions at every level 
of government, each authority having a basic planning 
unit. This would therefore require in the Sudan planning 
units at national, regional and local levels.
The national planning unit was already in existence
by 1969. It was, however, slightly modified to consist of
the National Planning Commission, (part of Ministry of 
Finance), the Council of Ministers; and the National 
Planning Organization of the SSU - all had different roles 
to play. The Planning Commission prepared the plans which 
were submitted for approval by the Council of Ministers 
guided by the broad strategy laid down by the SSU planning
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organization. Prior to the establishment of the Southern 
Regional Government, Regional Planning and Coordination 
Councils had been set up in 1976 following the creation of 
the Ministry of State for Southern Affairs (mentioned 
earlier). The Planning Council was made up of the 
representatives of "economic" government units in the 
South, representatives from outside the public sector and 
two representatives from the central Ministry of Treasury 
and Planning. The Planning Council formulated the 
integrated development plans for the region, consistent 
with central government policy.
The Regional Coordination Council comprised senior 
representatives of major government units in the South.
It was responsible for assisting the Ministry in the 
general supervision and implementation of government 
policy in the South, as well as in the preparation of the 
budget and the fiscal control of the budgeted funds.
However, following the establishment of the Southern 
Regional Government in 1972, the Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Planning assumed the responsibility of 
preparing the development plans for the Southern Region. 
Likewise all regional governments established planning 
departments in their respective Ministries of Finance, the 
effectiveness of which it is too early to assess.
Regional plans were normally submitted to the planning 
unit of the central government through the president of 
the republic and the central government for approval.
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2. The Coordination of Plans
For plans to be effective, their successful 
coordination at the national, regional and local levels is 
essential.
Proper coordination can only be achieved through an 
appropriate organizational framework both vertically and 
horizontally. That is to say, there must be coordination 
at every level of government. Local and regional 
coordination machineries must exist side by side with the 
central ones so that the local and regional plans form an 
integral part of the national plan. However, the only 
coordination council formed was that of 1970 mentioned 
above. It was, of course, responsible for assisting the 
Ministry of State for Southern Affairs as explained. The 
coordination council disappeared after the establishment 
of the High Executive Council. A Department of 
Coordination was created in the Regional Ministry of
Coordination and Legal Affairs in 1976, but it had neither
specified functions nor staff. Its budget allocations 
were being used by the Department of Legal Affairs, whose 
functions of litigation, prosecution and legal counsel 
were totally irrelevant to that of coordination.
According to Bona Thiang, Deputy Director for
Planning in the Southern Region:
"The integration of national and regional 
plans is based on the fact that the
regional economy is a component of the
national economy and the objectives,
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strategy, policies and priorities of the 
development policy declarations of the 
Sudanese Socialist Union."^q
However, it is submitted that the integration of national
and regional plans as stated by Thiang was largely a myth.
3. Educational Planning
Considering the ethnic, cultural, historical,
linguistic and religious differences in the Sudan (see
Chapter 1), decentralisation of educational planning
should have been accorded some priority in the government
policy on education. On the contrary, however,
educational planning was expressly denied to the regional
governments. For example, Section 6 of the
Self-Government Act quoted above stated:
"Neither the People's Regional Assembly 
nor the High Executive Council shall 
legislate or exercise any powers ... [on]
... Educational Planning."
A similar provision was also inserted in the Regional
Government Act, 1980 (see Section 8). According to the
Permanent Constitution,
"The State shall plan, supervise and 
direct education to serve the national 
objectives.
Such complete centralisation was questionable in that
it did not conform with the objectives of educational
planning as stated by R.H. Coombes, the great
educationist; it is:
"The application of rational, systematic 
analysis of the process of educational 
development with the aim of making
419
education more effective and more 
efficient in responding to the needs and 
goals of its students and society."^
If educational planning must respond to the "needs" and
goals of its students and society", then it was
contradictory to centralize educational planning as stated
above.
What role then did the decentralised governments play 
in the field of education? Were they able to influence 
any changes?
Certainly the role played by the regional and local 
governments was that of educational administration. That 
is to say, they were responsible for building, maintaining 
and supervising of schools below institutions of higher 
education.
The educational hierarchy in the Sudan is shown in 
diagram I below.
Diagram 9: The Educational Hierarchy in the Sudan
Category A
Category B
Category C
Institutions of Higher Education
- The universities, colleges, higher 
institutions (duration 3-5 years).
Secondary Education
- Senior secondary schools
- Training colleges for primary school 
leavers (3 years).
Primary Education
- Junior secondary schools 
(intermediate schools) (3 years)
- Primary schools (6 years)
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Institutes of Higher Education - Category A.
Institutes of Higher Education were the 
responsibility of the central government (both 
administration and planning).
Secondary Education - Category B.
The Regional Governments were responsible for the 
administration of secondary schools only. In the Southern 
Region for example, the Regional Minister of Education was 
a Member of the High Executive Council responsible for 
policy matters. These mainly involved the construction 
and staffing of schools. All responsibility for services 
with respect to secondary and intermediate schools were 
delegated to the provincial councils under the leadership 
of the Commissioner.
Primary Education - Category C.
Primary education was the responsibility of the local 
government councils. Every province had an Assistant 
Commissioner for Education and Education Officers, some of 
whom were Members of the Council. They were responsible 
for all educational matters in the province (in as far as 
administration of education was concerned). They were
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helped by technical inspectors and supervisors from the 
regional government. In the lower councils District 
Education Officers were attached to supervise educational 
matters therein.
However, major issues like school curriculum, 
syllabuses, examinations and examination standards, age of 
entry and so forth were the responsibility of the central 
government, as stated earlier. The regional governments 
could only modify the school calendar because of financial 
and infrastructural constraints.
A regional institute of education has been opened at
Meridi (in the South) intended to develop local curriculum
for education to be integrated into the general curriculum
so as to suit local circumstances. However, due to
unavailability of skilled staff and funds, the institute
13has not made any impact so far.
The Southern Regional Government has also attempted 
to reintroduce vernacular languages'^ in the primary 
schools to be taught together with English and Arabic 
languages which is likely to become too burdensome in 
terms of student workload.
The centralisation of educational planning in the 
Sudan is similar to the practice obtaining in Tanzania and 
Zambia where education is essentially the responsibility 
of the central government. In fact in Tanzania Kiswahili 
is the only official language taught in schools in
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addition to English. The government's language policy is 
very strict.
We find in Papua New Guinea, however, some limited 
decentralisation of powers over education. According to 
the organic law on provincial government as we have 
already seen, the provincial governments were responsible 
for "primary schools (including community schools and
village self-help schools) and primary education other
15than curriculum. What does this entail?
The distribution of powers under the Education Act, 
1970 show that the provincial (then District) authorities 
were responsible for the approval of primary school 
enrolments, selection of entrants to secondary and 
technical schools, determination of appeals on suspension 
or expulsion, determination of fees; provision and 
maintenance of school buildings, ensuring the availability 
of adequate teachers' housing; appointment, promotion and 
suspension of teachers; approval of membership and 
functions of boards of management of primary, secondary 
and technical schools.
Otherwise, the rest of the responsibilities were 
vested in the central government. These included the 
establishment of national criteria for selection, 
determination of limits and conditions of school fees; 
supervision of the implementation of approved plans like 
drawing up plans for the estabishment and development of 
schools, supervision of the implementation of approved
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plans, provision of facilities for adult education; 
allotment of quotas of teachers to provinces and of 
students to colleges, appointment, transfers, promotion 
and suspension of teachers? advising administrators on 
achieving the objects and purposes of tertiary education 
system; and approving membership and functions of 
teachers' colleges governing councils, hearing appeals of 
other authorities, measuring and checking the economical
1 c
and efficient working of the education system. °
B. The Control of Natural Resources
The principal forms of natural resources considered 
here include land, water, forests and minerals.
The participation of regional and local governments
in the exploitation of natural resources has to be
examined in the broad context of the national economy
because the permanent constitution stipulated;
"Natural wealth and resources under or 
above the ground or within the 
territorial waters shall be the property 
of the state and the state shall secure 
their appropriate exploitation."^
Furthermore, the state was to own and manage "all the
fundamental means of production in the economy". This
was evidently based on the socialist philosophy. However,
as we have already seen, the Southern Regional Government
was specially authorised to participate in the control and
exploitation of some of the resources.
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1. Control of Land
All regional and local governments were empowered to
dispose of land. The provision for the Southern Region,
however, expressly stated that it had to be undertaken 
"within the national laws". Presumably this was meant to 
apply to all regional and local governments. However, the
national laws made no reference to the exact powers of the
decentralised governments.
Although radical title to land was vested in the
state, land could be alloted to individuals and
organizations in leaseholds for different periods, say 30
years, 35 years or 50 years depending on whether it is for
19residence, agriculture or mining. Since 1970 all
unregistered land was brought under the control of the
Central Government but subject to allocation on leaseholds
on
by the Unregistered Land Act, 1970.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in 
the Land Settlement and Registration 
Ordinance, or any other law in force, all 
land of any kind whatsoever, whether 
waste, forest, occupied or unoccupied, 
which is not registered before the 
commencement of this Act shall, on such 
commencement, be the property of the 
Government, and shall be deemed to have 
been registered as such."2\
There is no express prohibition on the granting of 
freeholds but this omission from the laws suggests that the 
allocation of freeholds has been abolished. In practice 
freeholds have never been alloted since 1970.
I—
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The decentralisation of powers to the regional and 
local governments through separate legislations and at 
different periods has created a lack of uniformity in the 
procedures for land control and disposition in the Sudan. 
We shall consider disposition of land in the North and the 
South separately.
(i) Disposition of Land in the Northern Sudan
The position of land control and disposition in the 
Northern Sudan was not yet clear, following the 
establishment of the regional governments in 1980.
However, it would appear that the old procedures were 
still being followed. Those procedures were contained in 
various land schemes. The schemes depended on the purpose 
for which the land was needed and whether the land was 
located in a town or a village.
The People's Province Executive Councils were 
responsible for the disposition of commercial land (land 
for shops, grinding mills and so forth) as well as 
residential land in towns. They would allot land in rural 
areas only on the recommendation of the appropriate rural 
council. The Town and Land Scheme 1947 contained a model 
of a master plan for every town. It prescribed the use of 
land in a town on the basis of recreational, residential 
and commercial use.
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Residential land in a third class area was disposed 
of on a preferential basis to enable low income citizens 
to obtain land. However, land in the second class, first 
class residential areas and commercial land were disposed 
of in open auction, to the highest bidder.
The People's Rural Councils were responsible for the 
disposition of residential land in the villages and land 
for traditional agriculture on given directives. 
Application for such land was required to pass through the 
village council where the applicant was resident.
More rigorous conditions were introduced to regulate 
the allotment of agricultural land because of its economic 
importance. For example, the applicant had to be a
Sudanese and a cultivator, and there had to be no
-£r
conflicting claims over the land to be allotted.
Certainly new legislation is needed to define the 
scope and limits of the Regional and Area Councils over 
the control and disposition of land in the Northern Sudan.
(ii) Land Control and Disposition in the Southern Sudan
There was lack of adequate legal provision and 
control of land in the Southern Region, despite the fact 
that the region enacted three in the field of
land control and disposition. The Regional Demarcation 
and Survey Act, 1976^2 provided for the demarcation of
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boundaries and making of surveys in the Southern Region by 
the regional authorities only.
23The Regionaltand Acquisition Act, 1976 empowered 
the High Executive Council to acquire any land registered 
or unregistered for public purpose on compensation.
However, the terms of the compensation were not qualified.
24The Regional Town and Village Planning Act, 1976
made the Regional Minister of Housing and Public Utilities
"responsible for the direction and control of all town and
village planning". He was also to ensure "effective
cooperation between regional and local planning
authorities", and to secure "as high a degree of
initiative as is consistent with development on sound and
25uniform principles of planning". However, the Minister
was to carry out his functions through regulations
2 6approved by the High Executive Council. Unfortunately, 
however, no such regulations were ever made. So the 
powers and functions exercisable under the Act remained 
undefined.
A Regional Town Planning board was appointed under 
the Act, composed of the following ex officio members:-
(a) Director of Housing
(b) Director of Administration
(c) Director of Finance and Planning
(d) Director of Health and Social Welfare
(e) Director of Communications
(f) The Chief Survey Officer Regional Ministry of Housing
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(g) Senior Town Planner Regional Ministry of Housing
The functions of the Board were to act "as a
consultative body to the Minister and assist the Minister
27in the discharge of his functions under this Act".
A Standing Committee was also set up under the Act to 
which the Board would delegate its functions in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act. But ironically enough 
different people were appointed on the Committee.
However, the duties of the board as stated above 
still remained too general.
In the light of this gap, the Regional Ministry of
2 8Housing and Public Utilities issued guidelines to be 
followed by all sectors of the Town Planning system for 
Regional, Provincial and local levels. The guidelines 
were to direct them in controlling and imposing 
limitations on the activities of the public agencies or 
private individuals. But the guidelines had no statutory 
force. Their validity could thus be successfully 
challenged at law.
Despite this shortcoming the Local Town Planning 
Board granted all planning approvals on behalf of the 
Minister, because the Regional Planning Board rarely met. 
Paradoxically, however, there was no mention of the Local 
Planning Board in the Act. Its existence probably 
preceded the establishment of the Southern Regional
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Government.
The Relationship between the Regional Town Planning Board 
and the Local Town Planning Board
As already stated, the Act required the Minister to 
"ensure effective cooperation between regional and local 
planning committees". However, the Minister was unable to 
do so, so the relationship between the Regional Town 
Planning Board and the Local Town Planning Board differed 
as between Juba (the capital) and the other five 
provincial headquarters in the South.
In Juba applications were made either through the 
Local Town Planning Board for onward submission to the 
Regional Town Planning Board (when approved by it) or 
direct to the Regional Town Planning Board. The channel 
used varied according to the authority to which the 
applicant made his initial approach. If it was to an 
officer of the provincial authorities, the application had 
to follow the first channel but if it was made to the 
Ministry, it took the second direct channel.
In the other provinces, applications were first 
submitted through the local Town Planning board for onward 
submission to the Regional Town Planning Board. But as 
already mentioned, the Local Town Planning Boards had no 
statutory status. So they functioned as ad hoc bodies to 
provided local scrutiny of applications prior to their
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submission to Regional Town Planning Board. Hence 
decisions made by the Local Town Planning Board were not 
legally binding if unconfirmed by the Regional Town 
Planning Board.
Inspite of the said legislations, most of the land in 
the Sudan found in the rural areas was enjoyed and 
disposed of according to the customary laws of occupancy. 
The customary u*ws of land tenure varied from one tribe 
to the other and although information in this field is 
terribly lacking, it can be assumed to be similar to the 
customary laws of other African countries. Thus title to 
land is vested either in the family head, village elders, 
the chief or king depending on whether the tribe is 
decentralised or centralised.
2. Control Over Water
As stated earlier, the right to control the use of 
water within the region was omitted from the powers of the 
Southern Region but included among the powers of the other 
regions. The omission was probably deliberate owing to 
the political conflicts between the Southern and Northern 
Sudanese. In order to safeguard Northern Sudanese and 
Egyptian interests in the waters of the white Nile which 
runs through the South, it was presumably thought wise by 
Northern Sudanese politicians that it would be safer to 
omit the jurisdiction of the Southern Region from the 
control of use of water. However, the omission did not
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save the situation.
The first crisis arouse in 1975 over the digging of 
Jongolei canal to drain the waters in the Sudd area of the 
South for use in the Northern Sudan and Egypt. This 
scheme was to have expanded irrigation schemes in the 
North and Egypt and Sudan would have become the bread 
basket of the Arab world. However, the digging of the 
canal was vehemently opposed in the South. Government 
defiance of Regional Assembly deliberations was criticised 
by mass demonstrations and destructions to property. A 
student lost his life. For a while arrests of opposition 
leaders gave room for the inauguration of the canal 
project. However, work on the canal has been stopped 
since 1983 when the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) 
kidnapped foreign workers on the canal thereby halting the 
work.
Although the canal would have shortened the distance 
between the South and the North by about 300 miles as well 
as drained off the swamps of Jongolei area it would have 
deprived the surrounding area of conventional rainfall, 
fish and wildlife not to mention the displacement of 
people from their homes without adequate compensation. 
Moreover, there was no provision for water reservoirs. 
Furthermore, the life style of the surrounding people 
would have been drastically changed. It is presumably for 
these reasons that the digging of the canal has been 
obstructed in the South.
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Therefore inspite of the absence of a provision for 
the control of use of water by the Southern Region, the 
people of the region managed to physically assert their 
rights over the waters of the Nile.
3. Exploitation of Forests
We also saw that control over forests was assigned to 
all regional and local governments. This was the only 
natural resource exploited with no difficulty. For 
example, according to the distribution of legal powers 
between central ministries and the regional ministries of 
the southern region of the Sudan Act, 1977, responsibility 
over "central forests" was delegated to the Regional 
Government in the South (the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources in particular), while forests marked as 
"provincial forests: were the concern of the People's
O Q
Province Executive Councils".
Royalties were collected by the nearest local 
authority or according to the directives of the Minister 
of Finance*^.
3. Mining and Quarrying
Clearly, except for the Southern Region, control over 
minerals was expressly denied to the other regions.
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However, the scope and limits of control over minerals 
between the central government and the Southern Regional 
Government was not clearly drawn out. As we have seen, 
constitutionally all "natural wealth and resources under 
or above the ground ..." was the property of the state.
But according to the Self-Government Act, the People's 
Regional Assembly for the South could also legislate on 
"mining and quarrying without prejudice to the rights of 
the central government on the discovery of natural gas and 
minerals".^ The words "without prejudice" were 
ambiguous. It was difficult to judge when the rights of 
the central government would be prejudiced. Would it be 
due to the geographical location of the minerals or the 
economic importance of the same?
The distribution of legal powers between central
ministries and ministries of the Southern Region of the
Sudan Act, 1977 provided that:
"The High Executive Council shall 
exercise within the Southern Region of 
the Sudan the powers vested in the 
President of the Republic,
Similarly, the Mines and Quarries Act, 1972 stated that 
the Regional Minister of Commerce and Industry was to
"exercise within the Southern Region powers vested in the
3 3Minister of Industry". The powers of the President as
34defined by the Mines and Quarries Act, 1972 included,
laying down "the policy to be followed in prospecting,
extraction and utilization of mineral resources and
3 5quarried materials, constitution of mines"J and Quarries 
Board. On the other hand, the Minister was responsible
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for the recommendation of the members of the Board and 
issue of all kinds of licences for prospecting of minerals 
and quarries, mining, quarrying and granting of leaseholds 
for the same. He could hear complaints against decisions 
of the Board and grant special concessions.
4
Certainly, the provisions of the Distribution and 
Legal Powers Act made it plain that the Southern Region 
had control over minerals within the Southern Region but 
that could not completely resolve the ambiguity of the 
words "without prejudice" as raised earlier. The nature 
of minerals or the economic importance of the minerals 
remained in doubt. Did minerals include petroleum?
Minerals were defined by the Mines and Quarries Act, 
1972 as:
"All mineral and natural substance (other 
than the agricultural surface of land) 
and the mineral waters lying in, upon or 
underland which are capable for use of 
manufacturing or commercial purposes.
38Yet the Petroleum Resources Act, 1972 defined petroleum
as "all natural hydro carbons, liquid, gaseous or solid
material extracted or capable of extraction from the 
3 9ground." Ironically, however, the Distribution of Legal 
Powers Act made no reference to the powers of the regional 
government in relation to the powers exercisable by the 
President under the Petroleum Resources Act. It was 
obvious that this could not adequately exclude the rights 
of control by the regional government over petroleum in 
the Southern Region.
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Therefore legally speaking the rights of control over 
minerals between the central government and the regional 
government for the South were immensely confused. In 
practice, all the important minerals like gold and oil 
were mined by the central government to the exclusion of 
the regional government. Prospecting and mining licences 
were issued by the central government authorities under 
the Mines and Quarries Act 1972 and the Petroleum 
Resources Act 1972 to the multinational companies.
The Southern Region enacted the Regional Mines and 
40Quarries Act, 1977 conferring similar powers to the 
Regional Minister for Industry to issue prospecting and 
mining licences as contained in the above legislation but 
up to the time of its dissolution in 1983 the region never 
issued any licence concerning an important mineral. Hence 
the rights of the regional government were practically 
limited to quarrying of stones.
C . Commercial and Industrial Activities
It has been shown that both the Self-Government Act 
and the Regional Government Act authorised the regions to 
promote tourism and trade, establish industries and 
markets, issue traders licences and form cooperative 
societies. However these powers were so broadly defined 
that they lacked the necessary precision. For example, it 
was not certain which of the governments (central or
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regional) was responsible for matters like inter-regional 
trade, the incorporation and dissolution of companies, 
bankruptcy, insolvency, bills of lading, promissory notes, 
commercial and industrial monopolies, trusts, copyrights, 
patents, trade marks, insurance and weights and measures. 
Presumably they would be regarded as "incidental" matters. 
So the responsibility of the regional governments would 
depend on whether the items listed would be interpreted to 
be "reasonably incidental" to their powers listed above.
If so, then they would be within the jurisdiction of the 
regional governments, if not then they would be that of 
the central government.
However, the problems that were experienced by the 
Southern Region in the exercise of its commercial and 
industrial powers surrounded two matters - border trade 
and the incorporation of companies.
1. Border Trade
As we have seen, Section 6 of the Self-Government Act 
expressly prohibited the Southern Region from engaging in 
foreign trade "except for border trade and certain 
commodities which the regional government may specify with 
the approval of the central government".
However, this proviso was not happily worded. It 
remained a source of uncertainty and contention. On the 
one hand, border trade was clearly excepted from the
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general prohibition; but on the other hand it appeared as 
if the approval of the central government was needed. It 
could also mean that approval of the central government 
was needed for certain commodities not falling under 
border trade but foreign trade. That is to say the 
requirement for approval was separate from the provision 
for exception. Hence there would have been two 
exceptions.
Although the later interpretation appeared more
reasonable, the implementation of the provision was very
confusing. The central government did not concede to the
later interpretation. For it passed a resolution in
December 1 9 7 4 ^  empowering the Southern Region to issue
import and export licences for commodities like coffee,
tea, soap and others which should have been unnecessary in
the case of the neighbouring countries. The Regional
Government on her part, also passed the Border Trade
42Importers Registration Act, 1977 to regulate the conduct 
of border trade in the region. Consequently many traders 
were registered as importers of beverages like whisky, 
brandy, beer, crude materials like fertilizers, and spare 
parts as well as chemicals and manufactured goods.
However, when border trade was in full swing, the 
President suddenly issued a presidential order in June 
1 9 8 2 ^  withdrawing the power of the regional government to 
participate in border trade on the grounds of the abuse of 
power. Was the presidential order valid?
This would depend on whether the authority to conduct
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border trade hand been merely delegated or actually 
devolved. Whereas obtaining the consent of the central 
government from time to time for dealing in specified 
commodities would amount to exercise of delegated power, 
the exception proviso for conduct of border trade was 
exercise of devolved powers. To amend or alter the 
devolved power would have required amendment of the 
Self-Government Act in accordance with its provisions and 
not just issuing a contrary presidential order. However, 
delegated power could have been withdrawn by the order.
It was more likely that the right to conduct border trade 
was devolved and not delegated, therefore the presidential 
order should have been null and void.
In 1984, the Equatoria People's Regional Assembly
44attempted to recover powers of controlling border trade 
but it was unsuccessful. However, according to 
presidential order no. 1 of 1983, Equatoria Region was 
never assigned the power to control border trade from the 
start. Thus the scope of the application of central 
government approval was unclear.
2. Incorporation of Companies
It was not certain from the reading of commercial and 
industrial provisions whether the regional governments 
could incorporate companies because the powers were too 
general. For example "promotion of trade, establishment 
of local industries and markets, issue of traders'
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4 5licences and formation of cooperative societies".
So the issue was whether locally incorporated 
companies like Fulla Rapids Ltd and Upper Talanga Tea 
Company had any legal status. T h i s 'depended on w^G-ther 
incorporation was incidental to promotion of trade and 
industry by reasonable inference.
If incorporation were reasonably "incidental" to
promotion of trade and industry then the region could
incorporate companies. However, the incorporation of
companies had to be in accordance with the provisions of
the Companies Act but not under the Registration of
46
Business Names Act 1976 as was the case for Fulla Rapids 
Ltd and Upper Talanga Ltd. Registering a company under 
the Registration of Business Names Act does not have the 
same effect as incorporating it under the Companies Act. 
Whereas incorporation gives birth to a new entity, 
registration does not. Registration is a formality 
whereby names of all business enterprises are kept on 
record, which includes sole trading and partnerships. 
Therefore, even if the region had powers to incorporate 
companies the incorporation of Fulla Rapids Ltd and Upper 
Talanga Ltd were not valid in law because they were not 
incorporated under any Companies Act.
47The Sudan Companies Act, 1925 provided for the
incorporation of all companies in the Sudan, in accordance
with its provisions. The responsibility for incorporating
4 8companies were assigned to the Attorney General. The
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Head Office of the Registrar of Companies (the Attorney
General himself) was in Khartoum but provision was made
for the estabishment of branch offices in other parts of 
49the country. However, no branch office was every 
established. So the Regional Ministry of Commerce in the 
South was not even acting as the agent of the Registrar of 
Companies when it incorporated Fulla Ltd and Talanga Ltd. 
For a regional government to validly incorporate a 
company, every region would have to enact its own Regional 
Companies Act under which it could exercise its powers.
On the other hand, if "incorporation" was not 
reasonably incidental to promotion of trade and industry 
then the regions had no authority to incorporate any 
company. Hence the incorporation of Fulla Ltd. and 
Talanga Ltd would still be invalid.
D. Security
National defence was clearly a matter for the central
government but the Self-Government Act provided:
"Citizens of the Southern Region shall 
constitute a sizeable proportion for the 
People's Armed Forces in such reasonable 
number as will correspond to the 
population of the region. The use of the 
armed forces within the region and 
outside the framework of national defence 
shall be controlled by the president on 
the advice of the High Executive 
Council."^q
So the Southern Regional Government had at least a
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consultative role over the control of the People's Armed 
Forces.
On the other hand, the regional governments had 
control over internal security but in varying degrees (as 
we have seen). For example, the Southern Region could 
recruit, supervise and maintain police and prison forces 
but the other regions could only supervise and inspect 
their work. However, subsequent legislations introduced 
several changes.
51
The Police Act, 1979 stated that all "police forces
shall be constituted by an order of the President of the
Republic, after consultation with the national defence 
52council". The reserve forces were to be constituted by
order or approval of the President whether for temporary
53or special duties. The promotion of officers needed the
approval of the President and the appointment of officers
54m  other ranks were also regulated by him. Likewise all
security committees for the provinces, except that of
Khartoum province, were to be constituted by the 
5 5President. Although powers of the Southern Regional 
Government, were to be exercised "in accordance with 
national policies and levels", the provision of the Police 
Act 1979 amounted to recentralization of powers over the 
police into the President of the Republic.
56The Prisons Act, 1975, on the other hand,
✓
transferred the responsibility for the recruitment of 
prison forces to the commissioner of the province. He
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could also subdelegate those powers to the Director of 
Prisons or his assistant.57 Whereas the Director was 
charged with the responsibility of the administration, 
organisation and formulation of the policy of prison 
forces, as well as its financial affairs, the commissioner 
was to "assume the technical and administrative
c o
supervision of the prison forces in his province". The 
role of the President was limited to the appointment of 
prison officers and consenting to the resignation of those 
officers regarded to be in leadership rank.5^ Hence the 
Prisons Act, 1975 further transferred powers over prisons 
from the regional governments to the local governments.
The fire brigade was not within the jurisdiction of 
the Southern Regional Government but the People's Province 
Executive Councils whereas other regional governments had 
powers over it. Thus the position was not uniform from 
the beginning.
6 0
The Fire Brigade Act, 1978 placed the constitution,
command and administration of fire brigade in various
officials. Those in the provinces fell under the
Commissioner or a person appointed by him.^l However,
those in the Ministries, Departments and Public
Corporations came under the Head of the Unit or the person
authorized by him. The President was only required to
give approval for the promotions to the rank of Fire
62Brigade Brigadier and upwards. Those below the stated 
rank remained under the ultimate control of the
commissioners and the Head of Government units. As can be
443
seen, responsibility for Internal Security in the Sudan 
was largely confused.
E. Legislation on Traditional Law
From the reading of Article 9 of the constitution it 
is clear that traditional law was to be applied all over 
the Sudan.
"The Islamic law and custom shall be the 
main sources of legislation. Personal 
matters of non-muslims shall be governed 
by their personal law."
Section 10 of the Self-Government Act expressly 
authorised the Southern Regional Government to legislate 
"on traditional law and custom within the framework of 
national laws". Hence the region could legislate on the 
various customary laws of marriage, divorce, succession 
and so forth in so far as they were not contrary to the 
national laws. However, the demarcation between national 
laws and regional legislation in traditional matters was 
very delicate in the special circumstances of the Sudan 
where Islamic traditions are often regarded as national 
matters.
The promulgation of Islamic penalties and laws in 
1983 afford a suitable example. According to the new laws 
any laws which were contrary to them were to be null and 
void. A conflict between traditional law and "national"
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law occurred in Renk in the Southern Region in 1984 in an 
unreported case.
A muslim man (Arab) had sexual intercourse with a 
Dinka widow which, according to the Dinka customary laws, 
constituted the offence of adultery. It is to be recalled 
that the practice of widow inheritance is prevalent among 
the Dinkas like other tribes of the South and Africa in 
general. In other words, the death of a Dinka husband 
does not annul the marriage because the wife was married 
to the family of the deceased and could thereafter be 
inherited by the deceased's brother or relative. Legally, 
she was therefore still a wife. However, widow 
inheritance is not recognised by Islamic laws. In his 
defence, the Arab adulterer pleaded that the widow was not 
married because the husband was dead. Since all other 
laws which were contrary to the laws and principles of 
Islamic Sharia law were to be null and void, the 
magistrates court at Renk had no option but to dismiss the 
case. It was a very regrettable incident but it explains 
the absurdity of the application of traditional law, when 
the Sudan is Islamised.
F. Promotion of Languages and Culture
Surprisingly, inspite of the fact that there were 
numerous languages and cultures in the Sudan (see Chapter 
1) , it was only the Southern Region which was empowered to
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promote "local languages and culture".
If decentralisation meant unity in diversity, then 
there was no justification for the prohibition of other 
ethnic communities for example the Nuba, Engessena, Funj 
and Beja in other parts of the Sudan from promoting their 
local languages and cultures.
Unfortunately, the lack of skilled manpower and 
facilities for the promotion of languages handicapped all 
efforts to do so in the South. A Directorate for 
Languages was created in the Regional Ministry of 
Education in 1977 but it aborted. The Director joined 
politics and no replacement was found.
IV CONCLUSION
Several lessons can therefore be drawn from this 
chapter. In the first place powers devolved to the 
regional governments were not uniform. Those of the 
Southern Regional Government exceeded the powers of the 
rest, although all powers were based on the general 
practice of decentralisation. Powers of the Southern 
Region, like those of the other regions, were ill-defined 
in many aspects, particularly those to do with the control 
of natural resources and participation in trade and 
commerce. The idea of prohibiting the region from
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planning was totally out of place, that was why it was 
overlooked by the government in practice. Phrases like 
"within" national plans and policies, or in accordance 
with "national laws" seriousl y curbed the jurisdiction of 
the regions.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the central government 
returned to recentralising powers previously 
decentralised. This was especially obvious as regards 
police powers.
For decentralisation to be successful, the powers 
have to be redefined very precisely to eliminate 
ambiguities, contradictions, fill loopholes and remove 
unnecessary limitations.
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APPENDIX 1 
THE SELF GOVERNMENT ACT, 1972
SECTION 1 0 ;
"The People's Regional Assembly shall 
legislate for the preservation of public 
order, internal security, efficient 
administration and the development of the 
Southern Region in cultural, economic and 
social fields and in particular in the 
following:-
(a) Promotion and utilization of 
regional financial resources for the 
development and administration of 
the Southern Region.
(b) Organization of the machinery for 
regional and local administration.
(c) Legislation on traditional law and 
custom within the framework of 
national laws.
(d) Establishment and maintenance and 
administration of prisons and 
reformatory institutions.
(e) Establishment, maintenance and 
administration of public schools at 
all levels in accordance with 
national plans for education and 
economic social development.
(f) Promotion of languages and cultures.
(g) Town and village planning and the 
construction of roads in accordance 
with national plans and programmes.
(h) Promotion of trade, establishment of 
local industries and markets; issue 
of traders' licences and formation 
of cooperative societies.
(i) Establishment, maintenance and 
administration of public hospitals.
(j) Administration of environmental 
health services; maternity care, 
child welfare; supervision of 
markets, combat of epidemic 
diseases; training of medical 
assistants and rural midwives, 
establishment of health centres, 
dispensaries and dressing stations.
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(k) Promotion of animal health, control 
of epidemics and improvement of 
animal production and trade.
(1) Promotion of tourism.
(m) Establishment of zoological gardens, 
museums, organization of trade and 
cultural exhibitions.
(n) Mining and quarrying, without 
prejudice to the rights of the 
central government on the discovery 
of natural gas and minerals.
(o) Recruitment, organization and
administration of services of the 
police and prisons in accordance 
with national policies and levels.
(p) Land use according to national laws
and plans.
(q) Control of pests and plant diseases.
(r) Development, use and production of
forest products and pastures 
according to national law.
(s) Development and promotion of
self-help schemes.
(t) All other matters respecting which
the president may authorize the 
People's Regional Assembly to 
legislate."
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APPENDIX 2 
THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1980
Powers of the other regional governments were listed 
in Section 8 of the Regional Government Act, 1980 as 
follows:
"... The regional legislative and
executive organs shall exercise the
following powers:-
(a) The Government of the Region, good 
administration thereof, keeping 
order therein, development, 
promotion, taking care of interest 
and public order thereof.
(b) Development and utilization of the 
financial resources established by 
law or approved by the national 
power.
(c) Development of the People's Local 
Government in the Region and 
supervision of the establishment of 
its institutions and carrying out of 
its duties.
(d) Supervision of the police, prisons 
and fire brigade forces and 
administration of punishment 
institutions in the Region.
(e) Regulation and administration of 
educational, health and cultural 
service in the Region.
(f) Provision of care for social, 
charitable institutions and 
religious affairs in the region.
(g) Organization of trade, commodities, 
cooperation and industries in the 
Region.
(h) Utilization of water in the Region.
(i) Organization and provision of care 
for agriculture, pastures and animal 
welfare in the Region.
(j) Organization and establishment of
means of communication and transport 
and their units in their Region.
(k) Administration of employment and 
manpower, planning in the Region.
(1) Planning of towns and villages and
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the disposition of land 
Region.
(m) Promotion of tourism in
in the
the Region."
454
APPENDIX 3
Powers excluded from the jurisdiction of the other 
regional governments (for example, Section 6 of the 
Regional Government Act, 1980).
National Matters
Section 6:
"Subject to the provisions of the 
constitution, the regional organs shall 
not, when exercising the powers conferred 
on them, encroach on any of the following 
matters:-
(a) National defence and national 
security.
(b) Foreign affairs and international 
representation.
(c) Nationality, immigration passports 
and aliens affairs.
(d) Public audit.
(e) The judiciary, public prosecution 
and advocacy.
(f) Transit means of communication and 
transport.
(g) Inter-regional water supply and the 
national electricity net.
(h) Currency and coinage.
(i) Export and import trade.
(j) Institutions of national economic 
dealings.
(k) The national natural and mining
resources and the wealths under the 
ground.
(1) Institutions of national and 
regional elections.
(m) Educational planning.
(n) Any other matters regulated by 
national legislation."
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CHAPTER 8
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS: 1971-1985 
INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of a harmonious relationship between 
the central and regional governments on the one hand, and 
the regional and local governments on the other, is a 
crucial requirement for the successful operation of the 
decentralised system as a whole. However, this type of 
ideal relationship is not easy to achieve because it calls 
for balancing the needs of the respective inferior 
governments vis-a-vis the overall authority of the central 
government. In other words, appropriate balance has to be 
struck between the autonomy of the inferior governments 
and the sovereignty of the central government.
Principally, the inferior governments for important 
political and economic reasons have to be autonomous over 
certain matters assigned to them as detailed in Chapter 7, 
without any interference from above. However, the fact 
that they are not sovereign entities by themselves, 
necessitates the central government's overseeing of their 
activities in the interest of the whole nation. Thus the 
need for control arises.
This chapter makes a critical analysis of the 
relationship between the central and regional governments 
and between regional and local governments in the Sudan 
from 1971 to 1985. It identifies and examines the
456
procedures through which the central government controlled 
the activities of the regional governments and how the 
latter could protect or safeguard her interests from undue 
interference by the former. It also considers the methods 
by which regional governments controlled activities of the 
local councils. The vital issue of financial control is, 
however, deferred for detailed consideration in the next 
chapter. It is really astonishing that very elaborate 
methods of control had to be necessarily devised for use 
in one party state democracy as the Sudan was. But we 
shall first examine the objectives for control before 
proceeding to consider how the powers of control were 
applied in practice.
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND METHODS FOR CONTROL
The objectives for control shall be considered before 
the methods.
A. The Objectives for Control
There are five broad objectives for control which are 
briefly stated below. The first is that it is the 
constitutional and political prerogative of the central 
government to control the activities of the lower level
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governments. The justifications are that since the 
central government enacts the principal laws of the 
country, control is necessary to ensure conformity with 
these laws. However, the degree of control would depend 
on the system of government established - that is, whether 
it is totally unitary, highly decentralised or federal. 
Certainly in countries where considerable devolution of 
powers exist, control becomes unnecessary over matters 
which have been completely devolved to the lower level 
governments. Politically, control is the prerogative of 
the central government to ensure that the lower level 
governments conform with the political guidelines of the 
ruling party.
The second broad reason for control is a 
mijcro-economic one. It is the inherent duty of the 
central government to control inflation? and in order to 
do so effectively, it has to impose a ceiling over areas 
like budgeting, taxation, borrowing, formulation of new 
development projects, foreign trade and production 
activities as well as foreign exchange. Thus it has to 
issue macro-economic guidelines for the lower governments 
to follow. Once again the degree of control might vary 
from unitary states to highly decentralised ones and from 
developed countries to under-developed ones. For example, 
ceilings on foreign trade and foreign exchange might not 
be of much relevance to developing countries because the 
inferior governments hardly participate in them. Thirdly, 
as we have already seen in Chapter 7, the central 
government distributes functions to the lower level
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governments thereby making it also responsible to control 
the application of the functions. Functional control is 
deemed necessary to guarantee operation of the various 
governments within limits of their jurisdiction, avoid 
conflicts as well as further contribution by the central 
government to the lower level governments towards the 
costs of projects which might be beyond the capability of 
the inferior governments. Fourthly, the feeling of 
paternalistic relationship usually adopted by the central 
government, makes the object of control a necessity in 
that the central government feels duty-bound to direct and 
guide the lower level governments because it is much more 
mature in all fields. This is especially the case with 
local governments. For instance, control over local 
governments by central or regional governments are 
necessary for several important reasons. Here the object 
of control in the early stages is to develop the local 
government itself. Thus, the central or regional 
government tries to secure implementation of her policies 
in the administration of local services where these 
impinge on national interest. Although it is 
theoretically possible to divide services into central, 
regional, local or joint concerns, it is rare to do so in 
practice. The national interest normally predominates at 
one stage or another. But the need to control should be 
kept to the minimum so as to preserve local interests and 
maintain consistency with efficacy. One of the most 
important and generally accepted objects of central or 
regional control is the preservation of minimum standards 
in the national interest. That is to say, there should be
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some standard against which the achievement of local 
authorities in the performance of purely local services 
should be measured. However, the impossibility of finding 
the criteria which will operate effectively in local 
authorities of different sizes and diverse patterns should 
be recognised. Moreover, maintenance of local standards 
should not operate against local enterprise? it should not 
weaken the sense of responsibility of the local people for 
proper handling of local affairs. Related to minimum 
standards is the need for uniformity. Though uniformity 
among local councils is desirable, it is not necessary if
uniformity per se is to discourage local initiative. For,
local initiative demands marginal scope of independence. 
Control also checks against non-performance or. neglect by 
the local councils. A council that is not sufficiently 
active in performing the duties assigned to it will be
compelled into doing so by acts of supervision, inspection
or review of a higher authority.
Finally, it is quite necessary for the central 
government to control the attitude of the lower level 
governments by restraining them from indulging into 
activities or behaving in ways which are prejudicial to 
the interest of the nation as discussed in Chapter 7.
B. Methods of Control
There are numerous established methods of control.
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These include the power to disallow, approve, direct, 
advise, inspect, investigate, regulate or issue circulars, 
review, revise, veto and dissolve.
Those that exist between the central and regional 
governments are, however, much fewer than those found 
between regional and local governments. Controls are even 
comparably more minimal between a federal government and a 
state government because of their coordinate relationship. 
The usual arrangement in a federal government is to 
include a provision stating that where there is concurrent 
jurisdiction, the central legislation will prevail. In 
this way, the state legislatures are bound by the laws of 
the federal legislature. Sometimes provision is made for 
obtaining consent of the other government in case of 
delegation of authority by one government to the other. 
However, the power to disallow the legislations of the 
state or provincial governments do also exist as is the 
case in Canada. The Canadian Federal Government can 
disallow a provincial legislation. But by far the most 
typical methods of control in federations is through the 
exercise of powers of emergency or judicial review of 
administrative action.
Decentralised governments in unitary systems also 
employ powers of disallowance, emergency and obtaining 
consents, but there are many others. For example, there 
are provisions for consultations and the appointment of 
special commissions for resolution of disputes or to offer 
advice like the Premiers Council in Papua New Guinea.
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Additional to the above, the superior government invokes 
several administrative methods for control which are 
equally applicable to local government councils. They can 
be categorized under the broad headings of approval 
controls; directory controls; and financial controls.
(a) Approval controls take the form of a consent or 
approval that has to be obtained from the superior 
government before the act of the inferior authorities is 
complete or legally effective. These may take various 
forms like:-
(i) Ministerial sanction for draft order or byelaw to 
become effective.
(ii) Exercise ojy discretionary powers, say by a Minister 
in cases where the Statute states "subject to the approval 
of the Minister".
(iii) Appointments and dismissals of officers, where there 
is provision for the Minister to approve the appointment 
of dismissal of senior officers.
(b) Directory or advisory controls take place where the 
superior government gives directions and or advice to 
local authorities. This is also done in several ways:-
(i) By passing regulations which prescribe the 
administrative procedure to be followed in the course of 
putting the policy of a statute into effect. It may also 
set out some of the forms for use.
(ii) By inspection, whereby a body of inspectors is 
maintained to visit local authorities throughout the 
country.
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(iii) By directives where, say, a Minister is empowered to 
direct a particular authority. Here, it is different from 
issuing regulations.
(iv) By circulars whereby general advice is given through 
circulars to show changes in government policy or advice 
on particular difficulties and information as to technical 
developments and results of research.
(v) By default powers to penalise, etc.
(c) Financial control is also available in several ways
but these are considered in Chapter 9.
II. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
There were four methods of control available to the 
central government for maintaining control over the 
Regional Governments in the Sudan. These included 
approval and directory control methods, the power to veto, 
the powers of emergency and the power to dissolve the 
Regional Assemblies. The most effective method of the 
four was the authority to dissolve the Regional 
Assemblies. We shall consider these powers in turn.
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A. Control of Regional Governments
1. Approval Control
Approvals or consents were required from the Central 
Government by the Regional Governments for the performance 
of several activities. For example, in specifying the 
various duties of the departments in the Southern Region, 
the High Executive Council was required to "act with the 
approval of the President"'*' if these were matters related 
to the Ministries and Departments of the central 
government.
Approval of the central government was also required 
for activities like the conduct of border trade or use of 
funds in the budget etc. Approval for border trade was 
obtained once only in 1974 (see Chapter 7 for details). 
Consent, on the other hand, was very rare. The consent of 
the president of the Republic was necessary only if a 
request had been made to him for the withdrawal of a Bill
3
or a postponement of a law from coming into force, as 
examined later.
2. Directory Control
The Self-Government Act provided that "The President 
shall from time to time regulate the relationship between 
the High Executive Council and the central Ministries".^
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However, it was not specified as to how this was to be 
done. He could in practice therefore issue directives to 
the respective governments. Inspite of this power, the 
president, however, never resolved the problem for the 
provision of legal services in the region.
Provision of Legal Services
The problem of provision of legal services arose over 
the reconciliation of the powers of the Attorney General 
with that of the Department of Legal Affairs in the 
Southern Region. The Department was established in
accordance with the provisions of the Addis Ababa
6 6 
Agreement and Presidential Order No. 40 of 1972.
The functions of the Department as defined by the 
Department of Legal Affairs Regulations, 1977, included 
prosecution, litigation, drafting of contracts, 
legislative drafting and legal counselling in the Southern
Region supposedly on behalf of the Southern Regional
Government. However, these regulations were defective in 
that they were not properly authenticated. They were 
signed by Natale Olwak Akolawin, Regional Minister for 
High Executive Council Affairs as acting president of the 
High Executive Council, on behalf of the latter. Nowhere 
was it provided that an acting president could do so.
Apart from the defect in the said regulations, the issue 
was whether the Department could exercise the powers 
mentioned above in the Southern Region in view of the
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constitutional provision which stated:
"The President of the Republic shall 
appoint an Attorney General for the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan ... The 
law shall determine his duties, 
jurisdiction and responsibilities."^
One interpretation given to the phrase "an Attorney
General for the Democratic Republic of the Sudan" was that
no other Attorney General could be appointed in the
country. This reasoning was reinforced by the provisions
of other laws which defined powers of the Attorney
General. They vested all powers of prosecution,
litigation etc. on behalf of the Sudan Government in the
Attorney General. For example, the Attorney General's
o
Chambers Act 1973, authorised the Attorney General to be
Q
the legal adviser of the State. The Civil Procedure Act,
I9 7 4IO stated that all suits for or instituted in the name
of the Sudan Government were to be instructed in the name
of the Attorney General.-^ The code of Criminal Procedure 
12Act, 1974 also empowered the Attorney General to conduct
criminal investigations and prosecute on behalf of the
13Sudan Government . He could also stay proceedings (or 
exercise powers of nolle prosequi) under the same A c t . ^  
Nowhere was it mentioned in any of these laws that the 
Department of Legal Affairs could exercise any of the 
powers vested in the Attorney General in the Southern 
Region. Unfortunately, this was the interpretation 
adopted by the courts.
The other interpretation was by reasonable inference 
that the phrase "an Attorney General for the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan" did not preclude the Regional
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Government from appointing a Regional Attorney General of 
her own. There would have been no necessary contradiction 
in doing so because they would be representing different 
governments in the country.
In view of this problem, however, the Attorney
General delegated his powers of prosecution to individual
16members of the Department - but this was not an adequate
solution to the problem. The Department continued to have
no powers devolved to it. Finally Presidential Order No.
1 of 1983 on the redivision of the South expressly
prohibited the new regions in the South from exercising
any powers over "The Judiciary, Public Prosecution and 
1 7Advocacy". Subsequently, Presidential Order No. 35 of 
1984 transferred Members of the Department of Legal 
Affairs to the Attorney General's Chambers. Thus the 
controversy was resolved in a most unexpected manner - by 
recentralisation instead of decentralisation of powers for 
rendering legal services.
3. The Power of Veto
Under the Self-Government Act, the President could
"veto any Bill which he [deemed] contrary to the
18provisions of the constitution". This power was, 
however, never invoked. So it remained redundant since no 
occasion warranted its application.
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4. Assent to a Bill
Initially the Self-Government Act did not require
presidential Assent for a Bill to become law. The
1 Qnecessity of obtaining presidential assent to a Bill was 
introduced by the High Executive Council and People's 
Regional Assembly Act, 1980 which purported to amend the 
Self-Government Act. It should have been null and void 
for not having complied with the Amendment Procedure of 
the Self-Government Act discussed later but surprisingly 
enough it was effective.
On the other hand, Presidential Assent was not
directly required under the Regional Government Act, 1980.
According to that law a Bill in any Regional Assembly in
the Northern Sudan could become law on the signature of
the Governor alone. If the Governor of a region objected
to the passage of a Bill, he was required to send it back
to the Assembly with reasons for his objection within
thirty days, else it would become law. It would also
become law even if it were sent back within the said
period but it was passed again by two-thirds majority
70members of the Assembly.
The powers of assent of the Governor were not only 
similar to those of the president of the Republic but 
also to the powers of other presidents in Africa. For 
example under the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965, 
Presidential Assent was also necessary for a Bill to 
become law. If the president withheld his assent he was
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also required to send the Bill back to the Assembly with
reasons to that effect. The Bill could likewise be
presented for his assent for the second time within six
months if supported by two-thirds of the Members of the
Assembly. This time, however, the president was required
to "assent to the Bill within twenty-one days of its
22presentation" unless he dissolved the Parliament.
The fundamental difference between presidential 
assent in Tanzania and that of the Sudan was that, whereas 
the Sudanese Bill automatically became law if supported 
for the second time by two-thirds of the members of the 
Assembly, that of Tanzania still required presidential 
assent. The rationale of requiring Presidential assent is 
obviously based on the fact that the President 
participates in law-making under the Presidential 
constitution.
5. Powers of Emergency
Until 1980, emergency powers were entirely the
prerogative of the President of the Republic exercisable
at his own absolute discretion.
"... if the President of the Republic is 
satisfied that an imminent danger is 
threatening the independence of the 
country or the integrity and safety of 
its territory, or its economy, or the 
public organs of the state and its 
constitutional institutions, or the 
achievement of its international 
obligations, or the achievement of its 
people, he shall declare a state of 
emergency and take necessary measures to 
prevent the danger •••"•23
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Clearly, no other authority could declare or request for
the declaration of a state of emergency. Contary to this
provision, however, the Regional Minister of
Administration in the South, Moses Choi, declared a State
of Emergency over the region following an attempted coup
in July 1977. Obviously that state of emergency was ultra
vires and should have been treated as null and void. Yet
it was not declared so. However, the powers of emergency
were modified in 1980 as follows:
"If the President on the advice of the 
High Executive Council is satisfied that 
imminent danger threatens the unity, 
integrity and safety of the Southern
Region or its economy, the organs of the
Regional Self-Government or the 
achievement of the people in the Region, 
he shall declare a state of emergency and 
take necessary measures to prevent the 
danger • • • " • 24
Certainly, this provision was intended to enable the
regional government to initiate the process for the
declaration of emergency if it sensed some danger in the
region. Nevertheless, the regional government never
invoked this power. The State of Emergency declared by
the President all over the country in April 1984^J was in
the exercise of his powers under the constitution (already
quoted). It was, however, astonishing that similar powers
of emergency were not granted to the regional governments
in the North.
Generally, emergency powers are an exclusive 
prerogative of the national government even in federal 
countries like Nigeria, for fear of abuse of powers by the 
inferior governments. But the Governor of a state in
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Nigeria may request the application of emergency powers 
with the approval of a resolution supported by two-thirds 
majority of the House of the Assembly of the S t a t e . ^
6 . Dissolution of Regional Governments
Dissolution was the most powerful instrument for the
control of regional governments in the Sudan. It was a
prerogative power of the President of the Republic.
According to the Regional Government Act, 1980:
"When the President of the Republic 
considers that the public interest and 
the circumstances necessitate new 
elections he may after consultation with 
the Governor of the Region and the 
speaker of the People's Regional 
Assembly, dissolve the Regional People's 
Assembly. "27
However, it was not the same case with the Regional 
Assembly for the Southern Region from the start.
Initially, dissolution of the Regional Assembly in the 
South was not anticipated. Hence the omission of a 
similar provision from the Self-Government Act.
Presumably the Regional Assembly in the South was expected 
to stand dissolved at the expiry of its four years term of 
office as found in the export Westminster model of 
constitutions.
However, political developments in the Southern 
Region, as seen in the attempted removals of Lubari Ramba 
from speakership in 1975, and that of Lagu from the 
presidency of the High Executive Council by impeachment,
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in 1979, and the unlawful dismissal of Mboro, Bol and Akot 
from Speakership, Deputy Speakership and Controller of the 
Assembly respectively in the same year (see Chapter 6 ) led 
to the promulgation of the controversial High Executive 
Council and People's Regional Assembly Act, 1980. The law 
was controversial because it provided for the dissolution 
of the Regional People's Assembly by the President, which 
was contrary to the spirit of the Self-Government Act; yet 
the special conditions prescribed for the amendment of 
that Act were not satisfied by the passage of the 1980 Act 
because it was neither approved by a three-quarters vote 
in the National Assembly nor by a two-thirds vote of the 
Southern masses in a referendum.
The relevant section read:
"When the President [considered] that the 
public interest and the circumstances 
[necessitated] new elections, he [could] 
after consultation with the president of 
the High Executive Council (and the 
Speaker of the Assembly) dissolve the 
Assembly."
The dissolution of the Regional Assembly automatically 
terminated the existence of the High Executive Council 
too.
"Subject to the provisions of Section 
12(1) and 18 of the Regional 
Self-Government Act, the term of office 
of the President of the High Executive 
Council shall expire on the date of 
expiry of the duration of the People's 
Assembly or the dissolution thereof."29
Thus the President could dissolve the Regional Government
at will. It was not mandatory for him to consult the
president of the High Executive Council or the speaker
thereby seriously undermining the autonomy of the region
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as happened in 1980, 1981 and 1983. The circumstances of 
each episode will be considered separately.
(i) The Dissolution of the Southern Regional Government 
in 1980
We are already familiar with the facts of the 
struggle between the president of the High Executive 
Council, Lagu, and the Speakers of the Assembly, Mboro and 
Bol, as well as the Controller, Akot.
That the Assembly unlawfully decided to impeach the 
three officers and not the president of the High Executive 
Council has also been established. Admittedly, there was 
a constitutional deadlock because the Regional Assembly 
could never meet for lack of a quorum. In the event, the 
issue was brought to the notice of the President of the 
Republic by the aggrieved parties. In the exercise of his 
discretionary powers of dissolution detailed above, the 
President dissolved the Regional Government in March 1980 
after considering the recommendations of the fact-finding 
committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Aun Sheif Gasim 
which reported that "there [were] loopholes in the 
Regional Self-Government Act, 1972 that led to the
o n
disagreement". u The President of the High Executive 
Council was never consulted but was asked to resign. -1-
(ii) The Dissolution of the Southern Regional Government,
47 3
This time, the dispute arose over the burning issue 
of whether or not the South should be divided into two or 
more regions. It was the demand of Eastern and Western 
Equatoria provinces to have an Equatoria Region separate 
from the rest of the South as seen in Chapter 5. However, 
the motion was withdrawn from the central committee 
meeting of the SSU in Khartoum in March 1981 for 
consideration by the SSU lower units in the South as well 
as the Regional Assembly there. Subsequently, the motion
o o
was overwhelmingly defeated in the Regional A s s e m b l y ^  
after which the regional government seized the opportunity 
to ban any further discussion of the matter. However, the 
struggle for "redivision" went underground between its 
proponents in Equatoria and the president of the Republic. 
Consequently, the president, to the surprise of the 
majority of the people in the South, announced the
o o
dissolution of the regional government in October 1981. J 
It was alleged that regional government was being 
obstructive to the cause of democracy in the region. 
Disturbingly, neither the President nor the Speaker of the 
Southern Region were consulted.
(iii) The Dissolution of the Southern Regional 
Government, 1983
The final dissolution of the regional government in 
the South occurred in June 1983, which was intended to
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pave the way for the "redivision" of the region. Inspite 
of the gravity of the matter, the "redivision" issue was 
never considered by the National Assembly, and as already 
stated, the proposed referendum to be held in the South 
was called off.
The authority for the "redivision" was apparently 
based on the recommendation of the President of the High 
Executive Council that the "controversial issue of 
re-division or no re-division [had been] left in the 
protective hands of the President of SSU and of the 
Republic".^ However, such a requirement did not exist in 
any of the laws in the Sudan. Moreover, it was doubtful 
whether the P r e s i d e n t s  recommendation quoted above could 
be regarded as being in favour of "redivision". The 
speaker was, however, not consulted as he had been 
detained in Khartoum Kober Prison much earlier for 
expressing contrary views to that of the president of the 
Republic on the issue.
Having examined the powers of control, we now proceed 
to consider how the regional government could protect its 
autonomy from unwarranted interference by the central 
government under the Sudanese decentralised system.
B. Protection of Regional Autonomy
We have already stated that there were only two ways
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through which the Southern Regional Government could 
protect or safeguard interests. The Assembly could either 
request a Bill prejudicial to the interest of the region 
to be withdrawn or have it suspended if already passed as 
law. In fact it was worse for the regions in the Northern 
part of the country because they could only resort to the
o c
first method. Yet, the presence of these powers could 
by no means guarantee protection for the regions as shown 
by the boundary crisis in 1980, the refinery trauma of 
1981 and the enforcement of Islamic Sharia laws in 1983.
We shall consider how successfully or unsuccessfully the 
Southern Regional Assembly invoked the two powers in the 
above incidents.
The request for withdrawal of Bills was provided in
Section 14 of the Self-Government as follows:-
"The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a 
majority of its members, request the 
President to withdraw any Bill presented 
to the People's National Assembly which 
in their views affects adversely the 
welfare, rights or interests of the 
citizens in the Southern Region, pending 
communication of the views of the 
People's Regional Assembly. If the 
president accedes to such request, the 
People's Regional Assembly shall present 
its views within 15 days from the date of 
the accession to the request. The 
president shall communicate any such 
views to the People's National Assembly 
together with his own observations if he 
deems necessary."
That of postponing a law from coming into forced stated:
"The People's Regional Assembly may, by a 
two-thirds majority request the President 
to postpone the coming into force of any 
law which, in the view of the members 
adversely affects the welfare and 
interests of the citizens of the Southern 
Region. The President may if he thinks 
fit accede to such request.
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The reference to the citizens of the Southern Region was a 
typographical error. According to Section 2(viii) of the 
Self-Government Act Sudanese citizens refer to citizens of 
the Sudan as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act,
O Q
1957J°, which has no provision for citizens of the 
Southern Region.
What is important, however, is that under both 
provisions quoted above, the protection of the interests 
of the people in the South was left at the whim of the 
president. He could accept or reject any request, forward 
it to the National Assembly or refuse to do so. We shall 
now proceed to examine how the President used these 
powers.
1. The Boundary Crisis 1980
The boundary crisis was caused by the Regionalisation 
of the Northern Sudan in 1980. As we have seen, the 
Southern Sudan was defined as "the provinces of Baher El 
Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their 
boundaries as they stood on January 1st 1956 and any other 
areas that were culturally and geographically a part of
3 9the Southern complex as may be decided by a referendum".
Admittedly, this provision had remained dormant until 
1980 when the Regional Government Bill 1980 came up for 
discussion in the National Assembly. Section 4 of the
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Bill was controversial because it stated that the
boundaries of the new regions in the Northern Sudan were
shown in a map attached as schedule to the law:
"Each region shall have a boundary in 
accordance with the map set out in 
schedule 1 h e r e t o . " ^
In fact, no schedule was attached to the Bill. Yet it had
already been approved by the SSU Politbureau, the Council
of Ministers and the Legal Affairs Committee of the
Assembly. After insistence by the Members of the Southern
Region for the production of the map, the Survey
Department produced it showing boundaries which were
contrary to those of the Southern Region. The map had cut
off and annexed rich areas of the South to the North. In
particular the oil fields of Bentiu, the Dura area of Renk
and the copper belt of Hufrat El Nahas had been annexed to
the new regions in the North. In light of these
circumstances an extraordinary meeting of the People's
Regional Assembly was convened promptly to discuss the
intrusion and petition the President for the withdrawal of
the Bill.
Presenting the Southern case in the Assembly, Ambrose 
Ring Thick, chairman of the SSU Assembly body stated:
"Section 4 of the same bill is seeking to 
redraw or demarcate the borders of the 
regions of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan in such a manner as is clearly 
violating the provisions of the Southern 
Provinces Self-Government Act of 1972 and 
therefore of the permanent constitution 
of the Sudan ... This attempt will 
undoubtedly affect the rights and 
interests of the Sudanese people.
The above statements speak for themselves. Accordingly,
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the Assembly presented the following petition to the 
President.
"... We members of the ... Assembly have 
observed with great concern that the 
proposed map determining the boundaries 
of the new regions as provided by Section 
4 of the said Bill adversely affects the 
boundaries of the Southern Region 
contrary to the provisions of article 
2(3) of the Regional Self-Government Act,
1972 and therefore contrary to article 8 
of the Permanent Constitution of the 
Sudan. In view of the foregoing we ... 
hereby present this petition to your 
Excellency requesting the following:-
(a) Refusal to sign the Regional 
Government Bill 1980 as law and return 
the same to the National Assembly to 
debate Section (4) or amend it •••"•42
The petition was submitted under the provisions of
Section 14 of the Self-Government Act quoted above. The
President reacted by appointing a National Committee to
study the request which presumably endorsed it.
Thereafter the president issued a Decree confirming the
boundaries of the Southern Region as at 1.1.1956. Section
4 of the Bill was amended to re-read:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 8 
of the constitution and Section 2(3) of 
the Southern Provinces Self-Government 
Act, 1972 ... the boundaries of the 
Province provided for in subsection (1) 
shall be the same as provided inthe 
Reorganisation of the Provinces Act,
1974, with the exception of the parts of
the provinces adjacent to the Southern 
Region which boundaries shall remain as 
existed in the first day of January 
1956."43
Unfortunately, this was the only occasion when the 
interests of the region were successfully protected.
2. The Refinery Trauma, 1981
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We have already shown in the last chapter that the 
powers of the Central and Regional Government in the South 
over the control and exploitation of mineral resources 
confused. In 1974, the Central Government had issued oil 
prospecting licences to Chevron (an American company) 
covering various parts of the Sudan including the Southern 
Region, but without consulting or informing the Southern 
Regional authorities.
Subsequently, in 1977, Chevron struck larger 
quantities of oil in Bentiu in the South at the flow rate 
of 2,800 barrels per day, which was greater than anywhere 
in the western or central region of the country.^  
Thereafter some crisis ensued on the issue of the location 
of the refinery. There were two sites for consideration. 
Kosti in the North or Bentiu in the South. Both the 
Central Government and Chevron were in favour of Kosti 
arguably for technical reasons which were enumerated as 
follows:-
1. It was too costly to construct a refinery at Bentiu.
2. The refinery at Kosti would be constructed in two 
years only whereas that at Bentiu would require 3 to 
5 years - which was too long for the shape of the 
economy of the country to withstand.
3. Products of the crude oil were needed by major 
industries in the North such as Hajar Assalaya and 
Kenena which were nearer to Kosti than Bentiu which 
had no railway connection.
4. Bentiu was not served by any modern means of
480
45communication like air, roads or railways.
However, the Southern Sudanese opposed the location
of the refinery at Kosti. They prefered Bentiu so as to
give an opportunity to develop the area. Besides that, it
was the main source of the raw material. Their view was
summarised by Salwa Kamil Dallalah of Khartoum University
- as follows:
"Precisely because Bentiu is so 
underdeveloped, the refinery should be 
located there. The refinery would serve 
as a catalyst for development. Chevron 
would be required to build roads, 
schools, hospitals, employment would be 
granted in a depressed area, and the 
royalties and taxes would help free the 
South on dependence on Northern budgetary 
support. The Southern Region is poorly 
connected to the North as regard 
transportation so why take oil from 
Bentin and refine it in Kosti and then 
try to send it back to the S o u t h . " ^
For these reasons the People's Regional Assembly passed a 
47resolution calling for the installation of the refinery
at Bentiu under the provisions of Section 13 of the
Self-Government Act quoted earlier to protect the interest
of the people of the Southern Region. Nevertheless the
President issued a Decree confirming Kosti as the site for 
4 8the refinery. Obviously the Decree was not welcomed in 
the South as a Southern official commented: "Our place is 
like a cow which is being milked without being f e d . " ^
In fact, no Southerner was even appointed on the 
Board of the White Nile Company Ltd., which undertook the 
business of the oil. There was also no high ranking 
Southern officials in the company, nor among those
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undergoing training abroad. No taxes or royalties arising 
from the oil were assigned to the region with the 
exception of a sum of one million pounds allotted for 
Bentiu Development Project decided on an arbitrary basis. 
Not surprisingly, Southern grievance led to the attack and 
killing of three foreigners and inquiring of seven others 
at Rubkona near Bentiu in February 1984 which resulted 
into the indefinite closure of the oil operations.
3. The Enforcement of Sharia Law, 1983-84
Sharia Islamic law was introduced after the
"redivision" of the South, and although the Southern
Regional Government stood dissolved, the new regions, in
particular Equatoria Region, invoked the powers of
protection available to the former Southern Region to
5 0
suspend the Sharia laws.JU Under the Sharia Penal Code
Act, 1983, theft became punishable by amputation of limbs,
adultery by decapitation, drinking of alcohol by flogging
and murder by death or payment of blood money (dia) as 
51compensation.
As non-Muslims, people in the South opposed the
implementation of this law. The resolution which was
unanimously adopted by the Equatoria People's Regional
Assembly read:
"We ... Members of ... Equatoria Regional 
Assembly ... having learnt with great 
concern the passing of Sharia law in the 
Sudan by the People's National Assembly 
... and having exhaustively discussed the 
matter ... [And] believing in the unity
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of the entire Sudanese masses and the 9th 
of June 1969 Declaration which basically 
was the recognition of the cultural 
differences of the Sudanese People ...
And whereas the permanent constitution of 
the Democratic Republic of the Sudan 
1973, A. 16(b), (c), (d), (e) guarantee 
the rights of non-Muslims; which rights 
are not respected by Sharia laws Sections 
321(2) and 449 ... request Your 
Excellency ... to give constitutional 
guarantees by the restoration of the 
Sudan Penal Code 1974, and the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1974 to govern non-Muslims 
in Equatoria Region and the Sudan at 
large."52
Although Equatoria Regional Assembly had no powers under 
Presidential Order No. 1 of 1983 to request the 
postponement of a law, this petition was clearly based on 
the provisions of Section 13 of the Self-Government Act. 
Despite the illegality of the petition, the reaction of 
the President was highly significant. Regrettably the 
President did not respond to this vital request. He 
simply kept silent and the law remained in force.
Equatoria Regional Assembly also made another
petition seeking the withdrawal of the Promulgation of an
Islamic constitution in 1984. Reliable sources quote the
president's comment as: "Who told them that they had the
53right to discuss the matter?" The National Assembly did
not, however, succeed in passing the constitution - but
this was not due to the request of Equatoria Regional
Assembly? it was defeated by an overwhelming majority wish
54of the members of the National Assembly itself.
Considering the behaviour of the President in the 
exercise of his powers of protection as seen in the cases
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of the boundary crisis in 1980, the oil refinery in 1981, 
the enforcement of Sharia law in 1983 and the promulgation 
of the Islamic constitution in 1984, it was obvious that 
these powers were not very useful. For their 
depended on the attitude of the President. He could 
decide to protect or not to, as he wished. There was no 
obligation on him under given circumstances.
Alternatively, the successful implementation of the powers 
depended on extra-legal circumstances. For example the 
boundary issue of 1980 was successful because the 
Southerners were politically united. However, they soon 
got divided over the issue of the "redivision" of the 
South. So the successful application of the powers for 
the protection of autonomy became impossible. Therefore, 
in order to invoke the powers successfully, political 
unity of the Southerners was of paramount importance.
When compared with Papua New Guinea, the weakness of 
the Sudan is sharply revealed.
4. Comparative Development: Suspension of Provincial 
Governments in Papua New Guinea
Under Papua New Guinea's Independence Constitution 
1975, and the organic law on Provincial Government 1980, 
the grounds and procedure for the suspension of a 
Provincial Government were firmly laid down.
These were set out in Article 187(E) of the
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constitution; if:-
" (a) There is widespread corruption in
the administration of the Province; 
or
(b) There has been gross mismanagement 
of the financial affairs of the 
Province; or
(c) There has been a breakdown in the 
administration of the Province; or
(d) There has been deliberate or 
persistent frustration of, or 
failure to comply with, lawful 
directions of the National 
Government; or
(e) The Provincial Government has 
deliberately and persistently 
disobeyed applicable laws, 
including the National 
Constitution, an organic law, the 
Provincial Constitution or any 
national legislation applicable to 
the Province."
Suspension is also possible in cases of emergency due to 
w a r .
The National Executive could suspend a Provincial
Government provisionally pending confirmation of
Parliament by simple majority. However, the motion for
the suspension has to follow a particular procedure as
prescribed in Section 90 thereof, which states that a
provincial government:
" (a) Shall not be removed unless the Head 
of State, acting with, and in 
accordance with, the advice of the 
National Executive Council, has made 
a report to the speaker of the 
National Parliament, for 
Presentation to the Parliament, 
that, after consultation or 
attempted consultation with the 
Provincial Executive, the National 
Executive Council is satisfied that
(i) a ground for suspension set 
out in Section 187(E)1 of the 
National Constitution exists; 
and
(ii) the matter cannot be corrected 
unless the Provincial 
Government is suspended; and
485
(iii) the Provincial Government 
ought, in the national 
interest or in the interests 
of the people of the province, 
be suspended accordingly, 
giving reasons for the 
opinion; and
(b) Maybe moved only by a Minister."
Furthermore the motion has to be studied and the matter
investigated by the Commission for suspension of
Provincial Governments before it is debated. The
Commission consists of four permanent members of whom at
least two must be members of the National Parliament other
than Ministers, a representative of the Provincial
Government and an ad hoc member. It reports to the
Speaker of the National Assembly.
Under these circumstances, abuse of power as in the 
case of the Sudan is very unlikely.
III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS
Before 1981, local governments in the Sudan were
answerable to both the Central and regional governments.
Whereas the People's Province Executive Councils in the
Northern Sudan were answerable to the central government,
those in the South were answerable to the regional
government.
"The People's Local Councils in the 
Provinces of the Southern region shall be 
the basis for the organization of the
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Regional Self-Government provided by the 
Constitution for these provinces.",-,-
The foregoing provision was also reinforced by Section
10(b) of the Self-Government Act which made the regional
government responsible for the "organization of the
machinery for ... local administration". The Distribution
of Legal Powers between the Central Ministries and the
Ministries of the Southern Region of the Sudan Act, 1977,
directed that all the powers under the People's Local
Government Act, 1971, exercisable by the Minister of Local
Government and the President of the Republic were to vest
in the Regional Minister for Public Administration and the
High Executive Council respectively in the Southern 
56Region. However, whether the local governments were 
answerable to the central government or the regional 
governments, the powers of control under the Acts were 
similar. We shall consider control over local governments 
under the People's Local Government Acts 1971 and 1981 
separately.
A. Powers of Control Under the 1971 Act
The powers used for the control of People's Province 
Executive Councils under the People's Local Government 
Act, 1971, were:-
1. Regulatory powers.
2. Confirmatory powers.
3. Powers of supervision.
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4. Powers of inspection.
5. Powers of investigation.
6. Powers of disallowance.
7. Powers of veto.
8. Powers of dissolution.
We shall consider each power in turn.
1. Regulatory Powers
Invariably local government acts provide for the 
minister or some other authority to make regulations for 
the proper implementation of a local government law. This 
is so because parliament does not normally have time to go 
into the minute details concerning the running of local 
government councils. Moreover, it enables Ministers to 
act speedily so as to fill any gaps or cure any defects.
In terms of control, however, it enables the Minister to 
lay down rules which will guide the local government 
councils all over the country so as to achieve some 
minimum standards and uniformity.
Accordingly, the People's Local Government Act, 1971,
provided that:
"The Minister may, with the consent of 
the Council of Ministers, make any 
necessary regulations for the 
implementation of the purposes of this 
Act . . . " .
Several regulations were made by the Minister in the 
exercise of these powers. For examples, regulations were
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made in 1971 defining the conditions of local government 
officers? regulations for elections to the councils; and 
regulations which defined the relationship between the SSU 
political organ of the Council and the Members of the 
Council. In essence the last regulations stated that it 
was the duty of the SSU organ to lay down the policies of 
the government while the Councils enacted them into 
bye-laws. Unfortunatel y, copies of all the regulations 
are not readily available.
2. Powers of Confirmation
Local government councils are also authorised to 
issue local orders or byelaws to enable them to enforce 
the exercise of powers conferred on them by the local 
government laws. However, the normal practice is to have 
their orders or byelaws confirmed by some higher authority 
before they can have the force of law. The idea is to 
give the higher authority who is normally the Minister, 
Commissioner or Regional Assembly the opportunity to 
scrutinize the orders of the councils before they are 
validated. This method usually enables the higher 
authority to prevent a council from issuing orders which 
are prejudicial to some public or private interest.
It was, however, extraordinary in the case of the 
1971 Act that the orders of the Councils were not required 
to be confirmed. The relevant section read:
"The Council may, when exercising its
powers issue local orders leaving the
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force of law."
However, the Minister was authorised to suspend any local 
order or part of it for three months if he was of the 
opinion that pubic interest so required. But he had to 
submit his report to the Council of Ministers to that 
effect. The Council could revoke or amend the order.
This implied that if an order was not suspended by the 
Minister or even if suspended but was not revoked or 
amended by the Council of Ministers, then it was 
confirmed. Powers of confirmation under the 1971 Act were 
therefore indirect rather than direct.
This power was rarely applied. The only example 
which can be given was the confirmation of a local order 
issued by the Council in Juba in 1974. It was intended to 
force the idle population in Juba to go back to the rural 
areas. Since it was not suspended, it was assumed to have 
been confirmed.
3. Powers of Supervision
Supervision guarantees a constant check on the
activities of local government and their officers. By and
large the role of supervision was the duty of the
Commissioner.
"The Commissioner shall be responsible 
for the general supervision, ... and 
control of the government units in the 
province and he shall exercise control 
over civil servants working in the 
province and shall render reports on the 
effective discharge of their duties to 
their respective Ministries."gg
/ 3 ‘*S
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The Commissioner maintained general supervision and 
control over the councils through two broad mechanisms. 
These were the political and administrative machineries.
Politically the Commissioner, as we saw in Chapter 6, 
was the SSU Provincial Secretary. So all SSU secretaries 
in the districts and sub-districts were his 
representatives. They rendered monthly reports to him on 
the administration of the various parts of the province. 
Furthermore the SSU Basic Rules and Regulations provided 
for the holding of SSU annual conferences from the 
grassroots to the province. These conferences discussed 
all aspects of government policies and their application 
to the provinces. They also adopted resolutions for 
implementation by the various councils. Reports of these 
conferences were to be made available to the Commissioner 
for perusal and necessary directives.
Administratively, three things were done in relation 
to supervision. The Executive Officers in the 
sub-districts had to write monthly reports to the 
Assistant Commissioners in the districts who in turn 
compiled reports on the districts and sent them to the 
Commissioner. The reports covered every aspect of 
administration. The Commissioner then made the final 
report to the President of the Republic; those in the 
South did so through the High Executive Council. 
Apparently, this regular practice died in the 1980s when 
the administrative officers were subjected to political
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frustrations such as frequent transfers. They became 
disenchanted and lost enthusiasm in their work.
The Commissioner could also summon the Assistant 
Commissioners for personal meetings and discuss problems 
affecting their districts. This proved to be the most 
effective method of supervision.
Finally, the Commissioners made unscheduled tours of 
the provinces especially if the reports of the SSU and 
those of the Assistant Commissioners contradicted each 
other or on receiving complaints. This method was very 
effective too.
4. Inspection
Inspection on the other hand, was a duty of the
Ministries.
"Any Minister may inspect any activity of 
the People*s Executive Council respecting 
matters relating to activities of his 
Ministry; or he may depute any technical 
inspector to carry out any such 
inspection ...".^q
It goes without saying that inspection gives an
opportunity to detect weaknesses or any shortcomings in
the performance of any duty which is a necessary
administrative procedure. Inspections are usually done by
technical officers on a regular basis. The designated
public servants who carry out inspections normally have
the necessary qualifications and experience for the
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particular task. Inspection is therefore an appropriate 
method of control of an inferior authority to make it 
comply with certain requirements laid down by the superior 
authority.
The greatest problem with inspection was how a 
minister or a person deputed by him could inspect the work 
of a Commissioner; the Commissioner was of course part of 
the Council as shown in Chapter 6, and he enjoyed 
Ministerial status as well. In practice, this power was 
quite redundant. Copies of the monthly reports were 
instead served to the respective ministries to enable them 
to follow the progress of work in their field departments 
in the provinces.
As for the public servants on secondment to the 
Councils, annual confidential reports were rendered on 
them by respective officers. The Heads of the units 
rendered reports on their officials under their 
supervision while the Assistant Commissioners did the same 
on the Heads. The Commissioner reported on the Assistant 
Commissioners. Special promotion reports could also be 
made on request by the parent Ministry.
5. Investigation
Powers of investigation were to serve as a channel 
for receiving complaints against a council. The right of 
investigation existed under the 1971 Act only:
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"If a complaint or report is presented to 
the Minister that any People's Executive 
Council has failed to perform anything 
which it is obliged to perform by its 
warrant of establishment or by this Act 
or any other law, or that council 
performed any act which it ought not to 
have performed, or otherwise if the 
Minister is of the opinion that it is 
necessary to carry out an investigation 
into the affairs of the People's 
Executive Council, the Minister may order 
that a local investigation be held by a 
person or persons appointed by him."g^
Investigations could therefore also be used as alternative
procedure for correcting errors. However, there was no
incident of official complaint recorded in the South
although there were informal ones. The problem was even
if there had been any it would have been difficult to
handle the situation because the Commissioner would be a
party. As in the case of inspections, the power to
investigate was also redundant. Presumably the same
position obtained in the North.
6 . The Power of Veto
As we saw in Chapter 6 , the Commissioner had the
authority to veto any decision of the Council if "public
interest or the general interest of the state ... or the
6 2rights of the citizens or the principles of equality" 
necessitated doing so. Had this power been exercised 
frequently, it would have seriously undermined the 
autonomy of the Councils. However, the only incident 
which took place in the South was in 1982 when the 
Headquarters of Eastern Equatoria province was to be
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transfered from Juba to Torit about 84 miles apart. What 
happened was that the People's Province Executive Council 
of Eastern Equatoria decided that accommodation facilities 
(buildings), were to be made available at Torit before the 
Headquarters could be transferred. This was so because 
Torit had few buildings which could not house all the 
offices of the Executive Council. However, the 
Commissioner, Brigadier Saturlino Arika, was of the 
opinion that the decision was delayful. Being a native of 
Torit he wanted to see the Headquarters transfered as soon 
as possible. Thus his reason was more political in nature 
than administrative. He vetoed the decision of the 
council and ordered for the immediate transfer despite the 
shortage of buildings at Torit. The government officers 
in the Council refused to move but they were all served 
with letters of explanation which was a disciplinary 
procedure. Realising dangers involved in the 
confrontation between the Commissioner and his officers, 
members of the regional government decided to frustrate 
the proceedings by approving applications for transfers by 
the officers involved away from the province. Therefore, 
the power to veto was either never used or was 
unsuccessfully invoked as shown above.
7. Power of Disallowance
The power of disallowance was very important under 
the 1971 Act.
"... The Council of Ministers may in
consultation with the Minister, disallow
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partly or wholly, as it deems fit, any 
resolution passed by the People's 
Executive Council •••"53
Thereafter the Council of Ministers may direct the
People's Executive Council to revoke or amend the
resolution or local order within a specified period. If
the Executive Council failed to do so then the Council of
Ministers could suspend, revoke or amend any warrant or
suspend any powers of the People's Executive Council and
transfer the powers thereof to any person or other body.
The power of disallowance was therefore a very powerful
instrument of control under the 1971 Act. It could
eventually lead to dissolution. Once more this power was
rarely invoked.
The only incident in the South took place in 1979 
between Juba Town Council and Juba Rural Council. The 
issues were, which Council had the right to gibana (taxes 
on goods entering or leaving a council), collected at the 
bridge in Juba as well as the bridge tolls which were also 
raised at the same spot. The argument of Juba Town 
Council was that since the bridge was in Juba it had the 
right to both taxes. So it resolved to evict the 
representative of Juba Rural from the bridge.
Juba Rural, however, contended that the goods entered 
her jurisdiction before they reached that of Juba Town. 
Moreover the boundaries between Juba Town and Juba Rural 
were not clearly demarcated. Since the colonial days 
Captain Cook used to be in charge of both councils whose 
boundaries were not properly defined. Then it caused no
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problems. Furthermore, the offices of Juba Rural and Juba 
Town were located in separate wings of the same building. 
Legally both councils were entitled to levy gibana on the 
goods because they passed through them but it was feared 
that that would amount to double taxation and cause 
inflation. In the event the dispute was refered to the 
People's Province Executive Council which decided in 
favour of Juba Town Council on both issues. Being 
aggrieved, Juba Rural appealed to the Minister for 
Regional Administrations who exercised powers of the 
Council of Ministers in the region.
At this stage gibana was separated from the bridge 
tolls. It was decided that the bridge tolls should go to 
Juba Town because the bridge was clearly within Juba. But 
the issue of gibana was difficult to resolve so it was 
referred to a committee of investigation, the outcome of 
which remained unknown. Thus, the decision of the 
Executive Council was partly disallowed.
B. Controls Under the 1981 Act
Powers of control under the 1981 Act were in many 
respects similar to those provided by the 1971 Act. For 
example, the powers to issue regulations , confirm local
r c  cf: cn
orders or byelaws , supervise and inspect were 
similar. However, the powers of revision, reporting and 
dissolution differed. They existed under the 1981 Act but
497
not under the 1971 Act. On the other hand, the powers of 
vetoing and disallowance were deleted from the 1981 Act.
No explanations have been given for these variations.
Here we shall only consider the powers of revision, 
reporting and dissolution as they were not examined under 
the 1971 Act. We shall also consider the method for the 
resolution of conflicts between the Regional Executive 
Authority and the Area Councils which did not exist under 
the 1971 Act.
1. Revision
It is the inherent duty of a superior government like 
the Regional Government to check and annul, or refuse to 
render valid, decisions made by a local council if the 
decision was improper or illegal. The regional government 
must see to it that decisions taken by the local councils 
are not contrary to public interest or any law.
Although this vital power was omitted from the 1971
Act, it was catered for by the 1981 Act:
"The Commissioner shall assume the 
following powers:-
(d) He shall revise the works of the 
Councils and raise reports thereon to the 
Regional Executive Authority." Q
o o
This section, however, contradicted a latter one which 
provided:
"The Commissioner may revise the work of 
the Council and of the People's Local 
Council; or he may depute any qualified 
person to carry out such revision.
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Whereas the first provision made it mandatory for the 
Commissioner to revise the work of the Area Council, the 
second one made it discretionary. The change in emphasis 
was a very important difference in that if the 
Commissioner chose not to revise the work of the Council 
as contained in the second provision then the degree of 
control over the Councils of local government under the 
1981 Act would be seriously reduced.
Moreover the first provision required the 
Commissioner to do the revision by himself whereas the 
second authorised him to employ a deputy to do so.
Certainly the provisions of the latter section were more
far-reaching as most Commissioners were loyal politicians 
to the system and not real experts or technicians capable 
of revising the works of the Councils. Furthermore the 
second provision authorised the Commissioner or a person 
deputed by him to also revise the works of rural councils 
whereas the first provision did not.
2. Reporting
The method of reporting was intended to be an 
important instrument of control under the 1981 Act.
Reporting was to be done by both the Ministers and the
Commissioner.
Any Regional Minister was required to present "a 
report on results of the inspection together with any
499
recommendation [that was] appropriate to the Regional
7 nExecutive Authority". This requirement was 
complementary to the powers of any Regional Minister to 
"inspect the work of the CoOuncil or of the People's Local 
Council respecting matters relating to activities of his 
Regional Ministry.
As for the Commissioner, he was required to render 
reports on various occasions, for example after revising 
the works of the Councils to the Regional Executive 
Authority. He was also to report on the performance of 
the employees of the regional government seconded to the 
Councils, he being responsible for the heads of the 
executive organs in the C o u n c i l s . ^2
Finally, he was to render periodical reports on the 
performance of the Councils to the Regional Executive 
Authority. However, the frequency of the period was not 
specified. The implementation of this power was similar 
to the reporting systems discussed under the 1971 Act.
3. Dissolution
According to the 1981 Act:
"... The Regional Executive Authority 
may, for reasons of public interest, 
order dissolution of a Council and assign 
its powers to the Authority it may 
specify until a new council is formed.
Since conditions for dissolution were not laid down, it
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was possible to dissolve councils for political reasons.
In Equatoria Region, for example, four Area Councils - 
Juba Central and Rural, Yei and Torit were dissolved in 
1983 because the Members of the Regional Executive 
Authority at the time felt that the Councils were full of 
political opponents. They were charged with election 
irregularities. Similarly, all the Area Councils in 
Equatoria Region were dissolved after the overthrow of 
President Numeiri because the new administration of 
Equatoria, feared political opposition from the Area 
Councils which were then in existence. Thus, dissolution 
in the South was in practice used for crushing political 
opponents only.
4. Resolution of Conflicts
The provisions of Section 9 of the People's Local
Government Act, 1981 were an innovation in the laws of
local government in the Sudan. It expressly stated:
"In case of overlap of the powers of the 
council with those of the Regional 
Executive Authority, the powers of the 
council shall be exercised in accordance 
with the arrangements of the Regional 
Executive Authority."
The fact that powers of the Area Councils were not 
void ab initio for conflicting with those of the Regional 
Executive authorities was interesting. It gave the 
possibility for a compromise solution between the powers 
of the Council and those of the Regional Executive
501
Authority.
This provision was reinforced by those of Section 
8(1) of the same Act which required the Area Councils to 
exercise their powers "within the limits" of the general 
policy, plans and programmes made by the Regional 
Executive Authority.
Policies of the Regional Executive Authority were 
normally communicated to the Councils by means of 
directives which constituted another method of control.
CONCLUSION
This chapter clearly reveals that control powers are 
vital in any system of government, including decentralised 
ones. However, the degree of control differs from a 
totally unitary government to a fully decentralised one; 
with the necessity for control lessening as there is 
increase in the amounts of powers decentralised.
The administrative methods of control which existed 
during the colonial period such as supervision, 
inspection, reporting and so forth still continue in force 
today. However, political control has assumed more 
importance and effectiveness in one-party states like the 
Sudan than, say, in multi-party systems as found in Papua
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New Guinea. On the whole, control through the courts in 
decentralised systems within unitary constitutions is 
uncommon. In the Sudan it has indeed been non-existent. 
Conflicts and disputes are resolved through conciliations 
and issuance of directives by the higher authorities.
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CHAPTER 9
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DECENTRALISED GOVERNMENTS;
1971-1985
I INTRODUCTION
The problems of fiscal relations in a decentralised 
administration epitomise the variety of problems that 
exist therein. The questions raised are several and 
intricate.
What would be the most appropriate principle for the 
distribution of financial powers over revenue and 
expenditure between the central and regional governments, 
and between the latter and the local governments? Should 
the regional and local governments have taxing powers and 
be assigned independent sources of revenue or should they 
depend entirely on grants from the central government? If 
they are to have taxing powers and independent sources of 
revenue, how much should the powers be or which sources 
should those be? Should they be entitled to grants in 
addition to the locally raised revenue? Should the same 
principles of allocation of revenue between the central 
and regional governments also apply to regional and local 
governments.
What about the criteria for the allocation of grants
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between the regional governments inter se or the local 
government councils inter se? Should the central 
government retain some powers of control over the inferior 
governments? If so, which powers - should it be power 
over expenditure or over general management of financial 
affairs?
What machinery should be employed to work out and/or 
control the fiscal relations between the various tiers of 
government in a decentralised system?
Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that 
regardless of certain political, administrative and 
financial devolution of powers, the physical supremacy of 
the central government under a unitary constitution is 
unchallengeable. Hence problems of fiscal equity in the 
entire governmental set up are ultimately to be resolved 
by the central government, as it thinks fit. It must, 
however, be admitted that to work out an appropriate 
formula which would eliminate financial imbalance in a 
decentralised system is very difficult. Several 
principles have been used generally.
The principle of independent revenue has been 
generally adopted by most decentralised countries, except 
for Tanzania between 1970 and 1982, and for Zambia to a 
certain degree.^- The independent revenue principle 
advocates the transfer of taxing powers to the inferior 
governments. This means that the regions and the 
districts must be authorised to impose taxes on specific
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independent sources of revenue. The principle is said to 
be desirable in the interest of local autonomy and for the 
inducement of the sense of local financial responsibility. 
It can also enhance administrative efficiency in the 
system of taxation.
The principle of independent revenue was introduced 
in Nigeria under the 1951 constitution following the
2recommendation of Hicks-Phillipson Commission m  1950.
It supported the principle on the justification that has 
been stated already. However, it stated that the regional 
taxes must satisfy four conditions:-
1. The taxes must be clearly localised within the
regions.
2. The taxes must have stable yields.
3. The taxes must be inexpensive to administer.
4. The taxes must not hinder or endanger national
interest and policy.
However conditions 2 and 3 can be very difficult to 
satisfy considering the poverty of the third world 
countries.
Looking at the case of Nigeria before 1951, the 
fiscal relations between the central and the three
3
regional governments were entirely based on the principle 
of derivation. The principle of derivation arises from
the idea that each region should be returned a portion of
>
the revenue collected from it by the central government. 
This means the share of revenue must be proportional to 
the ratio of contribution to the national financial pool.
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The single justification for the principle being that it 
inculcates a sense of political responsibility at regional 
level for the furtherance of political progress. However, 
the principle is susceptible to enriching already wealthy 
regions and impoverishing poor ones. It could not, 
therefore, reduce the regional inequalities between the 
richer regions in Southern Nigeria and the poor one in the 
North. It was a cause of constant inter-governmental 
misunderstanding and friction. Moreover, its operation 
requires up-to-date data on the relative well-being of 
each region, the statistics of which are difficult to 
maintain in a third world country. Accordingly, the 
Hicks-Phillipson Commission rejected the derivative 
principle as the sole or most important basis for 
allocating revenue among regions.
Apart from discussing the general principles of 
federal finance and their application to Nigeria, the 
Commission advocated a system of revenue allocation based 
on the adoption of not just one, but a number of criteria 
which together would ensure "justice, liberty, fraternity 
and efficiency",^ the attainment of which would require 
four general principles which the Commission also 
advanced. These were, the principles of independent 
revenue, derivation, need and national interest.
We have already examined what the principles of 
independent revenue and derivation stand for. What about 
the other two principles of need and national interest?
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The principle of needs arises from the fact that the 
various sections of a country are inter-dependent. There 
should therefore be fair distribution of resources among 
the people irrespective of their places of birth and 
residence. Since population is the best available measure 
for human needs, and because it is also simple and easy to 
understand, allocation of revenue should be based on it.
In other words, there should be a conscious effort to 
share out revenue on the basis of population which should 
undoubtedly reflect the need for education, food, health 
services, transport etc. Inspite of the sound reasons for 
the principle^, Itiey were not adopted by the Nigerian 1951 
constitution. In fact problems of fiscal relations in 
Nigeria continued to trouble the government until the 
drafting of the 1979 constitution and even up to the 
present time. The Technical Committee appointed in 
January, 1978, under the chairmanship of Professor Aboyede 
recommended the adoption of five new principle for revenue 
allocation. These were:-
1. Equality of access to development opportunities;
2. National minimum standards;
3. Absorptive capacity;
4. Independent revenue and tax effort; and
5. Physical efficiency.
For details of the principles see Report of the 
Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation (Lagos: December 
1978). Another Commission, the Okigbo Commission, 
recommended in 1980, that the federal government should be 
entitled to 53% of the national revenue, while the States
512
receive 30%, the local governments 10% and the remaining
5
7% should go to the special fund. However, all the 
formulae T/ere amended several times before a permanent 
solution was reached in 1981.
The allocation of revenue (Federation Account, etc.) 
Act, 1981 of Nigeria provided for the maintainance of a 
Federation Account, into which all public monies is paid. 
It also prescribed the formula for the allotment of 
revenue among the federal, state and local governments as 
agreed by the National Assembly. The Assembl y resolved 
the share distribution as follows:-
(i) Federal government, 58.5%
(ii) State governments, 31.5%
(iii) Local government council, 10.0%.
The share of the state governments rs to be 
sub-divided amongst them as follows:-
(a) 26.5% on basis of equality
(b) 50% on basis of derivation.
Furthermore, the 26.5% is sub-divided as follows:-
(a) Minimum responsibility of government 50%
(b) Population, 40%
(c) Land area, 10%
The 58.5% share of the federal government has also 
been sub-divided according to the responsibilities and 
duties of the federal government.
(a) Responsibility of the federal government 55%.
(b) Initial development of the Federal Capital 2.5%.
513
iv
(c) Ecological problems 1%.
The share of the local government councils /s also 
sub-divided in similar percentages for equality, 
population and land as those of the state governments 
listed above. Hence Nigeria's formula for allocation of 
national revenue is highly rational and comprehensive.
Furthermore, the Act provided for the maintenance of 
joint State Local Government Accounts under the 
supervision of two committees.
1. The Federal Account Allocation Committee comprising:-
(i) The Federal Minister of Finance - Chairman.
(ii) Commissioner of Finance of each State.
(iii) Two persons appointed by the President.
(iv) The Accountant General of the Federation.
(v) The Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance or a person appointed by him.
The Committee ensures the prompt allocations and renders 
annual reports in respect of its functions.
2. A joint state Local Government Allocation Committee. 
The members of this committee are:-
(i) The Commissioner in charge of local government in 
the State - Chairman.
(ii) The Chairman of local councils.
(iii) Three Persons appointed by the Governor of the
State.
(iv) Two representatives of the Accountant General of 
the Federation.
State governments are expressly prohibited from
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borrowing money, funds, revenue allocated to the local 
councils.^
The Nigerian experience therefore affords a good 
example of the difficulties that can be encountered in the 
distribution of revenue in a decentralised system.
Finally, the principle of national interest hinges on 
the fact that certain essential services are of a national 
nature. The national government has to maintain some 
minimum standards throughout the country as well as see to 
it that provision is made for certain matters to be of 
significance to the central government. Matters like the 
judiciary, prisons, schools, health facilities and the 
1 ike.
Although the Sudan is not a signatory to 
International Conventions like the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) and the 
European Social Charter, which impose positive obligations 
on governments' parties to them to provide free education 
and medical assistance respectively, it could by no means 
avoid such obligations. These extraneous circumstances 
make it accountable to the international community for the 
maintenance of these minimum standards. But what does 
this mean in terms of finance? It means that if these 
functions are to be performed by a region, then the 
central government is under an obligation to see to it 
that the region has adequate resources to fulfil those 
functions or carry them out at the most basic or minimal
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standards. There will, therefore, always be inevitable 
need for grants from the central government. But should 
the grants be earmarked so as to cater for the specified 
obligations? This might be necessary, considering the 
purposes for which grants are given and the types that 
exist.
Grants are intended to fulfil several purposes.
1. Grants may wholly or partly finance the cost of 
services or development programmes regarded as being 
of national significance. That is to say, they 
should be consistent with the level of national 
interests, policies and targets.
2. Grants may encourage the efforts of regional 
authorities to develop services and programmes which 
are of course in line with national policy.
3. Grants can stimulate growth in regional economies 
which would both contribute to national growth and 
reduce inter-regional disparities.
4. Grants can be used for controlling regional 
expenditure so as to ensure compliance with national 
policies and standards.
5. Grants can also help in securing an equal or more 
equal, standard of services or development.
6. Grants can be intended to compensate regions with a 
low fiscal capacity, a relatively inferior potential 
for raising their own revenues.
7. Finally, grants can assist regions to cope with 
emergencies.
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The type of grants depends on the purpose or method
of transfer. Types of grants identifiable are:-
1. Percentage grants, which are based upon a fixed 
percentage, to meet the cost of specific purposes or 
projects. The ratio between the governments is 
determined - say 100% or 50% or 25% or any suitable 
figure. The Swedish Government for example gives 
local authorities 100% for the cost of teachers' 
salaries. The Sri Lanka Government provides 50% of 
the cost of municipal construction projects, 
including water supplies, bridges, playgrounds and 
libraries.
2. Unit cost grants are based upon a fixed sum per unit 
of service; for example, £500 per kilometre of road 
maintained, £20 per primary school child, etc. In 
Indonesia, for instance, the central government gives 
fixed sums per primary school and class, for repairs, 
equipment, books and sports. Unit grants can 
therefore cater for cost variations as well.
3. Grants to match the exploitation of regional national 
resources. This type of grant is self-explanatory.
An example is where the Tamil Nadu State in India 
gives village Pa^chayats grants to equal their 
collection of house tax as incentive grants.
4. Development grants may be allotted for a specified 
range of functions. For example, the Kenya District 
Development Fund and the Rural Development Grants in 
Papua New Guinea are intended for a variety of 
developmental functions.
5. Equalisation grants are intended to "top up" direct
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regional incomes in areas of below average or below
'standard' of fiscal capacity. For example, the
Indian State of Andhra Pradesh tops up Paflchayat
revenue where average land revenue liabilities fall
below one rupee per capita.
6. Contributions to balance regional budgets are meant
to reconcile regional revenue with expenditure. They 
•t&Ke.
either^the form of) block grants of" deficit 
grants. Deficit grants are based on actual budget 
deficits as in the Sudan. Here the grants are
normally estimated to meet the gap between
expenditure needs and the potential regional revenue 
as defined by regional and national standards as we 
shall see.
Having examined the criteria used for allocation of 
revenue generally, we now proceed to analyse those used in 
the Sudan from 1971 to 1985. Did the Sudan adopt any
l\
rational formula for the distribution of powers of rev^ue 
and expenditure between the central and regional 
governments; and between the regional and local 
governments? How successfully were the powers implemented
in practice? Were there any problems encountered? If so,
which ones?
Powers of financial control and expenditure will also 
be considered. The absence of a financial machinery in 
the country is also pointed out.
These examinations are, however, done against the
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poor economic profile of the Sudan which has had low GNP
and GDP over the years coupled with a high inflation rate.
Precisely, Sudan's GNP per capita stood at 440 US million
dollars in 1982 while the GDP was 1,160 US million dollars
in the same year. The inflation rate was projected to
reach 45% by 1985.^. Official sources, on the other hand,
indicated a steep debt rise from 227.5 US million dollars
in 1970 to 3,772.8 in 1982, coming to about 9 billion by 
8 F1985. Details of the economic profile are shown in the 
introduction.]
II GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
As in other countries, the Sudan depends on tax and 
non-tax revenues. The structure of the central government 
budget for the years 1978/79 - 1979/80 is shown in Table 
9.1. Table 9.1 shows that the principalL sources of 
revenue for the central government are the indirect taxes 
accruing from Import and Export Duties, Excise Duties and 
Duties on goods and services. So other forms of taxes not 
shown in the table have been assigned to the regional and 
local governments.
Ill REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
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Table 9:1
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET (REVENUE 
AND EXPENDITURE) (IN Ls MILLIONS)
1978/79 1979/80
Revenues Actuals Estimates Actuals Estimates
Import Duties/Duties on 
goods and services/ 
Excise tax 276 326 297 327
Other indirect taxes 82 87 77 70
Consolidated Income tax 61 66 55 89
Contribution from Agri­
cultural, Industrial and 
Commercial Corporation/ 
Profits from Suguar Mono­
poly 44 92 41 34
Other (including sale of 
Government Property) 172 341 222 486
Other public sector 
operations 5 8
Total 640 912 700 1006
Expenditures
Recurrent 575 821 671 943
Development 169 285 137 330
Public Enterprises Deficit s 74 0 43 ?
Total 818 1106 851 1273 +?
Deficit 178 196 151 267 +?
Met by: External loans 68 91
Bank Finance (net) 112 59
Source: Bank of Sudan: Annual Reports 1979 and 1980.
Figures rounded to the nearest Million.
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Regional governments in the Sudan were empowered to 
prepare budgets for services and development programmes 
and to impose taxes in addition to taxes levied by the 
Central Government and grants received from the same. We 
shall examine the financial powers of the Southern 
Regional Government and those of the regional governments 
in the Northern Sudan separately.
A. Powers of the Southern Regional Government
Section 25(2) of the Self-Government Act provided:
"The High Executive Council shall prepare 
a budget to meet expenditure for the 
services of security, administration and 
development of the Southern Region 
according to national plans and 
programmes and shall be presented thereby 
to the approval of the People's Regional 
Assembly."
As explained earlier, (see Chapter 7), development plans 
and budgets for the Southern Region were actually prepared 
in the region despite the prohibition for the region not 
to participate in planning stated in Section 6 of the 
Self-Government Act.
However, the budgets for the implementation of those 
plans had to be submitted to the central government for 
vetting before it could be approved by the People's 
Regional Assembly. This requirement was imposed by the 
Provisions of the Financial and Accounts Procedure Act,
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1977 and the Financial Regulations and Proceedings Act,
1 9 7 8 . ^  Section 16 of the Financial and Accounts
Procedure Act, 1977, stated:
"The Ministry [that is Central Ministry 
of Finance] shall inspect carefully the 
proposals of the annual budgets of the 
Peoples Executive District Councils and 
the Southern Region with a view to 
determining the deficit which will be met 
by the Central Government or the 
surplus." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly the aim of this provision was to authorise the
central government to determine how much was to be paid to
the region in terms of deficit grants. Determination in
this case involved reduction of amounts regarded as too
high for the central government to meet (see Chapter 7).
However, in order to enable the central government to
inspect, the Financial Regulations and Proceedings Act,
1978, required the Southern Region budget proposals to be
forwarded to the Central Ministry of Finance before they
could be discussed by the Regional A s s e m b l y . ^  In
practice, however, the budgets were even prepared
according to guidelines issued by the same Ministry that
did the inspection. Thus regional budgets and development
plans were, in reality, seriously controlled by the
central government. Central government control, as
already mentioned, involved arbitrary cuts to reduce the
estimates to fit the size of the purse of the donor
government. This was the case with the 1979/80
development budget when it was reduced from £20 million to 
12£15 million and has been so on many occasions.
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The Taxing Powers and Sources of Revenue for the Regional 
Government
The taxing powers of the Southern Regional Government
were prescribed as follows:-
"The People's Regional Assembly may levy 
Regional duties and taxes in addition to 
national and local duties and taxes. It 
may make legislations and orders to 
guarantee the collection of all public 
monies at different levels."
Different levels probably meant all Regional Government
Departments plus all the tiers of the local government
councils in the region since they were within the
jurisdiction of the regional government. Thus the taxing
powers of the regional government were separate from those
of the central and local governments.
The sources of revenue assigned to the regional 
government were listed in Section 25(1) of the Act as 
follows:-
"(i) Direct and indirect regional 
taxes.
(ii) Contributions from People's local 
government councils.
(iii) Revenue from commercial, 
industrial and agricultural 
projects in the region in 
accordance with the national Plan.
(iv) Funds from the National Treasury 
for established services.
(v) Funds voted by the National 
Assembly in accordance with the 
requirements of the region.
(vi) Special Development Budget for the 
Southern Region ...
(vii) Revenues to be determined in a 
special schedule attached to a 
finance law.
(viii) Any other sources."
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Clearly, the foregoing section did the following:
1. It authorised the regional government to raise local 
revenue from taxes and duties as well as investments 
in commercial, industrial and agricultural 
enterprises.
2. It authorised the regional government to receive 
three types of grants from the central governments.
(i) Grants to be voted by the National Assembly;
(ii) Grants for established services; (iii) Grants 
for special Development Budget.
3. The Local Government Councils were to contribute to 
the regional government. This idea was possibly 
carried over from the past practice when the local 
government councils used to contribute to the central 
government (see Chapter 4).
4. "Any other source" probably included loans and 
donations.
The revenues to be determined by a "finance law" were
accordingly provided in "The Revenues of Taxes and Duties
(Financial Aid and Other Revenue) for the Southern Region 
14Act, 1972", which became popularly known as Decree 39, 
promulgated by the President soon after the Addis Ababa 
Agreement.
As stated in the foregoing subprovision (vii) of 
Section 25(1) of the Self-Government Act, the Decree was 
intended to supplement and consolidate the sources 
assigned to the regional government.
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Apparently the law was not based on the
recommendations of an expert body (be it an official
comission or committee of technocrats). It originated
15instead from the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement
which were simply glossed over. No finance or economic
committee was formed because delegates from the Southern
Sudan Liberation Movement were too few and could not spare
anyone to represent them on such a committee. However,
the Decree did two important things. It specified or
spelled out the sort of taxes referred to as direct and
indirect taxes and duties in Section 25(1)(i) of the
Self-Government Act. It also authorised the regional
government to receive financial "aid" from the central
government. "Aid" meant any financial contribution paid
by the Central Government to the regional government
16towards the consolidation of the latter. However, "aid" 
was not clearly earmarked in the schedule to the Act. It 
was therefore difficult to distinguish "aid" from taxes 
and duties as we shall soon see. Aid was to be refunded 
in accordance with the terms specified jointly by the 
Minister for Local Government and the High Executive 
Council.
Taxes and Duties specified by the Decree were:-
1. Taxes on Net Income and Profit
Taxes on net income and profit included:-
(i) Business profit tax, collected from the region.
(ii) Personal income tax on government officials resident
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in the region.
(iii) Special development tax on adults in the region.
(iv) Rental tax at 5% of net profits of factories, 
cooperative societies; agricultural enterprises and 
cinemas, on central government and local government 
installations and enterprises in the region.
(v) Post office revenue, stamp duties.
2. Taxes on Production and Consumption
Taxes on production and consumption were:-
(i) Sugar monopoly profits on sugar consumed in the 
region .
(ii) Excise duties on alcoholic drinks and beverages sold 
in the region.
3. Taxes on International Trade
Taxes on international trade included:-
(i) Export duties on goods from the South.
(ii) Royalties on forestry products from the South.
(iii) Royalties on cigarettes, pipe tobacco and leaf
tobacco.
4. Fees and Charges
Fees and charges were levied on
(i) Sale of land.
(ii) Sale of farms and documents.
(iii) Other items specified from time to time.
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5. Proprietary Receipts
Proprietary receipts came from corporation tax on 
any factory or agricultural projects established in 
the region by other body other than the regional 
government at 5% of the initial cost.
6. Contributions from central government for the 
encouragement of agricultural, industrial projects 
and trading enterprises at 20% of the initial costs.
7. Grants from the National Treasury for new social 
service projects initiated in the region at the 
following rates.
(i) Educational institutions 20% of the expensese.
(ii) Trunk and through roads and bridges, 25% of the 
expenses.
(iii) Relief and social amenities 15% of the expenses.
(iv) Tourist attraction projects 25% of the expenses.
(v) Security 15% of the expenses.
(vi) Grants for post-secondary and university education 
in the Sudan 20% of the grants.
(vii) Contribution for research, scientific advancement, 
and cultural activities 25% of the expenses.
Superficially, the powers of the Southern region were 
wide and flexible enough even to include new sources of 
revenue. As to whether these powers yielded sufficient 
revenue for the services and development projects in the
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region will be considered after examining the powers of 
the regional governments in the Northern Sudan.
B . Powers of the Regional Governments in the Northern
Sudan
The financial powers of the Regional Governments in 
the Northern Sudan were similar in many respects to those 
of the Southern Regional Government. They could plan and 
budget for the implementation of the plans which were also 
controlled by central government. Although the provisions 
of the 1977 and 1978 financial laws were not amended to 
cover them, in practice they were subjected to similar 
procedures.
Their sources of revenue were fewer and enumerated as 
follows:-
" (i) Revenue obtained from the regional, 
commercial, industrial and 
agricultural projects.
(ii) Funds approved by the national 
government to the benefit of the 
region.
(iii) Loans and donations."
However, the regional governments could also, with the 
permission of the central government levy or collect taxes 
and fees from the following:-
" (a) Taxes on exports and imports.
(b) Excise duties.
(c) Capital profit tax.
(d) Pension deduction and after service 
benefits.
(e) Any taxes and fees on any commercial 
dealings, national services or 
investments or any other services or
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any official of the national power.
(f) Any taxes on fees or commercial
dealings, services, investments or 
any other service or any officials 
of the regional government."
Although the style of drafting is very clumsy it was clear
that taxes on international trade, and taxes and fees
arising from the central government enterprises in the
regions needed the approval of the central government
which was not the case with the Southern Regional
Government (as we have seen).
Moreover, certain tax sources made available to the
Southern region were omitted from those of the Northern
regions. These included items like contributions from the
people's local councils and the grant for the Special
Development Budget. But as we shall shortly see, these
v
additional sources conferred no practical financial 
advantage to the South. In reality, they were obsolete.
On the other hand, the Northern regions could, with the 
approval of the central governments (as stated above), 
raise revenue from pension deductions while the Southern 
region was not theoretically empowered to do so. Hence 
the differences in the sources of revenue between the 
Southern region and the regions in the North existed 
mainly in theory. In practice, there were financial 
imbalances between the regions but these were not 
primarily due to the sources quoted above, but because of 
the formula for the distribution of the grants and the 
different levels of development in the country. This 
point will become clearer when we examine the mobilisation 
of revenue by the regional governments.
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C . Mobilisation of Revenue by the Regional Governments
As already stated, the powers of the regional 
government detailed earlier showed that they could:-
1. Obtain grants from the central government.
2. Raise revenue locally from tax rates, fees and 
profits on investment.
3. Obtain loans and receive donations.
We now proceed to examine how these powers were 
implemented. Most of our examples will be drawn from the 
South because of its rich experience and long existence. 
Consideration will be given to one item in turn.
1. Grants to the Southern Regional Government
Clearly three kinds of transfers were meant to be 
made by the Central Government to the Southern Regional 
Government. (i) Funds for established services, which 
were contained in Chapters I and II of the budget.
Whereas Chapter I was for salaries and allowances of 
employees of the regional government, Chapter II was for 
services like office equipment, transport, spare parts, 
lubricants, etc.
(ii) Funds voted according to the requirements of the 
region. Requirements of the region were very wide and 
could include development budgets as well. (iii) Funds
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for the Special Development Budget for the Southern 
region.
Inspite of the clarity of the provisions, there were 
two kinds of transfers only. These were funds for 
established services and funds for development. Thus the 
difference between funds voted for the requirements of the 
region and the Special Development Budget funds were 
blurred after the establishment of the regional government 
in 1972. That means funds for the Special Development 
Budget for the Southern Region only existed at the time of 
the Ministry for Southern Affairs.
Since there was no specific fund for the Special 
Development Budget other than the development fund itself 
- there was no difference between the categories of funds 
transferred to the Southern region and the other regions 
even though the other regions had no provision entitling 
them to some special development budget.
Table 9.2 shows transfers made by the central 
government to the regional governments for the years 
1980/81 to October 1981.
As can be seen from the table, the central and 
Northern regions received higher grants than they would 
have deserved if distribution was based on the principle 
of needs; that is to say if the populations were regarded 
as the criteria for assessing needs. Area was not 
considered either. Apparently the richer regions like the
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Central region and Khartoum received higher grants than 
the poorer ones like the Eastern and the Southern regions. 
This was so because of the deficit grant system employed 
by the Central Government intended to meet (not entirely), 
the difference between estimates and expenditure only.
Thus in a way, the deficit grant system worked closely to 
the principle of derivation in as far as widening the gap 
between the poorer and richer regions was concerned.
Apart from the inequitable nature of the deficit 
grant system explained above, it had some other major 
defects. For example, the amount of grants actually 
released by the central government did not match the 
budgeted amounts. This was very obvious in the case of 
the Southern Region for all the years from 1972/73 to 
1980/81, as shown in Table 9.3.
Though the amounts released never matched the 
estimates, there were annual improvements in the figures 
as shown by Table 9.3. No reason was ever given to 
account for the fluctuation between the amounts released 
in 1973/74 and the latter years as from 1979/80.
Presumably the sudden rise in 1979/80 was due to the 
creation of new regional governments in the Northern Sudan 
in 1980.
The main reason for the cause of deficit within 
deficit (that is releasing less amounts to meet the 
deficit) was the shortage of liquid money. But careful 
consideration of the central government general
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Table 9:3
GRANTS FOR THE * SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT' 
BUDGET IN (OOP) OF SUDANESE POUNDS
Year Amount budgeted 
(a)
Amount realised 
(b)
(b) as % 
of (a)
1972/73 1,400 .560 0.4
1973/74 7,330 .676 9.2
1974/75 7,136 1,696 24
1975/76 7,164 1,624 23
1976/77 15,332 4,226 27
1977/78 32,490 6, 125 18
1978/79 22,500 7,822 35
1979/80 20,500 10,305 50.3
1980/81 20,500 12,804 62.5
Source: SPs Sodhi, Financial Issues, op. cit., p. 41.
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expenditure budget, casts much doubt on this explanation; 
as can be seen in Table 9.4, there were surpluses for the 
years 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84.
Furthermore, the amounts of the grants were
inconsistent, the transfers were irregular and the total
amounts transferred were very little. They hardly
amounted to 30% of the total national revenue. The sudden
rise in 1983/84 after the decline in 1980/81 was explained
by the Central Minister of Finance as being "in line with
the increased importance accorded by President Numeiri to
17
regionalisation". However, the seriousness of this 
statement is highly doubtful in view of the above facts.
Inspite of the shortcomings in the grant system, it 
was the most important source of revenue for both regional 
and local governments in the Sudan. Table 9.5 shows the 
relative importance of the grants to the locally-collected 
revenue.
For the years 1978/79 to 1981/82, as shown by Table 
9.5, the amount of grants exceeded the local revenues by 
about 70%. However, the grants declined progressively as 
the locally collected revenues showed improvements. 
Understandably, the nature of deficit financing is such 
that while local revenues appreciate, the transfers 
decline because the difference between estimates and 
expenditure is reduced.
r
Despite the grants transferred to the decentralised
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Table 9:5
SUMMARY OF THE TRANSFERS FOR THE YEARS 1978/79 - 
1981/82 SHOWING BUDGETED EXPENDITURE 
AGAINST RECURRENT REVENUES IN 
£(QQQ) SUDANESE fcmtyj
I terns 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
Expenditure 
Regional 
Executive Coun­
cils
Local Councils 
Total expendi­
ture
28,138
13,192
4,050
45,380
34,236
29,990
64,226
38,203
32,383
5,470
76,056
47,122
46,381
9,063
102,566
Revenue
Tax and Non Tax
Revenue
Regional
Provincial
Local
Total Revenue
11,412 
2,896 
4, 523 
*18,831
14,371
7,143
*21,514
15,054
2,680
4,682
*22,416
18,114
8,333
9,062
*35,539
Deficit 26,549 42,712 53,640 67,027
Grants in aid
Regional
Provincial
14,200 
9,300
16,200
19,800
19,293 
20,707
21 ,963 
26,038
Total *23,500 *36,000 *40,000 *48,000
* N o t e : Grants for development projects are excluded.
Source: J.R. Malik, Issues of Local Finance in the Southern
Region, In issues in the Management of Local Govern­
ment in the Southern Region of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan, Juba (1981), p. 25 .
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governments, the latter were always in deficit. Hence the 
position of having deficit within deficit was perpetuated 
in the Southern Region and indeed in the Sudan as a whole. 
It is difficult to explain why the Central Government was 
unwilling to meet the deficits when it had a surplus 
itself. Presumably decentralisation was not so important 
inspite of the political rhetoric surrounding it (see 
Chapter 5).
The drastic falls in 1981/82 and 1982/83 were 
probably due to the establishment of new regional 
governments in the Northern Sudan too; indicating that no 
extra allowances were made for them. Worse still, the 
grants could not meet the purposes for which they were 
intended as shown in Table 9.6. Clearly, the gap between 
the budgeted figures and the grants was widening, year by 
year. Although grants were a vital source of revenue for 
the regional governments, they were inadequate, 
inconsistent, irregular, irrational and imbalanced as 
examined above.
Regional Government Taxes and Fees
The locally collected revenues consisted of taxes, 
fees and duties as explained earlier. These will be 
examined in turn.
2. Regional Government Taxes
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Regional Government taxes can be classified as 
follows:-
(i) Taxes and fees levied and collected by the central 
government but assigned to the regional governments.
(ii) Taxes levied by the central government but collected 
by the regional government.
(iii) Taxes levied and collected by the regional 
government.
These taxes are also examined in turn.
(i) Taxes and fees levied and collected by the central 
government, but assigned to the regional government
These group of taxes and fees included:-
(a) Excise Duties
(b) Consumption Duties
(c) Export Duties
(d) Stamp Duties
(e) Post and Telegraph Duties
(f) Profits on Sugar
(g) Corporation Tax on New Projects.
(a ) Excise Duties
As we have seen, Decree 39 initially covered Excise 
Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits only. The scope 
of these taxes was, however, widened to include
540
cigarettes, petroleum products, cotton, sugar, shoes,
textiles, vegetable oil, soap, etc. by agreement between
18the regional and central government authorities. Table 
9.6 shows the budgeted share of the regional government in 
the national yield.
Regrettably, the share of the regional government in 
the total revenue of the Excise Duties was utterly
miserable. It neither corresponded to the population nor
the area of the region.
The inconsistency in the regional shares shows the
arbitrary nature of the decision. Inspite the extreme
poverty of the regional government's share, the central
government failed to recruit in full the budgeted amounts
to the regional government on the grounds that statistics
pertaining to the goods consumed in or originating from
the region had not been obtained. Attempts to collect the
statistics were unsuccessful because it was impracticable
to record the flow of goods to the region. There was no
elaborate system for doing so. So the accurate
comprehensive records demanded by the Central Government
authorities were unobtainable. This excuse was, however,
extremely flimsy since other criteria like population
index or some similar ones could have been used for
assessing reasonable estimates. One is forced to conclude
that the failure was due to lack of political will on the
19part of the Central Government bureaucrats.
In view of this problem, the Southern Regional
541
Government enacted "The Regional Excise and Consumption
20Duties Act, 1977". Under this law, the region acquired 
the right to collect excise duties on excisable goods
manufactured in the region. A lot of revenues were
expected from Wau Beer factory which was due for 
production in 1977/78. Increased output of cigarettes was 
also anticipated from the Haggar Cigarette Company. 
Estimates in the Six-year Development Plan showed that the
Wau Beer factory would produce 20,000 bottles per annum at
its maximum, which would fetch up to £s 4,800,000 as 
excise duty [see Table 9.7]. The Haggar Company was 
expected to increase its output from 9,000,000 cigarettes 
per annum in 1978/79 to 35,000,000 cigarettes by 1982/83, 
thereby increasing the amount of Excisable Duty from £s 
120,000 to £s 470,000 over that period. The statistical 
data is shown in Table 9.8.
However, due to financial constraints and the 
unavailability of proper managerial skills, these 
expectations were not fulfilled.
(b ) Consumption Duty
Consumption Duty was not based on Decree 39. It was
merely agreed between the regional and central government
authorities that the region should share from Duties
21imposed on imported beer and cigarettes. Table 9.9 
shows the expected revenue on this item. However, inspite 
of the estimates, the region never received its share, for
542
Table 9:7 
WAU BEER FACTORY ( U s )
Year Production in bottles Excise duty 
in Ls
1977-78 6,000,000 1,400,000
1978-79 16,000,000 3,700,000
1979-80 20,000,000 4,800,000
1980-81 20,000,000 4,800,000
1981-82 20,000,000 4,800,000
1982-83 20,000,000 4,800,000
Source: The Democratic Republic of the Sudan,
Southern Region, The Six-year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development, 1977/78 - 
1982/83, p. 59.
Table 9:8 
HAGGAR CIGARETTES COMPANY U ( )
Year Production Excise Duty
1977-78 9,000,000 cigarettes 120,000
1978-79 18,000,000 ” 240,000
1979-80 35,000,000 " 466,000
1980-81 35,000,000 " 470,000
1981-82 35,000,000 " 470,000
1982-83 35,000,000 " 470,000
Source: The Democratic Republic of the Sudan,
The Six-year Plan, o p . cit. , p. 60.
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similar reasons that obstructed the payment of Excise 
Duties. The estimated loss of the Regional Government 
from its share on this item was put at £s 1,450 million 
for the period between 1973/74 and .1977/78,
Although the said Regional Excise and Consumption 
Duties Act, 1977, empowered the regional government to 
impose Consumption Duties on goods imported directly into 
the region, the Customs Department had never paid any 
money into the account of the Regional Treasury on this 
item until the dissolution of the regional government in 
1983. The Central Government decided to be obstinate and 
defy the regional law. Since this item was not covered by 
Decree 39 it was therefore not within the jurisdiction of 
the regional government. Hence the provision was ultra 
vires, null and void.
(c) Export Duties
It was estimated that a total amount of £s 24,000 
would accrue to the regional government from Export Duties 
at the rate of about £s 6000 per annum for the period 
between 1973/74 and 1977/78 as shown in Table 9.10. 
However, no amount was ever transfered to the Southern 
Regional Government, for lack of statistics as in the case 
of Consumption Duty.
The region attempted to raise revenue on this item by 
exporting its products like cotton, tobacco, crocodile,
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skin and fish. However, the tax duty on the export of 
crocodile skin was particularly unpopular with the 
exporters, resulting in great difficulties in collections. 
On the whole, revenues collected from Export Duties in the 
region were very negligible.
(d) and (e) Stamp Duties, Posts and Telegraph Revenues
Stamp duties were charged according to the rates 
determined by the central government. The Post Offices in 
the region used to obtain their supplies of stamps from 
the Central Ministry of Finance and National Economy and 
remit the sales proceeds to the same.
However, Decree 39 entitled the regional government
to receive revenue from the sale of stamps and any
revenues collected by the Posts and Telegraphs Department
and the Telecommunications Department from their sales and
services in the region but receipts from the above sources
were not initially remitted to the regional government in
full for no given reason. An agreement was also reached
between the regional and central government in .1977/78
fiscal year whereby revenues for posts and telegraphs and
telecommunications assigned to the region were to be
directly remitted to the regional government, but the
latter had to assume responsibility for the maintenance of
all post offices in the region. Since then an annual
22amount of £s 100,000 has accrued to the region under 
this heading. Nevertheless, the share of the regional
547
government was extremely poor compared to the total 
revenue collected by the post offices in the country.
Table 9.11 shows the share estimated for the regional 
government.
(f) Profits on Sugar
The sale of sugar was a state monopoly from which 
revenue accrued to the central government. Decree 39 also 
entitled the regional government to profits on sugar 
monopoly based on the amount consumed in the region.
However, until the 1976/77 fiscal year, the central 
government never fulfilled its obligation, for reasons 
best known to itself.
The following profits had been estimated to accrue 
from sale of sugar by the governments^ /oLow^ to. tic * *1- .
After intensive discussions between the regional and
central governments in June 1977, and detailed examination
of the statistics with the Sugar Corporation, however,
estimates of the region's share of sugar "consumption" was 
23fixed at 4%. The figure was unrealistically low.
Moreover, the central government even failed to implement 
the agreement in full. The region got £s 1 million only 
from this yield every y e a r . ^
(9) Corporation Tax on New Projects
548
Table 9:11 
STAMP DUTIES S 1
Year Central Government 
Revenue (in Ls Millions)
Share of 
Revenue for 
The Regional 
Government 
(in L s )
1973-74 2.25
1974-75 2.00 20,000
1975-76 2.00 30,000
1976-77 3.00 30,000
1977-78 2.50 45,000
1978-79 2.50 120,000
1979-80 2.50 125,000
Source: SPs Sodhi, op. cit., p. 7.
Table 9:12 
PROFITS ON SUGAR u s )
Year Central Government Revenue 
(in Ls millions)
1973-74 12.33
1974-75 -
1975-76 12.00
1976-77 37 .00
1977-78 28.00
1978-79 29.60
1979-80 67.00
Source: SPs Sodhi, op. cit., p. 8.
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We saw that Decree 39 fixed corporation tax at 5% of
the initial cost of new factories and agricultural
projects set up in the region but not run by the regional
government. As pointed out by Sodhi, SPS, UN technical
adviser to the Regional Ministry of Finance, "although it"
was "easy to determine this [amount] of tax, the regional
government ... rarely received this revenue from the
25central government" because projects in the region^never 
materialised due to lack of funds and skilled manpower.
Thus taxes levied and collected by the central 
government but assigned tothe regional government were a 
disastrous failure.
(ii) Taxes levied by the central government but collected 
by the regional government
The taxes levied by the central government but 
collected by the regional government were:-
(a) Personal income tax
(b) Land rental tax
(c) Business profit tax.
These were direct taxes levied by the central government
2 6under the Income Tax Act, 1971. Decree 39 obliged 
individuals and businessmen residing or operating in the 
region to pay these taxes to the regional government. Of 
the three taxes, the personal income tax and the business 
profit tax were problematical.
550
(a ) The Personal Income Tax (PIT)
Limited success was achieved in the collection of 
this personal income tax. Considerable difficulties were 
experienced in the collection of these taxes from the 
employees of the central, regional and local governments 
in the region.
In the case of the regional and local government 
employees, personal income deductions were not remitted to 
the Department of Taxation in a regular manner, due to 
lack of liquidity. Financial hardships facing Regional 
Ministries and Provincial Executive Councils forced them 
to utilize the deductions to meet urgent needs. Worse 
still the accounts of the deductions were not passed to 
the Taxation Department.
The Regional Ministry of Finance tried to overcome
this problem by deducting an ad hoc sum of 8% from funds
released to various Ministries and Province Executive
71Councils towards disbursement of salaries. ' Obviously 
this was not a rational solution. Finally, the Ministry 
decided to deduct all personal income tax before remitting 
the salaries to the various Ministries and Departments.
As for the employees of the Central Government 
working in the region, most of their deductions were also 
not fully remitted to the Department of Taxation on the
551
ground that some of their mother units in the Centre sent
them only the net amounts of salaries. However, an
agreement was reached in 1976 that personal income
deductions in respect of those employees be remitted
directly to the regional government by the central
2 8
government units. Thereafter the yield from this tax 
increased from £s 500,000 to £s 1,350,000 between the 
years 1976/77 and 1981/82.29
(b ) Business Profit Tax
We also saw that Decree 39 empowered the regional 
government to impose Business Profits Tax. According to
the provisions of the "Traders Licence and Taxation of
3 0Business Profits Act, 1930" the People's Province
Executive Councils were responsible for the collection of
Business Profits Tax but only from traders whose income
31was less than £s 1000 per annum. Therefore the regional
government was entitled to Business Profits Tax on incomes
above £s 1000 per annum which used to accrue to the
central government. Inspite of these limits, there was
nevertheless some conflict of jurisdiction between the
regional government and the People's Province Executive
Councils which according to John Russie, resulted in
"under-assessment - and considerable tax-evasion by 
3 ?
traders". “ in addition to that, the taxation offices 
were too thin . all over the region so as to be able to 
reach nearer to all tax-payers.
552'
In view of these difficulties, the regional 
government decided that the collection of the entire 
Business Profit Tax be transfered to the Taxation 
Department of the Regional Ministry of Finance which would 
pay 60% of the yields to the People's Province Executive 
Councils. As from 1981/82, the entire yields were passed 
to the Executive Councils.
(c) Taxes Levied and Collected by the Regional Government
In the exercise of its powers provided by Section
25(1) of the Self-Government Act, the Regional Assembly
3 3enacted "The Regional Finance Act, 1974". According to 
Isaac Makur ...., the Director of Finance, this law was 
intended to provide additional sources of revenue for
34meeting part of the costs of the development projects.
The Act imposed Development Tax on government 
officials, employees and licence-holders for various 
businesses and professional practices in the region.
In 1977, the regional government introduced more 
taxes on the following:-
(i) Consumption taxes on sugar, dates, diesel, petrol, 
whisky, brandy and rum.
(ii) Service fees on telegrams, airport embarkation,
hotel bills and rest houses.
(iii) Production fees on agricultural produce like dura,
sesame, cotton, tobacco and cigarettes.
(iv) Property tax on imported vehicle and miscellaneous
553
appliances.
(v) Excise Duty on imported tea, coffee and exported 
crocodile skin and fish as mentioned earlier.
The total collections for the years 1974/75 - 1981/82 
is shown in Table 9.13.
As can be seen from Table 9.13, the revenue from 
these taxes and fees registered substantial growth from 
year to year. Although they had formed only 27% of the 
total tax revenue of the region in 1975/76, had risen
to 43% of the same in the following year. They further 
rose to 58% in 1980/81 and 72% in 1981/82.^^ Inspite of 
the steady progress, the amounts realised never reached 
the budgeted estimates as illustrated by Table 9.14.
Problems faced in the collection of Regional taxes 
were of the usual administrative nature such as lack of 
personnel, transport facilities, appropriate forms and 
dishonesty of the officials.
In the case of Development taxes, employees of the 
Central Government presented the same difficulties as were 
seen with regard to the Personal Income tax.
New Taxes
The new taxes introduced by the regional government 
included Sales taxes, Secondhand Motor Vehicle Purchase 
tax and Education tax.
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Table 9:14
ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL COLLECTIONS
OF LOCAL TAX REVENUES (TvTU s ~)
Year
Budgeted
Estimates
Amount
Realised
Percentage of 
the Amount Realised
1974/75 2.73
1975/76 3.16 1.72 54.43
1976/77 4.63 3.83 83.15
1977/78 8.43 5.22 61.92
1978/79 11.41 - -
1979/80 - - -
1980/81 15.05 7.04 46.78
1981/82 18.11 7.67 42.35
1982/83 20.63 -
Sources: compilations from: Isaac Makur Ater, "Regional
Financial Resources and their Allocation" (1979) 
and John Russie, "Fiscal and Financial Relation­
ship with Central and Local Governments" (1983).
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(i) Sales Taxes
Sales taxes were expected to yield £s. 240,000 from 
Renk Oil Mill and Tonj Kenaf Factory, which were expected 
to be in production in 1978/79 and 1979/80 respectively. 
However, the factories never came into operation for 
several reasons. The machinery and other equipment were 
not transported to the project sites because of transport 
bottlenecks. Inadequate funds and skilled manpower made 
it difficult to complete the plants.
(ii) Education Tax
The regional government introduced Education Tax in 
3 61978 and abolished all school fees but the Education Tax
Act was soon repealed in 1980 on the grounds that it was
contrary to the provisions of the constitution which
37advocated free universal education. But the charging of 
school fees in some schools was also unconstitutional.
Yet no action was taken against them. These schools were 
the private ones like Camboni schools and model schools.
3. Fees and charges for goods and services - rendered by 
the various Regional Ministries
The Regional Ministries raised revenue by charging
558
fees for services rendered by them or for goods sold by
them to supplement the above mentioned taxes. Regional
Ministries like Agriculture, Communications and Wildlife
made the greatest contributions. For example, in 1978/79
the Ministry of Wildlife collected £s 750,000 Sudanese and
200,000 US dollars from the collection of fees for
hunting, photography, sightseeing, Rest House fees, sale
38of ivory aned game-scoutmg. But, as shown by Table 
9.15, the collections never came near the estimated 
amounts. The estimates were too excessive to match the 
yields even though the amounts increased very rapidly year 
by year.
IV LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
We have seen that functions of local government 
councils under the 1971 and 1981 People's Local Government 
Acts included undertaking minor development projects in 
addition to the provision of services. They also had the 
authority to plan and prepare their separate budgets to 
support those plans. Inspite of their shortcomings in the 
planning and budget preparations, as seen in Chapter 7, 
they maintained independent budgets.
However, they were required to follow the rigorous 
procedures imposed by the Financial and Accounts Procedure 
Act, 1977 and the Financial Regulations and Proceedings
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Act, 1978 as in the case of regional governments 
(discussed earlier).
A . Sources of Revenue for the Local Government Councils
Except for one minor difference, sources of revenue 
for local government councils under the 1971 and the 1981 
Acts were identical. According to the People's Local 
Government Act, 1971, the revenues of the People's 
Executive Councils consisted o f :-
r"
" (a) Revenues from the taxes refer^d to 
in the Local Government 
(Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance,
1954 or in any other law, provided 
that the People's Executive 
Councils shall have the right to 
determine the amount of such taxes 
• • •
(b) Local fees and rates and licence 
fees.
(c) Revenues of commercial business 
carried on by the High Executive 
Counci 1.
(d) The proceeds of any taxes assigned 
by the central government.
(e) Appropriations determined by the 
Council of Ministers to enable the 
People's Executive Councils to 
fulfil their obligations.
(f) Fines and fees imposed or fixed by 
the People's Courts".
People's Courts included Chiefs Courts and the Native
Courts of 1931 and 1932 respectively (see Chapter 4); but
those legislations were never amended to read so.
However, funds from this source were diverted to the
central government since the judiciary was
constitutionally a central government matter.
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As we saw in Chapter 4, Revenues assigned by the 
Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes) Ordinance, 1954, 
included taxes on land and date trees, tribute tax, hut 
tax, poll tax, animal tax, taxation on rainlands (usur) 
tax and house tax. Following the tax reform of 1964, 
however, the hut, poll and tribute taxes were abolished 
for being inequitable. Taxes assigned by any other law 
covered rates, business profit tax (below £1000 as 
explained earlier), Licence on arms, fees on entertainment 
and any other local fees.
The difference between the Executive Councils in the
Southern Region and those in the Northern Sudan was that
in 1976, the regional government enacted the Social
41Service Tax Act, 1976 which replaced the taxes refered 
to under the Local Government (Appropriation of Taxes 
Ordinance) 1954 with one tax - that was the Social Service 
Tax. The Social Service Tax was imposed only on adult
A O
males in the region. The reason for the change was that 
the cattle-owning community in the region considered their 
animals neither as property nor as commodity for trade or 
business. In fact they were used for social functions, 
marriage considerations, performance of funeral rites and 
other prestigious purposes.
The only difference introduced by the 1981 Act was 
that the amount of grants to the local government councils 
w /f< to be decided by the regional governments.^ 
Previously, grants to the local councils were determined 
by the Central Government though those in the Southern
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region had theirs tampered with by the regional government 
which used to help itself out of the funds first. The 
appropriateness of the change is highly doubtful since it 
removes the central government totally out of the affairs 
of local government even in financial matters. As long as 
the regional governments remain financially badly off, 
they will seriously ignore the financial problems facing 
the local government councils.
B . Mobilisation of Revenue by the Local governments
Like the regional governments, local government 
councils in the Sudan were heavily dependent on the grants 
from the central or regional governments to supplement 
their locally collected revenues. We shall therefore 
consider grants to the councils before coming to the 
locally raised revenues.
1. Grants to the Local Government Councils
Grants were paid to these local government councils 
in accordance with the earlier quoted provision:- 
"appropriations determined by the Council of Ministers" to 
enable the People's Executive Councils to fulfil their 
obligations in Section 19 of the 1971 Act. This provision 
was of course substituted by that authorizing the regional 
governments to decide on the amount of funds to be
562
transferred to the Area Councils in the 1931 Act which 
repealed and replaced the 1971 Act.
The amount of grants transfered to the People's
u
Province Executive Councils exceeded the locally collected 
revenues as shown in Table 9.16 in the case of the 
Northern Sudan and Table 9.5 in the case of the South. 
However, the grant system was defective in several ways.
As in the case of regional governments, the table also 
shows that richer councils received more grants than the 
poorer ones.
The imbalance in the horizontal allocation of revenue 
also extended to the People's Province Executive Councils 
in the South as shown in Table 9.17 and the Area Councils 
even after the 1981 reforms as can be seen in the case of 
Kordofan Region illustrated by Tale 9.18. Furthermore, 
the grants received were less than the amounts budgeted as 
can be seen from Table 9.19. Table 9.20 shows the drastic 
difference between the allocations to the Northern 
Councils and the Councils in the Southern part of the 
country. The share of the latter was too little for no 
given reason. Presumably this was due to the inequitable 
system of deficit financing discussed earlier.
2. Local Government Taxes and Fees
Taxes and fees raised locally by the Councils can be 
grouped as follows:-
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Table 9:17
SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION OF GRANTS TO THE PEOPLES 
PROVINCE EXECUTIVE COUNCILS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION 
FOR THE YEAR 1980/81 FISCAL YEAR
Province Ls (000) Sudanese
Baher El Ghazal 637,500
Eastern Equatoria 202,400
Jonglei 602,800
Lakes 505,300
Upper Nile 599,300
Western Equatoria 383,700
Source: Regional Ministry of Administration, Juba.
Review of Peoples Executive Councils Annual 
Budgets for the fiscal year 1980/81, p. 46.
Table 9:18
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS TO THE AREA COUNCILS 
IN KORDOFAN REGION FOR THE YEARS 1981/82 AND 1982/83
(ALL IN Ls SUDANESE)
Area Council Expenditure 
81/82 82/83
Revenue 
81/82 82/83
El Obeid 
En Nuhud 
Bara
Um Ruaba 
Sodiri 
Kadugli 
Dilling 
El Fula 
Rahad
669,300
651.000
430.000
615.000
410.000 
692,089 
873,855 
816,473 
821,227
875,750
819,550
541.000
782.000
535.000 
868,500
1,070,500
1.005.000
1.001.000
800,000
2,000,000
300.000
750.000
200.000 
253,450
1,176,100 
486,400 
885,200
9 ,000
2.500.400 
330,400
1.273.400 
295,600 
274,700
1,540,600
579,900
1,178,700
Source: Regional Ministry of Finance El Obeid. The
figures in table 9:18 confirm the fact that 
the reform of Local Government in 1981 did 
not affect the financial aspect. Hence the 
imbalance in the distributions as was the 
case with those under the 1971 Act.
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Table 9:20
ACTUAL TRANSFERS FOR NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN 
COUNCILS COMPARED FOR PERIOD 
BETWEEN 1978/79 TO 1980/81 ( ^  U S  )
NORTHERN
COUNCILS
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 Total Remarks
113.500 205,500 225,800 544.800 91.7%
SOUTHERN
COUNCILS 9.300 19.800 20.707 49.807 8.3%
TOTAL 122.800 225.300 246.567 594.607 100.0%
Source: Own compilations from budgets of the Central and
Regional Governments for the period 1978/79 - 
1980/81.
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(i) Group I : Taxes
(a) Taxes on Land and Date Trees
(b) Animal Tax
(c) Taxes on Rainlands (usur)
(d) House Tax and Building Tax
(e) Entertainment Tax; and
(f) Social Service Tax.
(ii) Group II; Fees and Rates
(a) Gibana
(b) Livestock sales - on livestock
(c) Fees on simple manufactured local goods
(d) Fees for custody of lost animals
(e) Tobacco royalties
(f) Local rates
(iii) Group III; Licences
(a) Trading Licences - general trading and petty trading
(b) Driving Licences
(c) Vehicle Licence (for ownership)
(d) Liquor Licence (also for native liquor)
(e) Fire Arms Licence (for possession)
(f) Public Health Licences (different types relevant to
different professions)
(iv) Group IV; Rent 
Rent for use of:-
(a) Government buildings (shops and stores)
(b) Government houses (residential)
567
(v) Group V; Others 
Commercial activities.
We now proceed to examine the mobilisation of these taxes 
and fees in turn.
(a) Taxes on Land and Date Trees
Taxes on land (Attiyan) and taxes on Date Trees were 
levied under the "Taxation of Land and Date Trees Act,
1925" [see Chapter 4]. However, the total revenues that 
accrued from these sources were generally low as shown in 
Table 9.21 due to poor tax base.
(b ) Animal tax (Qotaan)
This tax was levied on animals like camels, cows, 
sheep, goats, houses, etc. under the Animal Tax Act, 1925 
(see Chapter 4). The rates of the taxes varied from one 
type of animal to another and from one province to the 
other. For example, that of Southern Darfur Province in 
1976 were as follows:-
Camel (75 p.t), cow (25 p.t), sheep (8 p.t) 
goat (6 p.t), horse (40 p.t), donkey (11 p . t ) . ^
The main problems continued to be that of obtaining 
accurate statistics concerning the animals as explained in 
Chapter 4. The situation was moreover aggravated by the
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Table 9:21
SHARE OF LAND (ATTIYAN) TAX IN 
PROVINCES REVENUE 1978/79 (IN Ls)
Province
Tax Yield 
(a)
Total on 
Revenue (b)
(a) as % of 
(b)
Gezira 52,190 5,000,000 1.04
White Nile 22,600 2,115,403 1.06
Blue Nile 129,950 5,729,454 2.27
Northern 72,840 1,105,220 6.6
Kassala 448,221 5,977,247 7.5
Red Sea 25,075 1,668,195 1.5
Nile 78,000 1,950 4.0
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Economy,
Khartoum, Budget of Peoples Province Exe­
cutive Councils 1979/80.
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abolition of the Native Administration system because the 
people brought into the Councils by the SSU were 
inexperienced, dishonest, opportunistic and generally not 
highly regarded by the community. According to Mohamed 
Ahmed Imam, the Local Government Inspector of Idd El
Ghanam Rural Council, "in nearly all provinces arrears
r 4 5[were] increasing".
Though collections from these taxes were not very 
high, given accurate statistics of the animals, the 
figures realised would have exceeded those shown in Table 
9.22 but it was not certain by what margin that would have 
been, and it was impossible to determine precisely anyway.
(c) Taxation of Rainlands (USUR)
Usur tax was levied on all crops grown on rainlands 
such as groundnuts, ... Arabic, sesame seeds etc. in 
accordance with the provisions of "The Taxation of Rain 
Lands (Usur) Act, 1925" (see Chapter 4).
Following the dissolution of the Ministry of Local 
Government, the People's Province Executive Councils fixed 
the taxes themselves. The provision for obtaining consent 
of the Minister of Local Government for fixing the rate of 
taxes became obsolete.
According to the representative of the Ministry of 
Finance, Usur tax had by 1978 become unprofitable. He
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Table 9:22
SHARE ANIMAL (QATAAN) TAX IN 
LOCAL TAX REVENUE 1978/79 (IN Ls )
Province
Tax yields 
(a)
own Revenues 
(b)
(a) as % 
of (b)
Gezira 170,000 5,000,000 3.40
White Nile 226,490 2,115,403 10.71
Blue Nile 170,000 5,729,454 2.92
Nile 26,000 1,950,805 1.33
Northern 17,500 1,105,220 1.58
Kassala 166,000 5,977,247 2.78
Northern Kardofan 439,941 4,637,919 9.50
Southern Kardofan 400,000 2,629,670 15.21
Northern Darfur 260,000 1,626,827 15.98
Southern Darfur 287,760 2,821,055 10.20
Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgets of Peoples Pro­
vince Executive Councils, Fiscal Year 1979/80, 
Khartoum, p. 2.
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added that "it [had] also been affected by the [then]
inflationary tendencies as the price of oil, mechanics,
4 6spare parts increase[d] in the agricultural output".
Table 9.23 shows how the yields from these taxes varied 
from one province to another. Whereas taxes on crops were 
a bouyant source in provinces like Northern Kordofan,
White Nile and Southern Kordofan, other provinces like the 
Red Sea and Northern Darfur had hardly any.
(d) House Tax and Building Tax
House and Building taxes were originally imposed 
under the House Tax Ordinance, 1918 (see Chapter 4). 
However, this Ordinance had been preceded by the Estates 
Act, 1964^, the provisions of which are similar to those 
except that the President could, from time to time, decide 
which of the towns the Act was to apply to by specifying 
the towns through a notice in the gazette. All Provincial 
Headquarters and all major towns were affected by the Act.
This tax was burdensome in that it introduced a form 
of double taxation on the same source as stated earlier. 
The general feeling continued to be that it should be 
amalgamated with the rates.
(e) Entertainment Tax
Entertainment tax was collected from recreational
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Table 9:23
SHARE OF USUR TAX - IN LOCAL 
REVENUES 1978/79 (IN Ls )
Province
Usur Tax Yields 
Revenue (a)
Province’s own 
Revenue (b)
(a) as % 
of (b)
Northern Kordofan 1,327,931 4,637,919 28.63
Blue Nile 600,000 5,729,454 10.47
White Nile 230,000 2, 115,403 10.87
Southern Kordofan 587,000 2,629,670 22.32
Southern Darfur 500,000 2,821,055 17.72
Kassala 1,307,208 5,977,247 21.87
Red Sea 12,055 1,668,195 0.72
Northern Darfur 97,600 1 ,626,827 6.00
Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgets For Peoples Province
Executive Councils for 1979/80 fiscal year.
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activities like football, cinema etc. under the 
"Entertainment Tax Act, 1956" (see Chapter 4). Its 
collection did not pose much problems except for minor 
dishonesties of the officials.
(f) Social Service Tax
As already stated, the Southern Regional Government 
replaced animal tax and usur taxes with social service tax 
in the Southern region. The exemption of women, however, 
made it discriminatory in nature. The rate varied between 
£s 3 and £s 6 between the 53 councils. The richer council 
areas obviously paid more.
Exemptions were obtainable, with the consent of the 
Minister for Regional Administration, for the following 
categories of people:-
(a) Persons who paid land or usur tax.
(b) Persons who paid income tax.
(c) Persons who paid Business Profit tax.
The exemptions were undoubtedly intended to eliminate
double taxation. According to Nick Devas of Birmingham
University:
"This tax has contributed around 70% of 
the local councils budgeted revenues in 
recent years . .."^g
It was only in the town councils that 'the Social Service
Tax did not generate much more revenue because the rates
(property taxes) contributed 60% of the budgeted revenues.
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Fees and Rates
The fees and rates which the councils imposed have
been identified as Gibana, (Arabic term for extra charges
on sales) livestock sales, fees on simple manufactured
goods, fees for the custody of lost animals and rates.
49Octrai (local customs duty) was very rare indeed.
Rates were collected under the Rates Act, 1954 (see
Chapter 4). The report of the Ministry of Finance at the
Local Government Conference of 1978 showed that rates
contributed up to 70% of the total Council revenues 
50then. The problem with the rates continued to be that 
of the difficulty experienced in the assessment.
According to the representative of the Ministry, if rates 
were "entrusted to a trained administration besides 
assessment committees of experienced persons, the revenue 
from rates
[would have] doubled".^
Table 9.24 shows the importance of rates as a source 
of revenue to the councils especially provinces like 
Khartoum, Darfur, Nile and Red Sea in 1978/79 and 
generally.
Licences
These included the general and petty trading
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Table 9:24
SHARE OF RATES IN TAX REVENUES 
1978/79 (IN Ls)
Province
Tax Yield 
(a)
Total Own 
Revenue (b)
(a ) as % 
of (b)
Gezira 216,980 5,000,000 4.3
’Khartoum 1,767,915 7,958,637 22.2
White Nile 140,000 2,115,403 6.6
Blue Nile 112,000 5,729,454 1.9
Nile Province 186,095 1,950,805 9.5
Kassala Province 242,892 5,977,247 4.1
North Kordofan 75,130 4,637,919 1.6
South Kordofan 65,000 2,629,670 2.5
North Darfur 55,790 1 ,626,827 3.4
South Darfur 428,000 2,821 ,055 15.0
Red Sea 217,780 1,668,195 13.0
Source: Ministry of Finance, Khartoum Bugets of Peoples
Province Executive Councils, 1979/80.
576
licences, driving licences, liquor licences, fire arm 
licences (for possession), Public Health licences (for 
butchers, shops, buffets, restaurants etc.). This wide 
range of licences are better categorized as miscellaneous 
receipts. They were levied and collected under various 
laws and local orders (see Chapter 4 for more details).
Dues
Dues consisted of accruals and retentions from 
services and sales rendered by some particular 
departments. For example, in Southern Darfur they accrued 
from sale of woollen carpets made by the Department of 
Prisons, furniture and timber made by the Province 
Forestry Department.
Rents
Rents accrued from the use of government buildings 
such as shops, stores and residential houses.
Revenues from Commercial Enterprises
We have seen that Local Councils were authorised to 
trade and participate in commercial activities generally. 
However, only a few councils like Khartoum, Gezira, 
Southern Darfur, Kassala and Western Equatoria attempted
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to conduct businesses, which were mainly limited to the 
transportation of goods and people. But as Ibrahim 
Mohamed Ibrahim, a senior official of the Ministry of 
Finance noted "the revenue from the enterprise ... 
indicated that they [were] all substantial losses ..." .
Inspite of this, miscellaneous receipts constituted the 
most important source of local revenue for the local 
councils as can be seen from Table 9.25.
Having examined the mobilisation of the most 
important sources of revenue - grants and local taxes and 
fees, we briefly consider the mobilisation of loans.
V LOANS
Borrowing as an alternative method for raising 
revenue has not yet been considered. It may be undertaken 
by the regional and local governments for a variety of 
reasons.
(a) To fund short-term cash flow deficits.
(b) To finance deficits in annual budgets covering
operating expenses and debt charges.
(c) To purchase plant and equipment of medium short-term 
life.
(d) To finance investment expected to yield income.
(e) To pay for long-term capital development.
However, it is the short-term cash flow deficits which are
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Table 9:25
SHARE OF MISCELLANEOUS RECEIPTS 
IN LOCAL REVENUES 1978/79 (IN Ls)
Province
Yield of 
Miscellaneous 
Receipts (a)
Total own 
Revenue 
(b)
(a ) as
• A ,
Gezira 5,146,885 7,370,000 69.8
Khartoum 2,623,192 12,293,000 21.3
White Nile 1, 161,028 3,415,000 34.0
Blue Nile 3,090,673 5,894,000 52.3
Nile 1,373,694 2,270,000 60.5
Northern 666,172 1,385,000 48.0
Kassala 2,000,021 6,634,000 30.1
Northern Kordofan 2,349,825 5,255,000 44.2
Southern Kordofan 1,703,595 3,068,000 55.5
Northern Darfur 1,601,852 2,161,000 74.1
Red Sea 1,164,990 1,898,000 61.4
Source: Ministry of Finance, Khartoum Peoples Executive
Council Budgets, 1979/80.
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common throughout the world.
There are several sources for borrowing in most 
countries. These include:-
(1) Loans from the central government (or a higher 
government).
(2) Loans from International Agencies such as World Bank,
African, Asian and Latin American Development Banks.
(3) Central Banks.
(4) Loans or overdrafts from Commercial Banks.
(5) International borrowing from reserve fund (for 
example, superannuation funds for employees or 
renewal funds for plant and equipment, etc.
Loans are usually subject to conditions of duration and 
terms of repayment but in the case of governments, the 
approval of a higher authority like the Minister might be 
needed first.
As we have already seen, provisions for borrowing 
were specifically inserted in the Self-Government Act and 
the Regional Government Act, 1980. Decree 39 also 
reiterated the point but referred to it as "aid".
However, the conditions for the repayment of the "aid" 
were never prescribed. In actual fact no "aid" was ever 
obtained.
There were similar provisions for local government
councils in the People's Local Government Acts, 1971 and
1981. For example, that under the 1971 Act stated:
"The People's Executive Council shall 
have power to borrow whether by charge or
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by overdrawing or issue of securities or 
any other manner, provided that the 
purposes of borrowing shall be stated and 
the Minister shall be informed of any 
action in this respect within a period of 
not less than one m o n t h . " ^
So both the regional and local governments were empowered
to borrow from undefined sources. It was however not
certain whether the decentralised governments could borrow
from the foreign sources, especially considering the poor
state of the country's economy. In practice this was an
impossibility.
The problem with internal loan financing in the Sudan 
arose from the facilities for loans and the availability 
of liquid money. There was no established government
institution specifically ..... for granting loans. The
Local Government Loan's Board created in 1954 as a unit of 
the Ministry of Local Government to offer loans to local 
government councils had disappeared long since.
As such, the banks remained the only sources for 
obtaining loans. However, the commercial banks were not 
keen on doing so. Apparently loans were being obtained 
from the Bank of Sudan only and were moreover limited to 
the Central Government.
According to Mahamed Geili, an officer of the Central 
Ministry of Finance, it was highly doubtful as to "whether 
local authorities could make use of the borrowing 
facilities"^ because the central government was ever 
over-borrowing from the domestic banks to finance major
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parts of its development expenditure.
VI FINANCIAL CONTROL
Freedom to spend and financial control are some of
the most vital aspects of decentralisation. Writing on
the principles and problems of federal finance in 1933,
B.P. Adarkar said:
"... full freedom of financial operations 
to both Federal as well as State 
Governments in order that they may not 
suffer from a feeling of cramp in the 
discharge of their normal activities and 
in the achievement of their legitimate 
aspirations."
This statement is as appropriate for state governments in
a federal arrangement as it is for a local government
Council. About a decade earlier (1928) a White Paper was
issued by the Ministry of Health in Britain expressing the
view that a proper system of government grants in local
authorities should, inter alia, "... permit the greatest
56freedom of local administration and initiative". For, 
as the Institute of Municipal Treasurers put it, "it is an 
essence of the pattern of Local Government finance that 
local authorities must be made to feel locally responsible 
and locally accountable for the expenditure which they 
incur . . . .
But were these principles applicable in the Sudan? 
Theoretically, the regional and local governments in the 
Sudan could spend freely so long as the expenses were
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within their budgetary limits. For example, the provision
for the local government councils as contained in the 1971
Act stipulated:
"The People's Executive Council shall 
spend its funds in such a manner as may 
be best for the exercise of its powers 
and in such matters as necessity may 
require to be carried out and in 
fulfilment of its loans and other legal 
obligations
The power to spend freely was, however, seriously 
curtailed by the budgeting and borrowing regulations, the 
grant system and the requirement to have accounts audited. 
We shall examine these different methods of control in 
turn.
A. Budgeting
All regional governments and local government 
councils were required to prepare their own budgets 
according to specified standards. Usually the contents of 
the budgets comprised detailed analysis of the economic 
and financial policies of the government. They must show 
the proposed estimates, expenditures, revenue and proposed 
taxes, statement of reserve fund etc. These budgets were 
all submitted for inspection by the Central Ministry of 
Finance before obtaining the approval of the Regional 
Assemblies as we saw earlier. Furthermore, the Ministry 
could give directives for the budgets to comply with.
Control was more rigorous in the case of local 
government councils and especially in the case of the
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People's Province Executive Councils because additional
consents had to be obtained from the Commissioner, the
Minister of Treasury and the Council of Ministers^ before
they could be submitted for approval by the Regional
Assembly, in the case of the South. The degree of control
was, however, greatly relaxed under the People's Local
Government Act, 1981. The numerous requirements for
consent as found under the 1971 Act were removed. An Area
Council, had to only "convene a special sitting for the
6 0discussion of the budget" which was expected to be
passed. Practically the only approval needed was that of
the Ministry of Finance.
If any additional funds were needed, supplementary
budgets had to be prepared to meet them. As a general
Y'
rule, no funds were to be transferred from one chapter to
l. 61
another unless approved by the Assembly. All monies 
spent should have been expropriated by Acts of the
r -5
Regional Assembly.
B. Borrowing
The general practice internationaly is to control
borrowing. Though there were no regulations to control
borrowing by the Southern Regional Government, it was
presumed that borrowing had to comply with certain
procedures. A regional government in the Northern Sudan
could not "conclude any internal loan without the assent
6 3of the People's Regional Assembly". There was no
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mention of external loans as already stated.
However, there were specific provisions controlling
borrowing by Local Government Councils. For example,
under the People's Local Government Act, 1981, an Area
Council could borrow money "provided that the purpose for
the borrowing" had to be stated. It was also "subject to
6 4approval by the Regional Executive Authority".
Surprisingly, the People's Local Government Act, 1971 
omitted to insert a provision to control borrowing by the 
People's Province Executive Councils. Presumably this 
omission must have been due to oversight and not 
deliberate.
C . The Grant System
As explained earlier grants are used by the superior 
governments to control the inferior ones with regards to 
their use and the amounts released. The deficit grant 
system in the Sudan encouraged the imposition of more 
control by the central government over the regional and 
local governments. The requirement for submission of all 
budgets to the Ministry of Finance for Inspection to 
determine the amount of deficit to be met by the central 
government was very obvious. Here we should recall the 
experience of the Southern region when its 1979/80 
development budget was reduced from 20 million to 15
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ft Rmillion pounds by the National Ministry of Planning.
D. Auditing
Auditing would have been by far the most effective 
method of financial control because .... any illegal 
expenditure could have been surcharged on the persons 
responsible for authorising the expenditure. Surcharge 
was also to be made upon persons responsible for any 
revenue which might have been lost due to negligence or 
misconduct.^  However, due to several factors, effective 
auditing was seriously obstructed in the Sudan.
There was a frustrating controversy in the Southern
Region as to who could audit the accounts of the regional
government. An independent Auditor-General's chambers was
established for the whole country, according to the
provisions of the Permament Constitution, to be:
"responsible to the President and the
People's Assembly for the performance of
its duties and the discharge of its
administration functions according to
law." _67
The Auditor-General's Chambers Act, 1970 authorised the 
Auditor-General to be:
"Generally responsible for auditing of 
... all accounts of the public bodies and 
corporations established by law, not 
withstanding any provision to the 
contrary in the Acts governing such 
bodies and corporations."^
Although the Regional Government (for the South) was not
mentioned in that Act because it preceded the formation of
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regional governments, the Self-Government Act expressly 
prohibited the Southern Region from exercising powers of 
"public audit" as we have seen in Chapter 7.
Inspite of the above-quoted legal provisions, which 
centralised auditing in the Sudan, the High Executive 
Council established a Department of Internal Audit in 1976 
to audit accounts of the regional government and other 
public institutions in the region because of the 
ineffectiveness of the Auditor-General's chambers in the 
region. The issue was whether the reports of the Internal 
Auditor's Department were legally valid. Were they, for 
example, admissible as evidence in court?
In the criminal case of Sudan Government v Omer Okot 
7 0(unreported), Bullen Panchol Aw a l , District Judge, held
that the report of the Internal Auditor was inadmissible
as evidence in court because the production of the report
contravened the provisions of the constitution and the
Self-Government Act. The report was therefore null and
void. As the prosecution evidence solely depended on the
report, Omer Okot was acquitted of the charge of criminal
breach of trust under Section 351 of the Sudan Penal Code
Act, 1974. On revision, John Onge Kasiba, Province Judge,
quashed the decision of the District Magistrate. He said:
"I wonder why the magistrate went on to 
base his decision on who should or should 
not be an auditor in the case. As I see 
it there was a prima facie case clearly 
made against this accused Omer Okot."^^
Although the decision of the Province Judge might have
been right in law some problem still surrounded the
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implications of the interpretation of the said Provisions 
of the constitution, the Self-Government Act and the 
Auditor-General's Chambers Act. If only the 
Auditor-General was allowed to audit public accounts then 
audits by the internal auditor were ultra vires, and 
therefore null and void. However, justice would have been 
grossly misdirected had the accused been left to go free 
because of the legal technicality. There was need for the 
Auditor-General to endorse the report of the Internal 
Audit to make it valid but this was never done. Thus the 
trial of the accused proceeded on an invalid document and 
proved to be a frustrating experience for the work of 
audit in the region. Since then hardly any cases reached 
the court.
The constitution also required the Auditor-General
to:
"Submit to the President of the Republic 
and the People's Assembly his reports on 
the accounts whose auditing is assigned 
to him by law, within a period not 
exceeding nine months after the end of 
each financial year.
Successful auditing requires the maintenance of proper
books of accounts which must be kept up-to-date and closed
annually. Although there were legal provisions to this
effect, the report of the Auditor-General in 1984
indicated that these provisions were not being complied
with. It stated that auditing in most cases was
impossible because of financial irregularities.
"More irregularities are likely to be 
discovered when and if the chamber can 
close all accounts of the government 
departments and every institution in 
which the Government has a share ... some
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province's haven't had their accounts 
closed since 1973, and most since 1977 
... As for the Southsrn region whose 
accounts have not been closed since 1972 
... the officials of the chambers are not 
sure when they will finish their work 
there • • • 73
CONCLUSION
This chapter clearly shows that no appropriate 
formula for the equitable distribution of revenue has been 
devised in the Sudan. Hence the vertical and horizontal 
imbalance in the distribution of national revenue in the 
country. Since grants from the central government 
constituted the most important source of revenue for the 
decentralised government, it follows that the inequitable 
distribution of grants would maintain regional and local 
disparities in terms of development and distribution of 
services. Thus rich regions would continue to get richer 
while poor ones would become poorer. This would all be 
due to the formula of deficit financing applied in the 
country. Moreover the deficit fdnding was not only 
inconsistent and irregular but persistently created 
situations of deficits within deficits.
Although revenue sources were assigned to the 
regional and local governments, a lot of problems 
surrounded their mobilisation. This was particularly very 
discouraging in terms of taxes.
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The taxes which were levied and collected by the 
central government for remitting to the regional 
governments never reached the latter on grounds of lack of 
statistics of the goods and commodities consumed in the 
region or leaving the same. Some taxes were levied by the 
central government but collected by the regional 
governments, but difficulties were encountered in 
remitting them to the Regional Treasury. They neither 
came from employees of the central government nor were 
they used by the collecting units. These problems were, 
however, finally overcome.
Taxes levied and collected locally have been yielding 
considerable amounts but their base was too narrow because 
of the Sudan's poor state of economic development.
However, revenues from miscellaneous sources such as 
receipts from licences, fees and services rendered by the 
various government departments and units have been the 
most promising sources of locally collected revenues for 
both regional and local governments. The provisions for 
loans have been totally obsolete for lack of credit 
institutions and liquid money.
The question of financial management has been 
interesting. Although both regional and local governments 
were free to spend as they wished, they could only do so 
within the limits of approved budgets. Other control 
provisions, like keeping proper and up-to-date books of 
accounts and auditing were seriously neglected
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particularly in the Southern region, thus allowing cases 
of corruption to go unpunished.
It is therefore necessary to reorganize the financial 
arrangements for decentralised governments in the Sudan on 
a sound basis. This would involve the working out of an 
equitable formula for the distribution of national revenue 
as recommended in the concluding chapter and appointing a 
permanent body for the supervision of the operation of the 
system and recommending appropriate changes from time to 
time.
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CHAPTER 10
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DECENTRALISATION
Previous chapters have examined fundamental aspects of 
decentralisation, including the structure of government; 
allocation of powers; financial arrangements and control of 
inter-governmental relationships. However, the problems 
raised by a programme of decentralisation extend also to a 
number of other matters which vitally affect the operation 
of government machinery in a decentralised system. For 
instance, successful infra-structure to support the 
regional and local system of administration. The sort of 
infrastructure meant here includes skilled manpower supply; 
communications; public and private
economic/financial/commercial and social institutions. The 
point is that decentralisation will be weaker if the 
regions do not have adequate skilled manpower; if they fail 
to develop quickly an appropriate system of communications 
and an effective network of Public and Private 
institutions. These factors are considered in turn in this 
chapter.
I. MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN THE SUDAN
Decentralised governments inevitably increase the
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demand for skilled manpower to operate the various 
governmental units established - though, of course, one 
argument in favour of decentralisation is that it enables 
more effective use to be made of the manpower which is 
available.
Nevertheless adequate staffing remains a prerequisite 
for the success of decentralisation. Yet, more often than 
not, developing countries lack adequate supplies of skilled 
manpower, as the examples of the Sudan, Tanzania and Papua 
New Guinea demonstrate.
A. The General Supply of Skilled Manpower in the Sudan
The general position of skilled manpower in the Sudan 
is shown in Table 10.1. It is difficult to establish 
whether or not the Sudan suffers from a general shortage of 
skilled manpower. An assessment by the ILO of the manpower 
requirement and supply in the Sudan for the period 
1975-1985, showed both deficiency and surplus of skilled 
manpower (see Table 10.1).
Whereas the Table shows an availability of surplus 
manpower in the fields of agriculture, medicine, chemical 
and electrical engineering, law and arts subjects in 
general, it reveals shortages in certain specialized 
professions like Accountancy, Education and Mechanical 
Engineering. The disparity is an implication of the fact
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that educational planning has not been effectively linked
to manpower needs, thus resulting in both surplus and
scarcity with the effect of the former being felt more
keenly at the national level. The statement of Mohamed El
Murtada Mustafa, the Deputy Director General of Labour in
1976 illustrates the point:
"Despite the shortage of high-level
manpower with certain specific skills, a
feature of Sudanese manpower which is 
particularly disturbing is the 
unemployment of educated skilled persons 
of certain categories. This problem has 
been increasing during the last 4-5 
years.
c
To have both unemployment in the presence of the sca^ity of 
skilled manpower is a paradox. It would seem that the
problem was largely due to lack of mobility, since most
qualified officers wish to work in a big city. For that 
matter the scarcity of manpower was more prevalent in the 
regions.
B. The Supply of Skilled Manpower in the Northern Sudan
Despite the lack of comprehensive and up-to-date
information to show the lack of skilled manpower in the
regions of the Northern Sudan, the available evidence shows
serious scarcity of personnel in those regions. It was,
for example, clear from the preliminary assessment of the
2implementation of the Regional Government Act, 1980, by El 
Teiriffi five years later. He noted the acute lack of 
manpower in those regions for the following reasons:-
603
1. The central government ministries did not take the
r
question of transferring manpower to those regions 
seriously. The integrated personnel system in the Northern 
Sudan, (since those regions had no public service organs of 
their own), left the responsibility for recruiting and 
training all personnel in the Northern Sudan to the 
national Ministry of Public Service and Manpower.
2. The policy of secondment of staff originally adopted by 
the Central Government hampered the loyalty of the staff to 
the regions, which was predictable since the primary 
loyalty of seconded staff is owed to their mother units.
3. The qualified personnel in the administrative and 
technical positions were reluctant to move out of Khartoum 
- for understandably Khartoum had educational, health, 
banking, transport and other facilities which did not exist 
in other towns. Moreover, promotions and scholarships were 
easily obtainable from the national capital. Though the 
over-concentration around Khartoum partly accounted for the 
unemployment in the capital, at the same time the location 
of the public service in the city deprived the rural areas 
of personnel.
4. The policy of central recruitment did not allow the 
regions to institute new policies to attract better staff.
A decentralised form of government that has an integrated 
personnel system, instead of separate systems, is likely to 
run into this kind of problem.
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5. The migration of skilled staff to neighbouring oil-rich 
countries like Libya and Saudi-Arabia also contributed 
seriously to the shortage. But no up-to-date record of 
the "brain drain" to such countries is available. However, 
old figures in the Labour Department show that in the 1960s 
and 1970s substantial numbers of Sudanese migrated to 
Libya and the Middle East countries as contained in Table 
10.2.
Table 10.2
Period______________________________Number of Migrants
1966/67 - 1973/74 8,800*
1974 1,213
Note; * 85% of this number were skilled.
Source: Shyam Nigaru, Skilled Manpower Situation in the
Sudan (1975-1985) and Policy Implications, p. 9.
Since then, migration has continued on an increased scale 
despite the fact that comprehensive records are not 
available. The number migrating escalated during the 
dictatorial regime of Numeiri.
Shortage of skilled manpower extended as far as the 
provinces and beyond. The report of the Administrative 
Survey of Southern Darfur Province in 1976 bears out this 
fact.
"... The Finance Department of the 
Province Headquarters were 24 Accountants 
short of an establishment of 30 ...
Accountants are in short supply
605
nationally but the situation [was] very 
common in less extreme forms. Particular 
shortages are of teachers, clerks and 
book keepers ... The M.T.D. (Mechanical 
Transport Department) for example [had]
12 staff in post out of an approved 
establishment of 49.
Thus manpower shortage in the Northern Sudan covered both
the regional and local governments due to the ineffective
policy of recruitment, transfers and losses through the
migration as listed by El Teiriffi. Otherwise Table 10.1
indicates abundance of educated people as stated earlier.
C . The Supply of Skilled Manpower in the Southern Sudan
In contrast to the Northern regions, it was planned 
from the start that the Southern region would have its own 
permanent public service. However, the scarcity of skilled 
manpower was very acute from the initiation of the regional 
government in 1972. That government had to start with 
seconded staff from the Central government, who were 
eventually transfered permanently to the Southern Regional 
Government. The statement of Donato Jubai, the Director of 
Public Service in the region, in 1972 that the region "had
4
to do with whatever staff it could lay hands on" exposed 
the desperation of the situation.
There was some improvement by 1976 but, as can be seen 
from Table 10.3, the problems were by no means over then. 
The vacancies were further increased by the creation of 
more posts in the Six-Year Plan for the socio-economic
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development of the South (1977/78 - 1982/83). Details of 
the manpower requirements are shown in Table 10.4. By the 
end of the plan period, 3,030 posts were anticipated to 
remain vacant.
Three years later Professor Rondinelli confirmed the 
continuing manpower shortage, particularly in the medical 
f ield.
"The six provinces of the Southern Sudan, 
with a population of about 3 million, had 
about 54 medical doctors, 18 nursing 
sisters and 285 health para-professionals 
in 1979."5
An administrative group from Birmingham University worked 
out the detailed requirements of the support staff 
(typists, clerks and book keepers), as shown in Tables 
10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.
Unfortunately, the redivision of the South in 1983
exacerbated the personnel shortage, as was clear from the
statement of Anthony Mogga, Acting Director General of the
Public Service in Equatoria Region:
"... Each new region [was] bound to 
experience a real shortage of manpower in 
some sectors. To fill these places with 
competent personnel [would] require years 
of training and staff development."g
The deployment of the personnel of the former Southern
region showed that Equatoria had retained 65% of the
7
skilled manpower. Nevertheless available evidence 
indicated that Equatoria still remained in great need. For 
example, Richard Nara, former Acting Director-General of 
the Regional Ministry of Regional Affairs (Equatoria 
Region), told a Colloquium on local government in Juba in
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Table 10:5
TOTAL SOUTHERN REGIONAL REQUIREMENT 
FOR TYPISTS, CLERKS AND BOOKKEEPERS IN 1975
Category Total no. required
Typists 832
Clerks 1 ,002
Bookkeepers 1 ,307
Out of the above figures the requirements for the 
three Peoples Province Executive Councils were 
381 distributed as follows:
Table 10:6 
TYPISTS
Province Typists
Available Required
English Arabic English Arabic
Upper Nile 11 9 30 21
Equstoria 12 5 18 11
Baher El Ghazal 7 4 16 8
Totals 30 18 64 40
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Table 10:7 
CLERKS
Province Clerks
Available Required
Upper Nile 23 50
Equstoria 22 42
Baher El Ghazal 20 32
Totals 65 124
Table 10:8 
BOOKKEEPERS
Province Bookkeepers
Available Required
Upper Nile 22 51
Equstoria 32 57
Baher El Ghazal 26 49
Totals 80 157
Source: Garth Glentworth, Outline Proposals for an
Institute of Public Administration for the 
Southern Region of the Sudan, University of 
Birmingham, 1975, pp. 14 and 10.
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October 1983 that:
"In Equatoria Region, much [was] left to 
be done as far as staffing of Area 
councils were concerned. The posts of 
medical officers, social workers and 
community development personnel plus 
their supporting staff [had] remained 
vacant in most councils ... according to 
the standard establishment of local 
government councils, Equatoria [was]to 
have a maximum number of 106 local 
government officers at the Area Council 
level, 23 at the Department of Local 
Government, and 18 officers in the two 
provinces of Eastern and Western 
Equatoria. Of the 147 posts only 
78 [were] filled and 65 [were] vacant."g
However, that was too general a position. A more detailed
study of the Western Area Council (also in Equatoria) by an
administrative team from Birmingham University in 1985
revealed serious manpower shortage as contained in Table
10.9.
The tables overleaf indicate the general manpower 
shortages in the South from the inception of the Regional 
Government for the South in 1972 to the period after the 
'redivision' of the South.
During the years of government by the "May Regime", 
1969-1985, the position of skilled manpower shortage became 
increasingly aggravated. There were several obvious 
reasons for the shortage.
Since the colonial days the South had lagged behind 
the North in every modern development, including education 
as seen earlier. At independence most Southerners who had 
some primary education occupied Article III (Senior Clerks
612
Table 10:9
THE POSITION OF STAFF IN WESTERN 
AREA COUNCIL - EQUATORIA REGION, 1985
Department Budgeted
Staff
Staff in 
post
Staff
Shortfall
1983/84 1984/85
General Adminis­
tration 104 106 49 54%
Education 1 , 125 1,125 694 39%
Health 140 140 86 39%
Social Welfare 3 3 1 67%
Agriculture and 
Veterinary 94 94 26 72%
Forestry 57 93 39 58%
Source: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Decentral­
isation Policy and Practice in the Southern 
Region, (1985), pp. 33-37.
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or Book keepers) posts. This rank was unfortunately 
depleted by the South to attain separate constitutional 
status. Consequently, schools and others institutions were 
disrupted.
After the granting of local autonomy to the South in 
1972, skilled Northern personnel (except school teachers) 
had to leave the region as they were politically 
undesirable. Even after the establishment of the Southern 
Regional Government, the educational system continued to be 
poor and manpower planning was almost non-existent.
D. Manpower Planning in the Southern Region
In order to maintain a constant supply of adequate
manpower for the public service, manpower planning is a
necessity in African states. Manpower planning is the
"Strategy for the acquisition, utilization, improvement and
9retention of human resources". However, manpower planning 
in the South, or indeed in the Sudan as a whole for that 
matter appeared to be very weak. Table 10.1 as stated 
earlier shows that from 1975 to 1985 scarcity existed 
simultaneously with surplus production of such personnel as 
a whole. Table 10.10 unfortunately shows that the 
admission of Southern Sudanese into institutions of higher 
education were too meagre to meet manpower requirements in 
the South.
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Although there was a surplus of qualified Sudanese in 
the various fields of specialisation as shown in Table 
10.1, recruitment into the Southern public service was 
limited to Sudanese of Southern origin. This was not due 
to any legal prohibition or official policy of the 
government, it evolved out of practice mainly due to the 
political undesirability of the Northern Sudanese in the 
South as stated earlier. Northerners were seen as 
dominators and oppressors. On the other hand, Northern 
Sudanese also regarded the South as a hardship area to 
which they would not go unless they were paid some handsome 
incentives which the government could ill-afford.
In the field of Public Administration, The Institute 
of Public Administration which was renamed The Institute of 
Administrative and Professional Sciences, was the only 
institution for training administrators for the whole 
country. Yet its intake per session was 20 people only.
It offered courses for induction, in-service training and 
refresher purposes in Public Administration and Management 
to newly recruited administrators and old ones as well.
Due to the limited training programme offered by the 
Institute, the regional government established a 
Multi-purpose Training Centre (MTC) at Juba in 1974, which 
also offered induction and Council Management courses to 
newly recruited administrators in the South. Those who 
performed well would come for a Diploma in Public 
Administration in the University of Birmingham. The Centre 
also offered courses for the support staff in the field of
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typing. Regarding finance, the region established a
Regional Accountancy Training Centre (RATC) in 1978 for
training book keepers and accountants for the region.
There was no similar college for Clerks or Office
Management, however. Inspite of the above arrangements the
situation in the South remained particularly difficult, as
stated by Mogga in 1984:
"The educational system in the Southern 
Region leaves a lot to be desired in 
terms of needs and manpower requirement 
planning."10
This remark in itself seriously understates the problem 
that has been exposed in this chapter.
A Regional Institute for Public Administration and 
Management (RIPAM) that was proposed for the South in 
1976/77 to be financed by the EEC did not succeed. This 
was firstly because the Conservative Government that came 
to power in Britain in 1979 sought to cut public spending 
and the cuts in the British public spending apparently 
affected the proposal. Secondly, this was a Southern 
region venture which was frustrated by the 'redivision' of 
the South in 1983.
All in all, the problem of scarcity of skilled 
manpower remained acute in the Sudan, a problem compounded 
by poor manpower planning.
E. Related Manpower Problems
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The availability of skilled manpower does not per se 
guarantee efficiency and effectiveness in administration. 
The degree of skill, competence, and discipline of 
personnel system are vital contributory factors to the 
success of any management.
Unfortunately, the Sudanese public service were at 
very poor levels of efficiency and discipline. In a way 
the colonial system of a narrow educational base, primarily 
intended to produce supporting staff and middle class civil 
servants then, has contributed to this weakness. Table 
10.11 shows that in 1948, it was planned that by 1962 about 
60% of the personnel would have been "Sudanised", but this 
aim was overtaken by the rapid political developments in 
the country.
At Independence in 1956, the Sudanisation Commission 
had Sudanised 1800 posts which was 100% of the posts within 
fifteen months (see Chapter 2). Thus the Sudanisation plan 
shown in Table 10.11 was rendered invalid.
Consequently, senior posts were filled by unqualified
and inexperienced Sudanese, which has remained a permanent
feature of the calibre of Public Service of the Sudan, as
observed by one analyst.
"The vision and intellectual horizon of, 
and standard set by, those promoted to 
the top grades in 1954-55 have had 
continuing inf luence.
Moreover the government in the 1960s introduced a policy of
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Table 10:11
SUDANISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
(PERCENTAGE OF POSTS TO BE SUDANISED 
BETWEEN 1948 AND 1962)
Year Division One Division Two Divison One and Two
1948 15.4% 25.2% 18.4%
1957 38.1% 58.7% 44.1%
1962 55.5% 78.9% 62.2%
Source: Sudan Government, Report of the Sudanisation
Committee, 1948, Central Archives Office, 
Khartoum, p. 19.
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employing all college graduates who could not find jobs 
elsewhere. This mass employment degraded the quality of 
public service even further.
The South still had the worst end of it when in 1972
it had to resort to appointing anyone with minimum
qualifications:
"... After the Addis Ababa Agreement 
rapid promotions in a situation of 
general manpower deficiency, have led to 
too many top positions being filled from 
the rank in the absence of Professional 
Qualified Officers, some administrative 
staff have reached the senior echelons
without full knowledge of the j o b . " ^
Certainly, 'redivision' of the South must have aggravated
the situation even further.
Throughout the existence of the Southern Regional 
Government, promotions were a persistent problem, not only 
because of the manpower deficiency but also because of the 
malpractices involved. For example, in the Department of 
Legal Affairs one law officer was promoted from scale "Q" 
(the lowest starting grade for a university graduate) to 
group "V" superscale in 1980 jumping scales "DS" and "B".
In this way the officer obtained an unmerited promotion and
leap-frogged over his seniors in scales "DS" and "B". This
practice also took place in other departments like 
Taxation, Commerce, Regional Administration, Agriculture 
and Public Service, despite public protests.
Furthermore, the system of employment was highly 
defective from the start due to the implementation of
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inadequate provisions of the Regional Public Service 
Regulations, 1975. Under the Regulations, all appointments 
were a prerogative of the Regional Ministry of Public 
Service, but, in practice, every department was allowed to 
fill vacant posts and submit the same to the Public Service 
for confirmation. The Public Service only considered 
whether the employed officer had the minimum qualifications 
required for the job. It never bothered to check and 
determine whether the successful applicant had been 
assessed fairly in competition with other candidates.
There was therefore little or no control over the calibre 
of personnel who joined the service by the Ministry. 
Corruption, nepotism and other sorts of discrimination 
prevailed over superior qualifications.
Some of these problems could have been overcome by 
further training but the opportunities for this were too 
limited. The inadequacy of training facilities internally 
has already been explained earlier. Since 1979, the Sudan 
Government stopped all training abroad on government funds. 
At the end of the day people resorted to the sparse and 
out-of-date facilities in the country.
According to Mogga, the situation was so bad because 
the National Training Act was only promulgated in 1976 and 
the translated English copy reached the Southern Region 
only in 1983, when it was on the verge of 'redivision1.
For him, this was due to lack of commitment on the part of 
political leaders towards manpower training and 
development. What is incomprehensible is why the region
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could not legislate its own training laws when it had the 
authority to establish a Regional Public Service.
Other factors also affected the efficiency of the
Public Service. They included matters of office routine,
transfers and leaves. In a report compiled in 1974 by an
administrative team from Birmingham University, it stated
that there were generally no job allocations and
descriptions in all the government offices. It quoted the
headquarters of Baher El Ghazal province as a rare example.
"18/1/1974/ Baher El Ghazal. Subject 
Division of work in the Province 
Headquarters ... Daily working 
programme."^
The team also found that the monthly and annual reporting 
systems (characteristic of good administration) were 
non-existent and handover notes were incomplete.
Ordinarily, there were serious delays due to the bad 
practice of "following up" of correspondences by personal 
visits and the obsession with meeting the administrators 
face-to-face.
Since Dr. Bakheits advocacy of the Politicization of 
the Public Service, as seen in Chapter 5, the Sudanese 
public servants became largely unruly. Political loyalties 
or disloyalties were the order of the day. This was very 
obvious from the transfers, absenteeism and the prolonged 
holidays or leave.
No specific period for transfers was prescjTtbed in the 
regulations but by convention transfers were to take place
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every two or three years. Since 1969, this routine was 
never strictly followed. Whereas some officers were 
transferred twice or thrice in a year, others remained in 
one place for as long as a decade. El Teiriffi's 
observations of the Public Service in the Northern Sudan as 
stated earlier, affords a good example. Sometimes
v
officials transfeij[ed on promotion "often [took] a catorie
14of subordinates with them to their new posts".
15The Public Service Regulations 1976 specifically 
defined working hours as "not less than forty-eight hours 
per week" starting at 6.30 R.m. to 2.00 p.m. from Monday to 
Saturday. A short period of one hour was permissible
1 g
between 9.00 a.m. and 10.00 a.m. for breakfast. However, 
most offices remained empty after 9.00 a.m. because a good 
number of the officials did not come back from breakfast 
"fatur", as is commonly called in Arabic. Rainy days also 
provided another justifiable occasion for absenteeism.
Leaves were entitlements under various headings:
normal leave; local leave; sick leave; study leave; and
17mourning leave. However, the leave entitlements were
over-used. For example, a person on an ordinary leave of
40 days would extend it unilaterally by another 20 days.
Mourning leaves were obtainable for close and distant
relatives, including friends or area mates. Study leaves
were a particular favourite as Rondinelli put it:
"Middle and higher level officials 
consider training leaves every two or 
three years to be a prerequisite of their 
jobs, as opportunities for a long-term 
stay overseas are particularly valued."^g
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Certainly the above real practices constituted disciplinary
offences punishable under the Southern Region Employeese
1 9Discipline Act 1976 but the machinery for the enforcement 
of the discipline was too weak.
F. The Public Service Disciplinary Machinery in the 
Southern Region
Section 5 of the Southern Region Employees Discipline
Act, 1976, stipulated:
"Any person who neglects or refuses to
comply with other regulation as .....
applicable to him or any lawful order of 
his superior officer, or who refuses, 
neglects, retards or obstructs or fails 
to perform his duty, or any act or 
omission exhibits conduct incompatible 
with the proper performance of his duties 
or unfitting his official position ... 
shall be liable to be dealt with under 
this act."
Penalties specified for the above offences included
reprimand, fine, stoppage from duty for specified period,
suspension, retardation of promotion and dismissal, all
20imposed by a Disciplinary Board. However, the 
enforcement machinery was very slack, as already stated.
An agricultural extension officer was suspended by his 
Ministry in 1974 for alleged "conduct incompatible with the 
proper performance of his duties". He went to Uganda and 
obtained employment there. He was tried after his return 
to the Sudan in 1982. Despite his long stay in the unknown 
foreign location, he was acquitted of the charge,
624
reinstated to his job and given full arrears of pay 
back-dated to his period of suspension. There were several 
similar cases.
The maximum period of suspension, according to Section
27 of the Act, was not to exceed 90 days but this
time-limit was never adhered to in practice. Suspensions
often exceeded the period. Moreover, another provision
entitling the authorised Minister to waive the limit could
not be enforced. The sections are quoted below.
"If the Head of Department considers that 
the interest of Public Service requires 
that an employee who is charged with an 
offence under this Act or against whom 
criminal proceedings which would 
constitute an offence under this Act or 
..., he may at once suspend him from 
performing such duties, provided that the 
period of suspension of offences unde^-^ 
this Act shall not exceed 90 days ..."
(emphasis added).
A n d ,
"If criminal proceedings are instituted 
against any employee, the employee shall 
not, unless the Minister so concerned 
directs, be brought before a Board of 
Discipline on any ground forming part of 
the criminal charge while the criminal 
proceedings are still pending."22
Quite often trials by Disciplinary Boards were delayed on
the ground that the criminal charge had not been disposed
of. This was the more likely in the situation of scarcity
of Magistrates in the region. But sometimes delays were
due to some unwarranted intervention. The case of Cyprus
Ndarago and others in 1979, affords a good example here.
Ndarago and others were employed as store keepers and 
accountants in the Regional Ministry of Communications.
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They were suspended under the Disciplinary Act for alleged 
misappropriation of funds. They were also charged for
criminal Breach of Trust under the Sudan Penal Code Act,
231974. However, the police investigator delayed the legal 
process for two years by keeping the case diary in his 
possession. Obviously, he had neglected to perform his 
duty, but was left uncharged for the lame excuse that the 
case was too complex for him. At the request of the 
Minister of Communications two and a half years later, the 
Department of Legal Affairs advised the Minister to invoke 
his discretionary powers quoted above, to order a board to 
try the accused officials. In doing so, the Department of 
Legal Affairs had sought to circumvent the rigours of the 
provision which had obviously produced delay or denial of 
justice. However, the Ministry of Public Service 
unlawfully prevented the Minister of Communications from 
exercising those powers. The outcome was even worse; the 
Minister simply ordered the reinstatement of Ndarago and 
others without any trial, disciplinary or judicial.
Clearly, the weakness in the implementation of the 
disciplinary machinery had led to abuse of power.
G . Conclusion
Problems of skilled manpower shortage, efficiency and 
to some extent indiscipline are common in third world 
countries - and not just the Sudan. Decentralised
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governments in Tanzania and Papua New Guinea have for 
example faced comparable problems in the supply of skilled 
manpower and efficiency.
For instance, a World Bank evaluation of the Ujamaa
programme in Tanzania showed that, with the dispersal of
skilled personnel to the regions and districts, the
administrative capacity of the Tanzanian Central Government
was severely weakened. It concluded:
"Weak leadership and management have 
proved, and will continue to prove [to be] 
very serious problems. The field staff 
assigned to the Ujamaa villages - 
agricultural field agents and cooperative 
and Ujamaa field assistants - cannot 
provide much help. They are ill-equipped 
to provide assistance of a technical, 
much less of organizational nature ... In 
addition to being very young and 
inexperienced, the vast majority of them 
have weak technical training ... it will 
be a long time before the various key 
positions can be filled by 
professionals."24
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea also started with a
dearth of competent professional staff. Decentralisation
reduced the efficiency with which other sectors of the
economy operated. To aggravate the situation, a series of
policy decisions made in the 1970s increased the severity
of the shortage of personnel referred to as "a chain of
manpower disasters". Moreover, simultaneous with
decentralisation was the policy of localisation, whereby
many experienced expatriates were replced by younger and
less experienced nationals, which exacerbated the pressures
on the administrative system. Demand of the private sector
further reduced the availability of talent for public
service.
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Thus the problems of skilled and efficient personnel, 
common to all developing countries, were intensified by 
policies of decentralisation. The Sudan has a long way to 
go in the accumulation, utilization and^improvement of 
manpower resources. It is advisable for the regional and 
local governments to have separate public service 
institutions and not integrated ones as in the Northern 
Sudan. There is also a need to give incentives to those 
working outside the capital. This could be by salary 
increases or rapid promotions. At the moment all salary 
scales are the same for all employees of the central, 
regional and local governments and yet those who work 
outside the capital are deprived of social amenities, 
promotions and scholarships as explained earlier. 
Educational planning has to be tightly linked with manpower 
requirements and there should be no discrimination in 
employment on grounds of birth or origin. The weaknesses 
in the procedures of employment, promotions, office duties 
and disciplinary machinery have to be drastically improved.
II. COMMUNICATIONS
Although the absence of communications could be seen 
as a reason in favour of decentralisation, its presence is 
also of great significance in promoting the same. 
Availability of communications facilitate coordination and
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integration.
As can be seen from Map 1, the Sudan like the other 
third world countries has a poor communications network. 
There are few surface roads from Khartoum to the Eastern 
and Western Sudan only. There are no all-weather roads to 
the rest of the country. The only railway line links port 
Sudan to Khartoum, Atbara, Kosti and Nyala in the Northern 
Sudan. The Southern extension was blown up by explosives 
used in the war in 1983.
The river transport to the South was impeded by 
several factors - the swamps of the Sudd region, the 
inadequate number of boats whi ch were too old and slow 
anyway. Plus the war that restarted in 1983. The Jonglei 
canal which was intended to shorten the distance between 
Malakal and Bor by about 400 miles, has also been halted by 
the war.
Flights by Sudan Airways are few and so irregular that 
it has earned the unhappy reputation of "Inshalla Airways" 
(meaning God Willing Airways).
Telecommunication systems like telex, telegrams and 
telephones are restricted in extent and are often out of 
order due to technical faults or deficiencies.
Commenting on the communications system in the Sudan,
Rondinelli wrote:
"Whatever coordination does take place 
between local councils and the province
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Executive Councils depended on sporadic 
and infrequent personnel 
communications•"25
Although this was not really the position all over the 
country, it was certainly the case in many parts.
The Southern Regional Government had for example
planned to build all-weather roads between Kosti and
Malakal; Juba and Wau; Wau and El Nuhud; Wau and Nyala;
Juba and Malakal and Renk; Juba and Kenya via Kapoeta; and
Juba and Uganda via Nimule in the six-year development plan
but the plan has not been successful for lack of funds,
spare parts, oil, skilled personnel and political
instability. Some £s 5,986,252 was budgeted for the
establishment of Regional Airline to act as feeder lines
2 6between the Southern towns especially Wau and Malakal.
Pilots and engineers were trained in the UK but no plane 
was ever purchased allegedly due to obstruction from Sudan 
Airways which sought to retain the monopoly of all flights 
in the Sudan. In actual fact, the South was isolated from 
both the North and the neighbouring countries, Kenya,
Uganda and Zaire.
Acute shortages of fuel supplies and vehicles
compounded these problems. American A.I.D. analysts
observed that the Government in the Southern Region could
"barely conduct its normal business for lack of fuel,
vehicles and power generation. Spare parts too [were]
27virtually non-existent. The effects of fuel shortages 
were far-reaching. For example, the electricity generating 
system in Juba could at times be run only for two to three
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hours a day. In consequence, the Juba water system went 
unfiltered causing unnecessary sickness and deaths. 
Construction of schools, hospitals, offices and other 
centres was often held up because material could not be 
transported. Medical supplies and patients could not be 
moved? tribal disputes could not be settled; road-building 
and bridge maintenance was impossible and naturally the 
life span of the vehicles was shortened.
The decentralisation programmes in Tanzania and Papua 
New Guinea also suffered from problems of communications 
although they strove to overcome them. Tanzania by 1979 
had less than 34,000 kilometres of roads, out of which only 
10% were all-weather roads, but also in a generally bad 
condition of maintenance. The villages were not directly 
connected to paved roads and were isolated much of the 
time. A USAID mission estimated that in Tanzania only a 
small percentage of farm families lived within a day's 
walking distance of an access road. It was therefore 
difficult or impossible to bring government services within 
their reach. ^
Before decentralisation, Papua New Guinea had an 
exceptionally difficult terrain which poses considerable 
difficulties to communications. However, a major road 
network has been developed in the Highlands, but the 
outlying villages remain isolated. Few provinces outside 
the Highlands have road links with each other and all 
provincial capitals are linked to the national capital by 
air and in a few cases by sea. Other parts of the coast
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are too swampy. Apparently, Papua New Guinea had the worst 
problem of communications among the three countries 
mentioned, except that the air and other systems like 
telephones, telegrams, telexes are more efficient and more 
widely available.
III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Finally, we should briefly consider the role of public 
and private economic and social institutions like 
companies, corporations, Boards, cooperative societies and 
voluntary associations for farmers and so forth in a 
decentralised system of government. These institutions are 
useful in the sense that their efforts may complement and 
bolster those of the government, or they may obstruct them. 
Therefore, their role should never be undermined.
Unfortunately, the Sudan has had very few enterprises
or institutions of the type. Rondinelli was right in
saying that:
"With the exception of some heavily 
financed organizations in the Gezira 
scheme, for example, cooperatives in most 
provinces are insufficiently managed, 
usually by non-professional local leaders 
who are frequently replaced at annual 
meetings.
Moreover the agricultural cooperatives in the Sudan 
suffered from chronic shortages of operating capital and 
lacked the mechanisms to make general savings or the
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opportunities to invest any savings made. No assistance
came from the national Ministries to rural cooperation and
extension services.
"Headquarters people rarely get to the 
field [the staff of the Ministry that 
is]. ... Spread so thin that the impact 
at village level is so negligible in 
terms of meaningful support and extension 
services."^q
Cooperatives and public corporations in the South were 
virtually still-born. These included the Regional 
Development Corporation (RDC), Equatoria Trading 
Corporation (ETC), Nile Tourist Corporation and Upper Nile 
Trading Company. All were ever in need of more money from 
the Regional Government.
In the case of Tanzania, Leonard concluded:
"The ability of villagers to participate 
in development planning and management 
was seriously constrained by inadequate 
technical assistance from supporting 
institutions.
Demands placed by decentralisation on the resources of a 
developing country are therefore very great. Not only must 
decentralisation be carefully and perfectly designed in 
terms of structures, powers and finances plus the 
inter-relationships, but an adequate pool of skilled, 
efficient and loyal manpower has to be made available to 
the government.
The government must, as quickly as possible establish 
an adequate network of communications as well as create 
institutions for public and private economic and social 
purposes as discussed in the chapter.
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION
PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DECENTRALISATION
What conclusions can be drawn from the material 
analysed in the previous chapters of this thesis?
This concluding chapter attempts to review the main 
areas of discussion earlier in the thesis, examining the 
objectives and the experiences of decentralised government 
in a comparative context (Part I ) , before evaluating the 
future prospects for decentralisation in the Sudan (Part 
II). Another attempt will then be made to present 
recommendations which would seem appropriate for the 
establishment of a successful system of decentralisation 
in the Sudan in the light of its special circumstances 
(Part III).
I. SUDAN'S EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALISATION IN THE 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
A. The Concept and Objectives of Decentralisation
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Theoretically, decentralisation means delegation or
devolution of authority by a general government to the
lower governments. Therefore, every government is
strictly speaking, decentralised since no government ever
transacts all its business from its headquarters in the
capital - a fact also confirmed by Ronald Wraith's
statements:
"... Public administration in all 
countries ... contains elements of both 
decentralisation and devolution. It is 
not a question of one or the other but 
the balance between them."^
However, those governments usually classified as
decentralised include confederations, federations and
unitary governments with several patterns of decentralised
systems as in Papua New Guinea, Iraq, the Sudan, Tanzania
and Zambia. Even then, there are two patterns of unitary
governments with decentralised systems - the quasi-federal
patterns which include Papua New Guinea, Iraq and the
Sudan and the integrated pattern, which is found in
Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana. The difference between the
two groups is that the former have similar characteristics
to those of federal governments while in the latter the
regional and district administrations form the same
administrative hierarchy? and whereas the former exercised
devolved powers, the latter had deconcentrated powers. A
government exercising devolved powers can be identified
from its autonomous status, budgetary and revenue-raising
capacity, ability to employ staff, presence of
considerable degree of powers and an elected or appointed
decision-making body.
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There are several objectives of decentralisation, 
including the effective provision of services, the 
accommodation or containment of secessionist tendencies, 
the promotion of popular participation and the 
acceleration of general economic development through 
coordinated, efficient and effective planning structures. 
All countries that underwent decentralisation had similar 
objectives except that of containing secessionist 
pressures which are found in Papua New Guinea, Iraq and 
the Sudan. As for the Sudan, the accommodation of 
secessionist pressures and the promotion of popular 
participation in government are of crucial importance. 
Whether these twin objectives have been achieved or not 
will be assessed soon.
B. The History of Decentralisation in Africa
Decentralisation in the Sudan has had a chequered 
history of development as found in other countries of 
Africa. It started as Native Administration or what was 
called indirect rule in Nigeria, Cameroons, Uganda and 
Tanganyika. This is what Alderfer refered to as 
traditional residues comprising Chiefs (or Kings) , village 
headmen and other types of local leaders. Their functions 
were too limited to meet the changing needs of the 
societies. However, the traditional systems were 
gradually replaced by local administrations as from 1930s 
and 1940s. After the influential Colonial Office Despatch
638
2
of 1947, responsible local government councils were
established all over British territories. So every
country inherited local government as a colonial legacy at
independence but the model depended on the ex-colonial
power. Whereas former British territories like the Sudan,
Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika etc. inherited the British model
of local government in the form of elected, multi-purpose
local authorities, - the ex-French colonies like Chad and
Upper Volta had the French model. However, for the Sudan,
the councils had to progress through five stages before
they could become fully responsible as recommended by Dr.
3A.H. Marshall in 1949. Consequently, all councils had 
either appointed or elected Members. Though a little 
more effective than the native administrative system, the 
councils provided limited services too.
Unfortunately, the post-independence period was one 
of reaction and rejection of the colonial legacies. Thus 
the 1960s witnessed the general undermining or even the 
elimination (in some cases) of the colonial heritage.
Local governments disappeared in British West Africa as 
there were no more local governments in any real sense 
with autonomous policy-making powers or control over their 
budgets.
However, amidst all these changes, the Sudan retained 
her elected local government councils established under 
the Local Government Ordinance, 1951, but with Provincial
4
Administrations superimposed over them. Several reasons 
have been give for these drastic changes including:
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(a) The need to eliminate opponents from the political
arena by centralizing powers.
(b) The initial belief that central planning would be 
rational for rapid economic development in the 
presence of widespread poverty.
(c) The hangover of centralisation from the colonial 
period was a significant influence.
However, by the 1970s centralisation was found to be
unsuitable for rapid economic development coupled. It
could neither accommodate or contain desires for 
secessionist pressures nor promote popular participation 
in government. Thus the Sudan had to take a leading role 
in establishing broad regional and local government 
systems to meet these objectives. Hence the establishment 
of the Southern Regional Government in 1972, other 
regional governments in 1980 and the local government 
councils at provincial levels in 1971 and their subsequent 
modification in 1981. Iraq did the same for the Kurds in
5
1974 and Papua New Guinea followed suit in 1976. But the 
systems were defective in several ways as analysed in the 
thesis.
C . The Design of Decentralisation
The design of decentralisation, which includes the 
structural set-up, the organization, the allocation of 
powers and the arrangement of inter-governmental
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relationships are important factors which need to be 
properly worked out if decentralisation is to be 
successful bearing in mind that so far there is no 
generally approved model suitable for any country. Every 
country must therefore design its own system of 
decentralisation to suit its local circumstances. The 
quasi-federal pattern found in Iraq, Papua New Guinea and 
the Sudan are primarily aimed at preserving national unity 
in diversity; whereas the integrated multi-tier system as 
estabished by Tanzania, Zambia, and even the Sudan under 
the People's Local Government Act, 1971, was specifically 
meant to promote popular participation in government.
This pattern followed the French-prefectoral model but 
combined with the element of one-party control similar to 
the communist model. It was originally intended to widen 
the base for the promotion of popular participation as 
stated, but it has been abandoned in both the Sudan and 
Tanzania. Whereas that of the Tanzanian system 
strengthened central government control over local 
councils after abolishing the elected District Councils 
inherited at independence, the one in the Sudan 
"recentralised" all powers decentralised from the central 
government onto the Provincial Commissioner in effect. 
Furthermore, the councils in both Tanzania and Sudan were 
full of ex-officio government offic ers and party 
functionaries with less elected councillors. In the Sudan 
for example a quarter of the seats were reserved for women 
who declined to take them for social reasons. The effect 
was to promote departicipation instead of participation. 
Consequently, both the Sudan and Tanzania reverted to the
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models of elected councils in 1981 and 1982 respectively.^
The form of decentralisation can also be problematic 
if geographically limited to certain parts of the country 
or if not uniformally applied all over the country. For 
example, the Southern Sudan was the only area of 
decentralisation in "a sea of deconcentrated authority" 
before 1980. Even then it remained relatively more 
powerful than the Northern regions until 1983. Up to now 
the Kurdish Region in Iraq exercises decentralised powers 
alone; Papua New Guinea was the only exception which 
applied decentralisation all over the country and under a 
uniform system too. Hence the relative stability in Papua 
New Guinea as compared to the Sudan and Iraq.
Structural problems have not been common with local 
governments. As we have seen they normally arise where 
the units are either too large or too small to be viable. 
The Sudan experienced such problems particularly during 
the period of the People's Province Executive Councils 
(1971-1980). The main problems arose from the sizes of 
the councils and the number of tiers established. In the 
first place the councils were too large to be viable (the 
minimum being about 50,000 square miles). Secondly, there 
were not less than three tiers of local government 
councils: the province, the district, the rural and the 
village levels. While all functions and resources were 
assigned to the Province, the rest had undefined powers, 
they were to exercise powers delegated to them by the 
Province Council which the latter never did. So
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confusions and conflicts of jurisdiction were inevitable.
These problems were, however, likely to be eliminated
I**
following the estabjishment of smaller single-tier Area 
Councils in 1981.7
The Sudanese and Papua New Guinean examples show that 
the scheme of power distribution is similar to that of 
federal systems based on exclusive powers assigned to 
either the superior or inferior governments or to both 
concurrently. Whereas, Papua New Guinea has both 
exclusive and concurrent lists, the Sudan adopted a single 
list with qualifications. In addition to that, the 
distribution of powers between the regional and local 
governments was not well balanced. For example, the 
Southern Region was expressly prohibited from "planning 
for economic and social development" while the People's 
Provinces Executive Councils and Area Councils which were 
more inferior were not. The powers were also defined in 
general terms and were largely imprecise. For example, 
the Southern Region was authorised to mine "without
Q
prejudice to the central government" on the discovery of 
minerals? the region was exempted from the general 
prohibition in carrying foreign trade in case of border 
trade but yet it was required to obtain consent of the 
central government from time to time with regard to 
certain unspecified commodities; it was not certain 
whether the regions could also incorporate and wind up 
companies etc. These over-generalisations inevitably 
resulted in conflicts and contradictions as analysed in 
Chapter 7.
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With regard to the intergovernmental relationship, 
there were those outstanding features between the central 
and regional governments in the Sudan.
A. The dominance of the President of the Republic and of 
the SSU over the regional governments. For example, 
he had the right to appoint and dismiss Governors,
Deputy Governors, Commissioners and Regional
. . 9Ministers.
B. He was to regulate the relationship between the 
Central Government Ministries and the Regional 
Ministries as he saw fit by issuing decrees or 
directives to that effect.
C. He had the power to declare a state of emergency or 
dissolve the Regional Assembly, and thereby the 
Regional Executive without consul ting the Regional 
authorities. He could also protect the interests of 
a region if they petitioned him and he felt like 
doing so. Incidentally, these overriding powers 
enabled the President to dissolve the Regional 
Assembly in the South very frequently.^
Thus the position in Papua New Guinea was comparatively 
better in that provisions for consultation and in 
particular for the establishment of the Premier's Council, 
which assist in the normalisation of the relationship 
between the Central and Provincial governments. In 
Tanzania and Zambia the decentralised governments were, 
however, totally subordinate to the Central Governments.
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D. The Financial Arrangements
Decentralised governments require adequate funds to
manage them and invariably, all decentralised governments
receive grants from the Central government. Whereas some,
as in Tanzania, are entirely dependent on grants, those in
the Sudan and Papua New Guinea have their own sources of
revenue too. They can budget against these sources which
are then supplemented by the grants in aid because the
local taxes or fees are inadequate to meet their demands.
However, the problem that arises from the sharing of
revenues is to adopt an equitable and comprehensive
formula which would balance the needs of the various
systems. No country has been able to do this very
satisfactorily. The Sudan affords one of the worst
examples in this respect due to its deficit grant system.
It ignored important criteria such as derivation, need,
equality and so forth. Deficit financing showed serious
imbalances both vertically and horizontally in the
12distribution of revenue m  the Sudan. Moreover, it did 
not give any incentives for the inferior governments to 
increase their own revenues or make best use of their 
resources in expectation of deficit financing. Instead it 
encourages the lower governments to "bid" for more than 
their needs, thereby inhibiting the proper allocation of 
national revenue. In this way it prevents proper planning 
of services at local level since the available resources 
would not be known or reasonably anticipated until after 
the approval of the budget. Worse still, it encourages
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arbitrary cuts since national resources would not be 
sufficient to meet all deficits.
National revenue allocation in Papua New Guinea was, 
however, much more rational and balanced because there 
were several categories of grants available to the 
inferior governments. These included:-
(a) Conditional grants.
(b) Unconditional grants.
(c) Unconditional shares of special tax revenues.
(d) Unconditional shares of distributable pool derived 
from a combination of central taxes.
(e) Combination of the above forms of transfer.
Whereas conditional grants guaranteed minimum 
standards, unconditional or block grants give greater 
autonomy. Moreover, a provincial government could obtain 
extra funds by submitting a budget to that effect to the 
central government.
Comparatively, the financial position of the 
decentralised governments were weakest in Tanzania and 
little stronger in Zambia because in Tanzania, both the 
Regional and District Development Committees were entirely 
dependent on grants from the Central Government,^  while 
in Zambia the Provincial Governments obtained grants from
the Central government but the Districts had their own
15sources of revenue.
By far the most comprehensive and equitable though
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still problematic formula for distribution of revenue in a 
decentralised system is found in Nigeria adopted in 1981. 
For it was based on several factors including needs - 
equality, derivation, minimum standards, and an elaborate 
system for its administration and adjustment.
E * The Position of Skilled Manpower
The lack of skilled manpower worsened by
inexperienced and inefficient available manpower is
prevalent in all decentralised systems studied. The Sudan
suffers more than most of them due to its weak manpower
17policy and the brain-drain to the Middle East.
F. Political Factors
Although political commitment among national leaders
is crucial for the success of decentralisation, the level
of political support found in both Sudan and Tanzania was
insufficient. Despite efforts made and pressures brought
by Presidents Numeiri and Nyerere to encourage people to
support decentralisation, their undertakings were largely 
18unsuccessful. However, there was absolute support for 
decentralisation in the Southern Sudan reflecting the fact 
that it had all along fought for self-government since 
1955.
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In order to make decentralistion succeed it is
therefore necessary, among other things, to mobilize
political support for decentralisation in all countries
and especially in the Sudan. Attempts were made to
abolish the role of traditional rulers in the Sudan so as
to widen the base for popular participation and promote
political commitment for decentralisation among the masses
but the efforts were unsuccessful. Instead the isolation
of traditional rulers from local government in the Sudan
led to mistrust of the SSU members, improper collection of
taxes and left many tribal disputes unsettled, thereby
increasing insecurity and instability. Though traditional
rulers have been accommodated in Zambia, 'tgeria and
Ghana, much remains to be done in improving their role and
19their relationship with the local government councils.
G. Administrative Support
Central governments in Tanzania and the Sudan did 
little to assist the lower governments in terms of 
administrative support despite the obvious need. In Papua 
New Guinea, however, Provincial Governments were greatly 
assisted by the Central Government in terms of personnel, 
directives, training and so on.
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H. Environmental Factors
Problems of infrastructure are common in all 
developing countries concerned to implement 
decentralisation policies. The Sudan, Tanzania and Papua 
New Guinea are particularly faced with inadequate 
communication networks, given the vastness of the 
territory in the case of the Sudan and Tanzania and, in 
Papua New Guinea, an impenetrable terrain and the 
scattered nature of the islands.
J- Supporting Institutions
Finally, the developing countries also lack private 
and public institutions like companies, cooperative 
societies and other associations to reinforce the economic 
and political structures under decentralised governments. 
These are especially lacking in the Sudan.
II THE PROSPECTS FOR DECENTRALISATION IN THE SUDAN
What is the future for decentralisation in the Sudan?
In attempting to predict the future for 
decentralisation in the Sudan, the views of all the
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political forces at play have to be considered. In May 
1986, the most dominant political parties in the country,
namely the Umma and the National Unionist Party, pledged
.}
to reintroduce the 1968 Republican Constitution which was
on
examined in Chapter 3. Briefly, that constitution 
advocated limited decentralisation of powers to regional 
government within a united Islamic state of the Sudan. 
However, as already discussed, that constitution was 
unacceptable to the Southern Sudanese and the pro-leftist 
parties. Hence its immediate overthrow in May 1969 by the 
army. Such a constitution might pass through parliament 
since the two parties command the majority of the seats 
but opposition to it is likely to grow stronger.
Whether the traditional political parties (the Umma
and the National Unionists) like it or not the pressure
for more decentralisation of government is on the
increase. This is done both politically and by persistent
guerrilla warfare in the South. The Rural Solidarity
Group (RSG), formed in 1985, comprising fifteen political
parties and associations, wrote a general manifesto in
December 1985, as follows:
"The large size of the country and its 
diverse cultures and means of livelihood 
demand that it cannot be ruled in a 
centralised manner. The most appropriate 
system for governing the Sudan should 
clearly define the distribution of powers 
between the Centre and the Regions. In 
this context it is our considered opinion 
that the Sudan be ruled through a federal 
system."2^
The group also advocated the "careful revision of Native 
Administrative System with a view to modernizing it and
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22rendering it more democratic".
In an interview with Colonel John Garang, the
Chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and
Army (SPLM and SPLA), he said:
"Sudan is a vast country ... it needs a 
decentralised form of government ... The 
Sudanese people will agree to what system 
of government or rule that best suits 
them in a broad based gathering, ... It 
is impossible to govern the whole of 
Sudan or even develop the whole of Sudan 
from Khartoum."23
In light of the endemic conflict between the Sudan 
Government and the SPLA, some form of decentralisation of 
government appears unavoidable. Both parties have already 
declared the need for a national constitutional conference,
which will constitute a forum for the discussion of all
political and constitutional issues at stake. Preparations 
for this meeting had already started secretly and, according 
to Sadiq El Mahdi, the Prime Minister, the following six 
points had been discussed and almost resolved:
"First Point: The need to recognise that 
the issue to be settled 
national not regional.
Second: The need to lift the state
of emergency.
Third: The need to repeal the
September 1983 laws 
(Islamic laws) which were 
legislated by Nimeri.
Fourth: The need to set - in the
interim period before the 
new constitution - the old 
constitution of 1956 as 
amended in 1964 to be the 
transitional constitution 
of the country.
Fifth: To abrogate any military
treaties that the Sudan was 
engaged in.
Sixth: The need to declare and
estacjish a ceasefire. "23
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The negotiations had already gone a long way but they were 
called off by the Sudan Government following the shooting of 
a civilian airliner in August 1986 which resulted in the 
death of 60 passengers on board. As more lives continue to 
disappear due to war and hunger in the South, the 
negotiations are likely to be recommenced in the foreseeable 
future.
Meanwhile, following the overthrow of the 'May regime' 
in April 1985, the successive governments have continued to 
maintain the already established administrative set up at 
the regional and local levels.
Decree 14 was promulgated by the Transitional Military 
Council [TMC], purporting to restore the South as a region. 
The relevant text reads:
"2. The Republican Order No. 1 1983
shall be annulled as from when this 
decree is enforced.
3. The provisions of Addis Ababa Accord 
1972 shall be effective as general 
framework for the regional 
government in South Sudan, with 
exception to that which deals with 
administration during the interim 
period.
4. The three Southern Administrative 
Areas shall remain as they are now 
for the interim period under a 
military administration which ... 
shall be established by the Armed 
Forces General Command.
5. A joint High Command for the three 
regions shall be set up under the 
leadership of an Army Officer."
These provisions raise a number of comments. Section 2 of
the Decree purported to repeal Order No. 1 of 1983 which
established three regions in the South. This would have
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meant the abolition of the regions as soon as the Decree 
came into force in April 1985. However, Section 4 of the 
same Decree authorised the continued existence of the 
three regions but as Administrative Areas. The 
differences between the regions and administrative areas 
were minimal. The administrative areas operated under 
Military Governors with the number of the Regional 
Authority members reduced from five to three. They have 
no Regional Assemblies too. There was no difference 
between the powers and functions of the regions and the 
Administrative Areas, however.
U-
Section 5 provided for the establishment of "a joint 
High Command" for the three 'regions' under the leadership 
of any Army officer. This High Command was known as the 
Transitional High Executive Council supposed to be similar 
to the defunct High Executive Council for the Southern 
Region (for details see Chapter 6 ) . ^  It was under the 
leadership of Major General James Loro as President of the 
council. However, the council had no defined functions. 
Presumably, it was intended to assume the functions of the 
former High Executive Council. Unfortunately, the Council 
was unable to move to Juba, the capital of the former 
Southern Region, due to opposition from Equatorians, the 
inhabitants of Juba. So the council remained confined to 
four rooms of the Central Post Office in Khartoum for the 
whole transitional period with no functions to perform.
Had it moved to Juba, conflicts over powers and functions 
with the Administrative Areas in the South would have been 
inevitable - since it had no separate functions as stated
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earlier. Consequently, the council was liquidated by the 
elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq El Mahdi in May 
1986. There are talks of reviving the Council but much 
uncertainty surrounds its future.
Section 3 of the Decree reinstated the provisions of 
the Addis Ababa Accord 1972, (that is the Southern 
Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972), but after the 
transitional period. Although the transitional period has 
expired long since, the three regions still continue to 
exist as administrative areas. Thus Decree 14 was 
unsuccessful in reinstating the Southern Region 
practically.
Ill RECOMMENDATIONS
Is it possible to introduce an improved model of 
decentralisation which might be more successful?
An improved model of decentralisation would require a 
careful design in terms of the distribution of powers, the 
balance of inter-governmental relationships, the 
organization of the central government, the number and 
types of institutions to be established, compromises over 
the recognition of state religion, the official language 
and sources of legislation, including built-in mechanisms 
and established procedures for inter-governmental
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cooperation and dispute settlement. We shall proceed to 
examine in detail what the above suggestions would entail.
A. The Scheme of Power Distribution
To work out an appropriate and acceptable scheme of
power distribution between the central and regional
governments in the Sudan is likely to pose much
difficulty, due to the uneasy relationship of co-existence
between the South and the North. For instance, the
suggested amendments to the Addis Ababa Agreement shows
that the South would as far as possible prefer to reduce
the list of national matters to four only, which are:
National Defence, External Affairs, Currency and Coinage,
25and Nationality and Immigration. However, due to the 
greater bargaining strength of the North, the South failed 
to achieve those aims. Nevertheless it indicates the 
presence of enormous problems to be resolved in working 
out a suitable power sharing scheme between the two parts. 
This time the main problems are likely to arise between 
the Sudan Government and the SPLM over the following 
matters:
1. The control of socio-economic planning and 
development.
2. Educational planning.
3. The control of natural resources.
4. Border trade.
5. Internal security including Regional Armed Forces.
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1. The Control of Socio-Economic Planning and Development
As shown in Chapter 7, the Self-Government Act had
expressly denied the Southern Region to participate in the
formulation and control of social and economic development
plans, although this was never strictly adhered to in 
2 6
practice. This time the regions would seek to omit any 
clause that would prohibit them from the effective control 
of socio-economic planning and development. However, all 
their plans must fall within the national framework of 
general plans and targets.
2. Educational Planning
Authority for educational planning was also expressly
27denied to all the regions. It was a crucial factor which 
led to the great disappointment of Southerners when the 
majority of their children had to discontinue with 
education at early stages due to irrelevant and out-of-date 
curriculum, syllabuses, examinations and standards, which 
were all designed by the central government. The regions 
should therefore be encouraged to undertake an effective 
participation in the educational system and policymaking. 
Although the central government should bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the general standards of education in 
the country, the regions must at least be enabled to design 
the curriculum, syllabuses for Primary and Secondary
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schools. The establishment of inter-governmental 
educational boards for the coordination of the plans and 
supervision of their implementation under the general 
auspices of the central government would be necessary. The 
responsibility for educational administration of 
institutions below universities and higher institutes of 
education should continue to be vested in the regions. 
Furthermore to promote educational decentralisation, the 
various regions should be empowered constitutionally to 
establish separate universities and consider admissions to 
high institutions, not only on basis of merit but also on 
some carefully worked out regional quota system. Thus, the 
wide educational disparities among regions would be reduced 
if not eliminated.
3. Control of Natural Resources
It goes without saying that the radical title to land
and the natural resources should vest in the Sudan
Government. However, it should be made possible for the
regions to have control over certain resources. In this
regard the exploitation of the most valuable resources such
as oil, gold and chromite are likely to cause friction
between the central government and the regions, especially
the Southern Region. However, there is evidence to show
that most Southern leaders, including those in the
SPLM/SPLA, accept oil as a national rather than a regional 
2 8resource. This idea could be extended to include any 
mineral considered as most valuable. By way of
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compensation, however, the regions should be entitled to 
share royalties on the minerals. For example, the region 
of production could get slightly more than the other 
regions. Furthermore, the processing of the crude material 
could be first undertaken in the region providing the 
source.
The control and exploitation of land, forests and 
water should be entirely vested in the regions except if 
needed by the central government for national purposes.
4. Border Trade
Although foreign trade is normally a central 
government matter, border trade in the special 
circumstances of the Sudan should be totally regional 
because of the vast size of the country and the distance 
between Port Sudan and the far regions in the South and 
West.
The regions should also have as many powers as 
possible for the establishment of industries especially 
light industries, promotion of trade, incorporation and 
liquidation of companies.
5. Internal Security Including Regional Armed Forces
The maintenance of peace and internal security is one
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of the most essential responsibilities for regional
29governments. As shown m  Chapter 7, the Police and 
Prison Forces were only regional in the South. The other 
regions depended on the Police and Prison Forces of the 
central government. For the purposes of uniformity and 
greater decentralisation, the recruitment, promotions, 
discipline and dismissal of the Police and Prison Forces 
should be regional in the whole country. The present 
decentralisation of the Fire Brigade Forces discussed in 
Chapter 7 is considered adequate.
It would, however, appear that the establishment of 
Regional Armed Forces in the case of the Sudan is necessary 
since constitutional provisions for the protection of 
regional autonomy have proved to be inadequate.
Southerners strongly believe that President Numeiri was 
able to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement because the 
absorbed Anyanya Forces were integrated into the Sudanese 
Army and distributed all over the country, contrary to the 
original intention of maintaining an equal number of 12,000 
men from the Anyanya and the central government forces in 
the South to guarantee the safety of the autonomy for the 
South. As long as mistrust continues to prevail in the 
relationship between the North and the South, a similar 
provision to that of 1972 or even a more powerful one will 
be required.
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B. Distribution of Financial Powers
The federal principle of revenue-sharing should be
upheld but considerably modified based on the
recommendations of a committee of experts, debated and
passed by the Assembly. In particular, sources of revenue
for the regional and local governments should be updated.
The irrational deficit grant system should be replaced by a
more comprehensive and equitable formula for sharing
national allocations based on factors like need, equality
and derivation. The Nigerian example, devised in 1981 (see
Chapter 9 for details), could be followed. Appropriate
committees should be established to administer the prompt
transfer of the funds and recommend necessary changes from
time to time. The Nigerian system of establishing
machineries to implement the financial provisions mentioned
30in Chapter 9 is also advocated.
C . The Organization of the Central Government
The Central Government should be more representative 
of the whole Sudan than it was in the past. Seats in the 
National Assembly and the Central Executive should be 
allocated proportionately to the regions in the country. 
In other words, the regions should have proportional 
representation in the National Assembly, the Cabinet and 
the Civil Service.
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D. Duality of Institutions
In spite of the acute shortage of skilled manpower, 
which favours the sharing of certain institutions such as 
courts, election commissions and the public service, it is 
recommended that every government (Central or Regional) 
should have its own legislature, executive, judiciary and 
public service. In other words the judiciary should no 
longer remain a central government monopoly. The idea of 
having an integrated public service should be abandoned. 
Furthermore, the regions should have proportional 
representation in the National Assembly, the Cabinet and 
the Civil Service.
E. The Question of State Religion
Since the Northern population of Sudan is persistent 
towards Islamising the constitution and because the 
population is largely divided into two major communities, 
60% Muslims living in the North and a substantial 40% 
non-Muslims largely concentrated in the South, to impose a 
national religion is likely to exacerbate conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. However, a totally secular 
constitutional structure would not meet the aspirations of 
the majority community to live under an Islamic 
dispensation. An acceptable compromise would involve the
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regions being empowered to opt to designate a religion as 
the official faith of that region.
F. Duality of Language
It is appropriate for the Sudan to use two official 
languages, English and Arabic because the North is 
predominantly Arab speaking while the South has a 
considerable and influential English speaking elite.
G . The Machinery for Inter-governmental Cooperation
Machinery for inter-governmental cooperation and 
coordination should be introduced. This should include 
such bodies as:
(a) a National Planning Commission;
(b) a National Development Council?
(c) an Inter-State Council (or Councils).
The Planning Commission should be charged with the 
collection of plans of various states, the drafting of 
national plans and advising on the implementation of the 
plan.
The National Development Council, on the other hand, 
should lay down the outline of the economic planning and
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supervise the Planning Commission. It should be composed 
of the Central Cabinet, Members of the Planning Commission 
and the Executive Heads of the States.
The inter-State Council is to facilitate consultation 
and coordination among State governments. The States 
could also be grouped into zones for that matter.
In addition, a special constitutional court should be 
established to adjudicate on inter-governmental conflicts 
in the country.
H. Method of Election to the Central Assembly
Elections to the Assemblies should be wholly based on 
direct secret ballot from single member constituencies.
The duality rule should continue to apply - that is no 
member should hold seats in the regional and the national 
assemblies simultaneously.
I . Unicameral or Bicameral Legislature
A unicameral legislature is often preferred for being 
less costly and much faster in legislating. But bicameral 
legislatures contain experienced legislators in the Senate 
and enables different principles of elections so as to
663
achieve more representative legislatures. Usually the 
central legislature represents both the unity and regional 
diversity of the country but seats in the second chamber 
are distributed in such a way as to represent the equality 
of the decentralised states. A bicameral legislature is 
therefore recommended for the Sudan, in the light of these 
advantages.
J . Locality Rule
It is recommended that seats should be restricted to 
the residents of the constituency or region they 
represent, to guarantee appropriate representation. 
Sudanese voting from abroad should cast their votes in the 
constituencies where they lived six months before leaving 
the country. This will curb the malpractice of all 
Sudanese resident in Saudi Arabia or any other country 
registering to vote in the Southern constituencies which 
they have never seen or lived in.
K . Control of Franchise and Electoral Laws
Electoral laws should remain uniform throughout the 
whole country. However, a permanent National Electoral 
Commission and a Regional Electoral Commission also on a 
permanent basis for every region should be established to
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conduct elections, recommend the revision of electoral 
laws and changes in the boundaries of the constituencies. 
The practice of appointing ad hoc electoral commissions 
should be discarded because they lack continuing 
commitment to their tasks.
L. The Number of Regions
The question of how many regions should exist in the 
Sudan is likely to cause great difficulties. Sudanese are 
generally divided over this issue. Whereas some regions 
like Equatoria and Upper Nile prefer regions as in 1983, 
others want the Sudan to go back to five regions as in 
1980. Yet some would prefer four regions, South, North, 
East and West, or even two, South and North. There are 
four reasons for the existence of the present 9 regions:-
(1) For the protection of regional minorities,
especially the minorities in Equatoria.
(2) The East objected to unity with the North since 
1980.
(3) Darfur strongly urged that it be recognized as a
region separate from Kordofan also in 1980.
The three reasons above are more associated with regional 
hostilities amongst the communities.
(4) Above all, the States should be of reasonably
uniform sizes, in order to promote healthy 
competition and rival efficiency.
However, this division ignores crucial factors like
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the scarcity of financial resources and skilled manpower, 
prerequisites for the success of decentralisation.
To establish two regions of the South and the North 
only would be "to pitch them against each other in a 
continual battle of ascendancy" as Professor Nwabueze 
pointed out. Three regions would be a similar case.
Therefore, the other viable alternative left is to 
dismantle the 9 regions and replace them with the 
following four:-
(i) The North
(ii) The East
(iii) The West
(iv) The South
(v) Plus the National Capital.
Such an arrangement would more or less conform with the 
recommendations of the Technical Committee on 
Decentraliasation 1980. However, some specific provisions 
would have to be inserted into the constitution to 
guarantee the protection of regional minorities.
Below are the recommended methods for the protection 
of regional minorities
(a) Inclusion of non-justiciable directive principles of 
state policy. These are general libertarian 
principles which serve as aid to interpretation. It 
is hoped that these changes will bring more judicial 
input in the Sudanese constitutional law cases.
Provisions for special seats in the regional 
legislatures for the representation of minorities; 
and the appointment of the members of the regional 
executive on the basis of agreed quota to ensure 
minority presence and prevent majority domination.
Provision for the establishment of special 
institutional arrangements such as the Ombudsman, 
the Public Service Commission, and so forth. In 
this connection, the provision for the appointment 
of Regional Ombudsman should be retained but the 
Regional Ministry of Public Service should be 
replaced by an autonomous Public Service Commission.
Provision for judicial action to enforce machinery 
of litigation, prosecution and constitutional review 
of judicial action. In particular, the Special 
Constitutional Court should have original 
jurisdiction in any dispute between the central and 
the regional or between regions. It should also 
have appellate jurisdiction from appeals arising 
from courts of appeal. Its decisions should be 
f inal.
Provisions designed to secure equality and fairness 
under the law. For example, well-trained and 
disciplined police forces; independent criminal 
prosecution departments; safeguards for the accused; 
plus executive action to ensure fair decision-making
667
such as a high standard of training for 
administrators, provision for appeal procedures in 
administration departmentally, by independent 
tribunal and an internal system of administration of 
courts.
(f) Parliamentary control and personal law protection
provisions such as application of family law, laws 
of succession and land law.
M. Provision for participation of regions in certain 
matters of foreign affairs such as international loans, 
border trade and consent to treaties with repercussions on 
the region.
(1) Regions should be empowered to raise loans from 
international sources with the approval of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bank of the 
Sudan.
(2) If a treaty is likely to affect the interests of a 
region, then it has to be endorsed by that region if 
the treaty is to be binding on it.
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N. Creation of New Regions
Unfortunately, such a provision has never been thought 
of in the Sudan. It is therefore appropriate to state that 
a request for a new region has to be supported by two-thirds 
majority vote of the members representing the area and a 
simple majority of the National Assembly. Such a provision 
would enable the creation of new regions without necessarily 
causing the amendment of the law as provided by the 
Self-Government Act, 1972.
0. Political Parties
1. Although in practice the nature of Sudanese society
makes it impossible to envisage a political party commanding
widespread support in both the Muslim North and the
Non-Muslim South, nevertheless there must be positive
encouragement in the constitution for the growth of
political parties based on national representation. A
precedent is established by the Nigerian 1979 
31Constitution
This suggests that no association shall function as a 
political party unless:-
(i) the names and addresses of its officers are registered 
with the National Electoral Commission?
(ii) the membership of the association is open to every
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citizen of the Sudan irrespective of his place of 
origin;
(iii) a copy of its constitution is registered in the 
principal office of the Commission in such form as may 
be prescribed by the Commission;
(iv) any alteration in its registered constitution is also 
registered in the principal office of the Commission 
within, say, 30 days of making such alteration;
(v) the name of the association, its emblem or motto does
not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or
give the appearance that the activities of the 
association are confined to a part only of the 
geographical area of the Sudan; and
(vi) the Headquarters of the association is situated in the 
National Capital.
2. Furthermore, the rules of the political party should 
provide:-
(i) for the periodic election on a democratic basis of the 
principal officers and members of the executive 
committee or other governing body of the political 
party; and
(ii) ensure that the members of the executive committee or
other governing body of the political party reflect
the national character of the Sudan;
(iii) this might mean that:-
(a) the election of the officers and the members of 
the executive committee of a political party 
shall be deemed to be periodical only if made at
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regular intervals not exceeding, say, four 
years; and
(b) the members of the executive committee or bther 
governing body of the political party shall be 
deemed to reflect the national character of the 
Sudan only if the members thereof belong to 
different regions not being less in number than 
say two-thirds of the regions comprising the 
nation.
3. The aims and objectives of the political party should 
conform with the fundamental objectives and the directive 
principles of state policy. These would include the 
political, economic and social objectives of the Sudan as 
well as foreign policy objectives and the national ethic.
4. Control of the political parties is also necessary, so 
finances of the political parties should be subject to 
scrutiny by the National Electoral Commission which should 
also be entitled to detailed annual statements and analysis 
of the sources of funds and other assets of the parties 
together with a similar statement of their expenditure in 
such form as the Commission might require. No political 
party should hold or possess any funds or other assets 
outside the Sudan, nor should it be entitled to retain any 
funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside the 
Sudan, and any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a 
party should be paid over or transfered to the Commission
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within, say, 30 days of its receipt with such information 
as the Commission might require.
A further measure to reduce profileration of parties
would be the prescription of a minimum of the national
percentage of the voters before a party could get a seat in
32any assembly, say, at least 5%.
P. The Reform of Local Government Law
On the whole, the People's Local Government Act, 1981 
is appropriate law and should be retained together with the 
provision incorporating it into the constitution also as to 
accord it constitutional significance. The Councils should 
also retain their corporate status, exercising devolved 
powers. They should remain single-tier authorities based 
on the present boundaries of Area Councils. However, the 
following modifications are suggested:-
1. There should be no provision for the representation
of the alliance of working forces and women. There
is no harm in leaving the total sizes of the councils 
as at present.
2. Councillors should continue to be elected by direct
secret ballot from single ward constituencies, but
their standard of literacy should be specified. To 
guarantee effective participation, the successful
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completion of junior secondary school (post-primary 
school) is deemed necessary.
3. Traditional rulers should participate but their role 
should be limited to the collection of taxes, the 
adjudication of customary cases and the settlement of 
inter-tribal disputes.
4. Council chairmen should continue to be elected but 
their responsibilities should be precisely defined.
5. The Chief Executive should continue to be the senior 
administrator in the Area and he should remain 
responsible for administration and the supervision of 
staff, as well as acting as Secretary.
6. Every Council should have its Treasurer, separate 
from the Chief Executive.
7. There should be express requirements for the 
Departmental Heads to possess and exhibit good 
qualities of leadership.
8. Functions of the local councils should remain as 
under the People's Local Government Act, 1981 - that 
is to say, to provide internal security, primary and 
junior secondary school education, health facilities, 
the construction of minor roads, the dissemination of 
information; housing, agriculture, veternary services 
and to undertake minor development projects and
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councils should be required to play a more 
significant role in development planning and should 
establish relevant machineries for planning, 
coordination and monitoring of plans.
9. The financial arrangements should follow those of 
Nigeria which have already been recommended in the 
Constitutional Provisions (see B above). However, 
provision should also be made for establishing Loans 
Boards from which the Councils can borrow. Local 
Councils should continue to be free to spend but the 
keeping of up-to-date books of accounts and auditing 
must be strictly enforced.
10. To promote loyalty and efficiency in local government 
services, every State should establish a Local 
Government Board. More Institutes for Public 
Administration and Management should be established. 
In particular, that for the South should be seriously 
reconsidered.
11. Local governments must remain under the
responsibility of State Governments who should also
maintain the necessary controls over them.
12. The post of the Provincial Commissioner would no
longer be necessary because there would be an elected
chairman for every Area Council. Moreover, the SSU 
has been abolished and replaced by multiparties. The 
Chief Executive would be a better treasurer, since he
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would be a professional administrator who was a 
political appointee. Supervision of security and 
review of council work could be more efficiently 
performed by the staff of the Regional Ministry of 
Regional Administration. Hence the post of the 
Provincial Commissioner should be abolished. This 
would also remove his coercive political influence 
over the councils and save on the costs of 
administration.
Q. Finally, in the circumstances of the Sudan, where the 
cooperation of the central government would be 
difficult to obtain, it is recommended that the 
single list option setting out powers of the central 
government is used, and the residual powers are 
vested in the regions. This would help to reduce 
conflicts and confusion. However, a provision should 
be added enabling either government to delegate its 
powers to be exercised by the other if that 
government consents. Such an arrangement would 
afford some room for cooperation.
However, if all these modifications were achieved, the 
Sudan would have moved towards a federal structure. This 
does not by all means suggest that effective 
decentralisation inevitably leads to federalism. Such a
675
conclusion is only possible in the special circumstances of 
the Sudan; otherwise decentralised governments including 
successful ones as in Papua New Guinea, do not always end 
up in federal governments.
The next problem is how effective decentralisation 
could be prevented from evolving into a federal structure. 
The main distinction between federations and decentralised 
unitary governments lies, of course, in the amendment 
process of their laws. In federations the coordinate 
relationship between the federal and state governments is 
entrenched in the single constitutional document which 
defines the powers and functions of both federal and state 
governments. The amendment of a federal constitution is 
usually difficult in that the process has to be undertaken 
by a Constituent Assembly, often requiring some special 
majority of say two-thirds or three-quarters of the 
Assembly to pass the amendment. On the other hand, the 
amendment of an organic law which usually prescribes the 
powers of the regional governments in a decentralised 
unitary system would appear easier because organic laws are 
invariably amended by the national legislature. However, 
the amendment of an organic law may become as difficult as 
that of a constitution if a rigid amendment clause is 
inserted into the organic laws which may also be entrenched 
into the constitution itself. In such a case the 
prevention of a successful decentralised government from 
becoming a federal government is possible. Unfortunately, 
this was the experiment unsuccessfully tried in the Sudan 
through the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972.
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The amendment provision of the Act as discussed in Chapter 
5 had required a special majority vote of 75% of the 
members of the National Assembly supported by two-thirds 
majority vote of the Southern masses in a referendum held 
in that region. Owing to the rigidity of the provision, 
the President felt obliged to abrogate the Act each time he 
wanted to introduce changes in the South, (the dissolutions 
of the Southern Regional Assembly discussed in Chapter 8 
confirm this point).
Thus, the safeguarding of an effective decentralised 
system from becoming a federal government is impossible in 
the special circumstances of the Sudan because of the 
flagrant violations of law by the national leaders.
In conclusion, it would seem that the Sudan is so vast
and diverse in terms of its ethnic, cultural, linguistic,
religious and geographical.composition that it provides
formidable problems for the constitutional draftsman. In
order to provide a suitable framework for the necessary
nation-building process on the basis of true national
unity, a fully-fledged federal constitution is seen as
appropriate. It must be admitted, however, that federal
systems are notoriously difficult to operate because they
depend upon the consensus of the federated community. As
W.S. Livingstone put it:
"The essential nature of federalism is to 
be sought for, not in the shadings of 
legal and constitutional terminology but 
in forces - economic, social, political 
and cultural - that have made the outward 
forms of federalism necessary ... the 
essence of federalism lies not in the 
constitutional or institutional structure
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but in the society itself.
As this thesis has shown, political commitment to 
decentralisation in the Sudan was sadly lacking at the 
centre. It therefore follows that the prospects for the 
immediate success of federalism is bleak. Further conflicts 
and political turmoil appear inevitable before political 
leaders are driven to the compromise which is necessary to 
avoid fragmentation.
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